Nomadic Passions: Encounters with Difference and Troubling Affect in the Novels of Jean Rhys by O'Shea, Johanna
O’Shea, Johanna. 2018. Nomadic Passions: Encounters with Difference and Troubling Affect in
the Novels of Jean Rhys. Doctoral thesis, Goldsmiths, University of London [Thesis]
https://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/24057/
The version presented here may differ from the published, performed or presented work. Please
go to the persistent GRO record above for more information.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact
the Repository Team at Goldsmiths, University of London via the following email address:
gro@gold.ac.uk.
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. For










Nomadic Passions: Encounters with Difference 




















Department of English and Comparative Literature 







Declaration of Authorship 
 
I Johanna O’Shea hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely 
my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.  
 
 
































I am extremely grateful to my supervisor, Carole Sweeney, for providing guidance, 
support, the room that enabled perseverance, and a brilliant model of feminist 
scholarship. My gratitude also to Chris Baldick, for his generosity and expertise at a 
late stage in this research project. My thanks to the scholars at the Jean Rhys 
symposium at Goldsmiths in March 2016, and particularly to Helen Carr, Denise 
deCaires Narain, Elaine Savory and Joan Anim-Addo, for their encouragement and 
insight and for all the critical work that helped me to complete this thesis. I am thankful 
to the staff in the English and Comparative Literature Department at Goldsmiths, and 
in particular to Michael Simpson for the enjoyable editorship opportunity he provided 
and his generous support. My appreciation to those with whom I worked on GLITS, 
especially Jacqueline Rattray and Alice Condé. I am grateful in particular to Richard 
Bolley for his invaluable help and conversation. Beyond my Goldsmiths life, my thanks 
to Daniel Kane for his support, and the brilliance of his seminars. I will always be 
thankful to Martin Warner for enabling this path, for the inspiring start to university 
life he created and for sparking my love of Jean Rhys. 
Thanks to all the friends who have helped along the way. In particular my 
gratitude to Tanguy for our enjoyable and necessary discussions which have made all 
the difference. I am deeply grateful to Lindsay, for her generosity and understanding. I 
want to thank my wonderful mother for making this PhD possible, and her parents for 
















This thesis addresses the largely unchallenged assumption that the passivity of Jean 
Rhys’s protagonists is a dysfunctional limitation of agency. It proposes that Rhys’s 
critique of oppressive forms of power is at the heart of a passivity which is in opposition 
to dominant ways of being and thinking. It is argued that in Rhys’s four later novels 
there is a textual insistence on both the positive value of difference and the potentiality 
of difficult feeling. The study rethinks the value of Rhysian negativity using the 
philosophy of Gilles Deleuze as a presiding framework along with contemporary 
feminist theory, especially the work of Sianne Ngai and Sara Ahmed. Deleuze’s 
celebration of difference and his theorisations with Félix Guattari of minor literature 
and affect are used to interrogate the complexities of Rhys’s style and narrative 
strategies, and to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of her use of passivity as 
subversion and her exploration of becoming in the modern world.  
The thesis analyses how Rhys’s navigation of passionate dissent and morbid 
affects challenges the values attached to the less powerful and posits an alternative to 
the conventional quest for happiness. Focusing on failure, a textual death drive and the 
problem of female transmission, the study identifies in Rhys’s later four novels a 
preoccupation with the limitations of the literary text, and contends that her work 
conducts a ‘libidinal mapping’ which addresses the problem of complicity. It is argued 
that a search for the conditions of communality spans these novels. Deleuze’s intensive 
reading method is used to think through what emerges in Rhys’s inscription of difficult 
connection in numerous fraught scenes, and the thesis questions whether, ultimately, 
danger and negative affect attend or in fact permit the possibility of self-making for the 
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Introduction: Reading Rhys with Deleuze   
 
In 1972, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari published Anti-Oedipus, the first volume of 
their revolutionary philosophical project, Capitalism and Schizophrenia.1 In it they 
pose the question: given that most people suffer because of inequality, why do we 
tolerate things as they are? They conclude that if we do not act against this situation, it 
is because we desire it: ‘it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be 
accounted for’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 31). To this end, which they describe as 
the task of schizoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari develop many nuanced arguments 
concerning the productive functions of desire that is always social and ‘has little to do 
with fantasy and dream’ (416). Importantly, they celebrate literature as an art form that 
is exceptionally good at making desire visible. 
This thesis is an attempt to account for the passivity of Jean Rhys’s protagonists 
– women who, like Herman Melville’s eponymous scrivener, Bartleby (1853), do 
nothing to improve their situation. Many critics have considered the problems of desire 
in Rhys’s fiction. I address these problems in the light of my belief in the strong 
political force of her writing. Deleuze and Guattari argue that schizoanalytic literary 
criticism should attend to the text’s gravitational pull to both an oppressive 
(reactionary, paranoiac or fascizing) pole and a revolutionary or ‘schizoid’ one, and 
this study heeds this advice, focusing on textual strategies of resistance but also on the 
protagonists’ complicity in suffering – both their own and the suffering of others. 
Rhys’s novels expose the violent operations of ‘organised society’ and its ‘code’, and 
the passivity of her protagonists is undoubtedly partially an effect of this violence, as 
Julia and her ex-lover make clear in the opening pages of Rhys’s 1930 novel After 
Leaving Mr Mackenzie (17, 18).2 Julia’s unusual attitude to the fact that she ‘doesn’t 
have a dog’s chance’ to succeed socially had, for some time in the past, attracted the 
privileged Mr Mackenzie, and his cruel rejection of her has compounded her difficulty 
to the extent that it somehow breaks her back, leading, as the words suggest, to a 
compounded passivity (ALMM, 17, 78). However, passivity does not just expose social 
inequality in Rhys’s fiction. Her narratives are troublingly devoid of ‘good’ activity; 
 
1 This was first published in Paris in 1972 as L’Anti- Œdipe: Capitalisme et schizophrénie.  
2 Hereafter, where needed, page references to After Leaving Mr Mackenzie are given with the 
abbreviation ALMM. Throughout the thesis, when there is sustained quotation from a text which has 
been referenced using an abbreviation, the abbreviation is given for the first instance in each paragraph 




there is negligible disinterested kindness, there are numerous cruel acts, and the people 
encountered by the protagonists mostly act in ways which support the oppressive order 
of things. The conditions for effective communality in the present are absent. There is 
also an insistence in these texts – sometimes voiced by the protagonists, but also a 
principle built into the narratives – on the value of nonconformity, on affirming 
difference and on thinking for oneself, beyond the parameters of received notions of 
rationality, morality, and success.  
These conditions ‘enliven’ the passivity of Rhys’s protagonists. In the first 
novel, Quartet (1928), Marya’s passivity works as a mildly subversive rejection of a 
gendered moral code as well as a visible effect of oppressive political realities, but with 
the following four major works this embodied situation becomes the vehicle for Rhys’s 
critique of common sense, a quietly admonishing riposte to the ideological values we 
deploy in reading and desiring conventional narratives and characterisation and, I 
contend, the central term in Rhys’s ethical engagement with vulnerability.3 In this light, 
passivity appears as the author’s desire for change. For over a century feminists have 
been concerned with opposing and dismantling Sigmund Freud’s claim, first articulated 
in his ‘Three Essays on Sexuality’ in 1905, that woman is innately passive (Freud 
2001a: 123-243), and for far longer women have insisted on their active involvement 
in political, social and cultural life.4 Feminists have demonstrated that women are every 
bit as active and creative as men. This thesis explores the potentiality of Rhysian 
passivity but is entirely opposed to an essentialist notion of female passivity. It 
proposes, rather, that now women have to a certain degree cast off patriarchal 
essentialism with its restrictive ideas of femininity and a universal, unknowable 
femaleness, looking to the variety of discursive female responses to oppression may 
help us to map out possibilities for resistance in the future. Rhys’s critical, creative and 
idiosyncratic responses to the oppression of marginalised women present a textual 
politics which differs greatly from the traditional notion of political engagement, but 
which resonates – strikingly, to my mind – with certain aspects of the textured field of 
contemporary feminist theory.  
These conditions and responses are the ‘passions’ investigated in this thesis. 
They play out in Rhys’s novels in ways which correspond to key concepts and theories 
 
3 Page references to Quartet are given using the abbreviation Q. 




in Deleuze’s individual and co-authored philosophical work. I use the term ‘nomadic’ 
as shorthand for this correspondence and also to indicate my reading of subjectivity in 
this fiction as unbound, nonunitary and close to Deleuze’s concept of becoming. Rhys’s 
protagonists are not female flâneurs but, as Wally Look Lai describes, ‘nomadic 
creatures inhabiting [...] a transient world’ in which they are ‘lonely, dispossessed, 
rejected’ (1968: 38). That world and the bodies in it affect them, and Rhys’s novels 
chart the results of these encounters, ‘feeling [the protagonist’s] pulse, as it were, all 
the time’, to borrow Sasha’s description of her self-awareness in the 1939 novel Good 
Morning, Midnight (128).5 These stories reveal the world’s tendency to be violent. It 
is, after all, not just humans who are violent in her writing – the wolves hunt, and the 
lice and ants swarm and devour. The impression made on Rhys by the violent natural 
history of her birthplace, its volcanic terrain and dramatic tropical climate is evident 
from her notebooks and interviews as well as her depiction of a beautiful, terrifying 
and tremendously powerful natural environment ‘as indifferent’ as a cruel ‘God’ in the 
1966 masterpiece Wide Sargasso Sea (107).6 Her social vision can, then, be understood 
as a world view in the sense of an understanding of the processes and tendencies of 
life, and it is comparable to that which we find in the philosophy of Deleuze, who 
comments casually in his 1981 book Spinoza: Practical Philosophy that ‘our place in 
Nature seems to condemn us to bad encounters and sadnesses’ (1988: 28).7  
I am not, however, suggesting that we should decentre the human in this 
consideration of a comparable sensitivity to violence. Both Rhys and Deleuze are 
predominantly focused on violent structures of thought, on human forms of violence 
which are historical and on those which are ongoing and embedded in experience. This 
last concern, in particular, in Rhys’s earlier work speaks of her ability to foresee what 
would become the subject of major political inquiry from the 1960s onwards; and the 
fact that Wide Sargasso Sea appeared only two years before Deleuze’s 1968 work 
Difference and Repetition (Différence et répétition) and only six before Anti-Oedipus 
should not be overlooked. While Anti-Oedipus develops Deleuze’s project of 
 
5 Hereafter, where necessary, page references to Good Morning, Midnight are given with the 
abbreviation GMM.  
6 Hereafter, where needed, page references to Wide Sargasso Sea are given with the abbreviation WSS. 
7 This text on Spinoza has a complicated history. In 1970 Deleuze published an anthology volume called 
Spinoza: Textes choisis; and in 1978 his essay ‘Spinoza et nous’ was published in Revue de synthèse, 
89/91. These two works were, respectively, updated as and incorporated into the volume first published 
in 1981 as Spinoza: Philosophie pratique. I am quoting from Robert Hurley’s 1988 translation of this 





introducing difference into thought, and demands that we counter our tendency to 
permit the incremental growth of fascistic forms of social, political, economic and 
psychological control, Rhys’s Caribbean tragedy presents a searing indictment of the 
systems, practices and institutions that encourage us to subjugate and exercise violence 
against those unlike ourselves. Rhys’s dramatisation of the ways in which patriarchy, 
imperialism, capitalism and Western cultural practices operate together to perpetuate a 
logic of dominance that invades all areas of life constitutes a development of the anti-
fascist position that she had taken in Good Morning, Midnight. The result is a set of 
ideas about desire, the individual, ingrained structures of thought, history and the 
workings of power that have a certain complex similarity to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
critique of the ways in which the systems of modern capitalism co-opt desire in order 
to enact a ‘manic attack by the body politic against itself, in the interests of its own 
salvation [...] an attack by the “whole” of society [...] against its “parts”’ (Massumi 
1992: 116). At the same time, while her novel gives us a sense of such an attack by the 
‘whole’, and while it is set in the mid-nineteenth century, it is also located within 
women’s struggles of the 1960s. Rhys’s staunch denunciation of patriarchy in her final 
novel is, for this reader, comparable to and – in terms of raising political consciousness 
– as effective as Deleuze and Guattari’s invective against capitalism. Like the latter, 
Rhys offers no easy means of overcoming the problems of violence that she traces. Her 
manner of reaching back over a century compels us to think about how these problems 
exist today, slightly differently, of course, but no less urgently requiring meaningful 
resistance and the social struggle for positive change.  
Describing Deleuze’s vision of nature as an order which is ‘full of cruelty and 
lack of sympathy for our peculiar being’, Keith Ansell-Pearson notes that the 
consequent ‘task’ for the philosopher is ‘to comprehend’ this situation and to ‘bestow 
upon’ the violence of nature – its deaths and losses – a ‘new meaning, which is the 
“meaning” of a new praxis that can only arise out of creating, and experimenting with 
new possibilities of existence’ (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 13-14). Rhys’s novels incisively 
depict the fact that encounters are frequently violent, and ethical, life-enhancing, joyful 
action is difficult and, crucially, should not be presumed. This is, I contend, one of the 
most important meanings of Rhys’s literary praxis and it is at the heart of the form of 
resistance she offers us. This thesis focuses on the ways in which this central meaning 




later novels, each of which conducts a different sort of exploration of new possibilities 
of existence.  
 
I. A schizoanalytic method 
This thesis is guided by the schizoanalytic principle of reading literature for the 
procedures it sets into play, rather than concentrating on a fixed meaning to be 
deciphered. There are various reasons why the following arguments navigate 
psychoanalytic discourse but generally avoid depending on it, the most obvious being 
that this thesis attempts to counteract the emphasis on lack and defect which still 
somewhat dominates Rhys criticism. One reason I turned to Deleuze’s philosophy near 
the beginning of this research project is that he and Guattari provide a model of desire 
from which lack has been ousted. Instead, their desire is social and political: desire is 
constituted, while it in turn constitutes the ‘socius’ – Deleuze and Guattari’s term for 
the social body across which desire flows in an inexhaustible process. This model 
seems particularly suitable for a fiction in which, I contend, all problems experienced 
by the protagonists, including the familial and sexual, have the political – understood 
in a broad sense – at their core. Using this model of desire also enables a detailed focus 
on the unavoidable Rhysian question of complicity while allowing us to avoid 
positioning her protagonists’ frequently destructive desire as something that is in any 
sense exceptional or purely individual. In their 1975 work Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature (Kafka: Pour une littérature mineure), Deleuze and Guattari develop the 
widely held opinion that the literary text is inseparable from the power structures that 
determine the moment of its creation: on their understanding this situation means that 
all literature, to varying degrees, reinforces the status quo (the order supported by the 
‘major’ language of the time) and some also works against it, in a ‘minor’ mode, and 
creates possibilities for positive change, or what the authors call ‘lines of flight’. All 
texts, then, reveal the schizoanalytic proposition – which is, of course, also a 
fundamental tenet of Christianity and other religions – that we are all guilty of bad 
desire to an extent. In particular, the dynamism that is central to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
theory of a desire that is always pulled between an oppressive and a revolutionary pole 
also helps us to think about the tension between resistance and submission, resignation 
or acquiescence that runs through Rhys’s narratives in terms of an overall aesthetic and 




According to schizoanalysis, literature is to be read for what it does (to be 
critically evaluated) and how it does (a matter of style, vitality or ‘health’, to be 
evaluated clinically). In both the critical and clinical sense (though more clearly for the 
former), meaning depends on the use value of the text: on how the established order is 
resisted and how style is used to push language to its limit, on the text’s capacity to 
reveal how desire works, on the writer’s capacity for producing a diagnosis of her 
contemporary moment, and even her prognostic capabilities. These ‘uses’ are central 
to the discussions in the following chapters. 
For Ian Buchanan and his co-editors in the introduction to Deleuze and the 
Schizoanalysis of Literature, it follows from Deleuze’s ‘pragmatic’ claims for literature 
that ‘whenever we find ourselves pondering the meaning of something we are in fact 
“using” it in some way’ (Buchanan et al. 2015: 5). Mindful of this idea, the aim in this 
study is to use Rhys’s texts productively by attending to the possibilities in her 
depictions of difference, intolerance, bad feeling and the quiet forms of resistance in 
her work.8 Of course, the focus is also frequently on the meaning of aspects of the texts. 
For example, I offer an answer to the interpretative question posed by the ending of 
Good Morning, Midnight which withholds definite meaning while encouraging us to 
search for it. I take Deleuze and Guattari’s postulate of a use-oriented schizoanalytic 
reading as guidance for a style of literary criticism which I aim to follow, rather than a 
prescription for a wholly realisable programme.   
This approach necessitates a cautious navigation between what is happening in 
the narratives, what is happening in the text in a wider sense and processes involving 
the reader and academic communities. Often, the processes identified happen in 
parallel on different levels. For example, the drive that is posited in my fourth chapter 
is, I argue, both Sasha’s and Rhys’s, it belongs to the text (Good Morning, Midnight) 
and also involves the reader. Frequently, the unusual negative behaviour of the 
protagonists (Sasha’s crying fit at the start of the fourth novel, or Julia’s vagueness and 
compulsion to check her appearance in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie) disturbs both 
other characters and the reader and provokes both to voice disapproval. In a related 
manner, it often falls to the reader to detect the social and political impact within the 
narrative of a seemingly slight event, as well as the moment’s wider political charge 
and aesthetic function. When Sasha is unable to carry out Mr Blank’s mispronounced 
 




demand she ‘stalls’ what Judith Halberstam describes as the ‘business of the dominant’, 
constituting a weak but notable kink in the business owner’s capitalist extraction of 
maximum profit (2011: 88). Sasha is fired and muses on her powerlessness, but with 
this incident her apparent dysfunctionality becomes an integral element of the anti-
capitalist critique Rhys offers in this novel. Crucially, and as we see in this last 
example, the passivity of Rhys’s protagonists generally gives us excellent cause to 
question the presuppositions and ideologies that we bring to the texts. In my view we 
read Rhys most productively when we question our expectations and probe our 
deployment of concepts such as agency, freedom and failure as we construct meaning.  
This differentiated reading practice has an important counterpart in the political 
arguments made in this thesis. The study does not propose that passivity is a 
meaningful, valid strategy of political action as such. Rather, the passivity of Rhys’s 
protagonists is read as an act of resistance within the realm of discourse. Their 
behaviour is, on this reading, a symbolic refusal of oppressive systems and of dominant 
discourses reliant on heteronormative conceptions of self-making. In these ways, 
Rhys’s writing acts on the socius itself. We can, I contend, learn from Rhys’s narratives 
to think differently about difference. Literature of the oppressed and dispossessed can 
inspire political hope. Rhys’s literature of the passive subject can also do this, but it is 
not the passivity of her protagonists which is of the greatest political value: it is, rather, 
the texts’ insistence on the potentiality of difficult feeling and the positive value of 
difference. Many of the ideas in this thesis could be – and many have been – 
investigated using feminist and postcolonial theories and put to work for their related 
political agendas. The intention here is not to overlook these approaches, much less to 
posit a superior Deleuzian approach in the place of others. The aim is to explore Rhys’s 
subversion from a different angle, to demonstrate the philosophical nature of her 
writing and thereby to contribute to the vast body of work on the politics of Rhys’s 
fiction. Four key concepts in Deleuze’s single and co-authored philosophy are used to 
this end. These are Deleuze’s logic of the outside, Deleuze and Guattari’s theorisation 
of art as one of the ways in which thought emerges, their concept of a minor literature 
and the idea of affect as becoming. These ideas suggest what I think is a useful way of 
extending the issue of Rhys’s textual politics beyond the realm of theme and narrative 
content, so it can also be approached formally, through style and the connections within 




This thesis examines the four later novels. It omits study of the short stories and 
Quartet for a number of reasons. The focus is on narrative strategies: on how situations, 
motifs, descriptions and dialogue repeat and, in important exceptions, develop; on 
passivity and the general absence of a desire for self-betterment over time despite, for 
example, changes in circumstance which, according to common sense, should lead the 
protagonists to seek employment, security or at least to try to modify their behaviour. 
This study identifies an elaboration of Rhys’s aesthetic across these four novels and 
examines the complication of ideas that are relatively undeveloped in her earliest novel. 
I draw heavily on Rhys’s statements about her life, work and political views in Smile 
Please, her posthumous autobiography of 1979, the unpublished Exercise Books and, 
in particular, her published letters.9 This is done not to contribute to a biographical 
reading of her work but rather to support a philosophical reading. It is useful, for 
example, to have evidence of Rhys’s suspicion of Freudian psychoanalysis in a study 
which is so heavily influenced by Deleuze.10 Evidence of Rhys’s literary pleasures and 
opinions is also very useful. Rhys had broad literary and cultural interests, which she 
often describes at length in her letters, and these statements are used to support the 
emphasis in this thesis on unexpected connections.  
Chapter Six employs a relatively unusual method of analysis, as it identifies 
connections between Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea in order to interpret 
the earlier novel.11 While this retrospective method might seem unorthodox we can, I 
believe, locate patterns, repetitions and perhaps even ‘strategies’ at work in Rhys’s 
fiction without attributing them to conscious artistic planning.12 Significantly, the 
complex problem for Rhys scholars of composition and textual histories makes it 
impossible to disallow the idea that ideas, plots and even passages from a later novel 
might have been at least partially formed when earlier novels were being written, and 
might have informed how the earlier works emerged. Rhys is notorious for having 
 
9 Hereafter, Rhys’s Letters 1931-1966, published in 1985, are referred to as Letters. 
10 In the Black Exercise Book (BEB) Rhys recalls picking up a book concerning girls’ childhood 
seduction fantasies from Sylvia Beach’s book store in Paris, and she notes in disagreement with the 
writer ‘ ’ (UTC, 
1976.011.1.1.1). Every attempt has been made to obtain permission from Jean Rhys’s estate to quote 
from Rhys’s unpublished writing. Unfortunately my attempts have been unsuccessful.  
11 Hereafter, where needed, page references to Voyage in the Dark are given using the abbreviation ViD. 
12 Although the idea of an unconscious strategy is somewhat paradoxical, I am using the phrase to suggest 
goal-oriented tendencies in Rhys’s writing which she neither theorised nor even explicitly articulated, 
and which may have been instinctual, deriving from affective and extra-cognitive layers of experience. 




produced multiple drafts of her work, making the mapping of textual production a 
minefield. To take the most obvious example, Rhys was planning and writing versions 
of Wide Sargasso Sea by the 1930s. Angier contends that she was doing so since a 
young woman in Dominica (1990: 371). Rhys claimed to have written three or four 
versions of the novel, and destroyed or lost the earlier ones (Letters, 213): it is known 
that she destroyed a version in 1939, and we cannot disallow the possibility that this 
was not the earliest draft (Angier 1990: 371). We therefore cannot say with certainty 
that elements of or even whole passages in Voyage in the Dark, for example, which 
seem to recall Wide Sargasso Sea do not do so because they were influenced by, if not 
actually intended for, a version of the latter that existed in some form when the third 
novel was being written.  
The idea of connection is central for this thesis, and consequently I foreground 
numerous connections among Rhys’s novels and other artists and thinkers including 
Arthur Rimbaud, Vincent Van Gogh, Franz Kafka, Deleuze and contemporary feminist 
theorists of unhappiness (Ahmed) and disgust (Ngai). The aim is to explicate an 
intricate political aesthetic which develops over time into a self-interrogating form of 
writing concerned with affirming connections with others precisely when it is most 
difficult to do so. 
 
II. Rhys’s nomadism: subjectivity and dissent 
Besides, it isn’t my face, this tortured and tormented mask. I can take it off 
whenever I like and hang it up on a nail. Or shall I place on it a tall hat with a 
green feather, hang a veil over the lot, and walk about the dark streets so 
merrily? Singing defiantly ‘You don’t like me, but I don’t like you either. 
“Don’t like jam, ham or lamb, and I don’t like roly-poly...”’ Singing ‘One more 
river to cross, that’s Jordan, Jordan...’ 
I have no pride – no pride, no name, no face, no country. I don’t belong 
anywhere. Too sad, too sad... (GMM, 37-38)13 
 
13 The modern Penguin editions of Rhys’s novels referred to in this thesis use unusual formatting for the 
ellipses, which occur frequently in Rhys’s writing. They include a full stop followed by a space and then 
an ellipsis. The first editions and the early 1964 manuscript of Wide Sargasso Sea held in the British 
Library use just an ellipsis alone as is customary (BL, MS 57587: 1964). Accordingly, my page numbers 
and the quoted punctuation follow these Penguin editions, except in regards to ellipses, for which I 
follow the standard format as used in these original editions and manuscripts. Interestingly, in letters of 
1957 and 1964 Rhys complains about there being ‘too many dots, too much emotion’ in Quartet (Letters, 





The protagonist of Rhys’s fourth novel is a disturbing creation. She undergoes an 
endless vacillation between defiance and defeat, and passion and apathy, is subject to 
apparently unwilling eruptions into her consciousness of sad memories and different 
voices and she frequently veers into irrationality; the breakdown of certainty and lack 
of clear meaning are a constant threat for both her and the reader. In the passage cited 
above, Sasha appears to be ‘schizophrenic’ in the sense that her inner monologue 
suggests the absence of solid identity and, in its place, a plethora of ‘masks’ and a 
number of unusually distinct voices and modes of thought. We find this apparent 
multiplicity of the subject throughout the novel. Different voices appear according to 
different environmental circumstances and seem more like concretions of a subject in 
flux which are relatively independent of one another rather than enduring aspects of a 
stable self. In this passage Sasha thinks she can remove her face, and with it her 
‘torment’, like a mask. In Part Four, after being attacked by René, she criticises herself 
in the second person and while we can read this as the co-presence of distinct facets of 
the personality there is, I think, good reason to understand the passage as Rhys’s 
expression of the fact that the self becomes in a process of constant flux. Deleuze’s 
philosophy provides us with some interesting ways of thinking about this situation.  
For Deleuze this process is a constant variation of one’s power due to the 
constant experience of being acted upon and acting: an ‘individual is first of all a 
singular essence,’ he writes, ‘which is to say, a degree of power’ (Deleuze 1988: 27). 
Sasha’s ‘detached’ and scolding voice conveys the sense that she is trying to locate and 
express her agency by voicing her small but significant temporal and geographical 
distance from the feeling of inconsolable grief that overwhelmed her a split second ago: 
‘This is me, this is myself, who is crying. The other – how do I know who the other is? 
She isn’t me’ (GMM, 154). The voicing of distance is Sasha’s means of re-asserting 
herself. The ‘second’ voice is necessarily cynical and self-critical because she is trying 
to regain some control over her emotions, shutting down a threatening hysteria with a 
forced sense of detachment: ‘say it all out calmly. You’ve had dinner with a beautiful 
young man and he kissed you and you’ve paid a thousand francs for it. Dirt cheap at 
the price’ (154). In becoming, the subject differs firstly from itself, a process which we 
can sense in Sasha’s affective awareness of the dangers posed by her feelings. Yet, as 
argued by Deleuze and Guattari in their 1980 work A Thousand Plateaus, the second 




entanglement, is always situated among other bodies.14 Becoming takes place in zones 
of indistinction, as bodies and other multiplicities encounter one another, leading to the 
destruction of one body or the other or their co-assemblage. In this philosophy, agency 
is entwined with and inseparable from the various ways in which we are affected by 
other forces which come both from inside and outside. There is, I propose, a structural 
affinity between this idea of becoming and Rhys’s narratives, indicating the fact that 
Rhys’s fiction is curiously affective. The narratives of her middle three novels make 
particularly visible what is also the case for Wide Sargasso Sea: existence for Rhys’s 
women plays out as a series of encounters, some of which might benefit the 
protagonists, most of which endanger them.  
The psyches of Rhys’s protagonists are not identical, nor fractured in the same 
way. Their inner worlds are different, just as the nature of their encounters differs, and 
we have a different kind of access to each of the protagonists. Nevertheless, this thesis 
proceeds from the idea that there is a characteristic Rhysian subjectivity. This is a 
depiction of an inner life riven by fracture, uncertainty, and passion, and which is, as 
Helen Carr writes, ‘formed and deformed’ by violent, oppressive social conditions 
(2012: 51).15 Rhys’s increasingly dramatic and nuanced method of depicting 
subjectivity offers a diagnosis of the problems of modern life: the narratives concern 
the effects of intolerance, marginalisation, alienation, dispossession and displacement. 
Yet we can also read the fraught inner lives of Rhys’s women – the tumult of which is 
clearest and most extreme in Good Morning, Midnight – in terms of Rhys’s ‘diagnosis’ 
or exploration of the flux of subjectivity in a general sense.  
Rhys’s writing evidences a complex understanding of inner life. Undoubtedly, 
this complexity stemmed from worldly problems (interpersonal, political, social, 
historical and environmental), but just as her awareness of the natural tendency to 
violence can be read as a world view rather than a view of what might be described as 
the local deficiencies of humanity, there is good reason to consider the possibility that 
Rhys conceived of inner life generally as dynamic and affective. Statements in her 
letters are testimony of Rhys’s search for truthful and meaningful ways of writing about 
her view and her experience. In several striking examples of Rhys’s perspectivism 
 
14 First published in French in 1980 as Mille plateaux: Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2. 
15 Throughout this thesis, references to Helen Carr’s study, Jean Rhys, are to the 2012 second edition, 





which suggest a view of the subject in flux as much as it is unknowable, she asks ‘[w]hy 
demand a view of life?’ when this is ‘surely’ not a writer’s ‘business’ (Letters, 100). 
The search is for ways to inscribe one’s embodied perceptions in a manner which 
accounts as much as possible for one’s limited perspective and the process of 
continually being affected. In her letters Rhys describes the strong effects that alcohol, 
depression, illness, family problems, poverty, worry, place and literature had on her 
ability to write. ‘No one knows anything but himself or herself. And that badly’, Rhys 
states (Letters, 104). ‘Books and plays’ are produced from a position; they are 
 
written some time, some place, by some person affected by that time, that place, 
the clothes he sees and wears, other books, the air and the room and every 
damned thing. It must be so, and how can it be otherwise except his book is a 
copy? (Letters, 101) 
 
To a significant degree, Rhys’s earlier novels are transcriptions of her experience into 
fiction. She was plagued by worry that her last novel would not seem right or authentic, 
because she had settled on a more ambitious project of imagining an experience which 
she knew only from a remove. Yet there are similarities between Voyage in the Dark, 
Good Morning, Midnight and Wide Sargasso Sea which suggest that with Antoinette 
she was still writing about inner life as she herself felt it. This is the life of the ‘unusual 
mind’ which appears to some to be ‘mad’, but might just be the mind of the author or 
the mind of the reader. I am proposing that in Wide Sargasso Sea Rhys was still aiming 
to depict subjectivity in a way which reflected her own experience of it: ‘I’ve never 
read a long novel about a mad mind or an unusual mind or anybody’s mind at all. Yet 
it is the only thing that matters and so difficult to get over without being dull’ (Letters, 
254). In this letter of March 1964 Rhys suggests that the life of the mind is a continuum, 
and one which had not been and perhaps cannot be represented accurately in words. 
She tried, though, and I think she was very successful. Collectively, her novels suggest 
that the experience of violence makes inner life more fraught, but does so by degrees. 
Rather than exploring a ‘normal’ psyche which becomes contorted when under 
pressure, on my reading these works suggest inner life as that which is always 
contorting and distorting according to forces from within and without.  
Any model of subjectivity which dissolves the ego’s boundaries raises 




unquestioning participation in hegemonic processes. Affect theorists such as Ahmed 
(2010) and Lauren Berlant (2011) are among scholars who have shown that Western 
political regimes depend on the populace’s belief that each individual is free to work 
for the good life which can be attained if sufficient effort is made and capital 
accumulated. Unhappiness, we are often told, is a personal problem rather than the 
evidence of a structural deficit which exacerbates to a dangerous degree the natural flux 
of experience. Conceptualisations of the subject which complicate the unimpeded 
progression from ‘I desire’ to ‘I act to fulfil my desire’ threaten to destabilise the edifice 
of neoliberal capitalism, and mitigate against the ‘thought control’ on which it depends 
and which Rhys so clearly perceived (Letters, 99). This thesis contends that her passive 
women are exemplary exercises in such complication.  
While Deleuze’s ethics of joyful action has certain problematic political 
implications, to which I turn shortly, it is worth noting here that it is erroneous even to 
discuss a Deleuzian ‘subjectivity’ because Deleuze generally avoids fixed definitions, 
but also – and, for this discussion, more importantly – because he is concerned with 
countering the idea that individual experience is, in fact, individual. This agenda has 
numerous political aims, including to demonstrate the fact that capitalism has intruded 
into every aspect of existence; to offer a model of connection as the basis of political 
change; and to reveal the political force of desire in order to help us to recognise and 
resist the ways in which we are manipulated into positions of complicity. Crucially, 
Deleuze’s politics is not distinct from his ontology and ethics. His thinking of 
imbricated subjectivity takes place in a vitalist realm in which change is constant, the 
self is always part of a multiplicity and – to simplify here – is a momentary instantiation 
of a form of Life that exceeds the organic (Deleuze 1995: 143). As Ansell-Pearson 
states, recalling a potent description from Difference and Repetition, the ‘radical move 
proposed by Deleuze consists in viewing individuality not as a characteristic of the self, 
but rather as that which informs and sustains “the system of the dissolved Self”’ 
(Deleuze 2004b: 219, in Ansell-Pearson 1999: 77-78). In this sense, individuality might 
be understood as a habit of choice, or the function of the occasions for joy and sadness 
that we create over a lifetime, where both such totalities are determined as much by 
external forces as by forces of which we are the adequate cause.  
Rhys’s insistent attention to the impact of the world on every aspect of one’s 
existence is, I think, ahead of its time, and reading her through a Deleuzian lens 




writing generally. In Rhys’s last three novels there are moments of self-overcoming 
which involve what might be described as a synchronisation with this impact, as though 
the protagonists’ individuality or sense of self finally achieves an orientation which can 
productively accommodate the difficulty of the constant process of being formed and 
deformed. These moments do not concern the subject’s self-consolidation, but rather a 
concurrent dissolution and effort which, I contend, together both stand for the subject’s 
past experience and affirm its continual dissolution in the future. These ambivalent 
scenes of transcendence are in keeping with Rhys’s narratives generally. They fit 
organically into stories concerning difficult experience and difficult lives, and minds 
which are under duress and which are considered unusual. Ultimately, the precise 
nature of Rhys’s understanding of subjectivity might be less important than the 
commitment to difficulty in her writing. If we take seriously Rhys’s statements about 
her desire to write about the unusual mind, then we might understand the affirmation 
of dissolution that we find at these key moments as an encoded commitment to her 
artistic engagement with an idea of subjectivity as that for which the centre does not 
hold – and perhaps even, in a certain sense, as testament to her adherence to an idea of 
the subject as a process of self-differentiation. The fourth chapter of this thesis turns to 
Deleuze’s philosophy of difference and repetition to explore this idea in Good 
Morning, Midnight; and Chapter Six and the Coda offer different models for reading 
other comparable concluding scenes in terms of a slightly different commitment. Here, 
though, we can pause on the final note of Ansell-Pearson’s comment on Deleuzian 
individuality – dissolution – to consider the light it sheds on an interesting and 
otherwise rather obscure facet of Good Morning, Midnight, the novel in which, I 
propose, Rhys explores the flux of subjectivity with greatest stylistic precision.  
 The Oxford English Dictionary provides seventeen major definitions of the 
verb ‘dissolve’ and while many of these can be linked to situations in Rhys’s fiction 
generally, most of them correspond to significant themes, motifs and dynamics in her 
fourth novel, suggesting that dissolution might be a principle of some sort in this text. 
These definitions also demonstrate a fundamental ambivalence which corresponds to 
the notable indeterminacy of Sasha’s narrative, concerning as they do both a 
‘loosening’ or the destruction of ‘physical integrity’, and a ‘setting free’ or breaking of 
constricting ‘bonds’. The first sort of dissolution is the main process at work in the Mr 
Blank scene, as Sasha loses her grip on meaning, and her physical capacity for 




when Sasha drifts off in the ‘miracle’ of a moment’s happiness; and, I think, it can be 
sensed again at the end of the novel when Sasha ponders ‘the enormous effort, under 
which the human brain cracks. But not before the thing is done, not before the mountain 
moves’ (GMM, 157). I argue in Chapter Four that the final pages of this work confront 
the capacity of art to effect change and thereby to liberate the world – to move the 
mountain – by increasing its degree of freedom. To dissolve also means to relax, to 
weaken and to enfeeble bodily strength, and Sasha’s entire narrative concerns her 
psychological and bodily enfeeblement. In one of the most significant dynamics, she 
experiences a gradual weakening of her ability to refuse René, which results in his 
attacking and stealing from her in Part Four. Another meaning is specifically 
cinematographic, and here we can recall Sasha’s ‘film-mind’, and the way her 
flashbacks are dissolved in and out of her present narrative (147). To dissolve can be 
to deny an overbearing authority and to denounce it as illegitimate. Sasha’s narrative 
works ‘to bust the roof off everything’ (33), revealing the workings of capitalism, 
racism, patriarchy and the effects on society and the individual psyche of the control 
exercised under fascism and the other violent political regimes of Europe in the 1930s. 
Sasha frequently dissolves into tears, a dissolution foregrounded in her first public 
encounter in the novel, much to the chagrin of a well-behaved café customer. Sasha 
has a surprising affiliation to water: she cries, is ‘fished up, half drowned’ (10), and 
becomes fixated on the fountains of the Exhibition. This is clearly her element. A final 
definition is significant. It is not just the bonds of authority which are broken in 
dissolution: to dissolve can be to put an end to association or connection. The severance 
of the Sasha-Serge bond is an unexplained and subtle form of textual violence, but also 
entirely in keeping with the novel’s general principle of dissolution. Yet I would argue 
that despite the various manifestations of this principle Sasha never entirely cracks up; 
her response vacillates but her anger or potentia does not weaken, and the text never 
flinches from its vision of the impact that the world has on her. Good Morning, 
Midnight is a narrative of dissolution, in which Sasha is formed and deformed by her 
experience, her individuality emerging as the tenor of this process, as that which 
‘informs and sustains “the system of the dissolved Self”’. Of course we can understand 
Rhysian subjectivity in pathological terms – as many critics have shown – but we can 





Returning to Sasha’s disavowal of her ‘other’ voice after René’s attack – ‘[s]he 
isn’t me’ – it is quite possible that the evocation of Rimbaud’s famous declaration, ‘I 
is an other’ is not accidental (Rimbaud 2008: 113).16 Although Sasha’s (and Rhys’s) 
preference is for alcohol rather than opium, this protagonist’s senses are disordered in 
a manner we can read through the young French poet’s aim of liberating a truly creative 
expression – of writing the new. As importantly, Sasha’s schizoid thinking is frequently 
irrational, proceeds in non-sequiturs and is often self-contradictory, but it is not without 
definite orientation. Like Rimbaud, Sasha also demonstrates an impassioned yet 
coherently expressed desire as dissent. This involves her anger (‘but I don’t like you 
either’) at the violence of society which renders her existence a depleted movement 
through dark, hostile streets. Sasha’s angry dissent, which is so effectively dramatised 
in her schizoid self-reflection about removing her mask/face, is her potentia or her 
productive (as opposed to repressive) power.  
Rosi Braidotti describes potentia as the ‘intensity’ of the nomadic subject, her 
‘rate of change, transformation or affirmation’, and the spirit of nomadic thought. ‘Life 
as the exploration of this affirmative capacity’ is at the heart of both Deleuze’s 
Spinozist philosophy and Braidotti’s own feminist use of ‘nomadic subjects’ as a set of 
‘transformative tools that enact progressive metamorphoses of the subject away from 
the programme set up in the phallogocentric format’ (Braidotti 2011: 12). Rhysian 
anger is often reactive rather than affirmative, but as Patricia Moran has argued recently 
(2015), the individual’s expression of anger at social injustice becomes affirmative and 
creative when the social order disallows anger as a valid response to oppressive 
conditions. Sasha’s dissent is a phobic striving away from the dominant order. Rhys’s 
novels in general demonstrate a phobic striving away from established structures of 
thought which is comparable to the restlessness of Deleuze’s nomadic thought: both 
involve a ‘kind of critical consciousness that resists settling into socially coded modes 
of thought and behaviour’ (Braidotti 2011: 26). Deleuze and Guattari introduce their 
nomadic thought in their introductory chapter on the rhizome in A Thousand Plateaus 
in which they state that the nomad is the non-sedentary type of individual who is not 
included by history (2013: 24). The nomad tries to ‘write sufficiently in the name of an 
outside’ which ‘has no image, no signification, no subjectivity’, producing an 
 
16 Formulated by Rimbaud in a letter to Georges Izambard, 13 May 1871. This relationship is discussed 




‘assemblage with the outside, against the book as image of the world’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2013: 24). The nomadic writer aims to write against all established forms of 
knowledge. Deleuze’s philosophy accordingly resists finite forms, is dynamic or 
unstable, and open to interpretation in a manner which exceeds the general 
indeterminacy of meaning characteristic of philosophical and literary texts. This thesis 
contends that this is also the case to a significant degree in Rhys’s novels, signalled 
clearly by the invisible multitude of further possibilities in Antoinette’s statement that 
there is ‘always the other side’ (WSS, 106). Rhys, like Deleuze, critiques and resists 
dualistic thought and dominant forms of sense-making, and this is an obstacle for those 
who seek a stable, definitive interpretation of her writing.  
 
III. Problems of difference  
This study proceeds in the awareness of the paradoxical nature of the thesis. Even 
though my arguments rest on the proposition that equivocality is central to Rhys’s 
aesthetics and politics, I am still offering what is, in a sense, a ‘strong’ reading of Rhys 
as a writer whose intellectual preoccupations overlap with Deleuze’s and in whose 
fiction passivity has a resistant, ‘deterritorialising’ function: that is, it works against the 
established order. This problem of defending a strong interpretation of a fiction in 
which equivocality is central is a function of nomadic thinking: how can we argue that 
this type of thought proposes anything other than a critique of established modes of 
thought, when it is invested in refusing the terms in which we, in the Western tradition, 
know and think? By way of an answer to this question, I propose that we can choose to 
embrace the knottiness of these nomadic issues and engage with them in a compatibly 
restless critical consciousness to see what possibilities are thereby opened up, or we 
can reject the philosophy on the ground that it does not meet the standards of 
established, rational (Aristotelian, Hegelian) practices of thought, and declare it to be 
self-contradictory and therefore fundamentally flawed.17 This study is an attempt at the 
former. It locates creative potential in differentiation rather than contradiction, in flux 
rather than stability and endurance and in a method of difficulty as opposed to an 
entirely coherent systemisation.  
 
17 Fredric Jameson’s interesting though rather ‘paranoid’ critique of Deleuze is a prime example of the 
latter kind of reading (Jameson 2009). The ‘paranoia’ I am referring to here is that evoked by Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick in her 1997 critique of cultural theorists who aim to expose all ideological structures 




  Braidotti and Ansell-Pearson both place emphasis on Deleuze’s creativity, and 
how this translates by necessity to the reader’s encounters with his work. Ansell-
Pearson describes Deleuze’s anti-method as being akin to the evolution of culture itself, 
and as the performance of thought experiments (1997, 1999). Braidotti argues that we 
should not be afraid to think through Deleuze’s concepts in new ways, given that he is 
‘one of few philosophers who preached conceptual disobedience’ (2011: 272). This is 
a central proposition in her feminist use of Deleuze and it guides my study of Rhys 
which practises relative disobedience in the attempt to carve out a new way of reading 
passivity in her texts as something which has political efficacy. Deleuze engaged with 
the work of philosophers he admired, and subjected it to strong re-workings, which he 
described, in characteristically provocative though unfortunate terms, as ‘buggery or 
(it comes to the same thing) immaculate conception’ (Deleuze 1995: 6). This study 
attempts a generous approach to Rhys’s writing which also tries to be faithful to the 
spirit of her work as I understand it. However, my use of Deleuze’s thought here is 
something like an unfaithful re-working. That is, I am presenting a defence of passivity 
using a philosopher who argues unequivocally for an ethics of positive, self-enhancing 
action. Deleuze explains this positive ethics in terms which recall some of the more 
stringent criticisms of Rhys’s protagonists: 
 
That individual will be called good (or free, or rational, or strong) who strives, 
insofar as he is capable, to organise his encounters, to join with whatever agrees 
with his nature, to combine his relation with relations that are compatible with 
his, and thereby to increase his power. For goodness is a matter of dynamism, 
power and the composition of powers. That individual will be called bad, or 
servile, or weak, or foolish, who lives haphazardly, who is content to undergo 
the effects of his encounters, but wails and accuses every time the effect 
undergone does not agree with him and reveals his own impotence. (Deleuze 
1988: 22-23) 
 
In one sense, my use of Deleuze may be justified because this study is my attempt to 
organise my encounters with Rhys’s fiction, the scholarship on her writing, and 
Deleuze’s philosophy. My engagement with Deleuze starts from the premise that his 
Spinozist ethics is a system for lived behaviour rather than the ‘behaviour’ of fictional 




of Rhys’s protagonists, his study of literary texts is, as Gregg Lambert has noted, most 
often a matter of offering a surprisingly positive reading of writers who seem to be 
ethically compromised or ‘perverted’ in some manner or another (Lambert 1998).18 
The refusal of Rhys’s protagonists even to try to organise their encounters certainly fits 
this description, and I trace the affinity in this fiction with what Deleuze and Guattari 
see as Kafka’s inability to affirm in the present a shared language of resistance. 
Passivity in Rhys’s novels is, I contend, a function of a comparable inability.  
This thesis maps across the later four novels Rhys’s search for the conditions 
which give rise to the possibility of good connection with others. This search largely 
follows Rhys’s development as a writer: it is most unsuccessful in After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie, futile in Good Morning, Midnight, nearing fulfilment in Voyage in the Dark 
and finally complete in Wide Sargasso Sea. In this sense, Rhys’s writing itself 
undergoes a creative evolution, and we can therefore understand this development not 
so much as a pessimistic indictment of humanity (though Rhys comes close to this 
position in her fourth novel) but as a working through of that which limits our capacity 
for joyful action. On the one hand, then, this study proposes that Rhys’s novel-writing 
career displays a form of self-overcoming that is congruent with Deleuze’s ethics of 
joyful action. On the other, I suggest that this same process of self-overcoming engages 
with fundamental problems of political commitment that Deleuze’s philosophy often 
problematically elides.  
 Most pertinently for this thesis, Deleuze’s ethics of joyous action does not pay 
sufficient attention to the fact that all bodies do not have an equal capacity to act. Rhys 
vividly dramatises this inequality in narratives which foreground the nuances and 
ambivalence of situations of limited agency. She shows us how, given the inherently 
violent order of things and the thorough invasion of capitalism into every sphere of 
existence, it is often very hard for the relatively powerless individual to act ‘joyfully’ 
by organising her encounters so as ‘to join with whatever agrees with [her] nature’ and 
‘thereby to increase [her] power’ (Deleuze 1988: 22-23). Access to what ‘agrees’ with 
one may be dramatically limited – and this is the case for Rhys’s protagonists. One’s 
material resources, social position, kinship network or lack thereof and the available 
‘structures of feeling’, to borrow Raymond Williams’s phrase (1977), might not be of 
an order which allows one to thrive. Moreover, thriving, in Rhys’s fiction, too often is 
 




proximate to complicity. Deleuze does not seem to account for what Denise deCaires 
Narain describes as the ‘stark reality facing’ the historically oppressed ‘who cannot 
position [themselves] effectively, or affectively’ within existing genealogies and social 
structures (2013: 289). In this sense his is an unlikely theoretical framework for reading 
Rhys. Yet unsuitability can be productive.  
An important point of convergence of the political visions of these two writers 
is revealing on two fronts, demonstrating a serious limitation of Deleuze’s philosophy, 
and an important political and ethical sophistication in Rhys’s work. For both Rhys and 
Deleuze, the issue at stake is not whether one is free, but how one acts, desires and 
writes within one’s constraints. First, then, we can see that Deleuze does not pay 
sufficient attention to the fact that different people experience different types and 
degrees of constraint. Furthermore, although Deleuze is clear that Spinozist joy arises 
when bodies enter into good arrangements with one another, and this principle is surely 
intended to mitigate against the possibility that the project of increasing one’s power 
might involve diminishing that of others, he also seems to assume a problematic 
transparency which supposedly allows us to act in the full awareness of the constraints 
experienced by others, and to know beforehand what sort of relations will benefit us 
and others. Deleuze’s Spinozist philosophy fails to account for the power differential 
among groups, and the necessary partiality of one’s knowledge of other people. 
Indicated, ironically, by his choice of the male pronoun in the passage cited above, he 
fails to give sufficient attention to the fact that the project of self-organisation in order 
to increase one’s power all too often props up prevailing power structures. The phrase 
‘increase one’s power’ is far from innocuous, and Deleuze’s refusal to engage 
meaningfully with this fact is jarring. However, these problems indicate a productive 
approach to Rhys’s narratives. My proposition is that the thorny issues of inequality 
and difficult relationality that Deleuze overlooks constitute both a stumbling block to 
action within Rhys’s novels and their driving ethical impulse. The passivity of her 
protagonists is inseparable from the dominant theme of complicity, and it poses the 
question: how do we act joyfully with the assurance that we are not contributing to the 
dominant order and harming others? In Rhys’s last three novels there is no easy answer, 
no example set for how to act, no masterful ‘should’ proposed for ideal behaviour. 
Instead, these texts disabuse us of the Deleuzian presumption of a transparent harmony 
between bodies, even within minority groups, as feminist and postcolonial theorists 




certain principle of action that can absolutely be affirmed in the present and in relation 
to present conditions is that cruelty is bad. Rather than offering wider ethical certainty, 
these stories of the haphazard lives of protagonists who fail to organise their encounters 
encourage us to engage honestly with the idea of difficult connection.  
As Elaine Savory notes, ‘political resistance, as the Caribbean knows, as 
feminism knows, is successful when individuals join together into effective groups’ 
(1998: 83), yet Rhys’s novels tackle the problem of how to act when the conditions for 
solidarity are absent. DeCaires Narain develops an argument of central importance for 
this thesis in several studies of the productive impossibility of easy connection (2010, 
2013). In readings of Rhys and other women writers who explore racial discord and 
inequality, she proposes an ‘affective feminist solidarity’ which does not presume an 
adequate ‘feminist community’ already in existence but which involves, instead, ‘the 
hard graft required to begin approaching’ difficult, often ‘abrasive’, ‘affective 
connections’ between diverse women, and the effort to be ‘alert to the structures of 
power that mediate how women encounter each other’ (deCaires Narain 2013: 295-96). 
This thesis emphasises those ‘structures of power’, focusing not on the relationship 
between individuals but on the ramifications for Rhys’s lonely protagonists of this 
‘hard graft’.  
This study contends that the passivity of the Rhys woman works to an extent as 
a figuration of the problem of how to locate agency in the process of becoming. The 
passive Rhys protagonist is read here as a model of the subject as that which is not self-
determining, yet such models raise the question: how can we, then, understand agency? 
If we do away with the idea of the individual as a self-determining entity that is 
ontologically prior to its actions and expressions, in reconceiving of the subject as that 
which is constantly acted upon and as that which is constituted by the regulatory 
processes of culture and discourse, are we not rendering notions of resistance, freedom 
and identity so problematic that we might, in fact, be undoing the conditions of both 
individual agency and political action? My suggestion is that, rather than being 
something the protagonists do or do not have, agency emerges in this literature as the 
form of effort which moves the protagonists closer to joyful action. That is, agency is 
expressed by modes of being – that involve action, thought, perception and feeling – 
which increase the protagonists’ force of existing, but effecting this increase, without 
contributing to the systems that perpetuate inequality, is always difficult and therefore 




positions solidarity neither as a given for a self-identifying group, nor as an 
impossibility. Rather, through her narratives, she demonstrates the fact that solidarity 
requires great effort. As deCaires Narain argues, in practice this effort can productively 
take as its focus, if not its raison d’etre, the negative affect that frequently erupts 
between bodies and the lack of transparency on such occasions. The negative affect 
that saturates Rhys’s novels makes visible the need for this effort. 
The absence of the conditions for communality in the present in Rhys’s novels 
indicates other questions that have been central to postcolonial and feminist studies: 
namely, how do we write with and for an historically oppressed group without both 
eliding differences of identity within that group and disavowing our own privilege in 
making such a linguistic gesture? Furthermore, how do we write against the dominant 
order when our language is the language of masters? As I argue in Chapters Five and 
Six, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a minor literature provides some ways of 
addressing these questions in the context of reading Rhys, though the problems 
themselves remain irresolvable. The Spinozist ethics of joyfulness that is so central to 
Deleuze’s understanding of affect and becoming constitutes a problem for thinking 
about affect and passivity in Rhys’s fiction when using Deleuze’s philosophy. 
Similarly, Deleuze’s affirmative philosophy of difference in itself is a powerful tool 
with which to read Rhys’s subversion of the established order, and her alternative to a 
widespread failure of thought. This thesis explores a number of the different ways in 
which Deleuze attempts to revalorise difference, in order to explicate what I argue is 
Rhys’s attempt to think the radically new or ‘difference in itself’. Yet there lurks within 
any notion of pure difference the risk of eliding violent histories, real inequality and 
real differences between people. The poststructuralist celebration of difference is aimed 
at countering the historical construction of ‘difference as pejoration’, a construction 
which has been ‘constitutive of the self-asserting power of Sameness’ (Braidotti 2011: 
75). This poststructuralist theoretical agenda is important but in practice it is risky. Too 
abstract or utopian an approach to this project often at least suggests – if it does not 
actually result in – the conflation of the theoretical and the political; and this is one of 
the charges that is frequently levelled against Deleuze.19 Difference is a highly 
 
19 Prominent among those who have taken this position are Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988), Peter 




contentious term in critical theory, and the reification of pure difference remains a 
deeply suspicious move for many.  
If, in 1997, Rita Felski could claim that difference ‘has become doxa, a magic 
word of theory and politics radiant with redemptive meanings’, there are plenty of 
theorists (Felski among them) who have contributed to the stringent critique of that 
doxa (1997: 1). Any broad deployment of difference as a signifier of any social group 
risks eliding the differences within that group and obscuring that group’s relative 
privilege. Summarising, Felski asserts that ‘we are now in a postmodern condition’ 
where any universal form of difference such as ‘female difference has fragmented into 
multiple differences and any appeal to general ideals or norms can only be considered 
politically questionable and theoretically naive’ (1997: 1). For Felski, no vision of ‘pure 
otherness’ has a place in a reasoned attempt to engage in and with political practice 
(1997: 5). Her feminist critique targets feminist discourses in which  
 
the feminine serves as the privileged marker of difference, standing in for all 
the forms of diversity that are repressed in contemporary societies. Braidotti, 
for example, refers to the difference between men and women as the prototype 
of all differences [...] describing feminism as the discourse of modernity. 
(Felski 1997: 5) 
 
Felski’s argument offers necessary caution to poststructuralist projects, but I think we 
can recognise an important distinction between the notion of ‘pure otherness’ that 
Felski critiques and a Deleuzian engagement with difference in itself as part of a 
‘radical redefinition of thinking as the activity that consists in reinventing the grounds 
for subjectivity’ (Braidotti 2011: 77). The distinction may be one of category error, 
perhaps involving too easy a conflation of identity politics and politically committed 
epistemology. The charges brought against theorisations of pure difference seem 
generally to rest on a Hegelian, dialectical opposition: the discursive ‘privileged marker 
of difference’ works, for Felski, to occlude and thereby to oppose real diversity that 
always exceeds any universal representation. Felski’s point holds water to an extent, 
but she is still perpetuating the dualistic thinking against which Deleuze and Braidotti, 
among others, are working. However, this same criticism has been made of Deleuze 
and feminist theorists. For some critics, such poststructuralists posit a pure difference 




the previously oppressed or different as the new dominant order over which a new self-
identity presides. The task of even beginning to understand what a non-dualistic 
practice of thought might be is an enormously difficult one, and this to me is the key 
point. I think Felski underestimates the necessity of Deleuze and Braidotti’s shared 
project of both freeing our thinking of difference from its historic associations with 
inferiority, and effecting an incremental loosening of the dialectical hold over our 
capacity for thought. These politically committed philosophical writers do not claim to 
have completed their task, but position themselves as performing a necessary form of 
intellectual work. At its best, thinking difference in itself is a ‘starting point’ in a larger 
process of necessary rethinking. That is, the meaning of performative writing such as 
Braidotti’s 
 
does not function in terms of the author’s ‘intentions’ and the reader’s 
‘reception,’ but rather in a much wider, more complex set of possible 
resonances and interconnections [...] As readers in an intensive mode, we are 
transformers of intellectual energy, processors of the ‘insights’ that we are 
exchanging, and cobuilders of possible inter-relations. (Braidotti 2011: 19) 
 
A valid theorisation of difference, as Braidotti explains, will be processual rather than 
aiming to reveal a sanctified truth. Above all, it will involve trying to find new and 
more adequate ways of thinking through embodied and always-relational subjectivity. 
Importantly, here she stresses the need to appreciate that, as critics, theorists and 
readers more generally, we are at work together. In my opinion, the creative 
disobedience that Deleuze and Braidotti practise is instructive. We can engage with 
other thinkers in good faith, usefully attend to the principles that we share, and draw 
on what we find to be of value, without overlooking the limitations of their proposed 
method for improving the condition of things.   
There are risks in any reading practice, and the aim of thinking through a literary 
text without the dominance of a clear framework of dialectical and empirically based 
argument might result in forms of ‘over-reading’. The idea of difference in itself might 
offer itself too readily to redemptive readings with their own agendas, which stray too 
far from context. However, this need not be the case, and the attention to historical 
context in this thesis is, I hope, one way in which this risk is allayed here. If we can 




and erasure, and if we can emphasise the discursive nature of the claims being made, 
then we might, I think, stumble onto useful ways of thinking affirmation, vulnerability 
and the unusual mind despite real differences and despite difficulty. There is also the 
possibility that we can theorise difference in Rhys’s writing in a more innocent way 
than Felski and others might have us think. It is not that fiction before 1968 – the 
‘watershed’ year for a certain type of post-Nietzschean poststructuralist theory – or 
before the feminist and postcolonial critiques of difference from the 1970s is immune 
from making ‘politically questionable’ use of a concept of privileged difference. 
Rather, it is useful to think in terms of genealogy, and before there were critiques of 
theorisations of difference, there was a celebration of difference for valid and urgent 
political reasons. Rhys’s writing may not involve the same ‘critique of the deep-seated 
conservatism of institutions’ that preoccupied the thinkers of ’68 (Braidotti 2011: 76), 
but I think there is an important affinity between Deleuze and Guattari’s work and 
Rhys’s outsider protagonists who rage in unusual fashion against the machine. There 
is, I contend, room to argue that before we satisfy what might well be a legitimate 
demand to critique Rhys’s orientation towards any sort of difference in itself, we need 
to establish that her work demonstrates such an orientation in the first place. This is 
one aim of this thesis.  
The problems of conducting a Deleuzian reading of Rhys outlined in this 
section are returned to intermittently in this thesis, and no definitive solutions are 
offered. As I have mentioned, it is useful to bear in mind the fact that Deleuze’s 
Spinozist ethics and his aesthetic philosophy are not one and the same, and so perhaps 
we need not worry too much if the former does not work as a framework for reading 
the behaviour of Rhys’s fiction. Heeding Deleuze’s nomadic method, this study also 
puts to use a non-Spinozist model of affect, and argues that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of literature’s production of ‘pure’ affect is compatible with the argument 
(developed in my second chapter) that negative affect is political and powerfully 
disruptive. Furthermore, although Deleuze’s ethics does not seem to allow for 
weakness, this may well be a weakness in his system of thought. It is quite possible, I 
think, to read the lack of joyful action in Rhys’s novels as having political value, and 
to identify joyful action as that towards which the texts move. Finally, I propose that 
there are sufficient reasons for setting Deleuze’s thought into dialogue with Rhys’s 
writing despite these problems – reasons which recast the problems as things to be 




Deleuze in a reading of Rhysian passivity might be surprisingly apt given that her 
fiction concerns the difficult absence of the conditions of good connection.  
  This introduction has outlined the key terms of both this thesis and its use of 
Deleuze, and what I understand to be some of the key issues in the readings I develop. 
There are some more general problems with using Deleuze’s philosophy in this study 
which is invested in reading against the dominant order. The emphasis in Deleuze’s 
aesthetics on ‘superior’ white male writers, Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that women 
are not the oppressed sex but only one among many, their criticism of democracy in 
the 1991 work What is Philosophy? ([Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?] 1994: 107-08), 
their problematic use of the terms ‘tribe’ and ‘nomad’ and their general elision of the 
difference between forms of labour exploitation in the West and elsewhere are 
problems which deserve to be acknowledged in political applications of their work.20 
It is, however, legitimate to take a generous approach and to use this philosophy 
anyway, in ways which might, possibly, help us to repair of some of the divisions which 
it leaves untouched.   
In a collection of essays on the legacy of Edward Said, deCaires Narain argues 
that Said’s failure to account sufficiently for gender and his positionality need not mean 
his work is of limited value for postcolonial feminists. Rather, certain central concepts 
and propositions in his work can be well ‘deployed in a reading of contemporary 
postcolonial women’s texts in ways that both invigorate feminist inquiry and help align 
Said’s work more closely with women’s writing than is usually the case’ (deCaires 
Narain 2010: 122). DeCaires Narain’s analysis ‘explore[s] the relevance’ of these key 
theoretical terms for postcolonial women’s fiction and ‘suggest[s] trajectories for 
extending the application of his insights’ (2010: 123). My study aims to follow a 
comparable approach in using Deleuze’s philosophy to read Rhys’s fiction. Among the 
most important of the thematic links between Rhys and Deleuze is their shared 
commitment to the value of risk. I take this to be an ontological, epistemological and 
aesthetic principle thematised in Rhys’s fiction. She formulated it in an unpublished 
manuscript fragment in a fashion which is strikingly consonant with Deleuze’s work: 
‘It was a long time before I learnt that when you are safe you are very rarely free. That 
 
20 An example of an important formulation of Deleuze’s aesthetics which is nevertheless troubling for 
its political myopia is his 1977 essay ‘On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature’ which was co-
written with Claire Parnet for Dialogues, their book of the same year ([Dialogues avec Claire Parnet] 





when you are free you are very rarely safe’ (UTC, 1976.011.1).21 Deleuze’s philosophy 
is today recognised for the great potential it has for thinking through relationality, 
embodiment and our existence in capitalism, and the aim in this thesis is to engage with 
these ideas and others in order to open up productive lines of thinking about risky forms 
of self-making in Rhys’s writing. In so doing, this study will, I hope, also contribute to 
the body of work which demonstrates the value of Deleuzian thought for politically 
engaged literary analysis despite and even because of the imperfections, biases, and 
risky manoeuvres characteristic of schizoanalysis. 
 
IV. Chapter summary 
The first chapter maps connections between the history of Rhys scholarship, the 
arguments in this thesis, and what I understand to be the key aspects of Rhys’s artistic 
vision: her radical critique of the logics of intolerance, the centrality of difficulty in her 
aesthetic, the absence of the conditions of communality and her complex intellectual 
engagement with negative affect. The focus is on the problems in her fiction which, 
since the 1920s, have moved Rhys’s critics to voice discomfort and, not infrequently, 
disapproval concerning the politics of these texts. I outline the main directions and 
debates that the criticism on Rhys has taken, and pay particular attention to the range 
of answers that critics have given to Helen Carr’s question on behalf of Rhys’s bemused 
readers: ‘why don’t [her protagonists] do something?’ (2012: 14). The chapter 
considers the affective force of Rhys’s fiction, and the problem of placing her work 
within categories – such as modernist or postcolonial literature – in the academic 
tradition.  
The second chapter charts multiple connections between passivity and affect in 
Rhys’s novels by staging encounters between the novels, Rhys criticism, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy and recent work on disruptive affect by Ahmed (2010) and Ngai 
(2005). The key problematic which emerges, and which the rest of the thesis continues 
to explore, is how a literature of the passive subject works as an act of resistance. 
Continuities are established between two crucial terms in Rhys’s poetics: her critique 
of the politics driving the production and circulation of negative affect, and a narrative 
economy which insists on the constant variation of her protagonists’ proximity to joyful 
action. Focusing on scenes involving disgust, contempt, shame and other 
 




uncomfortable feelings, the chapter maps the ways in which negative affect makes 
visible, disrupts and disobeys the diktats of imperialist, patriarchal capitalism and what 
Ahmed describes as the heteronormative ‘promise of happiness’ (2010). It is argued 
that Rhys positions unhappiness, vulnerability and even difficulty in opposition to the 
common sense idea that the quests for social success, for happiness and autonomy are 
innate and unquestionable aspects of human behaviour that are prior to ideology. This 
is read as a major narrative strategy which has significant implications for reader 
response. The final section conducts a Spinozist reading of joyful and sad passions in 
order to further draw out the nuances in Rhys’s writing of unhappy embodiment. 
Chapter three concentrates on the political context and the political meaning of 
Sasha’s inactivity in Good Morning, Midnight and examines her ethical failure. 
Foregrounding the historical rise of fascism and the violence of other oppressive 
political regimes against which the narrative plays out, the chapter focuses on Sasha’s 
vacillation throughout the novel, and on questions concerning the demand for 
conformity, the centrality of the Serge plot and the impossibility of communality for 
Sasha. The latter half of the chapter analyses the crucial scene at the end of Part Two 
in which Sasha claims inaction as a valid social position. Crucially, I argue that in this 
novel Rhys develops a style of failure. Connections are drawn between, on the one 
hand, Sasha’s failure to think and act and, on the other a failure of language which can 
be understood as a modernist predicament. Using Deleuze’s understanding of literary 
style as the ways in which writers push language to its limit, and the important final 
chapter on art in What is Philosophy?, the chapter proposes that constant variation is a 
key stylistic device in Rhys’s attempt to deterritorialise language.  
Chapter Four draws on arguments in Deleuze’s important work Difference and 
Repetition to read Sasha’s passivity in Good Morning, Midnight as a form of death 
drive which works towards thinking beyond the given. The chapter probes Rhys’s 
critique of common sense and, focusing on scenes concerning visuality, close readings 
of Deleuze’s theoretical idea of a death drive and his chapter on the ‘Image of thought’ 
(both in Difference and Repetition) are related to Sasha’s inability to recognise violent 
sights. This inability is modelled as the text’s drive to think the unthinkable. The 
conclusion establishes connections between intertextuality, Deleuze’s logic of the 
outside – according to which the greatest exercise of any faculty involves the striving 
for the limit of that faculty – and his aesthetic concept of affect, biographical statements 




Ultimately, the chapter argues that in this novel Rhys confronts the possibility that the 
literary text and art more generally is passive and cannot effect meaningful change in 
a world that repeatedly tends towards violence.  
Chapters Five and Six turn the focus to After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, Voyage 
in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea in an examination of Rhys’s inscription of 
problematic maternal relationships and her rejection of female linearity. Reading these 
novels against Deleuze and Guattari’s Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, both of these 
chapters identify the difficult maternal relationship as the prototype for subsequent 
scenes of desire. Chapter Five begins by outlining the key ideas in the schizoanalytic 
concept of minor literature. It then turns to Rhys’s troubling of the concept of female 
transmission, which is read as a liberating movement away from tradition. However, 
in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie this break is not wholly realised. The central story arc 
– Julia’s return to the maternal home – is unravelled in terms of a more potent return 
to the childlike, a fantasy realm of isolation and freedom. The chapter posits Julia’s 
anger towards society as the impetus for her problematic becoming-child, which is a 
refusal to grow up and, crucially, a refusal to address in any direct sense her own 
oppressive desire and her complicity in her suffering and the suffering of others.  
This refusal is contrasted to Anna’s movement towards unwanted pregnancy or 
what I term her becoming-unmother in Voyage in the Dark, which is the focus for 
Chapter Six. It is argued that in Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea Rhys 
conducts a libidinal mapping, as she develops a strategy for engaging with the central 
importance of difficult desire in her writing. This third novel is read alongside the final 
one to show that in place of the female line (the transmission across generations), there 
are numerous thematic, symbolic and formal connections that resonate between 
dangerously different, politically potent scenes of desire across temporally divergent 
series. These connections are read in terms of the proliferation of the two contrary states 
of desire posited by Deleuze and Guattari in their book on Kafka: fascistic desire and 
schizoid desire. The absent maternal inheritance is, it is argued, the key to actualising 
the resonance between these divergent series and thereby making visible the radical 
political aspect of Rhys’s nuanced inscription of desire. The deterritorialisation of the 
maternal line, figured so dramatically by Anna’s sad fate in Voyage in the Dark, is 
positioned in this chapter as the liberating, dangerous and necessary line of flight that 




Crucially, this process involves a virtual communality that finally comes into sight at 
the end of the novel.  
The Coda turns to Wide Sargasso Sea to continue to trace this becoming-visible. 
Drawing together the various discussions through the thesis it proposes that anxiety is 
the dominant affect in Rhys’s novels. Grounding the discussion in Rhys’s descriptions 
of her feelings about authorship and incorporating a recent study of modernist anxiety 
by Anthony Cuda (2010), it is argued that the passivity of Rhys’s protagonists can be 
read as a figuration of an authorial anxiety surrounding the moment of succumbing to 
the artistic passions in the act of literary creation. This anxiety is related to the search 
Rhys conducts across her writing for the possibility of communality. To conclude, ideas 
about the ‘thought’ of art in What is Philosophy? are used to read the power of sensation 
in Part Three of Wide Sargasso Sea and to detail the intricate emergence in the text of 




Dancing through the minefield: tracing critical difficulties 
 
I. ‘Unpublishably sordid’ and ‘works of rare artistry’: the early 
response 
To an unusual extent, the history of Rhys criticism reflects the main developments in 
twentieth-century literary studies. For Elaine Savory, whose 1998 monograph and 2009 
Cambridge Introduction to Jean Rhys both include detailed accounts of Rhys studies, 
‘the narrative of Rhys criticism is the narrative of cultural and racial history’ (1998: 
198). As Savory observes of the early reviews in the 1920s and 30s, critics 
characteristically attended to form at the expense of politics and voiced praise for 
Rhys’s style but disapproval of content (1998: 198). From her first known attempt at 
fiction, in versions of what would become Voyage in the Dark, Rhys’s subject matter 
was challenging, with many readers finding her unabashed depiction of emotional 
devastation unwarrantable. ‘An unpublishably sordid novel of great sensitiveness and 
persuasiveness’ was the verdict of Stella Bowen, Ford Madox Ford’s common-law 




exaggerated but nonetheless typical response.22 A representative review of After 
Leaving Mr Mackenzie concludes that Rhys’s ‘preference for gloom is not artistic so 
much as personal’, a comment that suggests the unexamined sexism which dominated 
the early reception and has left its mark in the fact that despite the similarities Rhys’s 
work bears to literature by male writers of the unhappy human condition such as Albert 
Camus, Knut Hamsun and Samuel Beckett, her fiction, unlike theirs, has not generally 
been explored for its philosophical significance, and her brand of alienation has too 
often been pigeonholed as a mark of her gender, and read as the mark of either a 
limitation or pathology.23 The question considered in the pre-war reception remains a 
matter of debate today: whether Rhys’s fiction is too personal, too ‘utterly, intensely 
individual’ to allow it to function as a ‘social document’.24 This articulation was offered 
by Florence Haxton Britten in a 1935 review of Voyage in the Dark. Although Britten 
concludes that the personal nature of Rhys’s writing is indeed such a limitation, her 
piece is generally positive, arguing that Rhys’s novel shows a ‘fresh, sensitive vision’, 
and is a work of ‘rare artistry’ in which the author ‘put into words the thing itself. Just 
that. No metaphors’. Unusually for the inter-war criticism, Britten’s analysis suggests 
both Imagism and Ford’s Impressionism as influences. Of Rhys’s four earlier novels, 
Voyage in the Dark received the most praise at the time of initial publication although 
the praise was, of course, mitigated by those who condemned the moral degeneracy of 
the passive, promiscuous Anna.  
It is possible that changes in the political climate of Britain in 1935 allowed for 
a brief tolerance or even appreciation of Rhys’s subject matter. Either way, four years 
later Rhys was far less fortunate. The timing of the publication of Good Morning, 
Midnight in April 1939 was disastrous. With the imminent outbreak of war with 
Germany, critics were less tolerant of the apathy and fecklessness of her protagonist, 
and no longer welcoming of the challenging moral ambivalence of Rhys’s world. 
 
22 Bowen is commenting on the 1920s typed draft of what would become Voyage in the Dark. The 
manuscript was given to Ford with Rhys’s chosen title, ‘Suzie Tells’, and he suggested the alternative 
‘Triple Sec’ (Angier 1990: 131). This was Rhys’s first attempt at writing a novel, and a section from it 
entitled ‘Vienne’ was her first published work, appearing in Ford’s transatlantic review in 1924. The 
extant manuscript of ‘Triple Sec’ is held in UTC, 1976.011.1.5.11-12.   
23 ‘The Pursuit of Misery in some of the new novels’, Daily Telegraph, 30 January 1931. See the 
discussion on page 57. References in this paragraph to the early (pre-1968) criticism, except where 
otherwise stated, are taken from the book review press cuttings held in UTC, 1976.011.1. As much 
information as possible is given in the following, and I have made every effort at accuracy. 





‘Terrible’, ‘oddly impressive’, and ‘irritating’ were terms applied by Ralph Straus who, 
nonetheless, conceded that the book had a ‘considerable effect’.25 On republication in 
the 1960s, Bertrand Russell and Eva Figes viewed the novel with more circumspection, 
calling it ‘a damned romantic novel of a romantically damned love: mature and 
disturbingly original’.26 Yet there were (and still are) critics for whom Sasha is simply 
intolerable, as demonstrated in a Sunday Times piece from 1967 which is worth quoting 
at length for its passionate disapproval of Rhys’s ‘passionate one-sidedness’. ‘Sasha is 
the sort of woman one avoids with some reason’, writes Mary Conroy, 
 
and one feels Miss Rhys might have recognised the fact instead of letting Sasha 
poeticise herself silly: ‘Yes, I am sad, sad as a circus lioness, sad as an eagle 
without wings, sad as a violin with only one string and that one broken…’ 
It has been suggested that Miss Rhys’s work is ‘peculiarly modern.’ While 
an increasing standard of literacy may enable those who enjoy sentimentality 
to enjoy it with Miss Rhys, the passionate one-sidedness of her sympathy, and 
the double plea for admiration and condolence are far from modern. In her 
insistence that women live by one thread alone, that sin is glamourous and 
sadness rather fine, Miss Rhys is no more modern than Françoise Sagan and a 
good deal less so than Jane Austen and the Beatles.27  
 
Today Conroy’s complaint looks peculiarly unmodern. Her charge of self-indulgence 
presupposes that a ‘modern’ writer should demonstrate an appropriate restraint, and 
thus fails to comprehend the value of – and humour in – Rhys’s challenge to the 
established order. Conroy’s analysis entirely overlooks the formal techniques that Rhys 
skilfully deploys in her innovative depiction of modern consciousness, such as the 
fragmentation of a pared down prose and the interplay of contrasting linguistic 
registers. Conroy’s suggestion that Good Morning, Midnight lacks a certain, desirable 
singularity evidences a critical deafness to Rhys’s savage irony and polyvocality. The 
canon of the modern propounded by Conroy, every element of which agrees on fixed 
principles, and which proceeds smoothly in the tradition established within English 
borders is the very canon against which Rhys writes in her refusal of homogeny, the 
 
25 The Sunday Times, 11 June 1939.  
26 Guardian, 15 December 1967.  




singular and the complete, and her passionate denunciation of English respectability. 
Conroy’s review is defiantly dogmatic, providing an excellent template of how not to 
read Rhys. Her language recalls Bowen’s response and the attitude of Lois Heidler, 
Rhys’s fictional cipher for Bowen in Quartet, who dismisses the ‘simple’, ‘sweet’ 
songs of a Spanish entertainer on the grounds of inauthenticity: ‘She tries to get an 
atmosphere of fate and terror. The weak creature doomed and all that – such nonsense’ 
(Q, 68-69). Self-pity, a refusal to take responsibility, lack of will power and a childlike 
posturing are accusations frequently levelled at Rhys’s protagonists, and occasionally 
at Rhys herself. Cumulatively, they suggest that the central problem in her fiction is 
that the protagonists are Rhys’s mouthpiece for a Nietzschean ressentiment. However, 
the critique in Rhys’s writing of the judgement of supposed weakness and inferiority 
involves the reader’s positionality in such a way that the levelling of this charge is 
troubling. To judge weakness as self-indulgence or defect is, often, to speak from a 
place of relative security, to obscure the mechanisms of oppression and to perpetuate 
the association of all that is less ‘successful’ with immorality and inferiority. The good 
Lois opines that weakness is ‘a damn convenient excuse sometimes’ (Q, 69), thereby 
revealing her privilege and her fear of being contaminated by Marya’s defective moral 
code, but also problematising the same judgement from readers. The climate of literary 
studies today is less concerned with moral judgements than in the interwar years. 
Politically sensitive readings emerged with postcolonial theory, second and third wave 
feminism and poststructuralism in the 1970s and ‘80s and these developments, along 
with the general renewal of interest in Rhys following the publication of Wide Sargasso 
Sea, laid the intellectual foundations for the highly nuanced readings that, increasingly 
since the 1990s, interrogate the coincidence in her fiction of distinct political problems 
and Rhys’s form of writing back. 
 In the more recent studies, after Look Lai’s seminal 1968 essay which was the 
first to position Rhys as a West Indian writer, we can discern several critical divisions 
with readings often focusing on either the issue of Rhys’s racial politics or the issue of 
female complicity and the centrality of violence in this fiction. In outlining these 
responses, I first concentrate on problems of placing Rhys, and in the latter section of 
the chapter I explore feminist concerns and readings which attend to difficulty, affect 
and subjectivity. There is also a division between the critical camp which tends to read 
the protagonists’ problematic behaviour as the result of a personal defect or an 




symptom signifying an external lack (social injustice or the absent mother, for 
example) which has resulted in a depletion of their agency. Both of these approaches, 
to varying degrees, create problems for our appreciation of the radical political force 
of Rhys’s fiction, and I propose that we need to rethink the passivity of Rhys’s 
protagonists as a productive textual strategy. The disapproval voiced in the last fifty 
years has tended to aim its opprobrium not so much at the protagonists’ moral 
degeneracy as at the ambiguity of Rhys’s representation of violence and the attendant 
fact that she does not write in the right way against the oppression she depicts. Coral 
Ann Howells’s study, for example, which focuses largely on Rhys’s gender politics 
and idiosyncratic modernism, describes Rhys’s fiction as ‘fairly insidious’: insofar, 
writes Howells, as Rhys’s ‘female victim complex’ is presented in her writing as a 
‘distinctive construct of the feminine, it speaks to women’s deepest insecurities’ and 
confirms their ‘deepest fears’ (1991: 19-20). This thesis argues that Rhys’s fiction is 
dangerous, but not because it is insidious in how it speaks to women’s greatest fears. 
Rather, its ‘danger’ lies in the challenges it poses to its readers: that we think 
differently, that we question the ideal that says there is a ‘right way’ to write about the 
difficult life, and that we consider that the condition of safety itself may be a 
problematic notion that comes charged with bourgeois conventions and 
heteronormative assumptions about how to live and think. Rhys is a challenger of 
values. As such, her critical reception is fraught with disapproval and suspicion.  
 
II. Problems of place 
From Paris to plantation: how to read Rhys? 
Andrew Thacker’s work on the intensely complicated textual histories of Rhys’s work 
and the centrality in it of vast spaces, border crossings and other sorts of journeys 
explicates her politics of space and flags up the difficulty of establishing unity in any 
critical inquiry into Rhys (2003, 2012). Her published work defies easy generalisations 
concerning literary movements to which it might ‘belong’ and specific political 
agendas to which it might adhere. Rhys’s writing spans the era of ‘high modernism’ in 
the 1920s to the so-called postmodern decades of the 60s and 70s, and the texts have 
different concerns according to where they are set as the stories roam from the cities of 
Vienna, Paris and London to the estates and reserves of the West Indies.  My reading 




GoGwilt (2011) who have argued that Rhys ought to be read through a pluralised 
concept of modernisms.  
Two years after the publication of T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land and James 
Joyce’s Ulysses, Rhys had her first story, ‘Vienne’, published in Paris which, in 1924, 
was a centre of the international avant-garde. Consistent with the modernism associated 
with writers such as Eliot, Joyce and Ezra Pound, for the early part of her writing career 
Rhys, too, was ‘pan-European and cosmopolitan’ (Rainey 2005: xxii). Rhys’s unique 
depiction of a particular type of consciousness is, of course, a formal achievement as 
well as a thematic one. Characterising the well-known writers in Modernism: An 
Anthology (2005), which includes six of Rhys’s short stories, Lawrence Rainey 
describes the modernist use of ‘rigorous, difficult, yet coherent forms’ in order to 
provide distance from and control over the ‘contingencies of time and place’ (2005: 
xxii). Rhys’s fiction is not, in general, formally difficult but her intuitive, affective 
prose is ordered by what Emery describes as a ‘poetic logic’ (1990: 164), which 
depends on dramatic fragmentation and a series of symbolic structures and complex 
allusions – most often to popular culture and modern literature.  
Writing of Ulysses in 1923 in response to negative criticism the book had 
received, Eliot states that Joyce’s use of Homeric myth ‘provided a way of controlling, 
of ordering, of giving shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and 
anarchy which is contemporary history’ (2005: 167). There is futility in Rhys’s novels, 
and occasionally (as in the last half of Voyage in the Dark) a sense of encroaching 
anarchy, but rather than myth, it is the protagonist’s fraught consciousness which acts 
as the ‘register’ of the external tumult and ‘their fraught position in the world’ (Carr 
2012: 114). There are correlations between Eliot’s claims for Joycean form and Rhys’s 
writing of subjectivity which, in its permutations and deformations, gives poetic 
expression, and thereby ‘shape and a significance’, to the fact that the chaos without, 
even on the scale of the world historical, truly permeates the inner life. Rhys does not 
address history with the universal inflection found in Eliot’s meditations on time, but 
history is a burden and threat in her novels from After Leaving Mr Mackenzie onwards. 
Her fragmented prose, the protagonists’ awareness of the mutability of language, their 
alienation and ironic detachment, their metropolitan meanderings which are akin to and 
yet so distinct from that of the flâneur and the many allusions in the fiction to other art 




modernists.28 The recurrence of certain tropes and themes does likewise: homelessness, 
fleeting café conversation, popular songs and the language of advertising, casual sexual 
encounters in liminal city spaces, anxiety about make-up and the threat posed to the 
individual by that which is life-like but inanimate (such as mannequins) in her work all 
designate a particular modernist sensibility associated with London and Paris in the 
interwar years. 
Reading Rhys as a modernist writer is complicated by a certain postmodernist 
inflection in her prose. Language is not just unstable for Rhys. It is the object of a 
distrust which is accompanied by a Nietzschean, self-conscious refusal of rationalist 
presuppositions concerning ‘truth’, ‘good’, and the sovereign subject of universal 
reason. Still other preoccupations which are often understood as defining terms in the 
widely contested terminologies of postmodernism seem dominant in Rhys’s oeuvre – 
foremost among which are a sense of the loss of faith in progressivist discourses of 
modernity, and the collapse of distinction between spheres of experience which is at 
least partly the result of the fact that capitalism, in Rhys’s world, invades everything. 
Power in Rhys’s fiction is, as Carr observes, more Foucauldian than Marxist, 
determining as it does the inner life (thoughts, knowledge, desire, imagination) and 
bodily capacity of the characters as well as their material and social existence (2012: 
54, 108). In these ways and in others, Rhys’s writing resonates powerfully with certain 
strands of the theory and philosophy that have come to dominate Western social, 
cultural and literary studies since the 1960s.  
More importantly, a focus on Rhys’s modernism or any universal theory in 
relation to her fiction risks obscuring the centrality of her politics of place and identity. 
As discussed, managing this problem is a major task in my reading of Rhys through 
Deleuze, who has been accused – famously by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak – of 
‘ignor[ing] the question of ideology’ and his ‘own implication in intellectual and 
economic history’ (1988: 272). Proceeding in awareness of this difficulty, this thesis 
argues that Rhys’s investment in difference is not neutral but passionate: it is born from 
her acute social perception which is inseparable from her colonial heritage and her 
identity as a white West Indian Creole. This study concurs with those critics – the 
earliest among them being Look Lai (1968), Kenneth Ramchand (1970, 1976) and 
 
28 Judith Kegan Gardiner’s 1982 essay details Rhys’s intricate intertextuality in Good Morning, 




Wilson Harris (1980, 1983) – who have argued that Rhys must be read as a West Indian 
writer.  
Rhys’s inscription in Wide Sargasso Sea of the power struggles converging on 
a white Creole woman in post-Emancipation West Indian society involves class, race, 
nationality, gender and sexuality and takes as its backdrop Emancipation – a pivotal 
moment in the history of empire. Yet the questions, ideas, problems and possibilities 
inherent in Rhys’s writing of race and empire are central to the value of her work as a 
whole. Criticism since the 1990s has shown that while we might still regard Voyage in 
the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea as Rhys’s two ‘West Indian novels’ – as Teresa 
O’Connor’s described them in her influential 1986 study – the region and its history 
also constitute what Savory terms a ‘submerged text’ in the other three novels (Savory 
1998: 117).29 Importantly, in analysing Voyage in the Dark, the novel which evolved 
from Rhys’s first serious attempt at writing, many of these studies have demonstrated 
that it does not make sense to confine the Caribbean of Anna’s memory to family 
background, history or one aspect of her identity. There is a general Spivakian 
recognition that this 1934 work, which contains within it the first traces of Rhys’s 
authorship, shares with her final novel a concern with that most curious of socio-
historical facts whereby as impersonal a thing as imperialism determines the most 
personal of things – identity itself.  
In a 2010 essay which applies Deleuze’s model of the three syntheses of time 
from Difference and Repetition in a reading of Wide Sargasso Sea, Lorna Burns 
analyses the conceptual terrain occupied by both Deleuze and those theorising the 
postcolonial dilemma of how to allow for newness without repudiating the past. 
Burns’s essay is a noteworthy turning point in Rhys studies. Carol Dell’Amico was the 
first critic to draw detailed connections between Rhys and Deleuze, with her 2005 book 
Colonialism and the Modernist Moment in the Early Novels of Jean Rhys, but her 
argument still centres on a psychoanalytic reading of behaviour.30 Burns was the first 
to conduct a detailed examination of the complex connections between Rhys’s 
 
29 For example, Savory points out that in Good Morning, Midnight the Caribbean is momentarily made 
present in the Paris-set narrative, but in a relatively oblique sense. In Part Two as Sasha drifts off into a 
dreamlike fantasy in Serge’s studio, the geographical description and characteristic, affective imagery, 
serves, for readers ‘familiar with Rhys texts’, as ‘a sure code of the coastline of Dominica and Sasha’s 
inheritance of memory of the island’ (Savory 1998: 117). 





treatment of temporality and Deleuze’s philosophy.31 The essay argues that Rhys’s 
final novel explores and attempts re-creation in a dramatic and peculiarly affective 
manner. As Burns suggests, Harris’s early, subtle reading of the Arawak-Carib myth 
of re-birth in Wide Sargasso Sea is a persuasive approach to this elusive textual 
preoccupation. In ‘Carnival of psyche: Jean Rhys’s wide sargasso sea’, Harris argues 
that Rhys makes intuitive and perhaps ‘unconscious’ use of certain myths originating 
in the Caribbean and South America (1980). In characteristically idiosyncratic style, 
Harris proposes that Rhys’s novel allows successive generations of new readers to 
access new meaning hidden in old myths, as meaning emerges in dialogue with change 
over time. This is, I think, a particularly rich approach to reading Rhys. Harris 
highlights the importance of intuition in both Rhys’s writing and the process of reading 
her – a critical point which is central to this thesis and its attention to those moments 
in Rhys’s fiction which seem to exceed rational explanation. Harris’s unusual focus on 
Rhys’s re-creation and its significance for reading practices generally moves from the 
political into the abstract, but in so doing his arguments do not relinquish their political 
force but, rather, perform his contention that there are alternatives to the dominant 
forms of knowledge and thought in the Western tradition. Burns’s and Harris’s studies 
offer useful caution against underestimating the significance of what we might term the 
place of time in Rhys’s fiction – a literary production described by GoGwilt as being 
‘shaped by [Rhys’s] career-long investment in memories of the Caribbean environment 
of her childhood’ (2011: 63). Importantly, both critics demonstrate, in very different 
ways, how Rhys’s engagement with West Indian and Caribbean history coincides with 
her exploration of the idea of thinking anew.   
 
The collapse of distinction 
This study follows the work of Emery, Carr and Savory who have argued that the 
collapse of distinction is a fundamental characteristic of Rhys’s writing. In this fiction 
the distinction between the postcolonial and the modernist is not secure, and the 
political and aesthetic are often inseparable. To take an obvious example, it is 
 
31 In her 2002 book on Deleuze, Claire Colebrook refers briefly to Wide Sargasso Sea in her explication 
of Deleuze’s transcendental repetition from which newness emerges – a repetition which is of particular 
significance in postcolonial literature and other forms of ‘minor literature’. Such literature ‘repeats the 
past and present in order to create a future’, and the ‘hidden forces of difference [...] produce texts, rather 
than repeating the known texts themselves’ (Colebrook 2002: 120). There is more work to be done on 




problematic to understand the fragmentation of Rhys’s prose simply in terms of 
modernist experimentation with form, without also considering the author’s West 
Indian origins. Fragmentation is also a significant feature both of Rhys’s non-fiction 
prose (the Exercise Books, Letters and autobiography) and her poetry, thus suggesting, 
I believe, that this was an instinctive feature of her writing as much as a finely honed 
and self-conscious artistic mode.  
GoGwilt argues that we ought to be alert to the possible relation of this 
fragmentation to the heteroglossial world of Rhys’s childhood in Dominica (2011). As 
he describes, this was a divided and divisive linguistic world of West Indian Creole 
English, standard English, French and French patois which Rhys rendered into a self-
interrogating and specifically Creole form of modernism which was problematically 
determined by the facts of decolonisation and which works to disrupt assumptions 
about the English language and the author’s literary tradition (GoGwilt 2011). 
GoGwilt’s intricate comparative study is concerned with showing the ways in which 
the postcolonial and modernist aspects of Rhys’s writing are inseparable, thereby 
locating itself in the re-evaluative field of the new modernist studies that argues for a 
pluralised, differential understanding of geographically and temporally expansive 
modernisms. He explores the difficult relationships and tentative ‘affiliations’ between 
Rhys’s writing and the politically effective ‘Creole modernism’ that established itself 
in the decades between the 1950s and 1980s in the writings of Caribbean figures such 
as Harris, Derek Walcott, Kamau Brathwaite and Édouard Glissant, writing which ‘has 
enacted a decisive displacement of literary traditions and the relation between different 
traditions’ (GoGwilt 2011: 148).  
On the question of political allegiance, GoGwilt concludes that while affiliation 
might be possible between Rhys and other writing produced from an ‘outside 
perspective’, that is, in consciousness of the discontinuity between it and other literary 
traditions,  
 
to the extent that Wide Sargasso Sea also attempts to grasp the inside 
perspective of a particular Creole – the madwoman in the attic of Jane Eyre 
(1847) – the problem of identity, literary and racial identity, remains unsolved. 





GoGwilt places great importance on Rhys’s refusal of interpretative certainty, 
positioning this at the heart of the meaning-making processes in which, on his reading, 
her fiction is involved. However, as we see in the quotation above, his study also 
foregrounds the enormous complexity of Rhys’s writing. These two aspects of her work 
are inseparable. On the one hand, Rhys mines ambivalence and resists categorisation 
and dualistic thought. On the other, she delves into the murkiest issues of identity and 
the most complicated matters of political, social, sexual and literary life. Rhys does the 
latter in Quartet, in her exposé of the hypocrisies and the routine exploitations that 
enabled bohemian, Anglophone, Left Bank cultural life to work for those already safely 
cosseted by relative privilege in a ruthless system of burgeoning patriarchal capitalism. 
Yet the acme of Rhysian complexity is reached in Wide Sargasso Sea, as our author 
finds a form that allows her not just to explore how any one instantiation of a problem 
both reveals and conceals others, but also to take distinct approaches to a problem 
simultaneously. In this sense, then, it is not so much a question of whether Rhys invests 
more in the inside or the outside perspective, in GoGwilt’s example above; rather, the 
significance is that she manages to do both in one text. In a related point, considering 
the diverse usage of the term ‘Creole’, GoGwilt argues that this word had a crucially 
pluralised set of meanings for Rhys which she set to play in Wide Sargasso Sea to 
signify both ‘a particular kind of figure’, including white, black and mixed-race people 
born in the West Indies, and ‘something different, something more akin to the emerging 
theories of “creolisation” that shape the linguistic-literary formation of Creole 
modernism’ (GoGwilt 2011: 148-49). While this thesis does not explore ideas about 
creolisation, some of the main arguments are comparable to GoGwilt’s. I am proposing 
that two simultaneous operations concerning bad feeling are at play in the oeuvre as 
whole – one which has a resistant negative force, and the other which leads to an 
overcoming of negativity. Similarly, my final two chapters focus on Rhys’s inscription 
of multiple modes of desire in her second and third novels. Further work could be done 
on how Rhys’s style of approaching a problem in multiple ways enables us to untangle 
the relationship between her Creole modernism and what I am proposing is her minor 
literature. For now, though, it is worth noting that the fragmentation of her prose, with 
which this discussion opened, can be understood as a manifestation of the commitment 
to the multiple as opposed to the singular and linear.  
In arguing for a passivity which has a positive role in the politics and ethics as 




ambivalence and irresolvable contradictions involved in Rhys’s inscription of 
politically and socially contentious scenes, figures and concepts – such as the much-
contested term ‘Creole’. Carr states that the nineteenth-century imperialist imaginary 
fixed the attributes of indolence and moral lassitude to the figure of the white West 
Indian Creole, and that central to Rhys’s work is her investment in ‘writing back to 
[this] specific representation’ (2003a: 39). This writing back exposes ‘the authoritative 
language of power’ and the ‘injustices that keep [...] “things as they are”’ (Carr 2003a: 
44, 50); and it targets English respectability – that national self-image so integral to the 
production of the stereotype of white Creole degeneracy. Contending Veronica Gregg’s 
assertion of Rhys’s racism with a nuanced account of the conflicting statements 
concerning race that we find in both the fiction and non-fiction, Carr concludes that 
‘perhaps what it is important to note is how remarkably opposed to racism [Rhys] was 
for her day, and how far she resists or complicates the essentializing definitions that 
colonialism relied on’ (2003a: 53). Following these arguments, I suggest that while 
Rhys exposes the oppressive mechanisms of the English class system and the suffering 
of those who exist in the interstices of its social categories, she is also mocking the 
hypocrisy of its rigid moral system and deconstructing its notion of ‘good’ behaviour. 
The passivity of her protagonists can, then, be understood as Rhys’s refusal of the moral 
and social imperative to work which, when set in relation to the civilising mission of 
imperialism – the Europeans’ ‘first experiment in capitalism overseas’ as George 
Lamming describes it – assumes a doubly subversive function, constituting a notably 
weak yet disruptive rebuttal of imperialist economic and moral logic (Lamming 1995: 
23). Rhys’s alternative logic is the intuitive, and it is presented in an accordingly 
oblique fashion. This does not detract from the possibility of reading in her fiction a 
powerful alternative to Western rationality and its will to knowledge, the West’s 
imposition of a universal moral code and the capitalist rendering of life as a game of 
winners and losers. 
Since her seminal 1990 study, Emery has been leading the line of inquiry into 
Rhys’s expansive modernism, finding Rhys’s oeuvre rich ground for exploring the 
dynamic relations among European, third world and female modernisms (1990) and, 
more recently, for charting the transatlantic and global modernisms so central to 
debates in new modernist studies (2009, 2012a and 2012b). In the 2012 Oxford 
Handbook of Global Modernisms which, significantly, includes three entries which 




and modernity, including Glissant’s work on relationality, and Homi Bhabha’s concept 
of a contra-modernity that ‘may be contingent to modernity, discontinuous or in 
contention with it’ (Bhabha 1994: 6). Emery elaborates on their relevance for the recent 
expansion of the concept of modernism: 
 
We can revise modernism as global by merely adding new and different 
modernities to a picture already drawn, or we can reimagine the larger picture 
by locating the constitutive alterity simultaneously within and outside of 
modernity, a project that recognises the previously unassimilated as necessarily 
so. (Emery 2012a: 49) 
 
For Emery, Rhys’s register of this ‘constitutive alterity’ works in conjunction with 
other writers from the Caribbean region to form a contramodernism which ‘erupted in 
the contradictory encounter of global forces of modernity, those that made human 
beings into objects of property and those that promised emancipation’ (2012a: 53). 
Rhys’s prose rejects ‘the rationalist logic of received histories’, instead evoking ‘a 
palimpsest of time and mutable spaces of land and sea, gesturing toward a larger vision 
of the planetary even as they portray the contradictory violence and creativity of global 
exchange’ (Emery 2012a: 49, 59). Emery has developed a unique reading of Rhys’s 
magic realism as an important intervention into the production of grand narratives, and 
this work has been important in releasing Rhys criticism from the confines of the 
European literary tradition. For my purposes, the most valuable contention in Emery’s 
work on Rhys’s contramodernism and the idea of the planetary is that of Rhys’s refusal 
of a rationalist logic of time. Emery’s work catalogues the alternatives that Rhys offers, 
several of which are close to my schizoanalytic reading: Rhys’s non-western model of 
subjectivity; her refusal of dominant models of visuality; and her non-linear, non-
teleological concept of time. 
A related trend evidenced in the work of critics such as Dell’Amico and 
Christina Britzolakis (2007) focuses on Rhys’s inscription of the intersection of various 
power structures such as imperialism, capitalism and patriarchy.32 While immensely 
rich studies which locate political questions at the heart of ideas about modernist 
 
32 Although these critics locate their analysis in the European city, this intersection can also be situated 




literature, there is sometimes a tendency in these intersectional readings to 
overdetermine the protagonists as subjects with drastically limited agency. 
Intersectionality allows for a nuanced consideration of the difference of the experience 
of oppression, an awareness that different individuals – within larger demographic 
categories such as ‘women’ – contend with different forms of social difficulty, and that 
various forms of oppression are frequently bound to one another in ways which alter 
and intensify their effects. Clearly, this approach is well suited to this fiction which 
targets capitalist ruthlessness, racism, patriarchy, misogyny and, more generally, 
intolerance to difference. In this critical vein, the protagonists are often read as making 
manifest and, to that extent, disturbing hegemonic processes of objectification and 
exclusion. Yet, reading the fractured nature of their inner lives as primarily an effect of 
these combined and dominant forms of power – albeit an effect which has the power 
to disturb the status quo – forecloses on the potentialities which Rhys’s inscription of 
fraught subjectivity creates. It may be the case, as Sedgwick argues in her 1997 riposte 
to ‘paranoid’ readings (2003: 123-151), that analysing these texts in terms of the many 
different types of power which are operating negatively and simultaneously on these 
protagonists inevitably tends towards a picture in which their agency is overshadowed. 
In this way, all counterintuitive and obscure forms of being and resisting are 
categorised as aspects of hegemony – at best, mere reflections of exclusionary and 
negating practices, rather than as part of any positive aesthetic and ethical stance. 
Rhys’s fiction demands to be read with a sensitivity to the dynamic, multifarious 
manifestations and operations of power which constitute modern life. Such a reading 
can produce a very bleak picture. However, Rhys’s writing also makes other sorts of 
demands which create possibilities for meaning rather than exposing, or serving as 
platforms for, already-established meaning. These are demands which are implied – 
which the texts yield up rather than state – and which involve a sensitivity to 
Antoinette’s statement that ‘[t]here is always the other side, always’ (WSS, 106). Power 
never operates in just one direction in this fiction; the protagonist is never entirely 
without agency; it is up to the reader to interpret the ‘negative’ in these texts, and – a 
central claim of this study – Rhys’s fiction problematises negative judgement of the 
relatively powerless female other. Accordingly, this thesis pays close attention to the 
subversive potential of hard-to-discern and counterintuitive forms of resistance and the 




This self-conscious positivity is not simple. Nor is it to underplay the bad 
feeling in Rhys’s writing and the existing criticism. Rather, I propose that bad feeling 
gives this writing great force. In Rhys’s sympathetic re-writing of the history of the 
dispossessed white West Indian Creole, Rhys made herself part of what, in 1966, was 
urgent political discourse. Her last novel seems to lay claim to being heard in the 
debates of its historical moment concerning West Indian history, literature and identity. 
For some, Rhys’s racial identity renders any such claim problematic at best and 
dishonest at worst. This was the issue debated by Brathwaite and Peter Hulme in the 
1990s across a series of articles for the journal Wasafiri. In 1974 Brathwaite put 
forward the view that white Creoles could not be identified with the spirit of West 
Indian culture. Two decades later, Hulme took up this argument, making the case for a 
pedagogical approach to Wide Sargasso Sea which centres on a troubling of the 
categories being applied. He draws on Ramchand’s 1976 claim that we can justify the 
teaching of this novel on a course on West Indian literature because the text makes us 
think: it poses challenges by making us analyse what it is that ‘makes a West Indian 
novel? and what do we mean when we say that a writer is a West Indian writer’ 
(Ramchand 1976: 93). For Hulme, the critical literature had by the mid-1990s 
established that the textual problem being grappled with by critics across diverse 
scholarly positions is not a matter of ‘essential and exclusive qualities in the novel’, but 
one which concerns ‘the kinds of cases that can be made out for certain sorts of linkage’ 
(1994a: 10). Importantly, Hulme highlights the fact that this novel reveals, above West 
Indian or Caribbean concerns, a set of ‘specifically Dominican affiliations’ (1994a: 8). 
In response, Brathwaite voices both impatience with what he sees as overly complacent 
relativism, and suspicion of critics’ tendency to use a naïve and revisionist language of 
‘competition’ in regards to Antoinette’s positionality (comparing the suffering of the 
white Creole woman to that of black West Indians, for example). He argues that it is 
the duty of the critic to approach the problematic issue of the post/coloniality and West 
Indian credentials of Wide Sargasso Sea with the awareness that ‘who you are inc yr 
ETHNICITY determines how you SEE Caribb (or any?) culture’ (Brathwaite 1995: 
70). For Brathwaite in 1995, the majority of the readings of the novel had not been duly 
attentive to the troubling aspects of Rhys’s depiction of racial politics which, for him, 
is epitomised by Rhys’s depiction of the historically impossible friendship between 
Antoinette and Tia. Rather than opening up the potential significations and linkages of 




agendas and, for many, a certain ‘element’ of white ‘guilt’ (Brathwaite 1995: 73). 
Further study is warranted on how the bad feeling which manifests in a certain form of 
highly charged, emotive language encountered relatively often in Rhys criticism speaks 
to Brathwaite’s charge. Hulme’s troubling of categories is a useful method for reading 
Rhys, and one which I follow here, and yet my study is equally in agreement with 
Brathwaite’s claims about the necessity of the reader’s awareness of her perspective.  
One reason I have outlined the Brathwaite-Hulme debate is because their 
exchange illuminates the difficulty of engaging critically with Rhys’s work – 
collectively, their arguments forcefully demonstrate that no reading can be all things to 
all readers. The same can be said of all literature, but this is an unusually potent and 
necessarily political dimension of the act of thinking critically about Rhys’s last four 
novels in particular. The aim in the following chapters is to proceed in appreciation of 
the issue of perspectivism in Rhys’s writing and in awareness of the partiality of my 
reading, while offering interpretations focusing on what I contend is the political 
meaning of certain aspects of Rhys’s difficult narratives and attending to the political 
force of Rhys’s general stylistic tendency to destabilise, described well by Savory: 
 
The Rhys woman is a subversive not just in intention and reaction to social 
conditions but in her very existence as a puzzling, riddling, self-questioning 
loose cannon who continually destabilises conventional values for women, 
sexuality and male behaviour towards women and all easy definitions of 
national, class and ethnic identity. Rhys’s collective portrait of women at 
different stages of life destabilises all easy definitions, racial, gender, class and 
national. (Savory 1998: 83)  
 
Can Christophine be contained? 
How, then, can we square this reading of Rhys as a challenger of values with her own 
occasional lapse into what sometimes appears to be close to Orientalist revisionism and 
even an unthinking racism? In what is probably the most problematic and discussed 
example of what may be evidence of latent racist assumptions, Rhys writes in a letter 
of 1966 to her editor, Diana Athill, of whether she can justify how ‘articulate’ she made 
the black servant/nursemaid character of Christophine in Wide Sargasso Sea (Letters, 
297). Critics such as Carolyn Vellenga Berman (2006) and Gregg (1995) have cited 




term ‘Creole’ which had originally served as a neutral term for a regional language, 
and as ‘Othering’ the black West Indian in her writing through an imagination with a 
‘profoundly racialised, even racist structure’ (Gregg 1995: 37). Gregg’s study, Jean 
Rhys’s Historical Imagination: Reading and Writing the Creole is the most 
unequivocal investigation into Rhys’s ‘racist’ credentials. In a central claim, 
comparable to one in Carr’s 1996 book, Gregg argues that one of the most significant 
aspects of Rhys’s work is her inscription of the ‘historical and discursive processes 
through which the Creole subjectivity is construed’ (1995: 24). The crucial difference 
between Carr’s and Gregg’s analyses is the latter’s emphasis on the proximity of 
Rhys’s writing to the discourses which have historically constituted Creole 
subjectivity. Whereas Carr emphasises the ambivalence and dynamism of Rhys’s 
depiction of the processes by which a particular type of consciousness is ‘formed and 
deformed’ (2012: 51), Gregg focuses on how Rhys’s writing ‘participates in contending 
representations of the West Indies’ (1995: 25) and concludes that, while Rhys writes in 
critical awareness of the problems of her white Creole perspective, ‘exposing the fault 
line and fissures in the colonialist discourse it repeats’, the texts nevertheless emerge 
from a ‘perspective which articulates the political values and the emotional and 
psychological investments embodied in […] colonialist discourse’ (1995: 72, 37). 
From Gregg’s stance, the mixed race and black characters in Wide Sargasso Sea are 
‘only props’ that Rhys ‘exploits’, and this supports Gregg’s claim that Rhys remains 
‘entrapped in the same assumptions she critiques’ (1995: 37). I contest this point on the 
ground that in Rhys’s novels all the secondary characters (white, black and mixed race) 
are precisely this – ‘props’. At most they are endowed with a limited form of inner life 
onto which the reader is given a brief window of access. Mr Horsfield in After Leaving 
Mr Mackenzie is allowed his own realistic cowardice, and in Wide Sargasso Sea a 
section of the novel is largely given over to the husband to voice his side of things. Yet 
Rhys’s interest always centres on the experience of her protagonists alone. For her 
secondary characters she provides occasional details rather than portraits of their 
origins, kinship networks, pleasures, troubles and memories; and, though their 
destructive desires are delineated, positive motivation is largely omitted. This is as true 
for Laurie and Ethel in Voyage in the Dark as it is for Daniel and Tia in Wide Sargasso 
Sea.  
I also agree with Carr’s compelling argument that what Gregg takes as Rhys 




equally be read as Rhys’s honest, if difficult, understanding of the racial politics she 
experienced in Dominica: 
 
Rhys’s characters can be situated within the archive of colonial stereotypes with 
which we are now so familiar, but they most often break out of them. Gregg 
appears to interpret her awareness that the whites are regarded with hostility or 
hatred by some of the black or coloured Dominicans as racist; it might be 
thought more, in the early twentieth century and possibly even more in 1936, 
when Rhys had her one return visit, a painfully honest realisation of the facts. 
(Carr 2003b: 106) 
 
To write about racism is, of course, not necessarily to align oneself with the racist views 
one depicts. In the opening pages of the husband’s narrative in Part Two of Wide 
Sargasso Sea the reader is forced suddenly out of Antoinette’s consciousness, which is 
mired in profound ambivalence and painful awareness of violence, and into a 
vehemently racist mind-set. Rhys leaves us in no doubt of the husband’s attitude to all 
that is different from him: Antoinette’s homeland, its black and mixed-race inhabitants 
and their customs are ‘debased’, ‘not civilised’, ‘savage’ (WSS, 57, 61). When he 
overcomes his fear of Christophine sufficiently to voice his disapproval of this woman 
who is ‘blacker than most’ (61), he declares that her ‘language is horrible’, her manner 
of wearing celebratory dress is ‘not a clean habit’, and ‘she looks so lazy. She dawdles 
about’ (71-72). While Rhys gives the husband a voice through which his weakness and 
cruelty are explained and given nuance, and which thereby prevents him from being a 
two-dimensional villain, she also allows no room for doubt concerning his character. 
In this respect, at least, Rhys makes things clear: his is a reprehensibly racist view 
which utilises accusations and stereotypes that are engrained in the language of colonial 
relations. In my opinion, Rhys’s narrative and characterisation express an authorial 
condemnation of racism.  
Returning to the thornier issue of the hostility against the white Creole woman 
that we encounter in Wide Sargasso Sea and elsewhere in her writing, I read this, 
following Carr, as a truthful if difficult presentation of real conflict and racial tensions 
experienced by Rhys. It is worth noting that she depicts such hostility as working in 
several directions: white against black and black against white (although the category 




white and black against the Carib people. In my view, we should neither discard nor 
simply try to ‘solve’ the problematic of Rhys’s positionality when she writes on race. 
The problems may be read productively. The fact that violence in her novels is 
unavoidable is helpful in thinking about the political problems of her autobiographical 
statements on race: to some degree they may be Rhys’s refusal to let her youthful self 
‘off the hook’, while also refusing to keep quiet about that which it is not easy to say.  
The ideology of Rhys’s presentation of racial conflict remains a sticking point. 
Savory tackles this question in her 1998 study, deciding that Rhys was both ‘racist and 
anti-racist’(x). In response to the interpretation that Tia in Wide Sargasso Sea stands 
for Rhys’s ambivalent, idealised identification with black Dominicans, Savory writes, 
 
Rhys certainly reflects the prejudices of her time, race and class, but she also 
marks a pathway for white writers, for whom too much liberal guilt and refusal 
to offend is as dangerous as racism itself. At least Rhys found an honesty which 
opens dialogue: she was in many ways ahead of her time in that willingness to 
deal with race. (Savory 1998: 135) 
 
Despite the difference of their readings of Rhys’s racial politics, Carr and Savory agree 
that Rhys’s writing proceeds from a particularly difficult honesty – which could, 
perhaps, be rephrased as an honesty concerning difficulty. In an interesting testament 
to Rhys’s capacity for troubling readers, Savory’s opinion on this matter seems to shift 
considerably in subsequent studies, and by 2003 she no longer sees honesty in the final 
novel but precisely the opposite: Savory argues that the emotional immaturity and 
alcoholism which in the earlier novels were still allowed as deficiencies by Rhys are, 
in Wide Sargasso Sea, positively romanticised. The Antoinette-Christophine 
relationship is rehearsed as a pernicious combination of inequality and wilful blindness, 
with the young woman using her black servant as a substitute mother while remaining 
securely mired in a childlike level of illusion and escapism. Rhys exoticises Obeah in 
a troublesome manner: its use as the ‘mainspring of the plot’ is ‘manipulative’ (Savory 
2009: 88). Various romanticised aspects of the text constitute its nostalgic mode of 
longing for an Edenic Caribbean world, which cloaks real, personal and historical 
difficulties in a seemingly treasured aura of vanished, idyllic exoticism. This ‘gothic 
romance [is] entirely different in tone’ from the earlier novels (Savory 2009: 80); it 




Savory’s argument that the novel’s romantic mode gives rise to political 
problems that are avoided in the earlier, relatively realist novels is compelling, but I 
cannot wholly agree with her assessment of Antoinette as wilfully deluded. On my 
reading, Antoinette is not just mired in illusion but is a profoundly uncertain character 
who is acutely aware that ‘there is always the other side’. Her state of being is dream-
like and vague; she cannot or will not comprehend the history which divides her from 
Tia and is the ugly occasion of her relationship with Christophine. While in the context 
of the lush, decadent Caribbean landscape of the novel these attributes are highly 
problematic, it remains possible to read them as part of Rhys’s counter to dogmatic 
rationalism (the husband’s certainty) and the violence committed in the name of the 
will to knowledge. If she cannot ‘know’ history, it is perhaps because the history to 
which she has access is the history told by and for the colonisers. Antoinette’s adequate 
knowledge of the history of white, black and Carib on the island is an impossibility, 
Rhys suggests. This is not wholly pessimistic but rather constitutes an insistence on the 
effort needed for authentic knowledge to be possible, and Antoinette’s intuitive and 
mysterious concluding call to Tia affirms the function of feeling in this effort, as I argue 
in the Coda to this thesis. The romantic landscape of Wide Sargasso Sea may well be 
a problem for the reader, rather than for Antoinette – being that which may seduce us 
into associations which are maybe too easy (given what I am arguing is Rhys’s 
commitment to difficulty): the romantic backdrop does not necessarily mean that 
Antoinette’s vagueness is romantic or dishonest. Identification in Rhys’s oeuvre is, I 
contend, never positive. I am thus cautious about equating the character of Antoinette 
with her island or with formal attributes of the text.  
The most famous answer to whether Rhys’s last novel is anti-racist and anti-
imperialist is Spivak’s 1985 essay, ‘Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of 
Imperialism’. For Spivak the character of Christophine is the litmus test for Rhys’s 
textual politics, and she asks whether Christophine can speak or is only a silenced other 
in the text, marking only its limits. Spivak concludes, famously, in the negative: 
Christophine is a silenced subaltern who cannot be ‘contained’ by a text which operates 
in the ‘interest’ of the oppressed white woman (1985: 253). Spivak’s criticism concerns 
the claim made by Western critics of Christophine’s effective resistance, as well as 
Rhys’s somewhat too-easy alignment of Christophine’s otherness with that of the white 
Creole Cosway-Mason women. For Spivak, the subaltern cannot be made to speak by 




recover an autonomous form of subjectivity for the Others of Europe that will allow 
them to speak for themselves’ is a fundamentally flawed exercise predicated on the 
need of ‘First World intellectuals to know and thereby control the Other of the West’ 
(1991: 81). In the conclusion to Maxwell’s extensive account of the debate between 
Spivak and Benita Parry (Spivak’s primary theoretical opponent in this matter), 
Maxwell concludes in favour of Spivak, defending her against Parry’s charge of over-
theorisation and arguing that  
 
faced with this prospect of the inevitable, Hegelian subordination of the Other 
which attends the act of speaking for the Third-World subject, the most that 
post-colonial intellectuals can hope to do is to continue critiquing the subject of 
the West. This is Spivak’s position. (Maxwell 1991: 81)  
 
I propose that rather than focusing only on whether Christophine is imbued with 
sufficient agency and authenticity, we think through this problem as we also attend to 
the possibility that the problematic relationship between Antoinette and her nursemaid 
constitutes a productive textual difficulty involved in Rhys’s project of unsettling all 
easy concepts and categories, including those of relationality and ideological 
affiliation. Though dramatically different in purpose, this position is not altogether 
dissimilar to Spivak’s refusal of the binary logic structuring the First World 
intellectual’s discourse of the Third World subject.   
 As the arguments outlined here demonstrate, the questions at stake in the 
Spivak-Parry and the Hulme-Brathwaite debates, which were part of the explosion of 
postcolonial theory in the late 1980s and ‘90s, are still contested today, though we 
might perhaps say that their urgency has abated as an appreciation of the challenges 
posed by Rhys’s work to dialectical thinking has developed. To read her today as for 
or against decolonisation, for or against mainstream, collective forms of feminist or 
class resistance is, I suggest, of relatively limited value. Instead, following deCaires 
Narain, Carr and Emery, whose arguments are outlined at the end of this chapter, my 
analysis focuses on the potential in Rhys’s exploration of difficult life.  
Every affiliation in Rhys’s texts is at once a disaffiliation; every gain is also a 
loss. The conflicts of race and racial identification are a crucial set of problems in her 
creative schema and not, I contend, something to be resolved or ‘worked out’. They are 




settling too easily into established patterns of thought which are reinforced by the 
conventions of the bourgeois novel as well as by a binary logic in which exploration is 
confined by the parameters of well-worn stereotypes, grand narratives and rigid 
academic categories. In so doing, Rhys encourages us to follow creative and generous 
lines of flight in our reading and thinking.  
 
III. Problems of life  
The biographical ‘phallacy’ 
I turn now to what might broadly be described as concerns with unhappiness, at the 
heart of which is the problem of language in Rhys’s writing. This problem is not 
confined to issues concerning the inadequacy of words but includes, of course, the 
inadequacy of people and the fact that in Rhys’s vision, language is frequently used as 
a ‘weapon’ (GMM, 44). Rhys’s fiction is replete with moments in which language is 
used cruelly and inflicts pain, but feminist critics in particular have focused on the 
mechanisms through which language inflicts violence over time as it performs the work 
of dominant regimes. Now recognised as a key principle of Rhys’s fiction, the linguistic 
problem has been subject to a vast range of interpretations, many of which anchor 
themselves to Rhys’s personal difficulties. Her biographer Carole Angier, for example, 
takes Rhys’s emphasis on violence – worldly and linguistic – as evidence of her 
penchant for self-pity and revenge fantasies, her distrust of people being alchemised 
into a mistrust of words (1990: 139, 405). Many psychoanalytical readings have 
retained a biographical focus, often taking as their cue Rhys’s unpublished account in 
her Black Exercise Book of the sexual abuse she suffered as a young teenager (at 
somewhere between the ages of twelve and fourteen (Angier 1990: 27)), perpetrated 
by a much older family acquaintance named Mr Howard. Such criticism includes 
studies by Deborah Kloepfer (1989), Anne Simpson (2005), Maren Linett (2005) and 
Kristen Czarnecki (2009). This work generally explains the violence which lurks within 
Rhys’s prose in terms of trauma, depression and personal loss.  
My exploration of the potential in unhappy states draws little on these studies, 
not least due to my belief that Rhys’s inscription of unhappiness is well considered 
through her profound intellectual engagement with difference and embodied 
subjectivity. Female authors are still too often marginalised by the erroneous sexist 




philosophical significance to Rhys’s work by aligning her representation of difference 
with Deleuze’s work may appear unduly grandiose – perhaps also thus perpetuating the 
Western masculinist privileging of the intellectual over the emotional which works to 
devalue non-rationalist ways of conceiving of experience – it is a risk that I believe is 
worth taking. In an important essay of 1982, Judith Kegan Gardiner analyses Rhys’s 
rich intertextuality in Good Morning, Midnight, identifying her incorporation of Emily 
Dickinson, John Keats, Oscar Wilde, Sidonie Gabrielle Colette, Anatole France, 
Virginia Woolf, Ernest Hemingway and James Joyce among others. Even by 1982, 
when Rhys’s interest in intertextuality and writing back had been made explicit with 
the publication of her final novel, this particularly literary quality of her writing had 
been largely overlooked in the criticism, along with other intellectual and philosophical 
concerns. At the end of her essay, Gardiner describes the bias through which women’s 
writing is, by the fact of the author’s sex, personalised: 
 
When a writer like Joyce or Eliot writes about an alienated man estranged from 
himself, he is read as a portrait of the diminished possibilities of human 
existence in modern society. When Rhys writes about an alienated woman 
estranged from herself, critics applaud her perceptive but narrow depiction of 
female experience and tend to narrow her vision even further by labelling it 
both pathological and autobiographical. The myth of Rhys as despised and 
solitary recluse furthers this misapprehension of her work. (Gardiner 1982: 247) 
 
Gardiner’s essay is just one of the first in a line of criticism which has established that 
Rhys’s fiction deconstructs the distinction between the personal and public, as well as 
that between many other apparent fixed oppositions. Gardiner is interested in 
demonstrating Rhys’s credentials as a highly literary artist whose 1939 novel 
incorporates a canonical literary tradition (which includes women but is dominated by 
men) in order, partly, to write against the easy, bourgeois and false oppositions which 
this tradition sustains – those ‘polarisations about sex, class and moral value that 
oppress women and the poor’ (1982: 233). The passage quoted above indicates the 
ironic fact that while Rhys’s novel undermines the logic of dualistic thinking, where 
one term is privileged at the expense of the other – such as the distinction between the 
good wife and the immoral prostitute, or between the happy, sexual young woman and 




has been categorised by many critics precisely according to such an opposition and 
labelled personal rather than intellectual. Gardiner shows that Rhys’s work is 
intellectual, and studies such as Carr’s (2003a, 2012) have shown that her intellectual 
concerns and inscription of intimately personal experience frequently coincide. Rhys 
did not continue writing about her life in the way that she does in Quartet. In the years 
after Quartet, her life came to centre on her writing, and I think that her writing 
developed to concern the situation of her writing. In tandem with this progression, Rhys 
developed a poetic language increasingly capable of registering the fraught experience 
of being enmeshed in a world which is all too often violent. I aim to show in this thesis 
that by her final novel these two concerns had become one.  
 
Mining the unspoken: feminist psychoanalytic responses  
Psychoanalytic criticism has done the most work in probing and speculating about 
Rhys’s writerly intentions and the significance that certain ideas held for her, both 
consciously and unconsciously. Since the late 1970s, psychoanalytic feminist readings 
have focused on female difficulty in her fiction and sought answers and clues in this 
‘dark’ terrain, mining the unknown, the unknowable and, crucially, the unsayable. 
Nancy Harrison’s 1988 study and Deborah Kloepfer’s book, The Unspeakable Mother: 
Forbidden Discourse in Jean Rhys and H.D, the following year, are representative 
examples of the psychoanalytic feminist readings which have positioned Rhys’s fiction 
as a form used by the author to work through psychical problems of desire which are 
inextricable from the reality of male dominance and which include, and may even be 
determined by, the fact of having a limited access to a male language. These studies 
have ensured that it is virtually impossible to ignore the fact that this fiction is about 
protagonists who have difficulty with the dominant discourse and the discourses of 
dominance.  
Nancy Harrison argues that the recording of a woman’s unspoken response 
within the framework of a masculine speech or discourse is the point of the novels – 
not what the characters desire to say (1988). She contends that Rhys’s fictional world 
is not a demi-monde, as often suggested, but a world of women’s speech, of women 
talking back, saying what they want to say in the interstices of ‘real’ dialogue. For 
Harrison, Rhys utilises a heightened example of a fundamental strategy of women’s 
writing: this is a writerly self-consciousness unique to women, which constitutes a 




ways in which the lives of its characters are determined by discourse (Harrison 1988: 
3). This staging, for Harrison, functions in a unique manner, speaking to its female 
audience of the female experience of being trapped in male discourse. It  
 
invites the reader to personal participation, allows the drama of women’s 
writing to surface in form as well as content. For the woman reader, the 
woman’s novel invokes an audience whose response is communal, though 
private – ‘communal’ because it is perceived by each reader as private and 
personal. (Harrison 1988: 3)  
 
As Andrew Gibson points out, Harrison’s claim of a singular female readership ‘fails 
to take account of the play of difference across identity’, and therefore allows her to 
‘still believe in a “we” who share tradition or a conversation’ (1999: 171). Gibson’s 
comments appear in a study concerned with ethical frameworks that are based on 
difference, rather than identification (1999: 171); and, drawing on various 
philosophers, including Emmanuel Levinas, he locates ‘self-difference’ at the heart of 
Rhys’s profoundly ethical fiction. His intervention flags up the limitation of Harrison’s 
argument, and in so doing raises various difficult questions, including the irrepressible 
matter of how to balance the need of an historically oppressed group to claim an identity 
with both the need to recognise diversity within groups, and the project – contested, 
but supported by many – of breaking the dominance of oppositional logic generally. 
Harrison’s arguments deserve to be contextualised within the project of recuperating 
previously overlooked women’s writing, which was a particular concern in Anglo-
American feminist scholarship in the 1980s. Her study deals with questions of literary 
history and feminist theory more generally, and her delineation of the woman’s novel 
should be considered against the history that gave rise to the need for such a concept. 
Today, some of Harrison’s arguments seem overly optimistic and problematically 
unselfconscious in their eliding of the differences among women; and yet, I think her 
study is particularly valuable for its demonstration of the fact that women – such as 
Harrison – are powerfully affected by the message of female affirmation in these 
stories, and by the nuanced and complicated mode through which this message is 
delivered.  
In a comparative study which theorises female language through lack rather 




Dark and Antoinette in Wide Sargasso Sea) as speaking back to a dead mother (1989). 
Reading the dead mother as a trope for textlessness, Kloepfer thereby argues that these 
women are working towards a way of speaking the unspeakable. Like Harrison, 
Kloepfer draws on psychoanalytic feminist thinkers, such as Hélène Cixous ([1975] 
1976), Julia Kristeva (1980) and Nancy Chodorow (1978). She argues that the maternal 
sphere is a place of dissonance within language and thus a peculiarly complicated site 
for Rhys’s protagonists, who are drawn instinctively to the realm of the non-verbal. 
Their problem with language is no simple madness or muteness, but a passing on of 
what has been cut out in the Symbolic order, and a feminist assault on the privileging 
of the signifier in androcentric discourse. Both of these books argue that Rhys develops 
a feminist poetics, and both offer valuable insights into her reception. Harrison 
foregrounds the intellectual dimension of Rhys’s poetics by illuminating her intricate 
intertextuality. Kloepfer highlights the ‘blind spot’ which has excluded Rhys from the 
inner circle of ‘high’ Anglo-American modernists. The main question raised by these 
feminist studies is: to what extent is the voice of the Rhys protagonist silenced, unheard, 
or disruptive? Kloepfer is far more equivocal than Harrison in regards to the third 
possibility.  
This question is an important one in Rhys criticism, and is raised in different 
contexts by many other political readings. Does Rhys’s subversive textual politics 
remain always as indirect critique, by exposing the oppressive effects of social and 
political injustice on the protagonists and revealing their difficult mode of being as an 
effect or a response, or does it work against the status quo in a more active way? Stated 
otherwise, how effective is Rhys’s writing back or counter-discourse? This thesis 
argues that Rhysian passivity is an obstinate non-conformity and part of a strategy of 
insistent difference which works in the worlds of the narratives but also on the reader. 
This is a similar argument to those made by Elizabeth Abel (1979) and Arnold 
Davidson (1985), who both contend that certain difficulties and conflicts in Rhys’s 
fiction can be resolved to an extent if we understand Rhys to be intentionally 
manipulating the reader, moving her towards unlikely expectations and judgements.  
Davidson argues that Rhys manipulates the reader’s expectation of plot 
development in the bourgeois novel (1985). My reading of Good Morning, Midnight 
similarly takes Sasha’s troubling repetition as a refusal of teleology and 
heteronormative readerly expectations. Abel’s early, highly influential feminist reading 




and schizoid inner lives are an exaggerative, literary means of ‘expos[ing] submerged 
realities’ whereby ‘woman’s common experience’ opens ‘into the pathological’ (1979: 
170). The protagonists’ passivity and helplessness are best understood as being 
‘schizoid-like’, in the sense developed by R. D. Laing in 1960 for the distinction 
between a mild precursor to and the full-blown schizophrenic state: this schizoid state 
is a legitimate though cyclical response to certain interpersonal interactions which have 
resulted in the protagonists lacking ‘ontological security’ (Abel 1979: 157). Political 
and social oppression renders these women childlike, helpless and passive, causing 
them to be treated increasingly as helpless individuals; significantly, there is ‘a 
continuum between the general lack of confidence produced in women by cultural 
attitudes and the radical lack of sense of self characteristic of schizophrenia’ (Abel 
1979: 169). The excessive helplessness of Rhys’s protagonists usefully gives visible 
form to the often-obscured effects of patriarchal violence.  
Abel argues that it is in Wide Sargasso Sea that the radical force of Rhys’s 
critique is given fullest form. Antoinette becomes ‘representative of women’s 
disintegration’ just as Jane in Jane Eyre is (or has been) the representative of their 
successful integration (1979: 172). The characters in this text and the confrontations 
between them are archetypal: Antoinette represents intuition and subjectivity and 
Rochester represents rationality and objectivity (O’Connor adds Christophine’s 
pragmatics into the mix (1986)). Rhys dramatises the interaction of two fundamentally 
different ways of ordering experience and, by making the rational and objective 
husband the villain of the piece and the foremost agent of imperialism in the novel, 
forces us to ‘re-examine our response to madness’ (Abel 1979: 173). Rhys shows 
experience and language to be relative, not absolute – they are, Abel says, ‘fluid’: as 
the husband tries to impose his form of perception onto Antoinette, Rhys shows us that 
‘to impose strict categories is to falsify’ and the author thereby ‘forces us to question 
our own logical categories’ (1979: 173). Abel’s essay is highly relevant in this thesis 
because she conceives of Wide Sargasso Sea as enacting an epistemological conflict in 
which the reader is forcibly implicated. Rhys  
 
force[s] our intellectual and emotional responses into contradiction. Because 
we know objectively that Antoinette is mad, while we feel subjectively that she 
regains her sanity, we undergo the conflict that the novel dramatises in its 




are forced to ask ourselves the question that the novel poses: how does one 
judge experience? (Abel 1979: 175)  
 
In Abel’s opinion Rhys does not provide easy answers, but positively stresses the 
intuitive as a mode of perception and cautions the reader against objective rationality 
concerning this text in which imperialism is shown to be ‘intellectual as well as 
economic’ (1979: 175).  
At times Abel’s reading does not account sufficiently for the intersecting forms 
of power depicted in Rhys’s work. One of the most problematic aspects of her essay is 
Abel’s positioning of the protagonists with women, in general, against men. She 
assumes – although more tacitly than Harrison – a self-identical demographic of 
‘women’ for which Rhys advocates. In my opinion, Rhys never lets women off the 
hook: the power struggle is, as Carr writes, always between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-
nots’, not between white and black, men and women (2012: 60). However, this thesis 
shares Abel’s contention that Rhys’s characterisation and narrative shape constitute an 
intentional manipulation of the reader’s expectations, and also addresses the key 
question of how we might best understand the instability and the violence in her 
narratives.  
There is now a consensus in Rhys studies that problems of language reveal 
important truths about how familial, social and political problems affect our capacity 
for experience. This consensus is not always a happy one. As Maren Linett has argued, 
while ‘the fragmentary nature of Rhys’s writing is sometimes celebrated by critics as 
evidence of a subversive stance, either in Rhys or in her characters’, a response which 
is of course, not peculiar to Rhys studies, but ‘part of a broader trend in feminist 
criticism’, this stance in Rhys studies can seriously mislead us (2005: 437). According 
to Linett, when ‘applied to Rhys’s novels’ this approach 
 
often leads to overly optimistic accounts of her characters as actively resisting 
such ‘culturally constructed oppositions’. In turning our traditional expectation 
of agency on its head, these accounts value Rhys’s incisive wit and social 
criticism, but they also underrate the characters’ unsavory but fundamental 





This thesis refutes this charge of ‘fundamental helplessness’, but agrees that the 
passivity of Rhys’s protagonists appears unpleasant and undesirable and proposes that 
it is precisely to the extent that it does that these characters challenge dominant values 
and ‘culturally constructed oppositions’. Linett’s wariness is shared by many critics 
who cannot definitively support the idea that Rhys’s narratives are more subversive 
than accepting of the status quo, and who celebrate Rhys’s formal innovations while 
remaining uneasy about what may in fact be her reproduction of the terms she seems 
to argue against. My approach to this problem is in the line of those critics who attend 
to the things that Rhysian difficulty makes possible. In particular, this study attends to 
the generative potential with which Rhys imbues the ambivalent and the unknowable.   
 
Positive encounters with difficulty 
Unlike Linett, Savory is relatively at ease with Rhys’s gender politics, certainly in 
comparison to her response to Rhys’s handling of race. Savory emphasises the political 
and affective force of Good Morning, Midnight in particular, arguing that while this 
novel appealed neither to pre-feminist readers of 1939, nor to a 1960s feminist 
audience, with Sasha’s refusal to ‘stop hurting herself’ a key problematic for many to 
this day, this text ‘seems very much in tune with our postfeminist, postmodern time’ 
(2009: 68). There is, I suggest, unusual prescience in Rhys’s inscription of ugly feelings 
– to borrow the title of Ngai’s highly influential 2005 book – and the potential of these 
minor affects for revealing and resisting oppressive political realities. Savory reads this 
fourth novel as a profound staging of the ways in which language is both ‘functional 
and entirely meaningless’, lending the work a similarity to both absurdist literature of 
the modernist period, and an affinity with ‘postmodernism’s recognition of the inability 
of language to have stable meaning’ (2009: 69). She identifies Good Morning, 
Midnight as Rhys’s best novel: this ‘masterpiece’ is ‘mordantly funny, at times highly 
satirical, very stylised and brilliantly observed’ (Savory 2009: 66-68). In her 
alcoholism, sexual promiscuity and other dysfunctional behaviour, Sasha embodies the 
key traits of all of Rhys’s protagonists but in a more heightened form. She is a 
fundamentally unreliable narrator, but this unreliability is mitigated by Sasha’s searing 
ability to ‘see herself with brutal clarity’ (Savory 2009: 70). The strength of this 1939 
novel, then, is its unflinchingly honest presentation of the experience of decline for 
those unable to survive society’s cruelties by manipulating others for their own 




Importantly, Savory foregrounds the difficulty facing the reader who tries to 
identify any unequivocal political stance in this work: 
 
Rhys’s unwillingness to take a single, linear position on major political issues 
marks a sensibility able to understand political and social currents of history 
with remarkable and uncomfortable honesty: she was entirely unable to be 
ideological, and fully determined to observe unpredictable contradictions of 
human behaviour; interesting details of consistent failure to live up to heroic 
ideals. (Savory 1998: 35) 
 
As argued, Rhys’s relentless confrontation with difficulty is handed onto the reader, 
forcing her into a plethora of problematic if not impossible choices. Ultimately, Savory 
seems to suggest that the problem with Rhys’s textual politics comes down to her 
insistent individualism. I attempt a positive reading of this attitude, positioning it 
against a fascist dictate of uniformity, but it remains, of course, highly problematic. For 
Savory it leads inevitably to failure. Rhys’s protagonists are both ‘politically subversive 
and willing to play along with middle-class conventions which are essentially inimical 
to their survival’ and this is ‘a difficult and exhausting game which one individual can 
never win’ (Savory 1998: 83): 
 
Both the Caribbean and the women’s movement have had internal struggles 
between those who were willing to stand up against established authority and 
respectability and those who were willing to go along with it. Rhys’s characters 
seem to incorporate and internalise this struggle, often as simultaneous 
attraction to and repulsion from male-centred England. (Savory 1998: 83-84) 
 
This thesis explores the potential in the ambivalence we find in Rhys’s fiction and her 
textual confrontations with complicity, and takes as its ground the absence of the 
conditions of communality that we find in these novels rather than seeing the 
protagonists as rejecting good relationships. It reads Rhys as navigating an uneasy path 
that rejects ‘easy’ identification and charts the dangers of isolated individualism.  
As we have seen, deCaires Narain addresses this issue by thinking through 
tangled, fraught and abrasive intimacies in postcolonial feminist fiction and the ‘labour 




(2013: 279). Along with feminists such as Ahmed, deCaires Narain is invested in 
moving past Spivak’s pessimistic conclusion that not only should we not speak for third 
world women, but the subaltern cannot speak. Feminist solidarity, she argues, depends 
on the effort we make: ‘Attention to the cultural and historical politics of location 
requires detailed work which does not lend itself to a readily graspable idea of 
solidarity. But the commitment to making “woman” and “feminist” signify in more 
meaningfully universal ways requires such work’ (deCaires Narain 2013: 278). My 
subsequent chapters also identify ways in which Rhys’s fiction ‘worr[ies] away at 
difference and inequality, struggling with modes of narrative that might recognise such 
inequities without compounding, dissolving or resolving them’ (deCaires Narain 2013: 
279). Significantly, deCaires Narain also identifies a problematic romantic 
aestheticisation in Wide Sargasso Sea but, unlike Savory, casts a positive light on this, 
arguing that Christophine is the feminist marker in this text in contrast to Antoinette. 
The servant has a strong voice and her spoken challenge to the husband has political 
force whereas Antoinette is ontologically unsure and has a severely limited ability to 
speak. In short, Christophine has ‘more power than her charge, a reversal that may 
appear to wilfully ignore history’ (deCaires Narain 2010: 128). Yet for this critic 
Christophine’s power is evidence of Rhys’s understanding of history, and it is history 
which  
 
shapes the novel and positions Christophine as the rightful, and indeed 
righteous, claimant to the homeland. Antoinette, by contrast, proclaims her 
affiliation with the landscape, but both her need to lay claim to it and the 
aestheticised nature of the claim belie the anxiety that attends it. In other words, 
Rhys confirms that Christophine belongs without question to the West Indies 
but endows Antoinette’s sense of belonging with none of that ethical certainty. 
(deCaires Narain 2010: 129) 
 
For deCaires Narain Rhys’s textual politics is ambivalent: she attempts to affirm 
Christophine’s authority and world, but is unable to do so. However, Rhys’s 
‘equivocation also indicates a space of uncertainty which might be read more 





‘Black’ and ‘white’ women [...] are inscribed textually in terms which are too 
ontologically distinct for full ‘conversations’ between these constituencies of 
women to be possible. However, the conversations between writers, readers and 
critics which Rhys’s texts enable are crucial steps towards mapping out the 
conditions – in societal and narratological terms – in which such conversations 
might be(come) possible. (deCaires Narain 2005: 500-01) 
 
In attending to postcolonial women writers’ risky depictions of fraught intimacies 
among unequal women, we might do well to be ‘more flexible, generous and forgiving 
than the grandstanding rhetoric of much current critical practice allows’ (deCaires 
Narain 2005: 498). We might take risks in order to extend ‘affiliative possibilities in 
our own critical practices as postcolonial feminists’ (deCaires Narain 2010: 139). The 
aim in this thesis for a reading that is both risky and generous is congruent with this 
argument. There is an insistently problematic impulse towards individualism that is 
central to Rhys’s writing, but might we not, following deCaires Narain, concentrate on 
Rhys’s equivocation in this matter? Wide Sargasso Sea, after all, concerns the attempt 
to forge difficult connections – Rhys’s relationship to the West Indies, and Antoinette’s 
relationships to Tia and Christophine being, as the criticism testifies, potent examples. 
If Rhys could only ultimately speak for herself – extended in the final novel to the white 
West Indian Creole woman – might we not infer in this a modest, ethical attention to 
positionality? A refusal to speak for ‘others’, transformed in her writing into an 
insistence on thinking through a feeling with (as opposed to feeling ‘for’)? In attending 
to the negative affect which suffuses her fiction and its reception, is a sense of 
connectedness not unavoidable? Does Rhysian affect not stage Ahmed’s claim, noted 
by deCaires Narain, that we ‘cannot not encounter each other, what is at stake is how, 
rather than whether the encounters take place’ (Ahmed 2000: 167). 
I contend that for Rhys, we are ‘in it together’, but this is a deeply 
uncomfortable state and in no way implies solidarity. This is enmeshed existence, 
inseparable from others, without the idea that one’s property is one’s private world, 
because there is only existence as part of this world. Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts 
of the assemblage and minor literature as the collective assemblage of enunciation are 
useful theorisations with which to think through Rhys’s always-difficult relationality. 
Identification and transmission are never positive in this fiction; but encounters and 




our enmeshment in an often hostile world, Rhys makes evident the fact that feeling is 
not distinct from thought. Rhys’s epistemology is Nietzschean: we see, think, know 
from our perspective; and violence is required to jolt us out of our well-worn patterns 
of thought, which are too often not really thinking at all. But her epistemology is also 
a function of her ontology, which is a vision of enmeshed subjectivity. Erica Johnson 
has recently theorised Rhysian subjectivity in terms of posthumanism (2015). This 
study draws upon Deleuze and Guattari’s work to understand it. Affected by every 
encounter, the protagonists’ bad feeling and their passivity evidence the peril of 
becoming. But Rhys’s creative passions also chart the possibilities of becoming as 
encounters lead to new perspectives and new insights. Affect can be disruptive; the 
disrupted can become the disruption. Passive characters can resist; and, I propose, in 
this fiction they serve as the figuration of the dilemma of becoming – that urgent task 
of locating agency when the self is no longer a contained, self-determining entity and 
the world is violent. And if we are all in it together, in what is, for many, an all-too-
often hostile world, then Rhys’s fiction is not just a much-needed reminder that fear of 
difference is dangerous. It is an affirmation that even when it seems unlikely, we can 
effect change. Her work is a line of flight: an insistence that things can be different.  
I close this chapter with a brief look at two considerations of Rhys’s concern 
with a certain, modern, ‘different kind of consciousness’ by Carr and Emery, both of 
whom offer positive readings of Rhys’s inscription of difference, elaborating not just 
its resistant force but also its generative function (Carr 2012: 27). Arguments by both 
are utilised in later chapters, and for this reason the following is just a general outline 
of their generous approaches to Rhys’s depiction of subjectivity.  
For Carr, ‘Rhys’s fiction registers the sense of disorientation and the uncertain 
identity of those who live the ambivalent, uncentred, dislocated existences which some 
now argue have become paradigmatic of our postmodern times’ (2012: 28). The 
protagonists struggle with authenticity, to find their voices and ‘to refuse the definitions 
others thrust upon them’, a narrative parallel to the fact that the ‘fiction was [Rhys’s] 
attempt to reject the hegemonic view of her existence, or of existences like hers, and to 
find terms of her own in which to tell her story’ (Carr 2012: 36). The ‘struggle’ is key 
in Carr’s account: the fiction explores how this different, sometimes resistant and 
sometimes defeated type of consciousness is ‘formed and deformed through exclusion, 




ambivalence, of this ‘fusion of apparently contrary elements’, of ‘protest and creation’ 
that, for Carr, is central to Rhys’s work and which sustains its incisive, generative force:  
 
Rhys rejects the language of empire, of colonialism, of class, of bourgeois 
morality, and constructs a different one. Language is not only the empty code 
that keeps injustice in place by claiming it is justice: it is the one tool one has 
to make alternative sense of the world. (Carr 2012: 110)  
 
On this reading, Rhys’s language mines ‘ambiguity, difference, darkness, warmth’, and 
demonstrates that ‘it is through the pain of the destabilisation of identity, and through 
the destabilisation of language, that the truth can be found’ (Carr 2012: 110, 112).  
Emery also focuses on how the novels depict ‘cultural conflicts of marginality 
and sexual exploitation’, arguing that Rhys’s inscription of the experiences of colonial 
and sexual exile constitutes an exploration ‘of possibilities for new aesthetic form at 
the intersection of three kinds of modernism – mainstream European, female and Third 
World’ (1990: 174). For Emery, each novel involves ‘a search for community and place 
[…] that supersedes the European quest for identity in the form of discrete individual 
“character”’: Rhys’s inscription of colonial and sexual difference operates in terms of 
‘formal alterations of conventional fictional patterns, alterations that may appear as 
silences, stuttering, interruptions, or inconsistencies’ (Emery 1990: 174). In their most 
generative form in Rhys’s final novel, argues Emery, these ‘formal alterations’ 
constitute ‘an opening onto alternate fictional possibilities for conceiving character […] 
as the brutal loss of identity that necessitates new spiritual and political alliances in a 
dreamed-of, magically realised, and chosen community’ (1990: 175). Crucially, Emery 
states that judging these works according to ‘European aesthetic, moral and 
psychological standards’ is fundamentally misconceived as it is precisely such 
normative criteria that Rhys’s oeuvre challenges (1990: 176). These novels ‘tear the 
fabric of realism – even of European modernism, with its illusions of a self to be 
fragmented – by rupturing sequences of beginning-middle-end and by exploring the 
possibility for consciousness when a unified, discrete self has never been a possibility’ 
(Emery 1990: 176, my emphasis).  
 These two readings are foundational for the arguments presented in the 
following chapters. Like Carr and Emery, I attempt a forward-oriented reading. I 




search for possible forms of communality which are realizable through intuitive 
connection rather than a logic of valorised identity. There is a form of self-making in 
her novels predicated not on a stable self that is capable of being fragmented or 
buttressed, but on the on-going, dangerous but also liberating experience of the loss of 
the self which we can equally describe as the ‘freeing of life from entropic containment’ 
– a helpful way of thinking about becoming proposed by Ansell-Pearson (1999: 81). 
Yet perhaps the most important similarity between this thesis and Carr’s and Emery’s 
readings is that I am also proposing that ‘freed’ subjectivity in Rhys’s writing involves 
something more than the personal. For Emery, it constitutes new aesthetic possibilities 
for conceiving of character, and for Carr its destabilisation is the condition of the 
possibility of the emergence of truth. This thesis, then, views Rhys’s nomadic 
protagonists, who are uncomfortable composites of agency and passivity, as opening 
up new possibilities for thinking about resistance.  
In these novels concerning how life overwhelms these women, an affective, 
intuitive mode of thinking is shown to have more potential than Western rationality for 
creating possibilities beyond our current predicament. Rhys does not present us with 
forms of resistance which operate independently of oppressive assemblages. Her 
writing often assembles itself in the likeness of the worldly assemblages of which it is 
part, as many of the views outlined in this chapter indicate. But rather than simply 
damning Rhys’s complicity we can profit by thinking through this problematic using 
Deleuze’s philosophy and other projects in radical thought. Activity, thought and desire 
are never ‘autonomous’; agency is not a ‘pure’ thing, prior to external forces; and as 
Rhys’s last three novels show, our language is inadequate for expressing this 
predicament. We do not yet have a widely spoken differential language, sufficiently 
capable of accommodating the excluded middle, but Rhys’s mature novels give us lines 
of thought which might help us develop that language. This chapter has traced the 
connections between this thesis and the decades of criticism which have secured Rhys’s 
place as an important modernist, a divisive feminist and a troubling postcolonial writer. 
I turn now to the intriguing possibilities and productive difficulties which lie in reading 
Rhys as a schizoanalytic artist, beginning with an examination of how negative affect 






Chapter Two  
‘I don’t love what they love’: negative affect and Rhys’s writing-
machine 
 
I. Negative affect: some definitions 
This chapter utilises an idea from Deleuze and Guattari’s study of Kafka, and argues 
that affect is a ‘saturating body’ in Rhys’s mapping of oppressive systems (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1986: 7). Affect destabilises things in such a way that the possibility of 
change is actualised. The analysis begins to chart Rhys’s search for the possibility of 
affirming communality, by focusing on the feelings that surround Rhys’s passive 
protagonists, and exploring the relationships between embodiment, feeling and Rhys’s 
refusal of the false promises and oppressive demands of the dominant order. Her stories 
of passive women demonstrate that bad feeling is a major currency of oppression and 
dramatise how negative affect circulates and is produced (often through gendered and 
racialised language), and how it controls and produces a sense of inferiority in 
marginalised subjects. Crucially, Rhys’s novels also demonstrate that negative affect 
can disturb the status quo and occasionally, with difficulty, it can even create 
possibilities for positive change. 
This chapter deploys several different theorisations of affect. The earlier 
sections refer to affect as feeling with a psychical and bodily dimension and focuses on 
how affect circulates among bodies, how it is produced under particular conditions and 
how it sometimes disturbs the status quo. The concluding discussion turns to a 
Deleuzian notion of affect as becoming. The chapter aims to take into account the 
notorious difficulty of defining affect, and the fact that Rhys’s fiction is intensely 
affective, indeed ‘uniquely affective’ in its evocation of ‘powerful feelings, gripping 
moods [and] emotions’ that are unusually ‘difficult to sort out, classify, account for’ 
(Johnson and Moran 2015: 8). Due to this difficulty Johnson and Moran describe the 
dominant affect in the writing as ‘spectral’ (2015: 7). It cannot be grasped but haunts 
the texts and the critical literature. They suggest that a good approach to this ineffable 
entity might be Sedgwick’s ‘reparative’ reading practice that moves away from what 
Sedgwick  
 




by a Freudian view’ to less Oedipal, drive-oriented understandings that ‘leave 
us in a better position to do justice to a wealth of characteristic, culturally 
central practices […] that […] [otherwise] become invisible or illegible’. 
(Sedgwick 2003: 147, in Johnson and Moran 2015: 8-9) 
 
In readying ourselves to be surprised, we might better enable an ‘openness to Rhys’s 
reconfiguration of emotional terminology, [and] attend to the way in which she offers, 
instead, her own vision of affective dynamics’ (Johnson and Moran 2015: 9). I propose 
that a flexible and inclusive understanding of affect itself benefits such an approach. 
Given the spectral nature of affect in these novels, a variety of models is helpful for 
exploring the possibility that Rhys is actually exploring different registers of feeling. 
Dominant ways of thinking about affect include taking it as something akin to 
transindividual emotion, as theorists like Ahmed (2010) and Berlant (2011) have done; 
positing affect as a built-in biological system that underlies emotion, following 
psychologist Silvan Tomkins (2008 [1962-1992]), or as a precognitive physical 
response or action composed of intensities that is distinct from emotion, as Brian 
Massumi asserts (2002). In their Affect Reader Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth 
navigate these approaches and others, offering their definition of affect as ‘an in-
between-ness’, an ‘accumulative beside-ness’, marking the ‘body’s belonging to a 
world of encounters or […] non-belonging’ (2010: 2), a point that brings their definition 
into contact with Deleuze’s understanding of becoming. I have argued that Rhys’s 
novels chronicle life unfolding as a series of difficult encounters. Accordingly, the 
affects with which I am concerned for most of this chapter are negative.  
Ngai’s influential literary study, Ugly Feelings (2005) unravels various negative 
affects which she describes as ‘minor’ and ‘ugly’, and I use the term negative affect 
following her work.  For Ngai, ugly feelings are minor affects in a quantitative sense: 
these states tend to be overlooked by the philosophical canon which takes greater note 
of more unequivocal, weighty affects such as jealousy, hatred and love. Ngai’s minor 
affects such as irritability, animatedness and paranoia are experientially, semantically 
and syntactically negative – definitions which are explored in this chapter. In short, this 
means that these affects are congruent with displeasure rather than pleasure; the value 
of their linguistic associations is usually negative; and they involve a phobic striving 
away. The affects discussed in the early part of this chapter are doubly minor, matching 




that schizoid function that Deleuze and Guattari assign to minor literature:  a striving 
away from the established order. Syntactic negativity also stems from the fact that ugly 
feelings involve a boundary confusion. They tend to generate feelings of ‘affective 
disorientation’ about what one is experiencing, and feelings of proximities and 
‘paradoxical convergence’ (Ngai 2005: 16, 36). These disoriented feelings make visible 
problems (often political) which are usually hard to articulate. Passivity in Rhys’s 
writing is not an ugly feeling, but it is intimate with and inseparable from ‘ugly’ affect 
and – as will become apparent in the rest of this thesis – it inhabits numerous 
boundaries, such as those between the defective and the symptomatic, and the personal 
and social. Above all else, passivity is what constitutes Rhys’s writing as an 
intervention: it produces affect that disturbs, that discloses the ill health and bad feeling 
of the worlds about which Rhys writes, it poses problems and reveals literature’s flow 
of impersonal life which exceeds the individual.   
The ‘problematisation of the distinction between subjective and objective 
enunciation’ in Ngai’s definition of ugly feelings is related to the question of what affect 
is in general: whether it is something subjective, belonging to the subject, or something 
in the world (2005: 20). There is now general agreement with Raymond Williams’s 
contentions that affect is social, and not just personal, and that there always remains 
the question of how one can speak about something which is felt, perceived, bodily and 
‘on the very edge of semantic possibility’ (1977: 32). To attempt to define affect is to 
encounter these problems; to attempt to write about passivity in Rhys’s fiction is to 
encounter similar problems. Thinking of both in Rhys’s novels necessarily involves 
‘slippage over rigid correspondences between words and meanings’ (Ngai 2005: 308). 
Slippage describes what is involved in using language to discuss experience which is 
on the ‘very edge of semantic availability’. Slippage also indicates Deleuze’s practice 
of deterritorialising terms by changing how he used them. In his work on Spinoza and 
A Thousand Plateaus affect means the passage between embodied states in the sense 
of the continuous variation of one’s force of existing. In his writing on art, it denotes 
an independent aesthetic entity. Both Deleuzian uses of the term are drawn upon in this 
thesis, although this chapter concentrates on the former. 
Affect in Rhys’s writing exists on numerous ‘levels’. It is a central aspect both 
of Rhys criticism and the protagonists’ mode of being, and secondary characters are 
often delineated largely by their affective responses to the protagonists. Affect also 




is Rhys’s impassioned corrective to Brontë’s insubstantial and politically problematic 
representation of the white Creole woman, we surely have grounds for also reading 
affect as the power of spirit or the power of an idea that art makes durable. This chapter, 
then, practises its own sort of slippage by moving among these various forms of affect. 
It begins by considering Rhysian passivity as a strategy that, like Ngai’s ugly feelings, 
feels bad.  
 
II. Affective passivity: the experientially and semantically negative 
One of the most important starting points for the arguments in this thesis as a whole is 
the compelling claim by recent feminist and queer theorists that we have good reason 
to question and defy the insistence that resistance must take certain, prescribed forms. 
Ahmed’s work is particularly significant for the arguments made here. She proposes 
that we should attend to how feelings are produced and circulate, the politics behind 
this production and movement, and how feelings cause objects to circulate. 
Examination of the production of those bodily and cognitive feelings which seem 
innate and belonging to the personal and private makes possible a disruption of the 
ways in which power encodes not just the world but our bodies, our perceptions and 
our reactions (Ahmed 2010, 2014a). Ahmed’s work is an exceptionally useful tool for 
reading novels which insist on the fact that the production of feeling is not a private 
matter. Rhys’s most powerful critique of the ways in which modes of being, thinking 
and feeling are discursively determined as valuable or undesirable according to their 
‘relative proximity to a social ideal’ (Ahmed 2010: 53) is the deconstruction of 
nineteenth-century English attitudes towards Creole indolence and female insanity in 
Wide Sargasso Sea. We find a similar deconstruction in Rhys’s other novels, and these 
texts all contain scenes in which the naming of negative affect has a performative 
function. Crucially, Ahmed presents a powerful analysis of the ways in which unhappy 
bodies and alienated subjects can disrupt and resist hegemonic practices just by being. 
To appreciate such strategies of resistance we would do well to learn to practise a 
differential form of thought rather than perpetuating an oppositional logic:  
 
Rather than hold on to the binary opposition active/passive, we can challenge 
the opposition, and we can do so by showing how that which has been deemed 




the conditions of possibility for doing something. The task is not to redescribe 
passivity as activity (creating as it were a generalised field of action) but to 
think of passivities as involving different kinds of action. (Ahmed 2010: 209-
10)  
 
Rhys’s protagonists are passive in various ways, frequently withdrawing from the 
world to their bed, but we should not assume that they are without will nor that they 
are inactive. These women move through public spaces, converse with others whom 
they affect, engage in sexual relationships, respond passionately when upset, and do 
much more besides. They impose their mode of being on their world, exemplifying 
Ahmed’s words to a notable degree. The intention here is to consider the affective force 
and the ideological value of the protagonists’ anti-normative orientation in their 
passivity, and to pay attention to the small, quiet or ‘minor’ things that Rhysian 
passivity, in all its bad feeling, does. It does two things exceptionally well: it 
illuminates the ways in which judgement (the language of value) and the language of 
feeling work together in an oppressive performative function, and it challenges us to 
rethink the value of things.  
Carr’s brief 1996 critique of Shari Benstock’s book Women of the Left Bank, 
1900-1940 (1987) is extremely useful for opening up this discussion of why we should 
question the pejorative function of the term passivity in a discussion of Rhys. Several 
of the arguments developed in this chapter have antecedents in Carr’s criticism which 
pays close attention to the performative function of value judgements. In Benstock’s 
feminist account of Anglo-American women artists in Paris in the early twentieth 
century only a few pages are dedicated to Rhys, but they are remarkable for the force 
with which Benstock asserts the writer’s affinity with the sordid. Benstock’s 
observations position Rhys’s inhabitation of certain areas apparently unvisited by the 
more refined female members of Paris’s modernist coterie as the effect and 
manifestation of her defective psyche. For Benstock, Rhys is in the wrong place. ‘The 
city’s margins, its peripheral limits’ in the thirteenth arrondissement was a ‘part of the 
Left Bank unknown to other of its residents’ (Benstock 1987: 448); Rhys’s movement 
and orientation are also wrong, being – paradoxically – emptied of purpose, yet 
drawing her to the iniquitous. Rhys spent ‘long days of aimless walking through mean 
and uninteresting quarters, passed nights in cheap hotels, and made weekly visits to the 




is described as evidence of a pervasive moral weakness inseparable from Rhys’s 
passivity. The ‘Left Bank represented exhausting and degrading efforts to provide the 
necessities of survival [… It] drew Jean Rhys like a magnet: disgusted by the sordid, 
she was nonetheless incapable of resisting it’ (Benstock 1987: 449). The tone, lexis and 
content of Benstock’s account all convey a negative moral judgement which is palpable 
in the distinct emphasis on descent in the passage (‘underworld’, ‘ladder’), and in the 
images of bodily and physical ‘disgust’ which abound (‘descend toward degradation’). 
Carr observes that Benstock’s portrait serves to turn ‘Rhys’s experience of 
oppression, this time economic, into a choice, or more precisely, into a failure of will’ 
(2012: 13). In declaring that Rhys was ‘drawn’ to the ‘sordid’, Benstock is, at best, 
ignoring the social structures which determined Rhys’s experience of poverty and 
marginality. Configuring her passivity as moral and psychological failure obscures and 
denies the very processes of oppression that Rhys’s fiction indicts. Crucially, as Carr 
comments, this interpretative act of foreclosure seems gendered and racialised. This is 
palpable in the sense of voyeurism as Benstock’s prose hovers over Rhys’s body as she 
moves inexorably through the grime of the lower echelons of Parisian society. 
Ironically, this recalls Mr Mackenzie’s admission that he was attracted by Julia’s social 
difference to himself, and that he lived vicariously through her ability to be 
unencumbered by social niceties. In her stance towards Rhys, Benstock is dangerously 
close to reiterating patriarchal norms.  
Benstock’s commentary underscores the fact that the passive body is most 
obviously culturally intelligible as that which belongs to the weak, the immoral (the 
indolent person or the prostitute) and the infectious (the ill or the insidious). As Carr 
explains, elaborating on Ramchand’s analysis (1970: 34), ‘indolence’ and 
‘licentiousness’ were terms used widely in the last two centuries to describe white 
Creoles. Rhys’s ‘attack on Englishness and its properties has continued to arouse the 
fear of moral contagion that association with natives always threatened’ (Carr 2012: 
14). This suggests that Benstock’s account has a corrective function. That is, the fear 
aroused in some of Rhys’s Anglophile critics may be managed by the moralising 
lexicon they use to condemn Rhys or her protagonists’ passive bodies. Carr draws links 
between this critical management of fear and mechanisms of colonialism and 
patriarchy. By locating a fault in the colonised subject’s body, mind or culture, the 
coloniser naturalises the oppressed subject’s position and shores up his or her own 




blancs), Frantz Fanon describes the colonial’s critical gaze and discourse as ‘fixing’ the 
colonised subject with inferiority (Fanon 2008: 89). The colonial social system  
 
draws its strength by maintaining this [inferiority] complex, in a society that 
proclaims the superiority of one race over another; it is to the extent that society 
creates difficulties for [the colonised subject] that he finds himself positioned 
in a neurotic situation. (Fanon 2008: 80) 
 
In a process which has important similarities to Fanon’s theory, the emergence in the 
eighteenth century of what Ellen Pollak describes as the ‘myth of passive womanhood’ 
(1985) served to compensate for Enlightenment ideas of universal freedom in a context 
in which women were not free and equal to men: the myth or fantasy ‘naturalises 
[women’s] political and cultural inferiority’ (Carr 2012: 15).33  
There is no simple equation between the operations of colonial racism and the 
workings of bourgeois patriarchy, and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to try to 
map this relationship in further detail, but Fanon’s theory and Carr’s genealogical 
analysis are useful for considering how, in a context of intolerance, the passing of 
negative judgement upon a seemingly neurotic, excluded and unhappy woman 
(whether an author or her fictional creations) inflicts a certain violence upon her. In the 
contexts of colonialism and patriarchal capitalism, the affective force of the dominant 
discourses that surround oppressed subjects (discourses determined by negative affects 
such as fear, anxiety and shame) often serves to diminish the agency of the oppressed 
by naturalising their inferiority. This is a central concern in Rhys’s fiction. As Carr 
observes, this process is also at work in the criticism and here we have another reason 
to counter negative diagnostic readings with another sort of approach.  
In many scenes in these novels the act of diagnostically naming the oppressed, 
marginalised subject as dysfunctional actually constitutes that subject’s sense of 
inferiority. Wide Sargasso Sea shows us that ‘madness’ is a label used to contain 
subjects deemed inferior and dangerous. The social disapproval of Antoinette’s mother 
 
33 Pollak’s book is a relatively early revisionary feminist study of canonical, male eighteenth-century 
literary figures. In it she distinguishes between ‘ideology proper’ in that period and ‘the social fictions 
that evolve at once to cover and to enable its effects’, arguing that women were subjected to a dramatic 
containment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England, with their value limited to a function 
of their role in a masculine economy – a situation that was reflected in a contorted fashion in major 




evolves into a negative diagnosis of ‘madness’ which is used to lock her up, and is then 
passed on to the husband to serve as a tool to legitimise firstly Antoinette’s removal 
from her homeland and then her incarceration in Thornfield Hall, resulting in 
Antoinette’s severe confusion in Part Three. It is the husband’s violent reaction to the 
otherness he encounters in the West Indies and his deployment of the weapon of 
oppressors which serves as a cautionary tale for the reader, and not Antoinette’s 
‘madness’ or her acceptance of the dangerous sexual passion into which he initiates 
her. It is not Antoinette’s weakness or irrationality but the husband’s fear and his cruel 
use of a diagnosis of madness that is the object of Rhys’s condemnation. This same 
warning is discernible in the earlier novels. The male characters who are seduced by 
and then turn against the protagonists come to resent these women because of their 
otherness and voice their disapproval in judgements of the women’s inferiority. To an 
extent this mechanism implicates the reader’s judgement of the protagonists’ 
thoroughly different mode of being.  
A letter of 1936 states explicitly what much of Rhys’s writing implies – that 
she understood instinctively and from experience, if not ‘in theory’, how the discursive 
production of the oppressed subject’s ‘complex’ of inferiority serves to benefit the 
dominant group and to strengthen the hegemonic system which produces these 
unhappy subject positions:  
 
persecution maniacs (so called) always have been and usually still are, the 
victims of persecution. Of course they’re called maniacs. It’s part of the game 
Society plays – Let’s Pretend that there is no such thing as this petty, leering, 
unsplendid cruelty. (Letters, 31) 
 
These statements resonate with Fanon’s theory of how the black subject’s sense of 
inferiority is discursively produced by a system which seeks to contain him and to 
naturalise his inferiority. To an extent, reading Sasha as having a pathological 
compulsion to suffer repetitively serves to naturalise her unhappiness and to underplay 
the cruelty that she perceives. It is also to assume, or ‘pretend’, that Sasha could 
somehow move outside the violence that so dominates the novel. If this violence is, in 
fact, inescapable then the persecution maniac is correct in feeling persecuted; and 
psychological fracture, incoherence and irrationality are understandable and maybe 




are sufficiently extreme (or the ‘game’ sufficiently cruel) then the subject’s 
relinquishment of behavioural norms and conventional logic may be no more ‘mad’ 
than anything else; it may, in fact, be an appropriate response, as Abel has argued. If 
cruelty is inescapable then the artistic choice to focus on protagonists with dangerously 
fraught inner lives may be read as a means of exposing that which is generally kept 
hidden. Carr argues that Rhys exposes the effects of the cruelty and violence that forms 
the ‘underbelly of Western civilisation’ (2012: 16). Rhys writes against respectability 
and hegemonic structures which tolerate and often serve to conceal social violence. To 
an extent, the protagonists cause disturbances within the narratives in this way. Their 
passivity keeps these women in difficult situations in which they suffer, but we might 
read the ‘spectacle’ that they make of themselves, in visible shows of unhappiness in 
public spaces, as a counter-hegemonic strategy of passively exposing oppressive power 
structures. Ironically, manifesting psychic fracture may be one of the least dangerous 
ways of exposing the cruelty of persecution. It may be a refusal to perform normatively 
because such a performance serves merely to perpetuate oppression to the extent that 
it does not disturb the status quo. This is the dynamic that runs through After Leaving 
Mr Mackenzie. Mr Mackenzie and Mr Horsfield are conscious of (and cowardly in) 
their acceptance of unfairness; and they are contrasted strikingly with Julia, whose 
honest disgust at ‘organised society, in which she has no place and against which she 
has not a dog’s chance’ (ALMM, 17), both attracts them and makes these men feel 
‘powerful and dominant. Happy’, even as they sense their complicity in the dominant 
social order which renders life for outsiders like Julia a matter of survival rather than 
thriving (36).  
We might, then, heed Deleuze’s warning that judgement is all too often value 
judgement that is formed in relation to what is established, and note that the status quo 
is that against which Rhys’s fiction rails. Her work challenges us to consider the 
expectations we bring to our readings of major characters, as Savory explains in 1998 
in relation to an earlier argument by Molly Hite: 
 
For Hite, as a feminist critic, Rhys’s marginal female character destabilises ‘an 
inherited narrative structure’, that is, precisely because she is marginal, is not a 
winner or a solver of problems, she challenges the conventions on which the 




Reading Rhys’s texts with assumptions from the bourgeois novel causes 
problems. (Hite 1989: 23, in Savory 1998: 58)  
 
Marxist theorists have taught us to be attentive to how bourgeois art forms and the 
novel in particular produce a limited range of subject positions, most usually with the 
effect of selling the illusion of autonomy in order to conceal the functions and 
mechanisms of dominant ideologies, and to naturalise an ideological world view. 
Rhys’s last three novels in particular strip us of the illusion of autonomy. Rather than 
creating protagonists who strive for husbands and financial security (the traditional 
objects of desire for women), Rhys ‘bust[s] the roof’ off the myth that happiness is in 
the hands of the individual, instead depicting women whose scope of existence is 
determined by oppressive social and political conditions (GMM, 33). In so doing, her 
novels expand the horizon of our ‘inherited narrative structures’, reminding us that 
experience is not ‘universal’ and not everyone desires and orients themselves in the 
same way. 
Theorists such as Ahmed and Halberstam have shown how narratives of so-
called good development can serve to reinforce hegemonic values which determine 
oppressive ideologies and their fascistic structures of thought such as capitalism, 
imperialism, patriarchy, racism, and homophobia. ‘Good’ development signifies that 
which is happy, acceptable, generally endorsed and unchallenged, relatively successful 
or leading to relative success in a material sense. These theorists critique the equation 
of happiness and success with ‘advancement, capital accumulation [and] family’ 
(Halberstam 2011: 89). In this framework, good development describes a mode of 
being which is acceptable because it is directed towards the ‘right’ things – those things 
which, we are told, bring ‘happiness’, when they also benefit the dominant order. The 
itinerancy of Rhys’s protagonists is not just the sign of their dispossession and a 
reflection of Rhys’s frequent experience of being without a secure home. It is also her 
refusal to orient her protagonists towards the capitalist principle of property ownership: 
‘A room with bath? A nice room? A room?...’, thinks Sasha in Good Morning, 
Midnight, as she ponders finding a more pleasant hotel,  
 
But never tell the truth about this business of rooms, because it would bust the 
roof off everything and undermine the whole social system. All rooms are the 




perhaps a bidet. A room is a place where you hide from the wolves outside and 
that’s all any room is. (GMM, 33) 
 
Sasha is resolutely not directed towards the right things, expending her energy on 
castigating the ‘social system’ and its ‘wolves’, rather than working in line with a false 
promise of happiness. The protagonists’ refusal of normative activity can, then, be read 
as a counter-hegemonic refusal to invest in projects of self-development or betterment. 
Rhys’s letters occasionally display the vehemence of the author’s politics and support 
this reading. Her excoriation of the middle classes (what Rhys terms the ‘soul 
destroying middle’) and their demand that ‘[e]veryone must be exactly alike’ indicates 
her distaste for the trappings of bourgeois respectability (Letters, 89), and Rhys’s 
scathing though realistic attitude to capitalism’s promise is also evident in her 
description of her disagreement with her third husband: ‘Max thinks that without 
money and security nothing can be done. I do not agree at all! I know otherwise. All 
the same the time does come when a little money a little security a modicum of praise 
does help’ (Letters, 164).  
The absence of good development which is so striking an aspect of Rhys’s 
aesthetic is, I contend, the author’s textual refusal of the principle that one should strive 
to organise one’s joyful encounters in accordance with a heteronormative agenda – and 
it feels bad. In Rhys’s narratives there is no positive progression, no steady increase of 
the protagonists’ happiness, no accumulation of wealth, and no forging of life-
enhancing and lasting bonds. No obstacles are overcome; instead, there is repetition. 
We might describe this as an aesthetics of failure. On the one hand, the absence of 
normative forms of self-making hastens these women’s movement into a situation 
resembling an impasse and suggests an unhealthy deterioration rather than a strategy. 
In a Deleuzian-Spinozist sense the protagonists dwell in, rather than attempting to 
overcome, their difficulties. On the other, this absence calls into question our 
presuppositions about good behaviour. It thereby becomes an important ‘pivot for 
reader-response’, alienating many and provoking disapproval from those who are not 
at ease having such presuppositions challenged, and eliciting appreciation from those 
who are (Savory 1998: 58). In the terms of Ahmed’s arguments, Rhys’s rejection of 
the promise of happiness reveals vulnerability and forms of displeasure as sites of 
possibility, rather than simply things to be avoided. In a powerful sense, Rhys’s novels 




Importantly, the disapproval Rhys’s protagonists incur from other characters 
and from critics indicates the extent to which narratives of good development are a 
functioning component of hegemony, training us in how to think about those who 
behave differently.34 It is, I think, too easy to equate a refusal to aim at good 
development with weakness, an indifference to life or nihilism. Mr Mackenzie does 
just this in Rhys’s second novel: 
 
The really incredible thing was that [Julia] did not seem to want to get away 
with it, that she did not seem to understand the urge and the push to get away 
with it at all costs. He knew, for instance, that she had not a penny of her own. 
After all that time she had not saved a penny.  
Almost he was forced to believe that she was a female without the instinct 
of self-preservation. And it was against Mr Mackenzie’s code to believe that 
any female existed without a sense of self-preservation. (ALMM, 20) 
 
If we cannot fathom Julia, then rather than judging her negatively for her inability to 
abide by usual norms of behaviour, we would do well to remember that Mr Mackenzie’s 
capacity for understanding her is severely hindered by his ‘code’, and our reading 
habits might be structured (and limited) by something similar. If we find Julia 
‘incredible’, then perhaps we should consider that this is central to what the text means 
– the issue at stake being, perhaps, not the psychology behind the choices made by a 
fictional construct, but the questions: why do we have the responses we have? What 
codes determine the judgements and the feelings involved in these responses? If we are 
disturbed by the protagonists’ behaviour, we can contextualise this by looking at how 
the protagonists cause disturbance within their narratives, and at the fact that this 
disturbance is met by a will to power that contains disturbing figures in violent ways. 
It is possible – albeit somewhat reductive – to consider Rhys’s novels as a series in 
which each work explores a different form of disturbance and containment. In this 
sense, we might say that After Leaving Mr Mackenzie primarily concerns the request 
for capital. Voyage in the Dark focuses on Anna’s relinquishment of control of her body. 
 
34 I am thinking here of Diana Athill’s rhetorically effective (but, to me, highly questionable) opening to 
her chapter on Rhys in her memoir, Stet (2000). Athill’s account is typical of the critical approach which 
equates the problematic behaviour of Rhys’s protagonists with the author’s apparent inadequacies. It 
begins: ‘No one who has read Jean Rhys’s first four novels can suppose that she was good at life; but no 




In Good Morning, Midnight Sasha makes a spectacle of herself. She cries, repeats, fails 
at tasks, drinks too much in public and flirts disastrously. Wide Sargasso Sea is 
tremendously complex but perhaps, above all, disturbs through Antoinette’s inability 
and refusal to try to make sense of that which she cannot clearly perceive. As this brief 
survey indicates, these novels are not primarily interested in particular, innate and 
essential human weaknesses, but with the ways in which social, political and discursive 
structures work to keep things as they are – favouring the powerful. In light of this, it 
makes limited sense to assess Rhys’s protagonists and narratives only according to pre-
existing codes or conventions. A more creative reading practice is warranted, in which 
we attempt to consider anew the reasons behind our response to these texts, and trace 
connections between such reasons and the ways in which bad feeling and disturbance 
are contained within the novels. 
Carr’s genealogical analysis, which is central to her elucidation of Rhys’s 
complex textual politics, provides one example of how to attempt this. Rhys criticism 
since the 1990s has not developed these ideas significantly, and we might question the 
extent to which this is due to what Johnson and Moran suggest is the waning status of 
Rhys’s credentials as a postcolonial writer (2015: 6). Johnson and Moran refer to 
several recent studies which develop arguments – quite similar to those made by Carr 
– which bring together psychoanalytic theory and postcolonial studies in a ‘a move that 
offers exciting new directions for Rhys scholarship’ (Johnson and Moran 2015: 5).35 
They draw particular attention to Kelly Oliver’s theory of ‘social melancholy’. 
Deploying Fanon (2001: 40), Oliver argues that ‘the negative affects of the oppressors’ 
are ‘deposited into the bones of the oppressed’ (Oliver 2004: xix). As Johnson and 
Moran note, citing Oliver, this process 
 
engender[s] a pervasive sense of shame that for women in particular often 
develops into depression, which in turn wordlessly speaks to ‘the loss of the 
self as an active agent and positive force in the world’. Rhys’s fiction depicts 
the very process of this loss and the debilitating state of mind that ensues, and 
while postcolonial readings of Rhys thus far have tended to focus on the 
historical and materialist dimensions of her work, this new body of 
psychoanalytic work points the way to a more holistic approach that brings 
 




historical and materialist concerns into dialogue with the states of mind they 
engender. (Oliver 2004: 121, in Johnson and Moran 2015: 5)  
 
Turning to affect in Rhys’s writing may serve to bridge some of the schisms in the 
scholarship on her work such as that between postcolonial and psychoanalytic readings 
which have generally been kept separate from one another. More specifically, thinking 
about how the mind and body are affected by power in specific historical conditions 
may lead to productive ways of approaching the discomforting degree to which Rhys’s 
work inhabits the zone of indistinction between the private and the social. Ahmed 
proposes that one of the valuable results of not dismissing unhappiness simply as that 
which must be overcome is that we might thereby develop our ethical capacity for being 
affected (Ahmed 2010: 219). Encountering Rhysian affect without assuming that the 
suffering of her protagonists is simply something to be overcome enables us to open 
up the critical dichotomy that has rendered Rhysian passivity the effect either of 
personal or social defect. Rhys’s narratives of women who do not resist their 
vulnerability can teach us things about how power works, how we think about our 
connectedness and our being in the world which is always private and social – and how 
we avoid thinking about it.  
Returning to Benstock, we can hear in her account something like a palpable 
effort to recontain within the realm of the personal precisely that which Rhys insists is 
also political. In Carr’s terms, such criticism functions to ‘blot out the darkness of 
[Rhys’s] work’ (2012: 16). Carr’s phrase conveys the idea of a willed blindness, and 
recalls Michel Foucault’s 1976 analysis in The Will to Knowledge of the ‘learned 
discourses on sex that were announced in the nineteenth century’ (1998: 55).36 These 
discourses were  
 
imbued with age-old delusions, but also with systematic blindness: a refusal to 
see and to understand; but further – and this is the crucial point – a refusal 
concerning the very thing that was brought to light and whose formulation was 
urgently solicited. (Foucault 1998: 55) 
 
 
36 This is the first volume of Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, originally published as l’Histoire de la 




I am not suggesting a resemblance between Rhys criticism – much of which has been 
feminist – and nineteenth-century discourses on sex. However, from the interstices of 
Foucault’s theory and Carr’s meta-analysis a distinct warning can be heard, cautioning 
us against a too-ready acceptance of the fantasy of the Rhys protagonist as unhappy, 
passive, without will and lacking agency. This is too complete and overdetermined a 
picture, and the values and negative affects which circulate in the novels and criticism 
are too easily read as static things, as fixed qualities, rather than dynamic and 
constituting processes. The aim in this thesis is to work against this fantasy, but not by 
moving entirely away from it. The intention, rather, is to occupy the fantasy, paying 
attention to its function as a ‘[w]hole series of reinforcements and 
intensification…carefully tailored to the requirements of power’ (Foucault 1998: 72), 
with the aim of finding something new and interesting about the passive female body 
within. 
There is a lively contemporary feminist debate around what feminists ought to 
do with the bad feeling produced by oppression, a debate to which Rhys’s novels speak. 
This study’s alignment with Deleuze’s philosophy necessitates a degree of agreement 
with Braidotti’s Spinozist contention that bad feeling or what she calls negative passion 
is something to be overcome in a becoming-joyful which is the aim of all life (Braidotti 
2006a). I am in complete agreement with her claim that we are in urgent need of ‘new 
and alternative modes of political and ethical agency’ (2006a: 2), and although she sees 
passivity as the absence of such things, I contend that Rhysian passivity can be 
rethought so it is in line with Braidotti’s project. Braidotti’s claim that an ‘[e]thical life 
pursues that which enhances and strengthens the subject without reference to 
transcendental values, but rather in the awareness of one’s interconnection with others’ 
is, I think, persuasive (2006a: 7). However, Braidotti’s defence of an ethics predicated 
on an affirmation which overcomes all negativity, including vulnerability and pain, 
strikes me as problematic. Nomadic ethics, for Braidotti, takes negative experience as 
its starting point and proceeding from a ‘Deleuzian-Nietzschean perspective [...] is 
essentially about transformation of negative into positive passions, that is, about 
moving beyond the pain. This does not mean denying the pain but rather activating it, 
working it through’ (2006: 12). I wonder if this closing double description indicates a 
problem. It is difficult to know how a ‘working through’ would find its place in 
Deleuze’s philosophy given his rejection of psychoanalysis. Even Braidotti’s idea of 




refusal of first principles, although her feminist ethics probably necessitates and 
warrants such a move. I find Deleuze’s philosophical celebration of the value of 
difficulty one of the most compelling aspects of his thought. Accordingly, a nomadic 
ethics for me would conceive of vulnerability, pain and unhappiness not as the negative 
per se, but as states of difficulty – cognitive and noncognitive, bodily and intellectual 
– which are valuable as they force thought. Such states would not be overcome, but 
would be points of becoming. They might even be thought of as the outside of ethical 
thought. They constitute that which cannot be desired in a desire for living well that is 
also living ethically among others; that which we seek to minimise in our world but at 
which our efforts are aimed. This is entirely my suggestion of how a nomadic ethics 
might allow for the productive capacity of vulnerability and pain. It does not derive 
from Deleuze. It may be the case that his ethical philosophy does not pay sufficient 
attention to the dangers of the will to mastery. 
Either way, Braidotti’s aim of overcoming negative passions is, for me, far too 
exclusive. I share Ahmed’s belief that we can learn much of political importance by 
paying close attention to how negative feelings, unhappy states and unhappiness itself 
are produced and circulated. Rather than dismissing these as things to be overcome, we 
can regard them as evidence in an archive or terms in a genealogy: as things to be 
thought through. In thinking them through, we can learn how violence is done to the 
bodies of those deemed inferior, strange or emotional, and we can develop an ethical 
capacity for being affected by others rather than replicating the desire for autonomy 
which is so central to capitalist notions of self-development (Ahmed 2010: 115, 219). 
Crucially, claiming our negative passions can be the means of ‘radical disagreement’ 
with the status quo, the promise of happiness and the set of normative associations that 
we are sold in contemporary life, such as the belief that happiness, strength, autonomy, 
success and normative activity are all different bricks on the road to the good life 
(Ahmed 2010: 213). As Ahmed argues, suffering can be our feeling of our 
disagreement with the good life and it can therefore be a way of doing something 
against those who subordinate the emotional, the passive and weak and women’s 
bodies generally (2010: 210). One response to this subordination is to show the world 
that women are strong and active beings. Another is to reveal and insist on the 
contingency and the power of the negative values that become attached to subordinated 
individuals, to attributes, feelings and states which are demeaned. Rhys’s fiction is an 




my arguments. I theorise Rhys’s affinity with the other side of the debate, in which 
thinkers such as Ahmed argue that we should harness our bad feeling precisely because 
of its political force; and I propose a philosophical reading in line with the ‘affirmative 
turn’, as Ahmed describes the effect of Deleuzian studies like Braidotti’s today (2010: 
213). The bad feeling that attaches to the passivity of Rhys’s protagonists is read as 
disruptive of the dominant order and I propose that Rhys’s last novel achieves a 
‘working through’ of negative affect that leads to the affirmation of future 
communality.  
We can sense some of this debate at play in Ngai’s claim that ugly feelings such 
as irritation and paranoia are ‘deeply equivocal’ and at their heart lies a ‘systematic 
problematisation of the distinction between subjective and objective enunciation’ (Ngai 
2005: 3, 20). These minor affects involve problems caused by ‘obstructed agency’ and 
which are therefore ‘charged with political meaning’ (Ngai 2005: 3). They are confused 
feelings of powerlessness which are ‘intentionally weak and therefore often politically 
ambiguous’; though not suited to clear and defined goals and ‘forceful/defined action’, 
this unsuitability ‘amplifies their power to diagnose situations, and situations marked 
by blocked or thwarted action in particular’ (Ngai 2005: 26-27). Ugly feelings function 
as ‘signs that not only render visible different registers of problem (formal, ideological, 
sociohistorical), but conjoin these problems in a distinctive manner’ (Ngai 2005: 3). 
Importantly, these problems ‘can also be thought of as allegories for an autonomous or 
bourgeois art’s increasingly resigned and pessimistic understanding of its own 
relationship to political action’ (3). The politically urgent task of thinking through the 
aesthetic and the political together is fraught with difficulty, Ngai argues, and is a 
‘prime occasion for ugly feelings’ (2005: 3).  
This is a complicated set of ideas with a high degree of self-referentiality, but 
sheds light on the equivocality of Rhysian negative affect. Chapter Three considers part 
of this theorisation in the context of Good Morning, Midnight. Sasha’s feeling of 
paralysis in the kitchen girl scene both highlights and seems to compete with the 
political significations of this text. Some time after her enlivening visit with Serge, 
Sasha is consumed with misery, orders a drink in a tabac, and guiltily observes the girl 
doing the washing up in confined quarters. She considers making a stand on the girl’s 
behalf, but does nothing other than think and sit and drink. In a text that is preoccupied 
with dangerous intolerance and the rise of fascism, this moment of not acting for 




real need for us all to be able to act for others, and this is most difficult and most urgent 
at times when violent regimes demand that our ethical capacity is inactive. Sasha’s 
passivity is diagnostic: her flaw, her solipsism, is society’s. She poses the fundamental 
questions of political engagement, of how one should act in relation to others: ‘Why 
should I?’, ‘What can I do about it?’ (GMM, 89), she asks, thereby enunciating the 
dilemma of her time. Interestingly, in regards to Ngai’s argument, it is extremely 
difficult to describe the tone in these words and in other parts of the scene. Sasha’s 
exhortation to society to have some ‘pity’ is impassioned, but her consideration of the 
girl is strikingly lacking in affect. It is, as Ngai describes Melville’s The Confidence-
Man: His Masquerade (1857), atonal. Yet this is not to say that there is textual 
indifference towards Sasha’s passivity and the absence of her active pity, nor that we 
do not care about it. As in Melville’s novel, there is a distinct meta-affectivity at work 
here, with our ‘perception of an unfelt feeling produc[ing] a secondary, dysphoric 
emotion’ (Ngai 2005: 83). Our response is dysphoric as any single interpretive 
orientation is problematic. We cannot simply condemn Sasha for her lack of feeling 
(because we are aware that there is unexpressed care), and because it is her passivity – 
her doing nothing – which constitutes a diagnosis of her time, and which thereby does 
something of great value. In this brilliant depiction of solipsism Sasha’s words stand 
for a regime of utterances, Deleuze’s term for the official language of any assemblage. 
Her statements stand for fascistic politics and structures of thought in the late 1930s, 
and we are caught between reading this scene as depicting a subjective passivity and a 
collective state of affairs. The scene, of course, presents us with both, and does so in a 
manner which opens up the ‘subjective’, freeing it from entropic containment as 
Sasha’s experience, her body, her feelings are determined by objective conditions.  
There is, I suggest, a clamour among the aesthetic, the affective and the political 
in this episode and in other moments when Rhys’s protagonists are aware of their 
passivity, such as when Antoinette asserts in her dream that she would not save herself 
from her fate even if she could. Attending to this tension, we might consider the texts 
to be underscoring the conditions of both meaning-making and the production of 
knowledge itself. In compelling the reader to sense the distinct political and affective, 
subjective and objective dimensions of the texts, the passivity of Rhys’s protagonists 
appears to reveal ideology at work – what Jameson described, in his essay ‘On 
Interpretation’, as the ‘constitutive structure in which the empirical textual objects 




the behaviour of these characters, when we ourselves in our passivity are implicated in 
it to the extent that our reading is a passive activity, and as our overdetermined 
expectations of good development are defied in narratives which depict women 
criticised for their inappropriate behaviour, the reading process is revealed as an 
endeavour constituted by dominant ideologies and modes of production which 
privilege conventional ways of being and knowing over passivity and the absence of 
certainty. The problems that arise from navigating the affective, the aesthetic and the 
political in search of stable meaning certainly encourage the reader to consider the 
ideology of her own reading and her desire for clarity and distinction.  
 
III. The intolerable in Wide Sargasso Sea 
Wide Sargasso Sea is by far the most passionate of Rhys’s novels and it also refutes 
this expectation of clear meaning in many ways. The text is full of fury and hatred, but 
there is also an important thematic key composed of minor affects, among the foremost 
of which is contempt: the contempt felt by both the husband and Mr Mason for the 
black islanders is central to the narrative; and Christophine’s contempt for Daniel, 
Amélie and the husband is a vital balancing principle which energises the text’s vision 
of human cruelty and softens the blow of Antoinette’s extreme passivity in the novel’s 
second half. Antoinette has a powerful, longing attachment to her home, and there is 
an early reciprocal, life-affirming passion between her and her husband which makes 
her ‘happy’ and ‘want to live’, and which is absent in the other novels (WSS, 77). With 
brilliant economy, Rhys sketches the passionate physical attraction that the newly 
married couple share: 
 
‘Die then! Die!’ I watched her die many times. In my way, not in hers. In 
sunlight, in shadow, by moonlight, by candlelight. In the long afternoons when 
the house was empty. Only the sun was there to keep us company. We shut him 
out. And why not? Very soon she was as eager for what’s called loving as I was 
– more lost and drowned afterwards. (WSS, 77) 
 
The husband’s unruly desire for Antoinette becomes painful once he finds an excuse 
to hate her, and he becomes increasingly tormented by the ‘giddy change’, the 




dominate, to his sense of powerlessness and loss, to remorse, temptation and sexual 
longing (WSS, 139, 141). The husband is the most dramatic locus of intelligible affect 
in Wide Sargasso Sea, and he tracks the flux of his feeling with an almost-admirable 
honesty, acknowledging even at the height of his hatred that he is driven by resentment 
and longing: ‘Above all I hated her. For she belonged to the magic and the loveliness. 
She had left me thirsty and all my life would be thirst and longing for what I had lost 
before I found it’ (141).  
The husband is unable openly to acknowledge the identity of this lost object. 
Of course, he desires the secret of Antoinette. He wants the ‘alien, disturbing, secret 
loveliness’ that she ‘hides’ – phrases which suggest his aim of capturing her spirit, 
controlling her desire, dominating her completely (WSS, 73). Yet this ‘secret 
loveliness’ is the husband’s description of the tropical environment that so troubles him 
– the land that morphs in his perceptions from being ‘too much’ (59) to being clearly 
‘hostile’, ‘threatening’ a ‘green menace’ (123). The lost object, then, appears to be 
some knowledge Antoinette could have conferred upon her husband concerning the 
landscape and her ‘secret’ ability to not just survive in this mysterious, overwhelming 
and threatening place but to profit spiritually from it, loving it ‘[m]ore than a person’ 
despite her awareness, which she discloses to him, that  
 
It is not for you and not for me. It has nothing to do with either of us. That is 
why you are afraid of it, because it is something else. I found that out long ago 
when I was a child. I loved it because I had nothing else to love, but it is 
indifferent as this God you call on so often. (WSS, 74, 107) 
 
Antoinette’s secret is her ability to tolerate that which is indifferent to her, and this is 
precisely that which the husband cannot bear. He can tolerate the landscape’s hostile 
indifference no more than he can bear the thought that Antoinette is indifferent to him 
and her passion indiscriminate:  
 
Sneer to the last, Devil. Do you think that I don’t know? She thirsts for anyone 
– not for me... 
She’ll loosen her black hair, and laugh and coax and flatter (a mad girl. 




sane woman would – or could. Or could. Then lie so still, still as this cloudy 
day. A lunatic who always knows the time. But never does. 
[...] 
I tell you she loves no one, anyone. I could not touch her. Excepting as 
the hurricane will touch that tree – and break it.  
[...] 
She said she loved this place. This is the last she’ll see of it. (WSS, 135-
36) 
  
In this important passage the husband conjures up Antoinette’s ‘madness’ as her 
passion which entirely exceeds him. Her madness is her lunatic expression of erotic joy 
that is so different from his, her lunatic refusal that this joy be a response secured only 
by him, and the lunacy of her joy in a place whose indifference to her only magnifies 
what he perceives to be the indifference of her passion for him and his general lack of 
control on the island and in their marriage.  
The dynamic between indifference and the intolerable that intensifies as Part 
Two progresses is potent and viciously ironic. Antoinette’s ability to exist in a 
relationship with that which is indifferent to her becomes the focus of the husband’s 
rising inability to tolerate his lack of control. Rhys’s fiction generally explores the 
experience of the marginalised who do not have control, and in her final novel 
Antoinette’s accepting and measured response to this environmental situation 
delineates the husband’s increasingly giddy attempt to reassert himself as a form of 
behaviour more akin to lunacy than is hers.   
Although Antoinette’s acceptance of her lack of control in relation to the island 
seems appropriate it has, of course, an important alternative and disturbing 
manifestation in her acceptance of her fate more generally. Her refusal to try to save 
herself in her dream signals her inability to ‘have spunks and do battle’ for herself, as 
Christophine advises (WSS, 96). Antoinette is aware of the crooked marriage deal that 
will disinherit her, but does nothing about it; she is completely unable to follow any of 
Christophine’s advice, despite seeking her help, and the resistance Antoinette offers to 
her husband once he has betrayed their marriage is exactly the self-destructive, 
unrestrained and violent behaviour that will allow him to declare her mad. Finally, she 
offers no active resistance to being taken from Granbois.  Antoinette’s refusal or 




protagonists. It is also, like Melville’s Bartleby, a preference not to act to save herself 
and, like the Scrivener’s behaviour and like other ugly feelings, it is emotionally 
illegible, intentionally weak and politically ambiguous. It is hard to know how to read 
Antoinette’s failure to attend to herself in the sense of acting in response to the peril 
she is in, but following Ngai and our schizoanalytic method, rather than mining her 
psychology or masochism we should ask: what situation does this failure or 
‘disattendability’ – as Ngai describes it, following William Ian Miller (1997) – indicate 
or diagnose? My suggestion is that Antoinette’s disattendability, her preference to not 
attend to and resist the danger that threatens her, is an ugly feeling which ‘render[s] 
visible different registers of [the] problem (formal, ideological, sociohistorical)’ of the 
intolerable (Ngai 2005: 3). That is, Antoinette’s passivity makes visible problems of 
disgust.  
In the ‘Afterword’ to Ugly Feelings Ngai explores disgust – an affect which, 
though not minor, is politically interesting for several reasons and has generally been 
overlooked for its opposite, desire, in literary and cultural studies. Disgust is the 
response we exhibit towards the intolerable. It is a phobic striving away from the 
disgusting which nevertheless is sometimes paradoxically close to desire as we focus 
on or even obsess about how to manage our feelings towards the intolerable object. 
There are several key scenes in Wide Sargasso Sea in which the husband feels disgust. 
On Daniel’s insistence that Antoinette ‘talks sweet talk and she lies’, the husband 
listens to the ‘black and gilt clock strike’ and feels he ‘must go. [He] must get away 
from [Daniel’s] yellow sweating face and his hateful little room’ (WSS, 103). The 
description of the clock underscores the racialised nature of the husband’s disgust at 
the proximity of this ‘yellow’-faced man who is related to his wife, and from whom he 
will shortly hear of her promiscuity with her mixed-race half-brother. When Daniel 
finally gets around to his direct attempt to extort money, the husband’s disgust returns: 
‘Now disgust was rising in me like sickness. Disgust and rage’ (104). He leaves 
Daniel’s house and perceives the ‘world’ suddenly ‘given up to heat and flies’ (104). 
His response to the island frequently verges on disgust at that which is ‘too much’ to 
tolerate, an exorbitance which, after Daniel’s poisonous words, gives rise to the thought 
that ‘in this damned place’ it is ‘probable’ that Antoinette and Amélie are related (105). 
That same night, Antoinette gives him the love potion and in the early morning the 
husband wakes with a ‘feeling of suffocation. Something was lying across [his] mouth; 




provoked by the drink a double in his rising disgust at having had passionate sex with 
Antoinette given his fresh ‘knowledge’ of the intolerable crimes of miscegenation, 
incest and the lie of her bridal virginity. Too ‘giddy to stand’, the husband falls  
 
backwards on to the bed, looking at the blanket which was a peculiar shade of 
yellow. After looking at it for some time I was able to go over to the window 
and vomit. It seemed like hours before this stopped. I would lean up against the 
wall and wipe my face, then the retching and sickness would start again. (WSS, 
114) 
 
Obviously legible as the husband’s physical reaction to a noxious intoxicant, this scene 
of vomiting also encodes a potent racial disgust – the yellow of the blanket recalling 
Daniel’s appearance – at being too proximate to a poisonous, contaminating, exorbitant 
otherness. Antoinette’s ‘dark alien eyes’ which are ‘too large’ have, since early in their 
marriage, disclosed to the husband her suspicious blood-line – ‘Creole of pure English 
descent she may be, but they are not English or European either’ (WSS, 56) – but 
Daniel’s accusations of inter-racial incest, Annette’s madness and promiscuity, and 
Christophine’s ‘evil’ practice of Obeah overdetermine an entirely excessive alien 
otherness that cannot be tolerated. Literally unable to swallow his disgust at the 
increasing otherness which, as he sees it, has penetrated him against his will, the 
husband manages his powerlessness by committing to hatred and to indulging all 
suspicion, however wild: ‘As I watched, hating, her face grew smooth and very young 
again, she even seemed to smile. A trick of the light perhaps. What else?’ (114). The 
husband manages his disgust at and fear of Antoinette’s otherness with hatred and 
negative fantasy, just as racists and other fascists have done throughout history.  
Ngai emphasises the use to which disgust has been put by intolerant ideologies, 
observing that this affect has been the object of a ‘spectacular appropriation by the 
political right’ which has rendered it ‘a means of reinforcing the boundaries between 
self and “contaminating” others that has perpetuated racism, anti-Semitism, 
homophobia, and misogyny’ (2005: 338-39). This use may, Ngai speculates, be the 
reason for the asymmetry in the attention given to desire and disgust, with the former 
utilised in all sorts of cultural studies aiming at tolerance and pluralism, but the latter 
rarely put to work in leftist agendas. The husband’s disgust at Antoinette’s 




painful history of the supposedly disgusting Bertha, that intolerable construct of 
monstrous, unknowable female otherness in Jane Eyre that Brontë locks away out of 
sight like a dangerous animal. Rhys shows the moment when Antoinette/Bertha 
becomes disgusting for the husband, in an insistence that this attribute is in no way 
innate but constructed and externally imposed. The disgusting, like beauty, is in the eye 
of the beholder, and the fascistic gaze is always likely to find difference disgusting 
when given the chance. The husband’s attempt to ‘know’ the island is 
epistemologically inappropriate, and his inability to tolerate exorbitant otherness and 
his resulting disgust are entirely unoriginal. Yet Wide Sargasso Sea is, I think, doing 
something more nuanced with disgust.  
In a complex Marxist-inspired argument, only a few key points of which can be 
indicated here, Ngai makes a convincing case that the left should not necessarily 
suppress its own disgust at that which is intolerable, such as existing class structures 
and expressions of bigotry, and it should also beware the fact that disgust is amoral and 
therefore ‘inevitably prone to uglification by moralists’ (Ngai 2005: 339-40). Drawing 
on Herbert Marcuse’s work (1965), Ngai argues that we might mobilise disgust against 
the repressive tolerance which enables the perpetuation of the existing order of things. 
This would entail a critique of the political state’s pluralism which can serve to drown 
out the radical potential of forms of dissent that utilise an idiom ‘defined by [the] 
vehement exclusion of the intolerable’ (Ngai 2005: 344): 
 
The hegemonic pluralism of both the academy and the larger society is (as 
[Ellen] Rooney argues) a mode of ‘seductive reasoning’ that conscripts the 
appealing rhetoric of inclusivity to exclude critical discourses of exclusion – in 
particular, those which take ‘the process of exclusion to be necessary to the 
production of meaning or community’. (Rooney 1989: 27, in Ngai 2005: 343-
44) 
 
This is not an argument against tolerance, but against the rhetoric that uses ‘consensus’ 
as a means of positioning dissent as totalitarian or – more common in today’s language 
– extreme. It is also an argument against what Ngai sees as the negative border of 
tolerance: contempt – that state of tolerating an object because one ‘assumes [that] 
object to be relatively unthreatening, only mildly offensive if offensive at all’ (2005: 




subject remains she who can be overlooked (Ngai 2005: 337). The ‘unsettling 
proximity’ between contempt and ‘benign tolerance’ is ‘disclosed precisely through the 
[Lawyer’s] managerial suppression of disgust in Melville’s story’ (Ngai 2005: 337). If 
Bartleby’s self-disattendability, which takes the form of his preference not to work, eat 
or survive, is politically ambiguous it is so because we cannot know for sure whether 
the story depicts an overcoming of his initial social invisibility through his extreme 
disattendability which makes him insistently visible and in doing so provokes the 
lawyer’s disgust, or whether it shows this initial invisibility consuming him, becoming 
internalised so he can prefer nothing in relation to himself. On a third reading, 
Bartleby’s extreme passivity diminishes his inoffensiveness, rendering him more 
visible, but not to the conversion point where he becomes a threat. On this view his 
quiet demise in prison is a complete failure of the objectionable to make itself felt. For 
Ngai, Bartleby extends his disattendability to disclose the limits of the ‘social 
inattention’ that practises contemptuous tolerance of that which is deemed offensive 
but unthreateningly insignificant and the agency of which is thereby diminished.  
This is a striking set of arguments for our analysis of Rhys’s protagonists who 
make themselves visible in a difficult way. Sasha’s tears on the opening page of Good 
Morning, Midnight are a note to the reader that this character will not behave as she 
ought. Julia acquiesces to being picked up by strange men, but she is too old to be doing 
so and provokes from one potential ‘suitor’ a gasp of disapproval (ALMM, 135). On 
her weekend break with Walter, Vincent and the latter’s girlfriend, Anna is not content 
to be patronisingly excluded from their discussion concerning her immaturity and she 
stubs her cigarette violently onto Walter’s hand in an act that reveals her lack of self-
restraint and emotional immaturity but which also utterly refuses the bourgeois, male 
determination of acceptable female behaviour. In general, the unmarried, 
unaccompanied presence of these imbibing women in public spaces is, the texts 
suggest, an affront. They refuse to be categorised as either wife/girlfriend or prostitute, 
they have no friends, and they insist on their active sexuality, thereby defying the 
various public positions open to women. In an exception, it is Antoinette’s presence in 
private that is problematic, but her Creole appearance and her willingness to be initiated 
into a fevered sexuality serve to make her visibly problematic for the husband.  
Encounters in Rhys’s fiction are mostly violent, as her protagonists are met by 
hostility which manages their difference, forcing their recontainment in socially 




first, third and fourth novels, in encounters which confer upon the protagonists the 
assignation of undesirable sadness: ‘Pourquois êtes-vous si triste?’, ask the two 
Russians in Good Morning, Midnight (39), the same question that is posed by strangers 
to Marya in Quartet (118). In Voyage in the Dark, the question is voiced accusingly in 
the negative and in English by Anna in reply to Walter’s patronising attempt to comfort 
her after they have sex for the first time: ‘I’m not sad. Why have you got this soppy 
idea that I’m always sad?’ (ViD, 33). The ‘sadness’ that is assigned or ‘fixed’ to the 
protagonists has a negative value – it is an aberration from the norm (the happy woman 
with a man) and therefore something that must be remarked upon. It is imposed on the 
woman as a mark of the female melancholy that, whether or not she feels it, is the 
socially appropriate response to being visibly single and no longer young, assigning a 
negative value to her unaccompanied female presence which is an implicit challenge 
to patriarchal society, recapturing her within the male gaze and realigning power in 
favour of the city’s male and married population. It is not necessary that the men are 
conscious of this intent. They may intend only to flirt, but this language of flirtation is 
determined by the language of the dominant order. The Russians’ question causes 
Sasha’s thoughts to spiral out of control in a series of clichéd images of sadness which 
concludes in a reductive refrain, ‘sad as a woman who is growing old. Sad, sad, sad… 
Or perhaps if I just said “merde” it would do as well’ (GMM, 39). Sasha ‘internalises’ 
the sadness the men have imposed upon her; the expletive suggests the violence of the 
imposition, and her resulting muteness (they ‘walk along in silence’) expresses the 
sense of inferiority that their words have produced. In these moments when the 
protagonists’ bodies and negative affects are the focus of disapprobation, Rhys reveals 
the extent to which negativity is not natural or essential but produced discursively in a 
contemptuous management aimed at re-establishing their disattendability, or relative 
inoffensiveness. These women’s passivity – which is also a self-disattendability – 
serves to make them persistently visible at times, but they don’t have a dog’s chance 
against the regime of social contempt that awaits those like them; and the performative 
function of negative naming rapidly assigns to them the appropriate synthetic affect 
and in doing so diminishes their agency and re-establishes their sense of inferiority and 
powerlessness. Interestingly, the main examples in Rhys’s first four novels of a 
character responding to the protagonist with disgust are Lois in Quartet and Norah in 




disattendability seems to be practised best by men. They seem better able to manage 
‘disgusting’ others than women. 
Wide Sargasso Sea is dramatically different from the earlier novels in this 
respect: Antoinette manages to convert her irritating presence into a fully-fledged 
embodiment of the disgusting. Her success is politically ambiguous, like Bartleby’s, 
but the excess of this conversion, its overdetermined nature works, I think, to hold up 
a mirror to the husband’s violent, imperialist uglification of otherness, forcing him to 
confront his own ugly inability to manage Antoinette if not his own moral inadequacies. 
As importantly, her conversion is Antoinette’s means of overcoming her self-
disattendability, her own bewildering passivity. In seeking out a love potion, 
administering it and thereby becoming-disgusting Antoinette claims agency. We might 
even follow Ngai here, and understand Rhys to be putting forward an argument for the 
aesthetically intolerable as that which might just effect change in a way in which the 
beautiful text cannot. Antoinette’s becoming-disgusting and all the other problematic 
or intolerable elements of the novel which have made themselves so vividly felt in the 
postcolonial criticism might, I think, be read as Rhys’s provocation to the pluralist 
aesthetic tolerance of a more or less friendly literary market in which ‘the radical 
impact of art, the protest of art against the established reality is swallowed up’ (Marcuse 
1965: 88-89). Of course, it is Christophine’s assistance that enables Antoinette to claim 
this agency, as the ex-servant provides the unspecified love potion. Christophine allows 
Antoinette’s radical becoming-disgusting, which makes it all the more fitting that she 
has been a primary focus of debate which has centred on whether or not the text can 
‘contain’ her. She is the means to Antoinette’s exorbitance, and the problem of the 
status of both Rhys and the text in relation to Christophine remains an exorbitant one 
that, in our inability conclusively to define the text’s political allegiance, we might even 
describe as intolerable.  
As discussed in Chapter One, the character of Christophine greatly muddies the 
always-complicated undercurrents of this deeply political novel. In the opening lines 
Antoinette cites Christophine’s explanation of the white ladies’ hostility to Annette and 
this plunges us immediately into an impossibly complex relationship. Christophine’s 
status is unclear. She is a servant and cook to mother and daughter, and nursemaid to 
the latter. Given as a marriage ‘gift’ to Annette by her husband, after his death and 
Emancipation Christophine has become integral to the survival of these women, as 




Antoinette’s relationship to Christophine is a heady mixture of childish dependence on 
a mother substitute, love for a loyal companion, admiration, fear, prideful entitlement 
and colonial superiority, and the power dynamic between nursemaid and charge is in 
flux. Sometimes the Antoinette-Christophine relationship appears exploitative and 
mostly determined by the white Creole girl who cannot comprehend Christophine as a 
free and equal agent, being capable only of seeing her as someone who exists to serve 
in unthinking loyalty. This is a troubling depiction of a profoundly complex inter-racial, 
inter-generational relationship forged in a climate of endless permutations of racial and 
xenophobic hostility and set against the backdrop of the disintegration and reformation 
of social structures that followed the Emancipation Act. Though difficult, their 
relationship nevertheless appears as a moving riposte to the principle of us-against-
them that is made possible by Christophine’s capacity for loving wisdom. Christophine 
is endowed with strength, courage and insight missing in all other characters including 
both Cosway women, and she has an exceptional ability to know things. This contrast 
is not unproblematic.  
In Part One Christophine tells Annette that she is ‘crazy in truth’ expecting 
‘clean dress’ for Antoinette ‘to drop from heaven’, stating ‘loudly that it shameful. She 
run wild, she grow up worthless. And nobody care’ (22). Christophine accurately 
identifies Annette’s shameful incapacity to be a good mother to Antoinette, but also the 
‘shame’ that Annette feels at being poor which Antoinette internalises, feeling that her 
mother is ‘ashamed’ of her and therefore unable to ‘speak to’ or ‘look at’ her (23). 
Similarly, Christophine offers the novel’s most accurate and damning analysis of the 
Emancipation Act, describing the English language and the law as the weapons of the 
‘cunning’ oppressor who has replaced slavery with other forms of violence now 
concealed beneath the coded veneer of a ‘civil’ system:  
 
No more slavery! She had to laugh! ‘These new ones have Letter of the Law. 
Same thing. They got magistrate. They got fine. They got jail house and chain 
gang. They got tread machine to mash up people’s feet. New ones worse than 
old ones – more cunning, that’s all.’ (WSS, 23) 
 
Christophine’s patois illustrates the new order as a coded chain (represented in the 
series of similar short clauses) that leads the black community inexorably by the ‘Letter 




bodily punishment. Her analysis is vindicated when the husband threatens to have her 
arrested if she tries to influence Antoinette further. In a series of letters exchanged by 
the husband, Mr Fraser, the Spanish Town magistrate, and Mr Hill, ‘the white inspector 
of police’ in the local town, the men hatch a plan to deal with Christophine if she ‘gets 
up to any of her [Obeah] nonsense’ (WSS, 118). Christophine understands the force of 
their threat of ‘send[ing] a couple of policemen up to [her] place’ (132), and knows she 
cannot defend herself against their authority which proceeds from an infallible machine 
of racism, misogyny, legislation and written English, in relation to which she is 
absolutely powerless. So she leaves: ‘“Read and write I don’t know. Other things I 
know.” She walked away without looking back’ (133). This is the last we see of 
Christophine, and the departure is contrasted with Annette’s inability in Part One to 
remove her family from Coulibri when she knows they are in danger. Christophine 
effectively organises her life: she chooses with whom she lives, and she leaves when 
she knows her current situation is unproductive or dangerous (84, 133). 
From Christophine’s first meeting with the husband she demonstrates her 
intimidating intractability:  
 
She looked at me steadily, not with approval, I thought. We stared at each other 
for quite a minute. I looked away first and she smiled to herself, gave Antoinette 
a little push forward and disappeared into the shadows at the back of the house. 
(WSS, 61) 
 
Christophine’s self-assertion is matched by her composed, generally unemotional 
demeanour. At most she offers disdain for the dishonourable fiscal motivations of men 
and the occasional gesture of disgust. In the important conversation between the 
husband and Christophine in Part Two she confidently stands her ground, speaks in a 
‘judge’s voice’, ‘indifferently’ and ‘steadily’ (126, 129, 130). The husband’s 
composure is as unsteady as his voice which is interrupted by Christophine’s words 
‘echo[ing] loudly in [his] head’ (126). He feels ‘hypnotised’ and experiences ‘pang[s] 
of rage and jealousy’ (130-31), and this is met with Christophine’s unemotional, 
resolute ability to ‘know’, which reaches its pinnacle in this conversation: she repeats 
the word twenty times in this passage alone.  
Christophine provides balance to the scheming black and mixed-race 




immune to the negative effects of isolation, choosing to keep the neighbourhood 
women at arm’s length, and she is depicted as having few needs and pride at her lack 
of dependency. One effect of this idealisation is to render her strength dangerously 
close to a stereotype of exotic, unknowable female black power. Depending on one’s 
view, Rhys either worsened or merely aired this problem by expressing her worry to 
Athill that she had made Christophine ‘too articulate’ – a statement which has given 
rise to much debate (Letters, 297). Christophine is unusually articulate in the sense that 
she is the only character capable of making insightful judgements of situations. Rather 
than this being a function of Rhys’s problematic depiction of a black woman, I propose 
that Christophine’s talent as an articulate diagnostician works with her lack of affect 
and her ability to walk away from oppressive situations to suggest Christophine’s 
proximity to the author. The devastating truth of the husband’s motivation is revealed 
by this isolated black woman who has that which Rhys shared – an irrepressible 
capacity to see and ‘know’ the violence to which humanity tends, which motors the 
various systems that determine the plight of the oppressed. Christophine knows the 
husband’s intentions:  
 
You want her money but you don’t want her. It is in your mind to pretend she 
is mad. I know it. The doctors say what you tell them to say [...] She will be like 
her mother. You do that for money? But you wicked like Satan self. (WSS, 132) 
 
She also articulates the fact that Annette was ‘drive[n]’ to madness, and offers an 
accurate summation of Antoinette’s masochistic love for the husband even after his 
betrayal which is in stark contrast to his extremely limited capacity for love (129). It is 
Christophine who voices the anxiety-laden Rhysian facts that we frequently desire 
against our interests, that we desire to dominate others and to enter into bad 
compositions with other bodies.  
Christophine is not, on my reading, too articulate. Her analysis provides the 
text’s vitality at this point in Antoinette’s decline. Instead, our last vision of her through 
the husband’s eyes signals a reason why Christophine is just articulate enough. The 
husband observes ‘a mask on her face and her eyes were undaunted. She was a fighter’ 
(WSS, 133). There are no other female fighters in Rhys’s novels, and even though we 
might allow that this is the husband’s sexist assessment of a woman’s strength relative 




description is accurate. Nowhere else in her fiction is Rhys interested in speaking for 
fighters, and given Christophine’s ‘mask’-like strength, her exceptional diagnostic 
ability and minimal affective register, we might reasonably conclude that Rhys was not 
interested in doing so in Wide Sargasso Sea either. While Christophine speaks for 
Annette and Antoinette, drawing on insight comparable to her author’s, we can, I think, 
conclude that Rhys did not presume to speak for Christophine. I am suggesting that 
Rhys’s interest was in writing for those for whom she could presume to speak, and that 
in her understanding this group was not lacking a voice but lacking certainty and 
specifically a boundary between their inner and outer worlds. These are the effects and 
manifestations of what Ramchand, following Fanon in his 1961 book The Wretched of 
the Earth (Les damnés de la terre), describes as the ‘terrified consciousness’ of the 
white Creole community after Emancipation (Ramchand 1970: 225).  
In Christophine’s opening description of the Jamaican white women’s prejudice 
against Annette’s Creole identity it is significant that the hostility is aimed at Annette’s 
good looks: ‘The Jamaican ladies had never approved of my mother, “because she 
pretty like pretty self” Christophine said’ (WSS, 15). Christophine’s role as interpreter 
underscores the absence of the mother, whose reclusiveness and alienation from her 
daughter has been caused by this disapproval. This absence is foregrounded by 
Christophine’s patois which omits the verb ‘to be’, the suffix from ‘pretty’, and 
substitutes ‘self’ for the reflexive pronoun ‘itself’. While Rhys’s phrasing suggests 
itself as an authentic representation of a form of black Jamaican language, the phrase 
also suggests alienation and difference and, significantly,  the absence of a definite 
subject. There is a mirror image around the word ‘like’ which suggests that the ladies’ 
gossiping emphasis on Annette’s appearance somehow ontologically precedes and 
excludes Annette herself. Annette’s distance in and then absence from the text suggests 
the self-concealment, the averted gaze, of the ashamed subject. At first able to maintain 
a show of pride, Annette ‘still rode about every morning not caring that the black people 
stood about in groups to jeer at her, especially after her riding clothes grew shabby 
(they notice clothes, they know about money)’; but shame has a corrosive effect and 
combines readily with other negative affects, and after her disabled son is abandoned 
(or condemned) by the doctor she ‘changed. Suddenly, not gradually. She grew thin 
and silent, and at last she refused to leave the house at all’ (16). In the five years before 
her second marriage, we are told, the proud Annette became increasingly ashamed of 




not hate them’ because they ‘had not escaped and soon [they] would be dead’ for they 
‘had no money left’ (29). Poverty is a mark of her social exclusion, a reason for her 
son’s decline and her reclusiveness and distance from her daughter, the reason for her 
on-going existence which she decries (death ‘would have been a better fate’ (19)) and 
a slow path to death. This opening description suggests the ashamed subject’s inability 
to assert her existence and to maintain her sense of self by distinguishing between the 
subjective and objective components of her shame.  
Verbal violence and the consequent feeling of shame is shown to create a 
similar sense of evacuation when Antoinette is called ‘white cockroach’ by Amélie, an 
echo of Tia’s earlier taunt that ‘[o]ld time white people nothing but white nigger now, 
and black nigger better than white nigger’ (WSS, 21). Antoinette tells her husband about 
Amelie’s song 
 
about a white cockroach. That’s me. That’s what they call all of us who were 
here before their own people in Africa sold them to the slave traders. And I’ve 
heard English women call us white niggers. So between you I often wonder 
who I am and where is my country and where do I belong and why was I ever 
born at all. (WSS, 85) 
 
In this disquieting passage Amélie’s anti-white hostility causes Antoinette’s speech to 
become soaked in racism, including her own and that of other white Creoles towards 
blacks, but also the hostility aimed at white Creoles by other groups. There is palpable 
hatred in these lines, coming from multiple points, effectively illustrating the tangle of 
racial politics with which the book deals. Its cumulative effect is to displace the facts 
of Antoinette’s identity, replacing them with impotent questions with neither question 
marks nor answers. The emphasis on place in this passage is important: Antoinette is 
moved into a state of not knowing in the world, in relation to people and places. Facts 
are at a remove, as Antoinette herself will be removed from the island. This ‘not 
knowing’ is the disorientation analysed by John Su (2015) and Bill Schwarz (2003) 
among others, and an effect of the general unhomely condition particular to the West 
Indies in which ‘almost everyone [...] has come, or their ancestors have come, from 
elsewhere. No one is wholly at home’ (Carr 2003b: 97). But this absence of certainty 
is also shame, that ‘fundamental affect of reflective knowing-about-oneself, of self-




Amélie’s insult creates in Antoinette shame concerning her social and historical 
positionality and epidermal difference, and this manifests as the displacement of self-
knowledge, mirroring the impossible position of the white Creole after Emancipation. 
In stark contrast to Christophine’s unemotional, fighting nature, shame dominates the 
Cosway women, affecting Annette’s ability to move from her house, and Antoinette’s 
ability to be certain about her history and – it seems – to resist her fate. Attending to 
the text’s emphasis on these women’s lonely vulnerability, we might see the ‘ranks’ 
which Annette and Antoinette increasingly lack as potentially providing some sort of 
epidermal assurance against the violent over-exposure experienced by mother and 
daughter. Of course, it is not isolation in an experiential, quantifiable sense that is most 
damaging for the Cosway women. The situation is highly complex, but to some degree 
theirs is the shameful isolation of the ‘terrified’ colonisers, a metaphysical loneliness, 
stemming from the knowledge that the action in which they and their ancestors have 
been involved renders them outside the possibility of community.  
Moran has recently addressed the relationship between shame and rage, in an 
argument that identifies a potential in various negative feelings in Rhys’s writing. 
Earlier studies have argued that negative affect in Rhys’s work is indirectly subversive 
to the extent that it exposes the oppressive power structures that determine the 
protagonists’ unhappiness, but Moran argues that the insistence on negativity 
constitutes direct resistance. Of After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, she writes,   
 
Julia may end the novel in a state of cold indifference to suffering that signals 
her broken and cringing spirit, but the novel itself, in its relentless gaze at the 
oppressive codes that disallow shame and rage as valid responses to 
disenfranchisement, basilisk-like forces us to share its fierce and unmitigated 
desire to annihilate those who would enforce – because they benefit by – such 
codes.  The ending of the novel points forward to Good Morning, Midnight in 
a manner that suggests Rhys’s commitment to the creative potential inherent in 
rage as a weapon against social and cultural shaming. (Moran 2015: 203) 
 
In Rhys’s work, Moran contends, shame is frequently sublimated into the less fraught 
affects of rage and melancholy. But all of these can be shared among acquaintances, 
and in Good Morning, Midnight, in certain ‘transformational encounters’ – Sasha’s 




embrace of the commis – Sasha dares ‘to share the shame of the afflicted’ and is thereby 
‘momentarily releas[ed] from her tormented self-imprisoning consciousness’ (Moran 
2015: 204). This is mirrored in the communality forged by the creative text itself, and 
Moran concludes that, in Wide Sargasso Sea, Rhys brought her ‘creative rage to bear 
on the canonical English literature that excluded, pathologised and marginalised the 
lives and stories of colonials like herself’ (2015: 205). If Julia’s fate is an insistence on 
the visibility of a reasonable negative response to oppressive systems which aim to 
delegitimise such responses, Serge’s art and Rhys’s last two novels testify to the fact 
that negative affects ‘can forge a profoundly human connection’ (Moran 2015: 204) – 
a point similar to my reading in Chapter Four of the Van Gogh allusions in Good 
Morning, Midnight. In this fiction negative affect can have a collective function, as 
well as considerable aesthetic value.  
There is a comparable collective function in the last novel as, I contend, Rhys’s 
search for communality finally comes to a close, but I think the Cosway women’s 
shame in Wide Sargasso Sea is significant for not being shared. This search is riddled 
by anxiety, and this is, I propose, Rhys’s global affect. The tense relationship between 
Christophine and the shameful Cosway women is a prime occasion for this anxiety. 
There is no easy way to read the uncomfortable contrast between the vulnerable, 
porously shame-filled white Creole women and the stoic, unemotional black women 
who successfully patrols her borders, organises her encounters and knows like her 
author. I think that we can see this readerly difficulty as the point itself and, rather than 
interpreting or solving this bond, we can read it as the nexus of Rhys’s insistence that 
a meaningful ‘human connection’ among characters and among readers is not a given 
but, as deCaires Narain argues, must be worked for. Although the text can be the site 
at which connections are formed, it can also be the occasion of reminding us that the 
absence of communality is a major part of our world today. On my reading the 
Christophine problem should not be ‘solved’.  
 
IV. Sad and joyful passions 
Anxiety is involved in Rhys’s search for communality and, as I argue in subsequent 
chapters, involves a self-overcoming. If we take a Spinozist approach and read Rhysian 




existing – we might understand anxiety in this fiction as a sort of objective correlative 
for this affective movement – as one manifestation of the continuous flux of being.  
As Spinoza laid out in his Ethics (1677), affects increase or decrease our power 
to act and to perceive, and accord to an economic logic of action in which what agrees 
with human nature is joyful because it increases our powers of acting and perceiving, 
and that which is sad makes us most alienated from these powers (Spinoza 1994: 
154).37 Spinoza’s passions are those affects which limit these powers; they diminish 
the body’s ‘force of existing’ (Spinoza 1994: 197). In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 
Deleuze reworks Spinoza’s distinction between affection (affectio) and affect 
(affectus), often rendered into capacity and force respectively. He establishes affect as 
the continuous variation of one’s force of existing: ‘passages, becomings, rises and 
falls, continuous variations of power [puissance] that pass from one state to another’ 
(Deleuze 1997: 139). In contrast, the affections are our capacity to be affected at any 
moment, and this capacity is determined by our body, mind, environment and choices; 
it is revealed in all our encounters (Deleuze 1988: 27). For Deleuze, it is our encounters 
that involve ‘actions, which are explained by the nature of the affected individual, and 
spring from the individual’s essence; and passions, which are explained by something 
else, and originate outside the individual’ (Deleuze 1988: 27). 
Passions are not uniform but exist on a scale of proximity to real action. Joyful 
passions ‘fill our capacity to be affected’ (Deleuze 1988: 27) and are those in which 
the power of another body is in agreement with, and therefore added, to our power. 
Because we are still separate from our power to act and perceive, the power that we 
possess is still only a formal power; yet, proportionally, it is increased and we are 
moved closer to the ‘conversion point’ of actual joyful action (Deleuze 1988: 27). Sad 
passions, conversely, move us further away from joyful action and are those we 
experience when we encounter a body which does not agree with our own, whose 
‘relation does not enter into composition with ours’ (Deleuze 1988: 27). Sad passions 
‘represent the lowest degree of our power of acting, when we are most alienated, 
 
37 Describing the textual history of the Ethics, Edwin Curley writes that this book is ‘not only Spinoza’s 
masterwork, it is also his life’s work’: Spinoza worked on its preparation for well over a decade, from 
the early 1660s onwards; the philosopher died in February 1677 and the text was finally published in 
Amsterdam a few months later, written in Latin and Hebew, entitled Ethica, Ordine Geometrico 
demonstrata, and included alongside a number of other unfinished works in B. d. S. Opera Posthuma 





delivered over to the phantoms of superstition, to the mystifications of the tyrant…The 
sad passions always amount to impotence’ (Deleuze 1988: 28).  
The shared Latin root of passivity and passion is passio, which means to be 
moved or to suffer, and this perhaps gives us ground for thinking about passivity in 
Rhys’s fiction as a form of Deleuzian passion – as the occasion of encounters which 
are not determined by the individual. Such a theorisation is useful as it helps us to 
distinguish between different passivities in the narratives. When Antoinette asks her 
husband ‘Why did you make me want to live?’, and explains that happiness ‘makes 
[her] afraid’ she is, I propose, articulating passivity as a joyful passion. In her 
impassioned speech which follows, there is a deathly refusal of actual joyful action, 
but an equal and opposite refusal to relinquish its possibility and proximity: ‘If I could 
die. Now, when I am happy. Would you do that? You wouldn’t have to kill me. Say 
die and I will die. You don’t believe me? Then try, try, say die and watch me die’ (WSS, 
77). Antoinette finds a happy mode of living impossible, and she expresses a death 
wish here, invoking a simultaneous murder and suicide, but the enunciation of the order 
/wish for her death is, of course, also the embrace and fulfilment of the couple’s sexual 
passion. It is the erotic insistence on la petite mort – orgasm and the woman’s total 
submission to her husband in the sexual act. This death signals a profound passivity 
which nevertheless is the movement towards joyous, active self-making in Antoinette’s 
embrace of her sexuality. In this novel, more than the other four, the sensation of the 
proximity of joyful action is palpable.  
This is not least due to the force with which Antoinette’s fate is described – the 
inevitability of the fact that she will end up as Bertha in Thornfield Hall, imprisoned in 
an attic until she finds a final means of escape. Antoinette’s fate functions almost as a 
character in the novel, akin to a ghost or spectre. It makes its entrance three times in 
the form of Antoinette’s dreams. Yet it doesn’t just ‘appear’; it is also that which, in a 
sense, accompanies or is part of the narration, somewhat like a chorus or even Nellie 
Dean in Wuthering Heights (1847), telling us how that which has already happened 
will happen. In this sense, as a virtual character, Antoinette’s fate ‘acts’ on her, enticing 
her in her passivity (in her dreams) to accept her husband’s route to the cold attic in 
England. Her fate fills her ‘capacity to be affected’ and is, in a sense, entirely in 
agreement with her power to act. The novel proceeds as Antoinette’s haunting by her 
fate, her path of living that which is destined, as she moves ever closer to the conversion 




flight, escaping her husband. Crucially, this conversion point has another aspect 
involving action which Brontë’s Bertha has not already committed. This is Antoinette’s 
new ability on the novel’s final pages to look back to her West Indian home and to 
gesture to the possibility of a female communality which breaches racial divisions. This 
is precisely what Jane Eyre precludes. In Deleuze’s Spinozist terms, we might describe 
the novel as a tragedy of joyful passions.  
 The concept of joyful passion can be used to unlock other key moments in the 
earlier novels. Sasha’s embrace of the commis is clearly instigated by the man but, as 
I argue in Chapter Four, enables her to conjoin her resignation and faith in humankind 
and affirm everything, thereby moving her closer to action. As argued in Chapter Six, 
Anna’s masochistic encounters with Walter initiate what will become a schizophrenic 
proliferation of connections in which she is enmeshed and which is, at least, not the 
cold, isolated passivity of her birth in England in the novel’s opening pages. Clearly, 
though, sad passion (as a purely destructive passivity) also permeates Rhys’s fiction. 
This is the deathly calm beneath the surface described by Sasha in Good Morning, 
Midnight as both an omnipresent threat and nihilistic solution. Sad passion is a form of 
psychic-bodily paralysis which occurs when the protagonists reach the limit point of 
their tolerance to suffering. Julia’s descriptions in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie of being 
‘smashed up’ and of having her back ‘broken’ by heartbreak convey the paralysis and 
self-alienation of sad passion, in which one is moved ever further from agency (ALMM, 
38, 78). Yet we need not exercise moral judgement when we encounter these moments 
of weakness. Actions and passions are not good or evil, for Deleuze and Spinoza; they 
are simply good or bad as they increase or diminish our power to act – and, crucially, 
even then, consideration needs to be taken of something larger, perhaps something like 
one’s ‘subjective disposition’ (Deleuze 1997: 119). This thesis attempts to rethink 
passivity in Rhys’s fiction by focusing on the subjective disposition of her writing. This 
disposition encompasses a passionate denunciation of intolerance, a preference for 
intuitive and rhizomatic relationality and an acute attention to the politics and potential 
of feeling. This study maps the ebb and flow of action, certainty, desire and passion, 
looking at the various things that this movement does in her novels and – in the 
following chapters – it identifies concluding scenes of self-overcoming which involve 
an intense passage between states. The subjective disposition of Rhys’s texts drives 
them towards a final dramatisation of something strikingly akin to Deleuze’s 




Critics who bemoan the inability of Rhys’s protagonists to act in ways which 
would prevent negative encounters might, perhaps, be overlooking the possibility that 
Rhys is interested in exploring life as a process of encounters. The mysterious 
conclusions of her novels raise questions concerning encounters, encouraging us to ask: 
what is Sasha feeling or becoming at the end of Good Morning, Midnight? What is 
happening as Julia enters her twilight in-between time at the end of After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie? What is the tenor of life at the end of Voyage in the Dark? Where will the 
‘passage’, the final word of Wide Sargasso Sea, lead (WSS, 156)? These endings give 
rise to a proliferation of various affects. Following Deleuze, though, I suggest that these 
conclusions can be read as the protagonists’ becoming as they enter zones of 
indistinction and move from one affection into another. Rather than doing nothing, her 
protagonists’ passivity is Rhys’s means of conducting a subtle exploration of life as 
transformation. Yet this need not prevent us from asking if there is a discernible overall 
tenor of life in this process of change.  
 Johnson and Moran state that it is difficult to extract one dominant problematic 
feeling from the dense, sargassum-like tangle of negative affect in Rhys’s fiction. This 
is presumably behind their respective arguments that Rhysian indifference is a form of 
death drive, and that shame and rage are often inextricable. This chapter has looked at 
disgust and shame and shied away from indifference, and has considered affect in its 
circulating, constituting, disruptive and economic guises. However, I contend that there 
is a low-level but potent anxiety that constitutes the global affect in Rhys’s last four 
novels. Its most obvious manifestation is the acute anxiety surrounding the encounter 
with others in Rhys’s fiction. This is thematised most explicitly in Good Morning, 
Midnight, in Sasha’s need for armour when in public, but it is also a narrative principle 
in the other novels. In Quartet, Marya is plagued by the idea that the Anglo-Americans 
in Montparnasse are gossiping about her affair with Heidler and contrasting her 
immorality with Lois’s bourgeois respectability. Julia is tremendously anxious about 
her return to her family, and although a melancholic anaesthesia drowns this anxiety 
out after her mother’s death, it is transferred to Mr Horsfield, who feels a short-lived 
but intense anxiety about helping Julia. In Voyage in the Dark Rhys creates a textual 
anxiety surrounding the matter of Anna’s fall into prostitution which remains active 
through to the end. It is impossible to say definitively that Anna has become a 
prostitute. She accepts money from men but never clearly requests it in exchange for 




which social allegiances and racial distinctions are so knottily problematised, to 
Antoinette’s pre-wedding anxiety, to the gradual build-up of tension between the 
husband and Christophine, and Antoinette’s anxiety-soaked dreams. In this last novel 
a major male character is finally allowed nearly a whole section to himself in which to 
voice his excessive anxiety, stemming from his inability to ‘know’ and therefore master 
his wife and her home.  
This chapter and the last have attempted to demonstrate that there is a highly 
evident anxiety in Rhys criticism which matches this textual concern. This is evident 
in the debates concerning the endings of Wide Sargasso Sea and Good Morning, 
Midnight. It is most apparent in the questions hanging over Rhys’s racial politics. This 
critical anxiety is more or less submerged, ranging from questions of how theoretical 
terms should be used when discussing Rhys’s fiction, to the worry addressed in Chapter 
One concerning how we can place her work and account for competing concerns. It is, 
of course, evidenced in my study which is a somewhat anxious attempt to justify the 
rehabilitation of a highly risky term. I turn now to four different yet connected ‘scenes’ 
of anxiety in Rhys’s novels (and I mean ‘scenes’ in a wide sense to signify important 
culminations towards which the texts work), across which we can trace problems 
concerning the protagonists’ stance towards others, their complicity in their suffering 
and authorial agency. I turn first to an exploration of Good Morning, Midnight, a novel 




A world alone, ‘late October, 1937’: Rhys’s impasse  
 
This chapter explores failure in Good Morning, Midnight. Its subjects are Sasha’s non-
conformity, the novel’s community of outsiders and Sasha’s individualism. The 
chapter concentrates on the various difficulties Sasha experiences which, I argue, are 
largely but not solely a result of the climate of her time, in the broad sense of the ethical 
temperature of the late 1930s in Europe. The analysis begins by focusing on the issue 
of conformity and the intolerance experienced by Sasha and the numerous other 
marginalised and dispossessed individuals who populate the novel. It then turns to 




which is read here as her most profound failure. The final section considers how this 
unsympathetic characteristic relates to the text’s encounter with the failure of words 
and art – an encounter which is a distinction of much modernist literature. This is not 
a reading of the modernist credentials of Rhys’s fourth novel as there is already plenty 
of excellent work on this subject. Instead, the concluding section offers some thoughts 
on how we might read failure in Good Morning, Midnight as its ‘style’ in the sense 
intended by Deleuze in his ‘aesthetics’ or – as the question of whether he does in fact 
develop an aesthetics has been contested – his writing on literature. Style, for Deleuze, 
is the means by which a writer pushes language to its limits. Significantly, the striking 
resonance between Deleuze’s concept of style and modernist engagements with failure 
indicates Jean-Jacques Lecercle’s proposition that Deleuze’s approach to the art of 
language is, in an important sense, modernist (Lecercle 2010: 122-157). While 
establishing failure as Rhys’s style in Good Morning, Midnight, this chapter therefore 
also aims to provide further ground for my claims that the temperament of Deleuze’s 
thought is, in certain respects, close to that of Rhys’s writing, and that his approach to 
modernist literature can profitably be used as a model for reading her difficult 
narratives.  
 
I. Violent regimes, conformity and a ‘communality of the excluded’ 
Rhys’s fourth novel is set in a Paris fraught with the danger, violence and paranoia that 
nationalist fascism engendered in Europe in the late 1930s. Threat and violence do not 
simply constitute the background to Sasha’s ten day trip. They determine what she does 
and does not do, her attitude to every encounter and her feelings towards the fabric of 
the city itself. Accordingly, the opening lines depict Sasha’s experience of her hotel 
room in terms of an aggressive challenge, and the city’s housing, rather than signifying 
safe dwelling, is just another entity threatening to assault her: 
 
They stand back respectfully, waiting for the poor devil without any friends and 
without any money. Then they step forward, the waiting houses, to frown and 
crush. No hospitable doors, no lit windows, just frowning darkness. Frowning 





Sasha seems paranoid but, as Carr points out, the ‘paranoia [Rhys] evokes is not just 
[...] that of a “psychological type”, but of an epoch’ (2012: 53). The epoch in question 
saw the rise of fascism in Europe and beyond, and the systematic targeting of Jews and 
other groups who were perceived to be different. Sasha’s paranoia, anxiety and 
confusion are not just attributes of a damaged psyche. As Carr argues, to ‘read Rhys’s 
continental fiction as divorced from this political context is as mistaken as it would be 
to ignore the impact of colonialism in her Caribbean stories’ (2012: 55).  
Rhys’s title indicates the importance of this political context, suggesting the 
threat of another world war which was widely sensed at the time in which the novel is 
set, ‘late October, 1937’ (GMM, 76). It also evokes the ethical vacuity of the conflicting 
ideologies of Stalinism and fascism, both of which gained insidious momentum from 
the mid-1930s. As I argue in the next chapter, this conflict is a ‘blind spot’ in this novel, 
made present but invisible in the ‘Exhibition’ which Sasha and René visit in Part 
Four.38 The uncharacteristically specific dating of the action and Rhys’s placing of the 
characters at the Trocadéro (137) identifies the Exhibition as the ‘Exposition 
Internationale des Arts et Techniques dans la Vie Moderne’, the world fair which took 
place in Paris from 25 May to 25 November 1937. The Exposition was most notable 
for the fact that the Popular Front government headed by Léon Blum – who was, 
himself, Jewish – gave central stage to Germany and the Soviet Union and these nations 
produced monumental pavilions that stood, dwarfing all the others, opposite each other 
in an ominous architectural confrontation that foreshadowed the ideological conflicts 
of the Second World War. Rhys took a trip to Paris during the autumn of 1937 and 
while there visited the Jewish artist Simon Segal, a friend on whom the character of 
Serge is based.39 Rhys’s treatment of the Exposition works with her characterisation of 
Serge and René to mark the textual concern with anti-Semitism.  
The violence of which Sasha is acutely aware reflects the pervasiveness of the 
violence that infected Europe and beyond at this time. In Britain this was embodied by 
Oswald Mosley who, in 1932, founded the British Union of Fascists which engaged in 
increasingly brutal marches and propaganda throughout the decade. The Spanish Civil 
War, alluded to by René (GMM, 63), raged from 1936-1939. At the same time, Stalin’s 
 
38 See page 139. 
39 Segal wrote to Rhys in November 1937, expressing his hope that she likes his painting of a man with 
a banjo, and confirming that her payment of two hundred francs had been received. Segal signs the letter 




purge trials were conducted and the atrocities of the Nazi regime became increasingly 
visible. Although politics is not discussed directly by Rhys’s characters, and Sasha 
ponders the ‘rather strange’ fact that the Russians ‘sheer off politics’ (41), many aspects 
of the text work together to suggest the fraught climate of Europe in the late 1930s. The 
novel’s proliferation of marginalised immigrants signals the rapidly changing map of 
Europe between 1937 and 1939. The fragility of the bond between Serge and Sasha 
evokes the danger of anti-Semitism. Part Four, in which Sasha finally concedes to 
René’s advances, suggests the absence of a stable alternative to violence: even the 
possibility of romance leads to a violent sexual assault. The novel conveys a pessimism, 
suggestive of that in Louis–Ferdinand Céline’s 1932 novel, Journey to the End of the 
Night (Voyage au bout de la nuit), and at times Sasha seems on the verge of 
misanthropy.40 However, Rhys attributes this to René instead, and imbues Sasha with 
an instinctive, trusting warmth towards Serge, thereby giving this novel its tenuous 
hope. Serge serves a crucial function in this text, being the single source of joy for 
Sasha in the present time of the novel. 
Rhys’s depiction in Good Morning, Midnight of the effects of fascistic 
intolerance on marginalised individuals is complex. Carr’s analysis of this novel 
emphasises the connections Rhys makes between different forms of discrimination. 
Drawing on Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of the ambivalent Jewish experience of 
assimilation, Carr observes that Rhys ‘writes of women who, like the assimilated Jews 
[in Bauman’s account], are unfailingly recognised as alien’ (2012: 34).  This is, I think, 
a central problematic in the novel. Sasha tries to conform, but as her ‘futile efforts to 
convince waiters that she is une femme convenable’ demonstrate, her attempts to fit in 
are ‘doomed’ (Carr 2012: 34). Sasha consequently recognises the futility of her efforts 
and rages against the demand for conformity. As was the case for Kafka in Bauman’s 
analysis, the ambivalence of this position of difference for Sasha is paradoxical, 
bringing, as Carr writes, both ‘impotence and insight’ (2012: 34). On the one hand, in 
momentarily wanting to conform, this protagonist is a victim forced to play a losing 
hand. On the other, Sasha’s awareness of her difference and her disdain for conformity 
are the conditions by which she ‘could be among the first to see through the modern 
dream of uniformity, the first to shake free from the modern horror of difference, the 
 
40 The titles chosen by Rhys for her third and fourth novels seem almost too close to Céline’s title for 
the similarity to be incidental. Carr posits that Rhys may have been writing back to this greatly admired 




first to assault point–blank the modern religion of intolerance’ (Bauman 1991: 156, in 
Carr 2012: 34-35). Good Morning, Midnight chronicles Sasha’s vacillation between 
these positions of incisive observer and victim – it ‘follows [her] swings between 
resistance and defeat’ (Carr 2012: 35).  
While this oscillation characterises all the protagonists in Rhys’s novels, Sasha’s 
is the most dramatic and it marks both her difference – her refusal and inability to 
conform and accept society’s demands – and weakness.41 It plays out metonymically 
in her relationship with René, whom she repeatedly rebuffs and accepts until he gains 
entry to her room and attacks her. This is Sasha’s version of the costly and mostly 
unhappy precarity which characterises the Rhys woman’s way of life, and which for 
Sasha, as for Marya, Anna and Antoinette, has a violent end. Rhys’s protagonists are 
all Darwinian failures. They do not have the drive necessary to thrive and become 
nurturers; they play no part in a community. Instead, their passivity is a lack of social 
fitness that propels them into dangerous situations. 
In a revealing letter of 1936, Rhys frankly admits her own Darwinian incapacity. 
‘For as a well trained social animal I’m certainly not the goods’, Rhys writes, 
commencing an apologia in which she denies that being poorly adapted to the every–
day ‘battles’ of social existence is proof of dysfunctionality (Letters, 30): 
 
I admit that the properly adapted human being enjoys the battle, I even admit 
that it can be done charmingly wittily and with an air. […] But I do not admit 
that because I am badly adapted to these encounters I’m therefore a mental 
deformity – I could fight in a big battle – or accept a great cruelty – or be cruel 
myself – but the little petty day by day snips and snaps – why should I be crazy 
if I say that I don’t think it’s worth it – that it takes something from one that is 
necessary to me – a certain how shall I say single mindedness. (Letters, 31) 
 
Rhys’s admission both involves a persuasive argument against conformity and 
indicates the acute problems that she experienced as a ‘social animal’. Whether great 
or petty, the conflict and competition involved in social existence evidently detracted 
from something vital for Rhys and while this vital thing, which she hesitates to 
 
41 This attribute generally defines the protagonists of Rhys’s short stories as well. There are notable 
exceptions, such as the stories ‘Tigers Are Better-Looking’ (1968) and ‘Pioneers, Oh, Pioneers’ (1976), 




describe, may be the writer’s ability to contemplate and compose in peace, this letter 
and her writing generally suggests that ‘single mindedness’ for Rhys meant the ability 
and the will to think for oneself. It is not simply that the pressure to conform requires 
a more or less significant expenditure of energy and the repression of individuality, nor 
just that it implicates one in dominant power structures. When, in the awareness of 
authorial statements such as this denunciation of social competition, we share Sasha’s 
intense perception of social conflict and observe her vacillation and her unhappy story 
arc, the sense emerges that the need to conform and the effort to prove one’s relative 
social superiority limit one’s ability to be oneself and to be true to one’s desires, feelings 
and instincts. These demands prevent one from thinking freely. While this is obviously 
an extreme proposition in general terms, in the context of European politics in the late 
1930s we may perhaps understand this as an anti–fascist position in the broadest sense. 
Laura Frost makes a related point in her chapter on the political function of unpleasure 
in Patrick Hamilton and Rhys’s fiction: 
 
Even as Hamilton’s and Rhys’s narratives are unconstructive, noncathartic, and 
fiercely individualistic, their implicit critique of the consensus that they see as 
the basis of contemporary vernacular pleasure can be read as an argument 
against the political regimes whose enforced conformity gained frightening 
power in the mid- to late thirties. (Frost 2013: 206) 
 
It is possible, then, to improve our understanding of this text by replacing an emphasis 
on Sasha’s inability to appear well-adjusted with attention to the expression of Rhys’s 
belief in the value of non-conformity and to the political relevance of this belief in the 
context of the novel’s historical setting. Sasha’s relative lack of respect for the norms 
of social behaviour is, I contend, one of the principal textual strategies by which Rhys 
affirms the value of individual difference in what Carr has described as ‘one of the great 
anti-fascist novels of the thirties’ (2012: 25).  
Sasha’s risky non-conformity is evident in her first encounter, a few short 
paragraphs into the novel, during which she is admonished for crying in public and 
thereby letting ‘everybody see’ how unhappy she is when the decorous thing to do is 
to conceal negative feeling (GMM, 10). Significantly, the tune that prompts Sasha’s 
tears is called ‘Gloomy Sunday’, the title of a notoriously depressing song composed 




the attention of American producers who promoted it as the ‘Hungarian Suicide Song’, 
so–called for its supposed effect of causing listeners to take their own lives. Even if 
Rhys’s song title is an unintended allusion to this infamous piece, which seems 
unlikely, its name nevertheless suggests a depressing piece of music. The woman who 
disapproves of Sasha’s visible sadness giggles at the melancholy song; in contrast, 
Sasha’s tears are a far more natural, appropriate response to the music. As this early 
incident demonstrates, Sasha’s behaviour and the demands of the world of the novel 
are at odds.42 To attempt to conform is to play society’s game, but the rules dictate that 
she will always lose and her presence will be increasingly unacceptable. In a crucial 
moment in Part Four, Sasha stalls in her application of make-up, and claims passivity 
as her response to this impossible situation:  
 
Well, there I am, prancing about and smirking, and suddenly telling myself: 
‘No, I won’t do a thing, not a thing. A little pride, a little dignity at the end, in 
the name of God. I won’t even put on the stockings I bought this afternoon. I 
won’t do a thing – not a thing. I will not grimace and posture before these people 
any longer. (GMM, 128) 
 
Of course, Sasha immediately acts against her own decision and continues her 
preparations for meeting René, another individual before whom she must perform. She 
counts her little remaining money and decides on a safe amount to bring with her, 
enough to get her home ‘in case [they] quarrel, in case he turns nasty’ (GMM, 128). 
Sasha correctly predicts René’s violent response to her final noncompliance in their 
sexual game, and in the deeply unpleasant scene in which he attacks her we can, again, 
sense the coincidence of misogyny and fascist and nationalist intolerance to those 
deemed to be different.  
Serge is the antidote to René. Although his friendship with Sasha is cut 
dramatically short he is her compatriot in suffering. The historical position of foreign 
Jews in Paris in 1937 was a dangerous one. The city saw a significant rise in French 
anti-Semitism due to a complex set of factors that included Nazi support in France, 
13propaganda, anti–communist fear and fear of another war, frustration at 
 
42A similar argument about discrepant realities in Rhys’s fiction is made by Bill Schwarz in West Indian 




unemployment rates, and the high numbers of immigrants into France from Russia and 
Germany. The close of 1937 saw the publication of Céline’s book–length pamphlet, 
Bagatelles pour un massacre (Trifles for a Massacre), in which the famous novelist 
accused communists and Freemasons but above all ‘vermicular, persuasive’ and ‘war–
monger[ing]’ Jews of driving the country towards another ‘massacre’ with Germany:  
 
It’s the Jews of London, Washington and Moscow who are blocking a Franco–
German alliance […] I don’t want to go to war for Hitler, I insist, but I don’t 
want to wage war against him for the Jews […] Rather a dozen Hitlers to an 
all–powerful Blum. (Céline 1937: 180, in Riding 2011: 21)43  
 
Céline’s essay was extreme but espoused a not atypical feeling; according to Alan 
Riding, Bagatelles pour un massacre had sold eighty thousand copies by the time 
Céline produced his next ‘pamphlet’ in 1938 (Riding 2011: 22). The display of Serge’s 
art which so delights Sasha in Part Two is a positive, alternative exhibition to the city’s 
politically problematic world fair, as Jess Issacharoff argues (2013). Serge clearly 
stands for some sort of possibility.44 Equally however, and as Issacharoff suggests, we 
can read the privacy of Serge’s display as indicating the threat posed to him by an 
increasingly hostile Paris: he is even more starkly isolated than Sasha, their meeting 
confined to his studio, and despite the strength of the instinctive bond with Sasha his 
character occupies only a few pages in Rhys’s text. Signalling the pervasiveness of 
anti-Semitism in this period, the strongest indications of the political danger faced by 
Serge are the implications of a story Serge himself recounts and Delmar’s criticism of 
his ‘friend’. 
Serge’s story of a ‘mulatto’ ‘Martiniquaise’ with whom he had briefly shared a 
building in London is a profoundly unpleasant tale of racism, xenophobia and 
 
43 On the request of Céline’s estate the ‘pamphlet’ remains out of print today. The translation of 
Bagatelles pour un massacre offered above is that given by Alan Riding in his study of life in Paris 
under the German occupation (Riding 2011). Alice Kaplan (1995) provides a very useful account of 
Céline’s idiosyncratic use in this text of Jewish and anti-Semitic sources. The information in this chapter 
concerning fascism in Paris in the 1930s draws on these accounts, on studies by Vicky Caron (2005) and 
Karen Fiss (2009), and on Rhys criticism on this subject, such as that by Emery (1990) and Carr (2012). 
44 Maren Linett (2005) and Issacharoff (2013) both explore in detail the possibility for which Serge 
stands arguing, respectively, that his Jewish identity figures an essential alienation, which is more 
generally the experience of modernity and of single women in the metropolis, and that he presents the 
potential of an alternative, transnational community beyond the political boundaries constituted and 




misogyny (GMM, 79-81). The woman had been traumatised by her neighbours’ 
relentless racial hatred, and for two years had been unable to go outside in daylight. 
Finally, a child’s instinctively cruel jeer at the woman’s body odour and unwanted 
presence (‘“I hate you and I wish you were dead”, the child said’ (81)) had rendered 
her ‘at the end of everything’ – incoherent, like ‘stone’, drunk and suicidal (80). 
Looking at the woman, Serge says, was like ‘looking down into a pit […] I had all the 
time this feeling that I was talking to something that was no longer quite human, no 
longer quite alive’ (80). Given the historical backdrop against which Serge tells the 
story, his astonishing depiction of the effects of sustained, venomous racism is surely 
an indictment of fascism, that ‘religion of intolerance’. Furthermore, as Carr notes 
(2012: 67), Serge’s story underscores the similarity between apparently distinct forms 
of intolerance by connecting the narrator’s Jewish identity, the Martinican woman 
stuck in an unhappy marriage in a virulently racist London and Sasha, his audience, 
who has already recounted a remarkably similar tale of experiencing the debilitating 
and dehumanising effects of hateful persecution by her own family, presumably 
because of her refusal to conform to norms of femininity. Recalling in disturbingly 
dissociative language the time she received a small bequest which provided the excuse 
for a family member to tell her she should have drowned herself in the Seine, Sasha 
remembers:  
 
Well, that was the end of me, the real end […] Saved, rescued and with my 
place to hide in – what more did I want? I crept in and hid […] to be left alone. 
No more pawings, no more pryings – leave me alone… (They’ll do that all 
right, my dear.) 
‘At first I was afraid they would let gates bang on my hindquarters, and I 
used to be nervous of unknown people and places.’ Quotation from The 
Autobiography of a Mare – one of my favourite books… (GMM, 37) 
 
In the ‘symbolically and politically linked experience’ of Sasha, Serge and the 
Martinican woman, writes Carr, ‘Rhys suggests the common workings of fascism, 
racism and bourgeois patriarchy, the persecutory power of the modern religion of 
intolerance […] Like a diaspora of the dispossessed, this novel evokes a communality 
of the excluded’ (2012: 67). Yet, while Serge’s story evokes a communality of the 




even in this scene in Serge’s studio, remain highly ambiguous at best. Her moment of 
happiness with Serge has great narrative potential, but it is noticeably brief and 
punctuated by her sterile interactions with Delmar. Most importantly, situated between 
the painter’s conjuration of the possibility of communality and his written statement of 
friendship that closes Part Two is a scene in which Sasha evokes and categorically 
denies the possibility of a union of the oppressed that might allow for positive change. 
It is, I suggest, through both Sasha’s inability to identify with others and the shape of 
her narrative that Rhys inscribes a fatal social fault which renders communality an 
impossibility in the novel’s present.  
This impasse can be sensed even in Serge himself. He describes his past 
awareness of the cruel eyes of the Martinican woman’s neighbours yet he admits to not 
trying to help her. He is blind to his own betrayal by Delmar, a Russian emigrant and 
so also one of the excluded. Delmar is Sasha’s means of introduction to the artist but 
is, in fact, an entirely untrustworthy ‘friend’, who speaks about Serge caustically, 
accusing him in terms strikingly similar to those used in Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda. 
He accuses Serge of caring for nothing and nobody, of living in squalid conditions, 
being ‘mad’ and of the ‘extreme Left’ (GMM, 57, 85–86). One prominent example of 
Nazi propaganda, the vicious exhibition ‘Der Ewige Jude’ (‘The Eternal Jew’) which 
opened in Munich in November 1937, represented the central terms of German anti–
Semitism and purported to show with scientific accuracy the innateness in Jews of a 
predilection for poor living standards, a tendency to madness and extreme selfishness, 
and claimed to reveal a Jewish–Bolshevik conspiracy.  
Of course it is significant that Serge’s art is formally experimental. His portrait 
of a ‘double-headed, ‘double-faced’ man ‘with four arms’ clearly suggests Cubism 
(GMM, 91), and his art generally has a ‘debased’ subject matter. It thereby fits within 
the Nazi category of ‘degenerate art’ which was denounced in the famous companion 
Munich exhibition of that name (‘Entartete Kunst’), held from July 1937. Serge’s 
association with African and Afro-Caribbean culture, created through his African 
masks ‘straight from the Congo’ (76), his tale of the ‘mulatto’ woman and even the 
allusion to the ‘Cuban cabin’ (77), also seem to allude to the Nazi-forged association 




‘Ewige Jude’ exhibition.45 Serge’s numerous ‘misshapen’ figures might be read as a 
sort of objective correlative for the painful reality of the political persecution of Jews 
and many other groups in the 1930s. We can also read Rhys’s intricate detailing of 
Serge’s art as signifying the spread of German fascism to France, and Delmar’s anti-
Semitic tirade, of course, supports this reading. The artist’s studio is, in a sense, 
occupied by Delmar’s latently hostile presence, and the artist’s disappearance, right at 
the centre of the text is highly significant and sinister: Part Two closes with Sasha’s 
sad toast to Serge’s letter, which confirms his friendship but also signals cessation. 
Coming right at the centre of the narrative, Serge’s disappearance suggests that the 
fault in the concept of communality is directly related to the text’s historical moment, 
is thematically central and at the heart of Sasha’s predicament.  
I have focused so far on Rhys’s inscription of social and political problems of 
the time in which Good Morning, Midnight is set, and traced a number of the ways in 
which we can contextualise Sasha’s swings between two contrary states and thereby 
open up the politics of Rhys’s narrative choices in this work. I turn now to the negative 
pole in this situation – to Sasha’s failure, her defeat through an insidious individualism 
in what I propose is the one of the most important and complicated scenes in Rhys’s 
fiction. 
 
II. ‘What can I do about it? Nothing. I don’t deceive myself’: 
Sasha’s failure 
Sasha’s individualism, her near-exclusive focus on her own needs, and her engagement 
in social relations without the active aim of building positive lasting relationships, 
might possibly be excused as a sort of survival strategy. Put simply, if she cannot 
depend on the kindness of strangers or familiars – and Serge is the only character to 
offer her any sort of disinterested companionship – then she might do well not to direct 
her efforts towards communal goals. The problem with this reading is the scene in Part 
Two in which Sasha observes the suffering of the ‘kitchen girl’ and concludes that she 
cannot act for her. This is an unusual episode in Rhys’s fiction as there are few moments 
in her narratives where her protagonists are challenged – by the situation, or by 
themselves – to act for another. Of course, given the historical context of Good 
 
45 Issacharoff’s essay traces the links between Serge’s art, the novel’s ‘Exhibition’, the Paris Exposition 




Morning, Midnight, Sasha’s conclusion is absolutely inexcusable. Her individualism 
mutates into or, for this is uncertain, is revealed as indifference and social 
irresponsibility. 
There are earlier, less awful moments of defeat throughout the novel in which 
Sasha indulges in an angry and solipsistic abnegation of agency. In an early example, 
Part One concludes with her fantasy about the callousness of the hotel staff – she 
imagines they would offer no help if she fell ill – which segues directly into Sasha’s 
claim that she wants only to ‘lie in bed all day, pull the curtains and shut the damned 
world out’ (GMM, 68). This is a fantasy of anaesthesia and escape comparable to that 
which we also find in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie. Clothes and make-up provide the 
‘armour’ Sasha needs in order to encounter the outside world; and alcohol and the 
interests of Paris, its men (sometimes) and its entertainments (notably, the cinema) 
provide distraction from her bleak awareness of the state of things. In allowing her to 
momentarily forget her profound unhappiness, these potential causes of pleasure ward 
off the complete emotional collapse that threatens her. They are all tools which allow a 
minimal level of engagement with the world and the people in it. However, Sasha’s 
desire to just ‘lie in bed all day’ is clearly melancholic, conveying what Julia Kristeva 
describes as the ‘learned helplessness’ of ‘depressive retardation’ – when the depressed 
individual slows down because neither fight nor flight are an option (Kristeva 1989: 
34). Rhys’s three middle novels offer powerful depictions of the physical exhaustion 
of depression, the gravitational pull of this all-consuming state and its desolate field of 
vision. At the close of Part One, as Sasha succumbs to this depressive lethargy, her 
angry fantasy permits her acknowledgement of her melancholy desire to avoid having 
to think of others.  
 Yet depression is not, on my reading, the main problem in Good Morning, 
Midnight. If we can identify one dominant concern in the text, it is neither the bleak 
state of Sasha’s inner life, nor the moral decay and incipient violence that characterise 
the society that Rhys depicts. In my opinion, the major problem concerns how, at times, 
Sasha is infected by these attributes of the external world, resulting not in her 
depression (which in a sense is a reasonable reaction to the wrongs of this world) but 
in the failure of her own ethical capacity. Rhys weaves an intricate web of ills in this 
work, and while we can (as I have suggested) read Sasha’s non-conformity as a 
legitimate symbolic response to the fascist and totalitarian demand for its opposite, as 




with fellow sufferers ironically reflects the fear and hatred of otherness which is at the 
core of the religion of persecutory intolerance. Angier argues that this inability on 
Sasha’s part is the reason behind her dramatic ‘rejection’ of René, her ‘brother doormat’ 
(Angier 1990: 404), and certainly this may be a reason for her hesitancy in accepting 
his advances. However, her failure to more readily accept this man pales in comparison 
to her failure to identify with another woman whose suffering resembles her own. 
Sasha’s desire, at the end of Part One, to drown out the thought of others ominously 
foreshadows the tragic moment of her ethical failure near the conclusion of Part Two, 
when her unwillingness or inability to identify with this woman is used to reason that 
she need not act for others.  
In her musings about the girl’s existence, Sasha makes ‘revolution’ (change 
realised through communal action) visible only then to refuse it absolutely. First, there 
is recognition: ‘I know her. This is the girl who does all the dirty work and gets paid 
very little for it. Salut!’ (GMM, 87). Then there is acknowledgement of the girl’s 
suffering, and Sasha defends her own ‘lack’ of sympathy: ‘How can she stay in that 
coffin for five minutes without fainting? ... Sorry for her? Why should I be sorry for 
her?’ (87). She then justifies this position. The kitchen girl’s ‘strong hands sing the 
Marseillaise’ and when the order of things changes, she will be duly admired: ‘when 
the revolution comes, won’t those be the hands to be kissed? Well, so Monsieur 
Rimbaud says, doesn’t he? I hope he’s right. I wonder, though, I wonder, I wonder...’ 
(88). Sasha pays her bill, asks for directions to the cinema, meditates in an impassioned 
monologue on people’s lack of thought and pity, orders another Pernod, and then, in 
noting her relief that the girl’s work is almost finished, questions whether she should 
act for her: 
 
It has just occurred to me that if I weren’t here the door of her coffin might be 
kept open. Might be. Not that I would have gone away if it had occurred to me 
before. Why should I? The hands that sing the Marseillaise, the world that could 
be so different – what’s all that to me? What can I do about it? Nothing. I don’t 
deceive myself. 
That’s settled. I can start on the second Pernod. (GMM, 89) 
 
Despite making the girl the figuration of change (and therefore hope), and despite her 




of communal resistance. She remains sitting, observing the girl’s suffering, and blind 
to the similarity of their lives.  
This passage is highly complex and works on numerous levels. Sasha seems to 
be disavowing her feelings. There is an extended sequence of references to possibilities 
of change which clearly therefore does hold significance for Sasha. Similarly, her 
question concerning her sympathy for the girl is more plausibly understood as evidence 
of a genuine sympathy on which she cannot act than as the complete lack of care. Sasha 
seems to be trying to ‘deceive’ herself into believing that she is callous and wholly 
pessimistic. The fact that she is getting drunk during this episode, and is preoccupied 
with planning her distracting excursion to the cinema reinforces the sense that Sasha is 
trying to avoid a truth here rather than exposing one. Following the subtle yet tragic 
logic of this scene and Sasha’s fraught claim that she is ‘trying so hard to be like’ others, 
the most important truth that Sasha evades is that there is a similarity between the 
kitchen girl’s suffering and her own which is all the more reason why she should act to 
help the woman. The girl’s ‘dirty work’, for which she gets ‘paid very little’ and which 
takes place in the torturous confines of a small, stinking ‘coffin’ (GMM, 87) is a worst 
version of Sasha’s past employment in Mr Blank’s emporium. Both women have been 
on the receiving end of a brutal, patriarchal capitalism. Instead of identifying with the 
girl, Sasha passively observes her, which signifies the class division that separates them 
but also recalls the terrorising gaze of Mr Blank, aligning her with the girl’s oppressors 
in the later situation. Accompanying Sasha’s refusal or inability to identify with the girl 
is the former’s troubling indifference to the ‘world that could be so different’. Sasha 
claims to be unmoved by the possibility of change.  Of course, the two problems are 
related. Belief that change is possible is a motivation to work with others for that 
change; and belief in solidarity makes hope and political commitment far more tenable.  
It is not, then, that Sasha is presented as being wholly without the capacity to 
care for her fellow human being. The tone in which she dismisses the problem (‘[t]hat’s 
settled’) suggests a disturbing suppression of feeling which seriously complicates our 
attempt to locate clear meaning. The sequencing of Sasha’s various statements also 
makes this scene particularly puzzling. Sasha first details the problem of ethical 
responsibility (she identifies the problem of the girl’s suffering and considers what she 
could do in response), only to disavow the problem dispassionately, and then 
immediately to evoke it again in her passionate plea for people’s understanding which 




can read this series of movements as another example of Sasha’s vacillation, but this 
example has a particularly destabilising effect for the reader. It becomes impossible to 
ascertain Sasha’s true feelings about the ethical question of how and when we should 
act for others. Similarly, we cannot dismiss the possibility that she desires a different 
order of things, just as we absolutely cannot affirm her desire for change.  
One way of reading this passage is to shift our focus away from the 
representational schema and consider, instead, the ways in which Rhys is working 
against the language of communication. Read in the terms of such an agenda, Rhys’s 
complication of Sasha’s passivity appears as that which ‘enables style to minorise the 
standard dialect of communication, to counteract its attempts at stabilisation through 
good sense and common sense and lets it move towards its limits’ (Lecercle 2010: 152). 
Accordingly, rather than trying to infer a fixed meaning concerning this character’s 
innate deficiency and her internal struggle, we can usefully probe the ideas concerning 
both meaning itself and the possibility of communication that Rhys is presenting in 
Sasha’s ethical vacillation. Lecercle’s description of Deleuze’s concept of style as that 
which deterritorialises language might be usefully applied here, and there are several 
ideas in his phrasing which resonate with Rhys’s scene. First, nearly the entire scene is 
silent, with the exception of Sasha’s requests from the waiter for more alcohol. Her 
ethical rumination and her plea for people’s thought and pity are just that – thoughts. 
Sasha is not communicating to anyone other than the reader. On Harrison’s reading, 
Rhys protagonists’ inhabitation of silence is generally positive: these characters occupy 
a space of speaking back to a male language of dominance (1988). However, we can 
equally read the dominance of silence in Good Morning, Midnight as an indication and 
symptom of a general linguistic malaise. Given the problem that Sasha has in 
identifying with the kitchen girl, and Rhys’s severance of the Serge plot, we can read 
Sasha’s silence as an effect of a communication which has somehow gone wrong. The 
faulty exchange of meaning between individuals in the novel is, I think, a symptom of 
the social and political problems of the text’s time – that is, of the last years of the 
1930s. Just as the sequence in this scene is devoid of what we might describe as ethical 
progression, with Sasha’s observation of the girl not leading to any form of productive 
action nor, I think, even to any feeling or thought that increases Sasha’s well-being or 
capacity for life, so communication is repeatedly shown to be faulty. Serge’s 
declaration of friendship should be the beginning of a new kind of relationship but 




in Sasha’s dismissal from the job (GMM, 23). Once outside his office, Sasha thinks too 
late of her perfect retort to Mr Blank, but this response is as redundant in its silence as 
her sad ‘salut’ to Serge’s letter, which should be an affirmation but is transformed into 
an ironic gesture that both signifies an end and hangs on in the text as a ghostly sign of 
what their friendship could have been. Finally, Sasha’s evocation of Rimbaud’s 
revolutionary poem ‘The Hands of Jeanne-Marie’ (‘Les mains de Jeanne-Marie’) 
which is a paean to the brave struggles of the female communards of Paris in 1871, 
while a form of communication across texts, in a sense does nothing.46 The lines of 
verse she alludes to are hopeful and signify the possibility of action and should, most 
obviously, help her summon the courage to act; yet they appear in her silent meditation 
which has a contrary orientation. As importantly, despite Sasha’s failure to act for the 
kitchen girl, her allusions omit (or avoid) the fact that failure is thematically central to 
Rimbaud’s poem, as it is to his poetic vision generally: his poem ends with the failure 
of the revolutionaries, symbolised by Jeanne-Marie’s capture and her gruesome 
punishment. Not only does the allusion not encourage Sasha to act, but her 
understanding of it seems to be flawed. The significance of this omission is heightened 
when we consider that Rimbaud was, for a period of Rhys’s writing career prior to 
1946, one of her favourite writers (Letters, 44-45). The allusion is, I think, a self-
conscious and oddly playful signal of Sasha’s tragic failure really to think and to act. 
Significantly, work is required of the reader in order to unpick the contradictory 
dynamics of this scene. Just as communication both within Good Morning, Midnight 
and across texts is problematic, communication between author and reader is frequently 
rendered through difficulty, hence we are confronted with an ‘impasse’ at the beginning 
of the novel, and Sasha’s vacillation as she ponders the kitchen girl indeed 
‘counteract[s]’ the ‘stabilisation’ that enables us to determine the meaning of this scene.  
These problems of communication and the destabilisation of the meaning-
making process which characterise this crucial episode make sense as Rhys’s attempt 
to write differently, beyond the representational realm in which signifiers are 
transmitted and decoded in a shared, stable system. Rhys, of course, had solid reason 
 
46 The composition of the poem is generally dated to between 1871 and early 1872. Jeanne-Marie’s 
hands symbolise revolution and real political resistance, but as Martin Sorrell explains, the revolution 
and resistance Rimbaud evokes are poetic as well as political: ‘Driven by his nature and experience, 
[Rimbaud’s] imperative became to reject the old life and to find a new way of being – utterly lucid, 





to attempt this in the years between 1936 and 1939, when she was writing the novel. 
The impasse with which she presents us on the first page is a challenge to the reader, 
as it makes us question our ideas of plot development, but it is also, surely, an 
acknowledgement of the writer’s predicament when words cease to be an abundant, 
comfortable and effective tool with which she can create work that is commensurate 
with the present state of things. Rhys’s impasse encapsulates the modernist ailment 
whereby writers encounter the failure of their medium. In 1915 Henry James described 
how this failure was occasioned by the horrors of the violence of the Great War: 
 
One finds it in the midst of all this as hard to apply one’s words as to endure 
one’s thoughts. The war has used up words; they have weakened, they have 
deteriorated like motor car tires; they have, like millions of other things, been 
more overstrained and knocked about and voided of the happy semblance 
during the last six months than in all the long ages before, and we are now 
confronted with a depreciation of all our terms, or, otherwise speaking, with a 
loss of expression through increase of limpness, that may well make us wonder 
what ghosts will be left to walk. (James 1915: 4) 
 
It is difficult to grasp how the ‘loss of expression through increase of limpness’ 
described by James might have been experienced by writers in the late 1930s, as the 
horrors of the brutal regimes of Europe signalled the onset of another world war and 
our failure to learn from history. It is equally difficult to grasp how such an experience 
might in any clear sense characterise ‘late modernist’ writing, given the many problems 
and questions this phrase raises. Yet in Good Morning, Midnight, in her preference for 
silence over productive communication, and for style over representation Rhys makes 
palpable the impasse of the ‘loss of expression’, when words themselves have been 
‘used up’ and have lost their ‘life’. Sasha’s failure – as she observes the working girl, 
refuses to recognise any similarity in their situations and decides she need not act on 
her behalf – can, I think, be read as an objective correlative for just this linguistic 
failure. When situated historically the protagonist’s engagement with the questions of 
whether she can and should attempt to effect change and her bleak and confusingly 
wrought decision can be read as Rhys’s expression of her experience of a dangerous 
linguistic enervation.  




linguistic realm. Sasha’s meditation on the question of action is interrupted by a lengthy 
internal monologue in which she castigates social intolerance towards those who are 
different and people’s general lack of thought. This is one of the most damning critiques 
of human inadequacy in Rhys’s writing: 
 
Please, please, monsieur et madame […] I am trying so hard to be like you. I 
know I don’t succeed, but look how hard I try […] Every word I say has chains 
round its ankles; every thought I think is weighted with heavy weights. Since I 
was born, hasn’t every word I’ve said, every thought I’ve thought, everything 
I’ve done, been tied up, weighted, chained? And, mind you, I know that with 
all this I don’t succeed. Or I succeed in flashes only too damned well… But 
think how hard I try and how seldom I dare. Think – and have a bit of pity. That 
is, if you ever think, you apes, which I doubt. (GMM, 88) 
 
Sasha’s words convey the burden of using the language of masters and the extreme 
effort required to think in this situation. The task of using the language of the oppressor 
and the act of thinking itself are made intolerably difficult by the demand for ‘likeness’ 
that they both involve. The entire passage is about the ‘weight’ of conformity. The 
palpable effort involved in ‘trying [...] to be like’ others is counterpointed by the idea 
that thinking is what requires real effort, just as the fleeting glimpses of Sasha’s 
successful conformity throughout the novel are countered by the ‘flashes’, here and 
elsewhere, which represent original thought. In this passage Sasha describes 
conformity in the terms we have already identified in Rhys’s letter of 1936: it comes at 
the expense of the individual’s ability to really think, in the most important sense of the 
term; and flouting the social dictum of conformity endangers one in all sorts of ways. 
Sasha is condemned to the awareness of three continuous, conflicting and depleting 
processes: her fleeting desire for conformity comes at the expense of being able to think 
originally, costs her great effort, and inevitably results in failure. The passage 
dramatises the cost of being a ‘Savage Individualist’, as Rhys described herself in a 
letter of 1963, which, she notes, is a ‘very expensive thing to be’ (Letters, 275). It also 
constructs thinking in a Nietzschean-Deleuzian light, as that which involves both great 
effort and conflict. The emphasis on thought ironically underscores the fact that Sasha’s 
ability to think is also compromised, as she cements her inability to identify with the 




dramatic exposition of Sasha’s predicament insists on the real, worldly consequences 
of a failure to really think. The scene carries the powerful political message that change 
and even resistance both require that people learn to think.  
 To conclude this chapter, I turn to the questions of how we can understand this 
difficult form of thought that Rhys seems to demand, and how we might read her style 
in a way that accounts for both linguistic failure and the effort required truly to think 
and yet moves beyond the impasse which is central to the novel’s vision. 
 
III. A style of failure 
In the conclusion to his lively and illuminating study of Alain Badiou’s and Deleuze’s 
philosophical readings of literature, Lecercle explains that while both philosophers 
develop their own versions of modernism – Badiou’s more ‘twisted’ than Deleuze’s – 
both also depart from ‘what is thought to be the main characteristic of modernism, the 
idea that the specificity of art resides in its language’: instead, for these thinkers, ‘such 
specificity resides not in language but in ideas’ (2010: 201). We might perhaps leave 
aside the claim concerning the defining characteristic of modernism and use the 
assertion about the philosophers’ modernism to think about how the thought or ideas 
of Good Morning, Midnight might operate beyond the regime of representation. To 
rephrase, if the depressing failure of thought both evidenced and derided by Sasha is 
tied, as her monologue suggests, to language as a form of representation (and Sasha’s 
emphasis on likeness supports this notion), then what might language be doing and in 
what other sort of failure might it be involved if we look beyond representation?  
The most explicit statement in Deleuze’s work on the relation between 
philosophy and literature occurs in What is Philosophy? in which Deleuze and Guattari 
set out their aesthetic proposition that art has its own kind of thought, distinct from the 
thought of philosophy and the thought of science.47 In their chapter ‘Percept, Affect, 
and Concept’, towards the end of the book, they develop this claim, arguing that 
whereas philosophy produces concepts, art produces affects and percepts. For Deleuze 
and Guattari the thought of art occurs in the realm of sensation not representation. The 
problems with this unreasonable, sweeping proposition are significantly mitigated by 
the philosophers’ predominant focus on twentieth-century literature. Their aesthetics 
develops in accordance with key principles of Deleuze’s philosophy, notably his 
 




monism, and his logic of the outside, according to which life is revealed to the extent 
that we grasp the fact that all processes strive towards their limits.48 Deleuze celebrates 
literature for its ability to reveal in sensation not a particular experience or opinion but 
Life itself. Sensation, as blocs of affects and percepts that exist as independent 
composites, bears witness to this immanent power of spirit: it reveals the ‘nonhuman 
forces of the cosmos’ (WP, 183).49 With great effort, the artist manages an exhausting 
‘athleticism of becoming that reveals only forces that are not its own’ (172). This last 
statement returns us to Deleuze’s aim to work against doxa, or common sense and 
established modes of thinking. The writer’s task is not to convey her opinion or recount 
her life but to reveal the force of newness itself: ‘sensory becoming’, write Deleuze 
and Guattari, ‘is otherness caught in a matter of expression’ (177). The Deleuzian 
writer, then, works against representation, to overcome opinion and doxa and to reveal 
Life (which they also call chaos). This is why, as Lecercle explains, the ‘work of style’ 
is to make ‘language forego meaning and strive after silence: silence is the limit 
towards which language strives, and the means and medium of such striving is style’ 
(2010: 151). In Deleuze’s aesthetics style deterritorialises language. Working in the 
opposite direction to that of doxa and meaning, style pushes language to its limit, to the 
point of its failure.  
The discussion of linguistic failure above positioned Sasha’s silences and the 
novel’s uneasy communication at the impasse of the loss of expression, but these 
textual features still remain, to an extent, within the realm of representation. What 
stylistic operations in Good Morning, Midnight, if any, accord with Deleuze’s idea of 
procedures which deterritorialise language? What in Rhys’s style takes us into the 
regime of the sensible or that of ‘dissensual sensation, behind doxa, that [which] is 
beyond common sensory experience’ (Lecercle 2010: 196)? And what ‘dissensual 
sensation’ does Rhys’s style create? What is the style of Rhys’s literary thought? These 
questions are at the heart of the close readings in the following chapters of this thesis. 
Chapters 5 and 6 concentrate on a minorisation that destabilises ideas about desire and 
complicity. There are numerous times when Rhys’s syntax becomes intensive and 
transforms into what Deleuze describes as ‘formulas’. The final three words of the text 
 
48 There are formulations of this key concept throughout Deleuze’s writing. It is, for example, central to 
Difference and Repetition. Ansell-Pearson gives a very interesting elucidation of the idea in Germinal 
Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze (1999: 84-5).  




form a notable example. They hollow out our understanding of the difference between 
affirmation and negation, acceptance and rejection, finality and ‘irredeemable 
ambivalence’ (Carr 2012: 81). Yet as I have argued, vacillation is a major feature of 
Rhys’s style in this work and thinking through Deleuze’s aesthetics we can view this 
as a manifestation of ‘continuous variation’, an idea which is central in Deleuze’s 
writing on literature.50 Sasha’s swing between resistance and defeat is a formal device 
that exceeds the representational regime in which it does, nevertheless, also work. The 
text is concerned primarily not with the development of story, character or theme, but 
with its own variations. The ceaseless swings of Sasha’s mood, tone and orientation to 
others, the text’s shifts from past to present, the variation of the mode of the writing 
(one moment realist, the next symbolic or approximating the Surrealist), and the 
continuous movement between repetition and novelty (the novel begins with what may 
or may not be ‘[q]uite like old times’) are manifestations of the continuous modulation 
which, I think, is one of the most important features of Rhys’s style in Good Morning, 
Midnight. This stylistic operation works as a matter of disequilibrium on the level of 
both form and content. It disassembles the idea of the integrated, self-determining 
individual subject, and it allows Rhys’s prose to attain to the impersonal, ‘digging’ 
beneath her story and the realm of representation, ‘cracking open [...] opinions, and 
reaching regions without memories, when the self must be destroyed’ (Deleuze 1997: 
113).  
The final few paragraphs of Part Two see Sasha read Serge’s letter and then 
unroll and survey his painting of a ‘man standing in the gutter, playing his banjo’ 
(GMM, 91). As the scene plays out the prose starts to ‘undulate’, presumably as the 
effects of numerous glasses of Pernod and ‘a bottle of Bordeaux’ hit Sasha and she 
becomes ‘almost as drunk as [she]’d hoped to be’ (90). The syntax assumes a lurching 
quality, what Deleuze describes as ‘rolling and pitching’, as Sasha’s inebriation 
becomes ‘intensive’, transferring ‘from the form of content’ to the ‘form of expression’ 
so the line of words itself seems to stumble back and forth (Deleuze 1997: 111). When 
the painting is ‘unroll[ed]’, the painted figure ‘stares at [Sasha]. He is gentle, humble, 
resigned, mocking, a little mad. He stares at [her]. He is double-headed, double-faced. 
 
50 This idea is discussed most explicitly in Deleuze’s 1993 essay ‘He Stuttered’ in Essays Critical and 
Clinical, published in the same year ([Critique et clinique] Deleuze 1997: 107-114).  I argue in the next 
chapter that at the end of Good Morning, Midnight this stylistic operation transforms into a ‘coupling’ 




He is singing “It has been,” singing “It will be”. Double-headed and with four-arms’ 
(GMM, 91). Firstly a series of descriptors pours out which charts the variation of the 
image itself – the banjo-player is a sort of anti-Mona Lisa, his expression is un-fixed, 
un-graspable – as well as Sasha’s fluctuating attitude to the painting, to Serge and to 
life. Then the lines begin to return to aspects of the painting already observed, to 
expressions already used, as the descriptors ‘double’ on themselves, but with variation, 
so the past becomes the future and the five-part series that described the painted man 
is followed by the four-part series of Sasha’s recollection: ‘I stare back at him and think 
about being hungry, being cold, being hurt, being ridiculed’ (91). The rhythm of the 
prose in this short section is remarkably effective, as the mostly very short clauses 
accumulate through a syncopated use of conjunctions, ellipses, dashes, commas, full 
stops, series of descriptors of varying lengths and repetition-with-variation. The rolling 
and pitching becomes angrier (‘[t]his damned room’) until Sasha’s entire past seems, 
momentarily, to be encompassed within her current drunken haze, an achievement 
expressed in a final pattern with a fragile symmetry that is contorted by the concluding 
ellipsis: ‘It’s all the rooms I’ve ever slept in, all the streets I’ve ever walked in. Now 
the whole thing moves in an ordered, undulating procession past my eyes. Rooms, 
streets, streets, rooms...’ (91). Rhys’s prose undulates just as we can imagine Sasha 
swaying, imbibing, repeating and circling back on herself till her double-vision 
transitions to drunk unconsciousness.  
 Language in Good Morning, Midnight involves neither a stable system nor 
balance. Instead, as in Deleuze’s understanding of language, there is ‘perpetual 
disequilibrium’ and the desire to break away from the given (Deleuze 1997: 110). For 
Deleuze, the great writer creates zones of vibration in language by choosing and 
connecting terms not according to a binary logic (such as the principle of mutual 
exclusivity), but by making inclusive choices and forming reflexive connections: this 
is ‘creative stuttering’, which ‘makes language grow from the middle, like grass; it is 
what makes language a rhizome instead of a tree, what puts language in perpetual 
disequilibrium’ (Deleuze 1997: 111). Two coterminous processes occur. Constant 
variation and various other stylistic operations of disequilibrium create sensation; and 
language is pushed to its limit. In these two processes the thought of literature is 
revealed.  
As we can see at the end of Part Two, the constant variation in this text inclines 




the obligation under which she put herself to consider whether to act for the kitchen 
girl, and it is legible as her desire to be free from empathy altogether. Yet as the 
variation throughout the novel evidences, Sasha does care, and her intoxication is 
equally legible as that which helps her cope with her pleasure in Serge’s statements of 
friendship (both his letter and his painting) in the awareness of the many interpersonal 
failures in which she has been involved. Her desire for alcohol is both the desire not to 
care and the desire for that which helps her cope with caring. The affective state into 
which Sasha is immersed at the end of Part Two, then, might be described as the feeling 
of being stuck, by which I mean not paralysis but the situation of both wanting and not 
wanting to proceed with an ethical life. While we might, of course, read this critically 
as weakness of will in the place of what should be moral fortitude, we can take a more 
generous approach to this text, and understand Sasha’s inactivity, her drinking and her 
passive undulations as embodying a staunchly political message. We can read in the 
conclusion of Part Two what is, in my opinion, central to the thought of this text: its 
staging of the fact that the ethical life is necessarily difficult, that it requires great effort 
and vigilance and that good action should not be taken for granted.  
This chapter has examined questions of conformity, communality, Sasha’s 
failure, Rhys’s style and how we might think about the thought of her texts in terms of 
sensation. I turn now to an exploration of how failure in Good Morning, Midnight might 
be read as Rhys’s line of flight. The necessary difficulty of the ethical life has a 
correlative in the violence involved in the act of thinking, and Rhys’s fourth novel does 
more than dramatise the failure of thought at certain moments. In this work there is a 
drive to think the failure of thought, a drive which also reveals a profound 




The death drive of Good Morning, Midnight 
 
This chapter aims to account for various moments of danger in Good Morning, 
Midnight which involve epistemological and visual occlusion and which culminate in 
what appears to be an ambivalent form of destruction at the novel’s conclusion. These 




Difference and Repetition, and are modelled as facets of a textual death drive which 
works in terms of the will to encounter that which cannot be recognised – namely, the 
unthinkable limit of thought.51 The beginning of the chapter sets out a reworking of 
Deleuze’s complex model of a death drive, in tandem with an exploration of how his 
critique of representational thought might be used to understand Sasha’s isolation and 
uncertainty. The argument then moves to further historical contextualisation, focusing 
on the function of the Exhibition in Good Morning, Midnight, and considers the politics 
of Sasha’s inability to recognise violent sights. The final section considers how Sasha’s 
final encounter might work as an engagement with the unthinkable that pertains to 
literature and art more generally.  
The model used in these argument is not Freud’s death drive – the theory he 
formulated in 1920, which had evolved from his observation of an unproductive 
compulsion to repeat into his concept of a drive of life that ‘aspire[s] to an old state, a 
primordial state’ of the lifeless, ‘from which it once departed, and to which via all the 
circuitous byways of development it strives to return’ (Freud 2003a: 78). Rhys’s fourth 
novel is marked by a proliferation of negative repetitions which brings the narrative 
close to the terrain of Freud’s delineation of a compulsion to repeat that outweighs the 
pleasure principle. Sasha suffers a bewildering compulsion to repeat negative 
experiences, exemplified by her three-part self-contradiction, ‘[n]ot the Dôme. I’ll 
avoid the damned Dôme. And, of course, it’s the Dôme I go to’ (GMM, 60). The novel 
is replete with three pairs of mothers and daughters, various pairs of men, including a 
pair of untrustworthy sexual partners, numerous stories which repeat tales already told 
and motifs which recur throughout. Also marking a certain affinity with Freud, in 
Rhys’s novels the sense that the protagonists are fated to repeat unhappy experiences 
is accompanied by a sense of their return to a ‘prior state’. This is frequently 
coextensive with the protagonists’ inertia, and a certain childlike quality that Marya, 
Julia, Anna and Antoinette have; and there are journeys of return in the four later 
novels. However, the protagonists do not die within these narratives. Even at the end 
of Voyage in the Dark Anna’s death is not a narrative fact as such. It can be difficult to 
encounter Rhys’s women who, in David Plante’s words, have a ‘great dark space’ in 
the place of comprehensible, reasonable motivation (1984: 40). In Good Morning, 
 
51 Page references to the 2004 Continuum edition of Difference and Repetition are hereafter given using 




Midnight the reader is faced with an almost unremitting bleakness and epistemological 
opacity in which there is no clear explanation for the protagonist’s self-destructive 
repetition. The end point of this text’s death drive is unclear, and I suggest that it is the 
simultaneous obscurity and excess of the passion in the novel’s final scene which so 
negatively affects some readers.52  
The concluding scene of Good Morning, Midnight dramatises an encounter 
which seems somehow comparable to death, yet in which ambivalence and 
epistemological difficulty are of central importance. The scene also suggests possibility 
and an opening up, signalled by Sasha’s triple affirmation. The text’s ‘drive’ is entirely 
at odds with Darwinian survival and Freud’s pleasure principle, but if we consider the 
shape of the narrative, its punctuation by various blind spots, Rhys’s critique of 
intolerance and Sasha’s mysterious and bivalent fate, then Deleuze’s exploration of a 
form of thought that involves both destruction and creation suggests itself as a 
particularly apt set of ideas with which to approach this difficult novel.  
 
I. Rhys, Difference and Repetition and another death drive 
Deleuze’s philosophy is dedicated to the tasks of critiquing the privileging of identity 
and opposition which forms the logic of established western thought, and thereby 
restoring difference into thought. His death drive in Difference and Repetition is part 
of his project of identifying ways in which difference – in the form of the radically new 
– is generated, and developing the Nietzschean proposition that real thought is creative 
because it involves thinking beyond that which is established. Deleuze uses the concept 
of a death drive in his other writing – for example, in Anti-Oedipus and his 1969 work, 
The Logic of Sense (Logique du sens) – but its configuration and use differs 
significantly from work to work. My arguments here refer solely to the idea as it 
appears in Difference and Repetition. 
Deleuze’s death drive is a difficult concept, and at times he is wilfully obscure 
in its deployment. It operates as a sort of figuration of or metaphor for the dissolution 
of the self in involuntary memory, which Deleuze argues is a form of repetition that 
allows a unique encounter with ‘pure’ time. This encounter is Deleuze’s paradigm for 
the nomadic subject’s experience of its own creative evolution. The death drive, then, 
 
52 I am thinking here of Angier’s introduction of her own ‘death’ in her readings of what she sees as 
Rhys’s increasingly indifferent protagonists as Rhys comes increasingly to indulge the ‘death of love’ 




is legible as the affirmation required in thinking time in the awareness of the subject’s 
absolute non-identity, and in thinking the future as a multiplicity which will lead to the 
subject’s further differentiation. The death drive presupposes the ‘dissolution of all 
previous identities and their novel transformation’ (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 82). This is 
the thinking of being itself as the excessive task of affirming the ‘all of chance’ (DR, 
142).  
 One of the most striking things about the death drive in Difference and 
Repetition is that Deleuze does not use it explicitly in his third chapter, entitled ‘The 
Image of Thought’, in which he puts forward a view of thought as a violent encounter 
with the unthinkable and the unrecognisable, which, of course, we could readily 
understand as an encounter with a sort of death. The death drive would be an obvious 
concept with which to tackle such things in his proposition of a new style of philosophy. 
However, perhaps it would be too obvious for a philosophy driven by the desire to 
unsettle thought. Despite this, the death drive lingers on in ‘The Image of Thought’, 
resonating with the spirit of the argument, its descriptions and style. This, I propose, 
gives us grounds for extending Deleuze’s death drive into his critique of 
representational thought in order to develop a reading of Rhys’s critique of common 
sense that sheds light on the various blind spots in her fourth novel.  
In ‘The Image of Thought’ Deleuze critiques the transcendental method of 
establishing a doctrine of the faculties, based on its error of ‘tracing the transcendental 
from the outlines of the empirical’ (DR, 181). In place of Kant’s transcendentalism, 
Deleuze proposes that the limit of any given faculty must be acknowledged to be at the 
heart of any attempt to think that faculty through: the ‘transcendent exercise’, he writes, 
‘must not be traced from the empirical exercise precisely because it apprehends that 
which cannot be grasped from the point of view of common sense’ (180). The aim is 
‘to avoid any explanandum or transcendence that would function as a condition for 
what is. The question of philosophy, for empiricism, is not to account for the condition 
or meaning of the given but to respond to the given’ (Colebrook 2000b: 113).53 The 
Deleuzian philosopher responds by creating concepts as ‘intervention[s]’, or responses 
to particular problems or situations (Colebrook 2000b: 114).  
 
53 The question of Deleuze’s transcendentalism is one of the central points of debate concerning his 
philosophy. For example, Daniel W. Smith contends that providing the conditions of the production of 
the new is one of the two bedrocks of Deleuze’s project in a reading which sometimes seems quite 




We might, then, understand Deleuze’s logic of the outside, his aim to think 
through the limit of the faculties, as a sort of death drive which self-consciously, 
constantly threatens to over-reach itself:  
 
Each faculty must be borne to the extreme point of its dissolution, at which it 
falls prey to triple violence: the violence of that which forces it to be exercised, 
of that which it is forced to grasp and which it alone is able to grasp, yet also 
that of the ungraspable (from the point of view of its empirical exercise). This 
is the threefold limit of the final power. Each faculty discovers at this point its 
own unique passion – in other words, its radical difference and its eternal 
repetition. (DR, 180) 
 
Art, argues Deleuze, can help us with this risky task of pushing the faculties to their 
limits. Marcel Proust pushes memory to its limit, and Lewis Carroll does the same with 
sense. Specifically, the unmediated intensities of affects and percepts, those ‘free or 
untamed states of difference in itself’, that are produced in certain works of art raise 
sensibility and imagination to ‘the level of the transcendent exercise’ where these 
faculties encounter their limit, forcing us to confront that which can only be imagined 
but which is also ‘empirically unimaginable’ (DR, 181). Style, as the continuous 
variation, stuttering, or fragmentation, releases these states of pure difference or 
unmediated intensities.  
For some artists, such as Antonin Artaud, the aim of writing is to engender 
thought in language by pushing the language of schizophrenia to its limit (DR, 184). 
Sasha’s exhortation to ‘think, you apes’, suggests and dramatises a severe diminution 
of the possibility of thought. Applying a logic of the outside to this novel, what faculty 
(if any), might we ask, does Rhys bear to its limit? What is her equivalent to Proustian 
reminiscence, Carroll’s nonsense, Artaud’s schizophrenia? Extrapolating from Sasha’s 
failure identified in the previous chapter, and taking into account the impasse with 
which Rhys begins this work, I suggest that Rhys is pushing the ethical faculty of 
literature to the ‘extreme point of its dissolution’ – the point at which words fail because 
they do not lead to the action that is required. This, I contend, is the unthinkable event, 
the encounter with the nonrecognisable, to which the text drives itself.  
In the third chapter of Difference and Repetition Deleuze argues that the 




think’, is a travesty of philosophy because it presupposes a certain Image of thought 
involving an upright nature on the part of thought, a good will on the part of the thinker, 
and the fact that everybody knows what it means to think – a common sense (DR, 
166).54 As long as this remains a universal given, difference will be subordinated and 
represented ‘through the identity of the concept and the thinking subject’ (335); thought 
will operate in terms of identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance; and the task of 
restoring difference to the thinking of thought will remain out of reach. This argument 
gives us a means of reconsidering Sasha’s radical uncertainty and her failure, 
sometimes, to think as evidence of Rhys’s healthy scepticism about thinking in general. 
Sasha repeatedly denounces established, respectable thought which operates in terms 
of an established ‘sentimental ballad’ and which she names cliché: ‘Everything in their 
whole bloody world is a cliché. Everything is born out of a cliché, rests on a cliché, 
survives by a cliché. And they believe in the clichés’ (GMM, 36). Rhys presupposes 
neither an innately good thought, nor a good will on the part of those who think, and 
Sasha’s inability to include herself in her own scepticism reinforces the sense of the 
accuracy of this stance. Instead of possessing self-awareness, Sasha is profoundly 
uncertain in regards to her knowledge, perceptions, desires and feelings: ‘Am I 
disappointed?’, she wonders, ‘[a]m I vexed?’ (GMM, 128–9). It seems that Sasha does 
not take as a given what is meant by ‘self, thinking, and being’ (DR, 164).  
Sasha also seems to understand the role in representation of common sense.  For 
Deleuze, this shared stance denotes the ‘subjective’ presupposition of the principle of 
identity, which we use to judge the self a supreme, enduring entity in relation to which 
the ‘object’ or the other is always the opposed and inferior. We do not need to look 
hard to find a comparable objection to common sense in Good Morning, Midnight, a 
novel concerned with how marginalised others are persecuted and deemed inferior 
because of their difference. Common sense, as Deleuze describes it, is ‘a subjective 
principle of collaboration of the faculties for “everybody”’ which contributes to the 
Image of thought the ‘form of the Same’ (DR, 169). There is no good ‘collaboration of 
the faculties’ for the benefit of ‘everybody’ in Rhys’s final interwar novel. There is 
instead a dramatic disparity between Sasha’s vision and analysis of the world and the 
perception of those she encounters. With the exception of Serge, she encounters nobody 
 
54 I retain the single capitalisation in the phrase ‘Image of thought’ in order to reinforce its specific sense 




who is ‘likeminded’, and the fellow feeling between Serge and Sasha is undermined by 
an insurmountable difference which sustains the gulf between them. Despite this 
camaraderie, Sasha kisses the unlikeable Delmar, and her visit with the artist concludes 
on a monetary transaction, prompted by Serge’s initial scepticism and Sasha’s 
embarrassed insistence; their buyer-seller relationship epitomises the fundamental 
difference between them as well as the mechanics of oppositional negation which 
determines the mood of this novel. 
For Deleuze, rather than being an act which adheres to a pre-existing Image, 
thinking is a violent encounter with nonrecognition because it is an encounter with the 
limit of thought, with that which is not yet established and which therefore cannot be 
recognised and can only be sensed: the ‘form of recognition’, Deleuze asserts, ‘has 
never sanctioned anything but the recognisable and the recognised; form will never 
inspire anything but conformities’ (DR, 170). Thinking the ‘new – in other words, 
difference – calls forth forces in thought which are not the forces of recognition, today 
or tomorrow, but the powers of a completely other model, from an unrecognised and 
unrecognisable terra incognita’ (172). Sometimes Sasha’s inability to think and to 
comprehend is just that – an inability. At such times the thought of the text and Sasha’s 
thought are distinct. At other times the protagonist’s inability to recognise seems to be 
productive and corresponds to Deleuze’s affirmation of an encounter with something 
which can only be sensed. In these moments Sasha’s thought coincides with Rhys’s 
stylistic procedure, which plays out by way of convulsions, for probing the limits of 
the literary text. 
 
II. Violent encounters and an Exhibition of blind spots  
In an essay on Rhys, Jamaica Kincaid and Michelle Cliff, Emery argues that these 
writers are invested in writing against the ‘European epistemology of the visual – sight 
as the dominant way of knowing’ (1997: 259). Emery proposes that forms of 
representation predicated on the imagination as ‘image-making process’ are bound to 
‘an image-producing and consuming global capitalism’ and seem ‘also inseparable 
historically from the “imperial eye” or “commanding gaze” of colonialist practice and 
discourse’ (1997: 261). She reads these Caribbean women writers as inscribing a 
‘counterdiscursive revision’ of narrative devices which ‘figure’ visuality (Emery 1997: 




‘excess’, or its absence rendered a ‘significant present’ – serves to expose ‘the 
constitutive processes of the colonialist imagination’, and also creates ‘resistance to it, 
renewing vision for subversive and newly creative purpose’ (Emery 1997: 262). 
Extending and twisting this argument, I propose that Good Morning, Midnight presents 
a counterdiscursive refiguration of the dominant Western epistemological 
presupposition that Deleuze names the Image of thought.  
This refiguration is dramatised in Sasha’s lack of common sense when 
confronted by her tyrannical employer, Mr Blank. In assigning him this name Rhys is 
parodying his inability to see and comprehend Sasha in a humane manner: there is a 
capitalised unthinking ‘Blank’ where his compassion should be. His form of rationality 
allows him only to see Sasha as an inferior other whom he can terrorise and exploit, 
and Rhys’s epithet is a pithy indictment of the lack in the comprehension of people like 
him. He derides Sasha’s nonsensical response to his demand and calls her a ‘helpless 
little fool’ (GMM, 24), but her nonsense and her inability to make sense of his 
mispronounced demand to find the cashier serve to make him see her and she becomes 
a visible irritant rather than remaining an invisible cog in his capitalist machine. Her 
nonsense stalls his business (his cheque is not delivered), is her means of escape from 
the oppressive situation and subverts the capitalist, imperialist ethic of mastery that Mr 
Blank embodies. Her nomadic subjectivity is generally a matter of navigating and 
surviving this mastery, but here it becomes a matter of affirming a different act of 
thinking.  
The fact that Sasha’s utter uncertainty is more pronounced than that of Rhys’s 
other protagonists can be explained by the pernicious propaganda which was a 
dominant discourse in Europe in the late 1930s. Her uncertainty can be construed as 
the effect of being subjected to violent misrepresentations of reality which are designed 
to mislead. There is an emphasis on visuality and representation in this fourth novel 
which works alongside Rhys’s linguistic scepticism as the author’s response to the 
dominance of propaganda generally – the euphemistic signs of patriarchal imperialism, 
capitalism and war; and certain facets of the text mark out the insidiousness of Nazi 
propaganda specifically. The most notable marker of propaganda is the Exhibition 
which is occupying the city. It seems to threaten Sasha, invading her unconscious in 
the nightmare of Part One, and it is thematically linked to her excruciating awareness 




carries a number of contrary significations.55 It is at once a spectral and spectacular 
construct for Sasha, supporting various psychic dichotomies such as desire and fear, 
reality and fantasy. Above all else the Exhibition signifies the ‘coexistence of 
discrepant realities’ which Bill Schwarz understands to be the ‘principal object’ of 
Rhys’s narratives (2003: 22). In Rhys’s fiction,  
 
the inner subjective life of her protagonists never seems to be reconciled with 
the diktats of the given world. Much of her inventiveness as a writer derives 
from her capacities to craft a narrative which in itself dramatises and makes 
evident the workings of these discrepant realities – social and subjective – in all 
their textured, phenomenological everydayness. (Schwarz 2003: 21) 
 
The 1937 Paris world fair exhibited a sense of unreality in dramatic fashion. It took up 
the centre of Paris, displacing the ‘real’ city, and replacing it with structures that 
purported to represent foreign cultures, while omitting virtually all representation of 
French society as it was in 1937 – fraught with social conflict.56 The Exposition did 
promote peace – albeit somewhat ironically, relegating the Star of Peace to the Place 
du Trocadéro outside the Exposition’s perimeters. The Exposition also and more 
elaborately promoted a ‘world view’ – an internationalism predicated on the illusion of 
global cooperation, a supposedly universalist gaze which incorporated everyone, and a 
truly modern, ethnographic appreciation of other cultures which manifested itself in a 
mania for classificatory systems and often quaint and Orientalist exhibitory practices. 
It did so, however, against a background of an increasingly dominant xenophobic and 
anti-Semitic sentiment in Paris. The view from the esplanade or ‘promenade’ (as Sasha 
calls it) at the Trocadéro’s Palais de Chaillot was the principal viewpoint of the 
Exposition, and from there the spectacle of Stalinism and Nazism confronting one 
another was unavoidable (see Figure 1). The opposition of the German and the Soviet 
pavilions, situated on either side of the Exposition's main axis, running between the 
Palais de Chaillot and the Eiffel Tower, dominated the Exposition’s main space, its 
 
55 Christina Britzolakis’s essay 2007 essay focuses on Rhys’s inscription in Good Morning, Midnight of 
the intersection of capitalist and imperialist practices, patriarchy, fascism and modernist discourses and 
argues that this intersection coalesces in the Exhibition.  
56 My analysis of the political significations of the Exhibition is informed by the accounts of French 
fascism cited in the previous chapter and by studies of the 1937 world fair by Britzolakis (2007), Linda 





principal view and the discourse surrounding it. Newspaper reports on the world fair 
frequently focused on this spectacle of confrontation. A weak message of peace and a 
modern ‘world view’ formed the stage on which totalitarianism foreshadowed the 
disaster of the Second World War.57 The Exposition inadvertently laid out in visual 
terms the human propensity for self-deception, and our predisposition to accept (and 
enjoy) the discrepancy between reality and the image of reality with which we are 
confronted. 
On the one hand the Exhibition in Good Morning, Midnight is a metonymic 
figuration of Sasha’s confusing experience of discrepant realities and unreality, 
standing for this experience on a metropolitan scale and thereby giving public 
expression to that which is more commonly the relegated phenomenological experience 
of marginalised others. On the other hand a powerful textual erasure suggests 
something quite contrary. In Part Four, Sasha and René go to the Exhibition’s main 
viewpoint – the Trocadéro’s promenade – and stand ‘looking down’ at the fountains 
shining in the lights (which we see in Figure 2 below). Their illuminated night time 
view would encompass the Eiffel Tower in the distance, flanked by the two pavilions, 
separated by the fountains (137). This is the spectacle that Sasha wants to see before 
she leaves (GMM, 136). Yet, taking in this view, Sasha only sees the fountains. The 
text blanks the sight of the totalitarian standoff in what seems to be an authorial 
comment on the monumentality, the contrivance and the violent content of the 
dominant spectacle.  
This strange moment indicates the human tendency to feigned myopia – an 
unwillingness of the social consciousness to see what is coming, which was tragically 
evident in the late 1930s. It appears as a willed blindness on Sasha’s part and a textual 
manoeuvre: like Mr Blank, the Exhibition is assigned an anonymous or blank value. 
There are no signs other than the date and the naming of the Trocadéro which give it 
either an identity or content. The fountains that preoccupy Sasha serve as a veil, 
distracting her from that which is either side of them, and distracting us from asking 
why Rhys has evacuated the scene of its explicitly political content. The text allows 
neither the reader nor the characters to see that which it seems to want us to see: the 
spectacle of totalitarianism and the sight of an event which demanded a willed self-
delusion. The scene presents a revision of the form of dominant visuality exemplified 
 




by totalitarianism and, in particular, fascism, which dictates what is seen and imposes 





Figure 1. The view by day of the German and Soviet pavilions in Paris, 1937. The area 
they flank was, and still is, named Place de Varsovie. By permission of the Bureau 




Figure 2. The view of the Palais de Chaillot by night, 1937. The column behind, with 
the star on the top, was named the Peace Column (it does not exist anymore). By 




Sasha responds strangely to the Exhibition, and becomes transfixed in a 
moment of aesthetic rapture by its ‘cold, empty’ beauty (GMM, 137). There is an 
intense sense of isolation in her response which nevertheless involves strong desire. 
Despite and because of René’s company her encounter with the Exhibition is hers 
alone. She is spurred to go to it by his anti-Semitic remarks about Russians in Paris. 
‘Jews and poor whites. The most boring people in the world. Terrible people’, says the 
gigolo (137), and Sasha responds, 
 
For some reason I am very vexed at this. I start wondering why I am there at 
all… I want to get away. I want to be out of the place […] I want to go by 
myself, to get into a taxi and drive along the street, to stand by myself and look 
down at the fountains in the cold light. (GMM, 136-37) 
 
When standing at the viewpoint Sasha seems intensely gratified: ‘Cold, empty, 
beautiful – this is what I imagined, this is what I wanted.’ Her rapture seems to depend 
not on the vision itself but on a correspondence between her expectations and the 
reality of the Exhibition – on having imagined and desired correctly, and on having her 
desire fulfilled. The Exhibition appears as a surrogate for Sasha, standing in the place 
of a desired person. Unlike René, with whom there is always discord, the Exhibition 
meets her desire. Yet this is true only to the extent that she ‘imagined’ and ‘wanted’ 
cold, empty beauty. Her disengagement with the scene and the sense of self-
disengagement suggested by her lifeless (‘cold’, ‘empty’) imagination and desire is 
underscored by her detached assessment of one of the buildings: ‘“The building is very 
fine,” I say, in a schoolmistress’s voice’ (GMM, 137). This passage seems to dramatise 
what Walter Benjamin described as the modern predicament of self-alienation which 
fascism exploits. Concluding his famous 1936 essay ‘The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction’, with which Rhys may have been familiar, Benjamin argues 
that fascism sees its ‘salvation’ in rendering politics aesthetic, giving the masses ‘not 
their right, but instead a chance to express themselves’ (2008: 1108). For Benjamin, 
‘all efforts to render politics aesthetic culminate in one thing: war’ (2008: 1108). This 
may have been all too clear for the visitor to the 1937 Exposition, with its spectacle of 
the Soviet and German pavilions unequivocally presenting architecture and the art held 
within as ideological confrontation. The vision would have convinced at least some 




realisation of the Futurist slogan cited by Benjamin at the end of his essay: ‘Fiat ars – 
pereat mundus’, let art be created, let the world perish (2008: 1108). It is likely that 
Rhys interpreted this spectacle as an image of violence when she visited Paris in 
November 1937, and there is good reason to assume she was sensitive to what Albert 
Speer’s swastika-adorned pavilion represented.  
Sasha’s strange response to the spectacle of totalitarian confrontation calls to 
be read in the light of the novel’s concern with ingrained intolerance towards 
difference, and Rhys’s rejection of dominant visualities and epistemologies. To those 
willing to perceive it the spectacle symbolised the likelihood of another World War 
and Albert Speer’s monument figured racial hatred as political project, and this 
presence on the main axis of the Paris Exposition may have signalled, for Rhys, a sort 
of triumph over the city she so loved.58 The evacuation of Sasha’s gaze suggests more 
than just self-alienation. Unlike René who dislikes the Star of Peace and delights in 
conflict, thereby being a suitable citizen for the diktats of fascism, as Benjamin 
understood it, the absence in Sasha’s view from the Promenade suggests a refusal to 
see a politics of hatred and intolerance made aesthetic. Balancing this focus on fascism, 
the text’s refusal to address this spectacle directly also signals the refusal of the 
politicisation of art. Sasha’s aesthetic rapture then works as the opting out of the terms 
of representation on offer to her, binding as they do the aesthetic to the political, and 
both, here, to virulent racial hatred. This narrative blanking is the text’s refusal to 
incorporate what cannot and should not be understood – Sasha’s paranoia turned into 
a ‘cold, empty’ blindness which nevertheless has a symbolic, psychic and ethical 
function.  
Deleuze writes that  
 
recognition is insignificant only as a speculative model. It ceases to be so with 
regard to the ends which it serves and to which it leads us. What is recognised 
is not only an object but also the values attached to an object. (DR: 171)  
 
This later moment of unseeing vision seems to speak back to Sasha’s blank-hearted ex-
employer as well as to the values associated with the Exhibition. The blind spot in the 
 
58 Although in 1937 only a symbolic triumph, within a little over a year after Good Morning, Midnight 




Exhibition can be read as the denunciation of the three main elements of the Image of 
thought: the ‘image of a naturally upright thought, which knows what it means to 
think’, an ‘in principle natural common sense’, and a ‘transcendental model of 
recognition’ (DR: 170). On this reading, Sasha’s detached ‘schoolmistress’s voice’ that 
underscores her nonunitary subjectivity, René’s anti-Semitism and his relegation of the 
Star of Peace to something ‘mesquin’ (petty or mean), and the nature of the blanked 
spectacle itself constitute Rhys’s version of the refusal of the first two elements. 
Thought is not a given, and collaboration is only for the benefit of a violent world order. 
The world of this Exhibition allows no room for difference except as that which is, at 
best, secondary, relegated to categorised representations of the exotic ‘other’, and at 
worst that which is unacceptable for the totalitarian state. Recognition of any sort would 
be the adoption of an epistemology according to a model of dominant visuality and the 
denigration of difference. Sasha’s refusal to see the Exhibition is an almost laying bare 
of the third element, the model of recognition which ‘remains sovereign and defines 
the orientation of the philosophical analysis of what it means to think’ (DR: 171). This 
is a moment of passive resistance, as Sasha refuses to orient her thought solely towards 
identity and opposition, analogy and resemblance. There is adequate reason to judge 
Sasha’s aesthetic response a philosophical one rather than as just the failure of a faculty, 
although failure is sometimes the condition of the act of thinking: 
 
it is not a question of saying what few think and knowing what it means to think. 
On the contrary, it is a question of someone – if only one – with the necessary 
modesty not managing to know what everybody knows, and modestly denying 
what everybody is supposed to recognise. Someone who neither allows himself 
to be represented nor wishes to represent anything. Not an individual endowed 
with good will and a natural capacity for thought, but an individual full of ill 
will who does not manage to think, either naturally or conceptually. (DR: 165-
66) 
 
This passage describes Sasha’s position accurately: she has struck many critics as an 
idiot ‘full of ill will’ who cannot or will not see what she ought to do. Yet this visual 
negation is, I contend, the text’s modest death drive – its means of refusing dominant 




The culmination of this Deleuzian death drive in Good Morning, Midnight is 
Sasha’s bewildering affirmative embrace of the commis at the end of the novel. This 
act moves the text away from its critical orientation, away from a ‘not managing to 
think’, as indicated by Sasha’s final affirmation, ‘[y]es – yes – yes…’ (GMM, 159). My 
reading of this much-debated ending is not far from those critics who have viewed 
Sasha’s acceptance of the sinister neighbour as the internalisation of fascism, but I 
cannot disallow the affirmative impulse in the embrace. Thinking through Deleuze’s 
death drive alongside his elaboration with Guattari of literary affect gives us a means 
of reconciling the contrary dynamics which play out in Rhys’s conclusion.  
 
III. ‘The enormous effort, under which the human brain cracks. But 
not before the thing is done’ 
The end of Good Morning, Midnight dramatises a death drive in a fairly straightforward 
way. The commis stands for real horror. His white dressing gown, which connects him 
to the father figure in Sasha’s nightmare, and the strange simile likening him to the 
‘priest of some obscene, half-understood religion’ align him with the cult of Führer 
worship contrived by Hitler (GMM, 30). The commis is an incestuous amalgamation 
of fascist tyrant and victim (a ‘poor devil of a human being’ (GMM, 159)), father and 
lover, ghostly and substantial. Importantly, he is different from all the other characters 
in the novel in that he is rendered with no attempt at realism, is a highly symbolic 
construct and inhabits these boundary confusions. Sasha’s acceptance and her 
affirmation seem clearly self-destructive and, on one reading, her act seems to 
dramatise Deleuze and Guattari’s central argument in Anti-Oedipus that fascism is the 
desire which we all have for destructive power. The death drive is, in one sense, the 
inevitability which attends her embrace – an act which is a repetition of her disastrous 
acceptance of René on the landing in the dark. There are several other incidents which 
preordain this final act, most powerful and disorienting among which is Sasha’s 
nightmarish daydream in Part Two during her fleeting moment of happiness with 
Serge, when she envisions the ‘dreams that you have, alone in an empty room, waiting 
for the door that will open, the thing that is bound to happen...’ (83).  
Yet explaining the embrace as Sasha’s acceptance of her desire for destructive 
power does not account sufficiently for various other textual elements such as the sense 




various dramatic shifts in register and voice, the intensification of imagery and the 
emphasis on sight in the conclusion. However, the most vivid description of ‘death’ in 
the concluding pages is Sasha’s repetition of Serge’s paean to Vincent Van Gogh, and 
this serves as a sort of catalyst which enables these various elements and contrary 
dynamics to work together.  
Serge’s veneration of the great post-Impressionist signals another 1937 
exhibition. A rather unusual show devoted to Van Gogh was held in the new Palais de 
Tokyo as part of the Paris Exposition. Part of an experimentation with the educative 
function of different kinds of exhibitions intended for the masses, this exhibition 
included not just Van Gogh’s paintings and drawings but also an unusual ‘extra room 
containing documents, newspaper clippings, photographs of the places Van Gogh had 
worked [...] and panels with texts pertaining to the painter’s life and philosophy’ 
(Blühm 1999: 72-73). Rhys may have visited this or discussed it with Segal. In their 
meeting in Part Two, Serge admits he 
 
cries about Van Gogh. [He] speechifies about ‘the terrible effort, the sustained 
effort – something beyond the human brain, what he did.’ 
Etcetera, etcetera... 
When he gives me a cigarette his hand is shaking. He isn’t lying. I think he 
has really cried over Van Gogh. (GMM, 79) 
 
In Part Four, during Sasha’s faltering attempt to recompose herself after René’s attack, 
and while expressing her desire for René’s return, she repeats Serge’s words, with a 
variation which signals the ‘crack’ of death: 
 
‘But why the gesture of not taking the money? I argue. ‘It was simply 
ridiculous. You know you’re regretting it already. Go back and get it. You could 
walk in, you could say “I forgot something”, take it and walk out again.’ 
Come back, come back, come back... 
This is the effort, the enormous effort, under which the human brain cracks. 
But not before the thing is done, not before the mountain moves.  
Come back, come back, come back... 





It is impossible to know rationally what the repetition of Serge’s words means in this 
context. On the one hand, the ‘effort’ is that exercised by Sasha as she wills the return 
of René in order to seduce him so she will no longer have to bear her loneliness. On 
the other, we have little reason to think that Sasha believes that she can actually will 
René back. She retains sufficient capacity for lucid articulation for us to dismiss loss 
of sanity as an all-encompassing interpretative solution. René’s aggressive pursuit and 
assault when Sasha changes her mind, and his boast of having participated in gang rape 
might be grounds for assuming that the ‘thing’ that has to be ‘done’ despite the lethal 
effort it involves is the act of willing his return in the knowledge that he will do her 
harm.59 The ‘thing’ might be Sasha’s affirmation of her masochistic submission and 
self-defeat; it might be her acknowledgement that she needs bonds of connection even 
if those bonds will destroy her. Yet if this is the case, Serge’s sublime appreciation of 
Van Gogh makes little sense, other than in terms of a final sublimation of all that was 
good for Sasha into a death wish. I propose instead that the allusion to the Dutch 
colourist, like Rhys’s notable use of Rimbaud at an earlier key moment in the novel, 
provides us with the means of understanding the text positively if we look to what 
Sasha’s evocation of Serge’s admiration of this painter after René’s attack does.  
The allusion brings Van Gogh into presence in a sort of poiesis, as the text 
brings itself forth, in these concluding convulsions, in its relation to his creativity. Van 
Gogh emerges in his struggle to create his paintings, alongside Serge’s intense and true 
response to this, a response which allows Sasha to believe him. To understand this 
making-present we can turn to the correspondence between Rhys’s text and Van 
Gogh’s art. In Van Gogh’s beautiful and tragic letters in the 1880s to his brother, sister 
and a few friends, the artist describes how he found ‘consolation’ for life’s suffering in 
his powers of creation as he learnt to express feeling and sensation in colour. However, 
the act of creation, as he responded intensely to the colours of the French landscape, 
involved an increasingly heightened emotional response which caused the increasingly 
dangerous physiological attacks that plagued him (Van Gogh 1996: 394, 481). 
Breaking the two allusions down, we can see four things being brought into presence. 
There is the ‘enormous effort’ made by Van Gogh to create art; and there are his 
 
59 Pinning Sasha to the bed, René describes a ‘very good truc’ for women who flirt without intending to 
satisfy the man’s desire: ‘“in Morocco it’s much easier. You get four comrades to help you, and then it’s 
easy. They each take their turn. It’s nice like that.” He laughs loudly’ (GMM, 152). Among the most 
violent moments in Rhys’s oeuvre, René’s sadistic misogyny is overlooked surprisingly often. Cf. 




magnificent paintings, in which colour expresses feeling and sensation. Thirdly, there 
are blocs of sensation – or what Deleuze and Guattari also describe as a ‘monument’ 
of affect – in these paintings, which endure to this day, and to which Serge responds 
with such intensity (WP, 164). Finally, there are the passionate responses of the two 
characters: Serge’s rapturous feelings for Van Gogh’s work, and Sasha’s belief in 
Serge’s feelings. Both responses suggest a significant degree of consolation for the 
suffering of these two characters.  
My description of the enduring power of Van Gogh’s art here draws on Deleuze 
and Guattari’s theorisation in What is Philosophy? of blocs of sensation which are 
independent of the material of the art work. In this conceptualisation, the artist ‘creates 
blocs of percepts and affects’, and ‘the only law of creation is that the compound must 
stand up on its own’ (WP, 164). The painter ‘shatter[s] lived perceptions into a sort of 
cubism, a sort of simultaneism, of harsh or crepuscular light, of purple or blue, which 
have no other object or subject than themselves’ (WP, 171). We see this in Serge’s 
passionate words in Part Two which evoke a monument of sensation that is independent 
of Van Gogh and the three individuals in Serge’s studio, and which also affect Serge 
and Sasha, providing a consolation for life that the reader also feels, as we appreciate 
Sasha’s one moment of happiness in the novel. For Deleuze and Guattari the painter 
deals mainly with percepts but the writer ‘invents unknown or unrecognised affects and 
brings them to light as the becoming of characters’ (174). She ‘uses words, but by 
creating a syntax that makes them pass into sensation’ she ‘wrest[s] the affect from 
affections, the sensation from opinion’ for a people yet to come (176). This is the 
practice of ‘fabulation’. Put simply, this independent and new sensation produced in a 
work of art exists for future generations more than it does for the present. This sensation 
will assist future generations to speak a better language. In Van Gogh’s words, true art 
endures, to be appreciated more meaningfully in the future, and it consoles.60 Similarly, 
For Deleuze and Guattari, art will ‘raise’ future generations to ‘the height of the earth’s 
song and the cry of humanity’, constituting ‘tone, health, becoming’ (176). Art as a 
‘monument does not commemorate or celebrate something that happened but confides 
to the ear of the future the persistent sensations that embody the event: the constantly 
renewed suffering of men and women, their re-created protestations, their constantly 
 
60 Both sentiments are repeated in Van Gogh’s letters, and his claim about appreciation has proved truer, 




resumed struggle’ (WP, 176-77). Great art increases the possibility of revolution, offers 
consolation for the failure of this event, and memorialises the possibility of bonds 
established among a people.  
Van Gogh largely avoided making explicit political statements, much as Rhys 
did, but his work is ‘revolutionary’ in its interested and beautiful depictions of land 
workers and the poor, in his experimentation with technique, his refusal of the rules of 
the Paris schools, his use of colour to move beyond representation but in resistance to 
abstraction. Serge’s tearful response to Van Gogh enables him to empathise with 
Sasha’s inclination to cry, and this is the means through which they bond: ‘This is 
where he starts getting hold of me, Serge [...] “I often want to cry”’ he says’ (GMM, 
78). Serge’s response to Van Gogh’s art in Part Two is therefore central to the text’s 
refusal of nihilism and misanthropy. The ‘persistent sensations that embody the event’ 
of Van Gogh’s art that Serge perceives are, surely, those sensations involved in the 
struggle to create in the face of material deprivation and social persecution and at the 
greatest possible expense. Serge’s Jewish identity and the style of his art will, we can 
infer, increasingly endanger him in a manner not wholly dissimilar to the danger in 
which Van Gogh was increasingly caught as he frightened his neighbours, navigated 
hospitalisations and pushed his creativity to its limit. Yet Sasha is no artist. What 
‘event’, then, is embodied by her sensations in Part Four as she recalls Van Gogh’s 
‘enormous effort’? What are the ‘bonds’, if any, that are installed as the ‘mountain 
moves’ and Rhys’s novel concludes? 
 Near the beginning of their chapter, ‘Percept, Affect, and Concept’, Deleuze 
and Guattari note that an artistic ‘method is needed’ to ‘wrest the affect from affections’ 
in order to create a compound of pure sensation. They itemise a range of such methods: 
‘vibrating sensation – coupling sensation – [and] opening or splitting, hollowing out 
sensation’ (WP, 168). Undoubtedly there are others, but the previous chapter’s analysis 
of Sasha’s vacillation gives us a strong indication that the coupling of sensation is 
Rhys’s method for wresting sensation from words in a heightened manner at the end of 
Good Morning, Midnight. From the moment that René unpins Sasha, steals from her 
and leaves, the mode of her expression becomes dramatically unstable, with different 
registers of voice and thought accumulating, interrupting one another and repeating 
with slight variation. Despite this instability, two dominant feelings are expressed. 
There is a feeling of a lingering confidence in humanity: ‘I don’t want to see him go... 




something’, Sasha thinks, as René rifles through her bag (GMM, 154). Clearly, this 
lingering confidence is not simply beneficial. It has already been responsible for 
Sasha’s disastrous relinquishment of her defences against René. Nevertheless, it 
persists to the closing lines in which the commis becomes just ‘another poor devil’ – 
his sins, the words imply, no worse than most. In stark contrast Sasha also feels a 
debilitating resignation. Considering her happiness just a short time ago, the distraught 
Sasha first tries to establish temporal connection between the two dramatically different 
feelings, asking ‘[w]ho is this crying? The same one who laughed on the landing, kissed 
and was happy’, but her resignation erupts and prompts her to sever herself from any 
remaining hope: ‘This is me, this is myself, who is crying. The other – how do I know 
who the other is? She isn’t me’ (154). Although this recalls Rimbaud’s famous formula, 
the recollection is surely ironic. His revolutionary spirit would warrant affirmation 
rather than damning denial. Sasha’s lingering confidence, if it were active here instead, 
might lead her so far as affirming ‘I am the other, and the other, and the other’ ad 
infinitum.  
Sasha’s faith in humanity gives her a future-orientation, producing the future 
tense that rises up in the two paragraphs which chronicle Sasha’s imagined, animated 
encounter with the figure in Serge’s painting:  
 
He’ll stare at me, gentle, humble, resigned, mocking, a little mad. Standing in 
the gutter playing his banjo. And I’ll look back at him because I shan’t be able 
to help it, remembering about being young, and about being made love to and 
making love, about pain and dancing and not being afraid of death, about all the 
music I’ve ever loved, and every time I’ve been happy. (GMM, 155) 
 
This morphs into a delirious mythical vision which begins by surveying the wrath, 
debasement and death of the gods. The situation is bleak, ‘Madame Vénus se fâchera’, 
‘Phoebus Apollo is walking away from me down the boulevard to hide himself in la 
crasse’ and ‘even Jesus is dead’ (GMM, 156). Yet this state of affairs suggests a 
lingering Nietzschean faith in humankind’s capacity to manage things ourselves, once 
we cease to look to higher powers for comfort and answers. This faith is conveyed in 
the multitude made present through the unclear ‘hum of voices talking’ which sounds 
only like ‘[f]emmes, femmes, femmes, femmes’ (156), as well as the fact that the vision 




One, ‘the more alive of the two’ who insists that Madame Vénus is angry and with 
whom she feels some affinity (41). The Part Four vision matures into the surreal, still 
mythical image of the ‘enormous machine, made of white steel’ with ‘innumerable 
flexible arms’, at the end of each of which is either ‘an eye, the eyelashes stiff with 
mascara’ or a light: ‘The arms that carry the eyes and the arms that carry the lights are 
all extraordinarily flexible and beautiful. But the grey sky, which is the background, 
terrifies me’ (156). This vision couples the two dominant sensations powerfully. The 
white steel suggests Sasha’s submissive admission of the ‘beauty’ of fascism, of its 
politics made aesthetic, but there is also a beautiful, resilient, ‘flexible’ and apparently 
unruly energy to this machine, signalled by its cosmetic femininity. This is no simple 
war machine. It dances to an ‘accompaniment’ of ‘music and song’ with which Sasha 
is familiar, despite the terrifying, grey background (156). This machine also evokes a 
multitude, through both the numerous arms and eyes, and through the music and dance 
which, in Rhys’s fiction, most often involve shared experience.  
The vision does not end optimistically though. One voice seeks to abolish the 
other, in a deathly demand for complete conformity: ‘Damned voice in my head, I’ll 
stop you talking’ (GMM, 157). This fascistic signal is reinforced by the reiteration of 
René’s violently misogynistic insult to Sasha earlier in Part Four when she was still 
refusing to have sex with him and jokingly tells him she is a ‘cérébrale’. He tells her 
that she is mistaken, that she is ‘stupid’ and, whereas she won’t admit her desire for 
him, the cérébrale is  
 
a woman who doesn’t like men or need them [... and] doesn’t like women either. 
Oh no. The true cérébrale is a woman who likes nothing and nobody except 
herself and her own damned brain or what she thinks is her brain [...] a monster. 
(GMM, 136) 
 
After the attack Sasha repeats this as she imagines René’s disgust as he walks away 
from her hotel: ‘Sale femme. Ridiculous woman [...] You don’t like men, and you don’t 
like women either. You like nothing, nobody. Sauf ton sale cerveau. Alors, je te laisse 
avec ton sale cerveau...’ (157). At this point it is entirely unclear what the dominant 
feeling or sensation is. Sasha is castigating herself for her resistance to René, and we 
might therefore see some lingering belief in the gigolo’s goodness. Yet the imagined 




itself, and the effect of its inclusion here is to elevate that which is deemed inferior or 
‘dirty’ – namely, those who are different in race, health or belief and, of course, the 
independent, intelligent, sexually active woman. This sense is immediately reinforced 
by Sasha’s subsequent response-fantasy, as Sasha imagines her dirty brain as a 
‘monster... The monster that can only crawl, or fly... Ah! But fly...’ (157). Sasha may 
be a monster alone, when resigned to humanity’s cruelty, but that may be preferable to 
being among those whose twisted immorality and extreme cruelty depend on the 
demand for total ‘cleanliness’.  
A few lines later, Sasha evokes Van Gogh’s ‘enormous effort’, after which the 
diversity and magnitude of the registers become slightly less extreme, and she 
continues to will René’s return, now with a degree of imagined success. Significantly, 
her voices continue to try to determine her ‘sale cerveau’. She tries to quiet them: 
‘Don’t worry about that – no more sale cerveau’ (GMM, 158). She reassures the 
phantom René that she is not hysterical, but ‘cried like that because [he] went away’ 
(158). The ‘sale cerveau’ is aligned here with a resigned individualism, but Rhys 
immediately reverses this, positioning it as that which houses Sasha’s belief in people: 
‘(Or did I cry like that because I’ll never sing again, because the light in my sale cerveau 
has gone out?)’ (158). Finally, the door opens, Sasha lies ‘very still, with [her] arm 
over [her] eyes. As still as if [she] were dead’ (159). The commis enters and the prose 
shifts into the strange affirmative mode that continues throughout the final paragraph: 
‘I don’t need to look. I know’ (159). Although bewildering, it seems that the ‘great 
effort’ determines the movement into this affirmative register, given that it is only after 
its articulation that the vocal variation diminishes, Sasha gets ‘hold’ of René in her 
fantasy, the tenor of her angst lessens, and she seems to walk him step by step back to 
her room until her door is opening.  
I propose that Sasha’s ‘effort’ is the work of authenticity needed to rid her of 
the sense of opposition between resignation and faith. The coupling of faith in people 
and resignation in the closing pages of the novel reaches fulfilment, and the two 
feelings finally commingle, becoming diffuse in this final paragraph. A sort of 
phenomenological ethics is achieved in which the ‘importance’ of everything that 
happens is affirmed without resorting to a transcendental criterion or dualisms: the 
colour of the commis’s dressing gown is ‘very important’, and it is a blessed relief that 
‘he doesn’t say anything’ (GMM, 159). His invasion of Sasha’s room and body signals 




We can no longer sense either resignation or faith in these words. Instead, the event 
that they embody is figured or made present. We cannot look to Van Gogh’s creation 
to locate this event, but we can heed his difficulty and look to the text’s various 
exhibitions and the difficulty of thinking which Rhys inscribes with such passion. 
Sasha’s affirmation of her embrace of the dangerous commis, as she ‘look[s] straight 
into his eyes’ is, I contend, Rhys’s acknowledgement that art in her time must proceed 
in the awareness of its own failure to prevent the rise of totalitarian regimes and the 
world’s descent into another war. The ‘enormous effort, under which the human brain 
cracks’ can be understood as the need to create art both in the knowledge that such 
creation requires confidence in humanity (after all, for whom would her novel be, who 
might buy and read it, if not those who might understand and learn and feel better as a 
result of reading it?), and in the resigned knowledge that humanity is failing itself once 
again and consuming itself with its fascistic lust for power. Rhys begins Good Morning, 
Midnight with an impasse. She concludes it with an encounter with the impassable 
which is at the centre of a creative process. This is an encounter with the limit of art 
and the outside of thought, achieved through a stylistic commitment to affect. 
Returning to Difference and Repetition, Sasha's embrace of the terrible blank commis 
works as an encounter with nonrecognition that affirms the ‘work’ or ‘genitality’ of the 
thought of literature: the literary text brings itself into presence as it is ‘forced to think 
its central collapse, its fracture, its own natural “powerlessness” which is 
indistinguishable from its greatest power’ (DR, 184-85).  
By paying attention to the monument of affect in the closing pages of Good 
Morning, Midnight, as well as to the text’s drive to this moment, its historical context 
and Rhys’s refiguration of dominant forms of representation, we can read the death 
drive in this fourth novel as the task of learning which affects the entire individual, as 
Rhys thinks through both the failure of literature to bring about positive change and the 
possibilities for fabulation in these conditions. There is no possible gesture to a future 
people in this work, no possibility of communality other than the fact of the text itself. 
There is instead an intense focus on the text’s present, on its events – the spectacle of 
the world’s descent into another world war, the rise of fascism and Stalinism, a 
totalitarian spectacle at the heart of a major centre of the art world. While doing many 
other things, Sasha’s repetition stands for history’s repetition. Unfortunately, history is 
still repeating itself. We can learn a great deal from Rhys’s ‘enormous effort’ to create 




thing today. We can at least be comforted by the art that exists both to console us and 
to help us speak a slightly better language, and which might just lead us closer to a 
better world.  
In a 1979 interview for The Paris Review, Rhys recalled her attraction to Paris 
in the 1920s, describing it in typically understated terms as ‘a very interesting place’: 
‘Whenever I had some money I’d shoot back to Paris. Paris sort of lifted you up. It’s 
pink, you know, not blue or yellow; there’s nothing like it anywhere else’ (1979: 234 
[2008: 210]). There is nothing pink about Paris in Good Morning, Midnight. A few 
pages into the novel Sasha addresses the city to which she has returned: ‘Paris is 
looking very nice tonight… You are looking very nice tonight, my beautiful, my 
darling, and oh what a bitch you can be! But you didn’t kill me after all, did you? And 
they couldn’t kill me either…’ (GMM, 15). The incipient violence here is a signal to 
the reader, as is the following reference to a moment thirteen years earlier when Enno 
and Sasha ‘waited for a couple of hours to see Anatole France’s funeral pass, because, 
Enno said, we mustn’t let such a great literary figure disappear without paying him the 
tribute of a last salute’ (15). The city did not kill Sasha, but the reference to the death 
of the writer who bears the nation’s name indicates that, conversely, Sasha might in a 
sense outlive its capital. Anatole France died in 1924 which is the year that Rhys’s 
literary career was launched with Ford Madox Ford’s publication of ‘Vienne’ in his 
December issue of the transatlantic review, which placed the newly named Rhys 
alongside luminaries such as Ford, Gertrude Stein, Ernest Hemingway and Havelock 
Ellis. In 1924 she adopted Ford’s suggested pen name and, in a number of senses, 
became Jean Rhys. For a time in the 1920s, Paris was the centre of Rhys’s world, a 
European surrogate home and the birthplace of her artistic identity. It was one of the 
most important centres of the Western art world of which she was a new member. It 
was one of two places which served as both literary origin and inspiration for Rhys – 
the other being Dominica. ‘When I say write for love’, Rhys explained to Francis 
Wyndham in 1959, in relation to Good Morning, Midnight, and not being able to 
reconcile herself to writing for money, 
 
I mean there are two places for me. Paris (or what it was to me) and Dominica, 
a most lovely and melancholy place where I was born […] Both these places or 
the thought of them make me want to write […] ‘Midnight’ was Paris revisited 





The sad song (‘Gloomy Sunday’) on the first page of the text joins together in a poignant 
allusion to the city in which Sasha hears it and the island on which Rhys grew up. 
Dominica, the name derived from the Latin for Sunday and marking the day on which 
Columbus first saw the island, is yoked to Paris by the sad song, a ‘tribute’, perhaps 
(like that paid to Anatole France), to both of the places Rhys most loved and to the fact 
that both had become irrevocable. These allusions to literary origins, to ‘my beautiful, 
my darling’ Paris and to death in the novel’s opening pages suggest that the book’s title 
has a personal resonance: they invite us to see the significance in this text of the 
author’s encounter with the source of creative lineage when that source no longer holds 
and now manifests the dissolution of creativity. Sasha’s embrace of the commis is, I 
contend, Rhys’s intuitive and ethical affirmation of the necessary task of seeing and 
writing about the Paris she loved in the process of transforming from ‘morning’ into 
‘midnight’, and the author’s confrontation with the fact that art had not prevented the 
rise of fascism, Stalinism and the other violent regimes that were expanding in the 
1930s. It is possible, also, to read this embrace as Rhys’s acknowledgement of the 
possibility that artistic visions of change and even faith in the redeeming power of art 
may in fact be useless forms of self-delusion.  
Rhys may not have wanted to see this failure, and Sasha does not see at the 
Exhibition; she embraces René in the hallway in the dark, and she keeps her arm over 
her eyes while he attacks her. Difference is never easy to encounter, and the change in 
Paris that Sasha witnesses and considers is painful; this pain is possibly greater than 
that attached to her memories of the past. On the final page, however, she needs to see. 
She first envisions the return of a man: ‘I don’t need to look. I know’, she thinks (GMM, 
159). Yet really looking may be the writer’s only task, especially when the sight is 
difficult: the ‘difficult thing is the only worth while thing’, Rhys wrote in 1963 (Letters, 
241). Accordingly, Sasha looks: 
 
I take my arm away from my eyes. It is the white dressing-gown. 
[…] 
I look straight into his eyes and despise another poor devil of a human being for 
the last time. For the last time… 
Then I put my arms round him and pull him down on to the bed, saying: 





The novel’s conclusion dramatises Rhys’s refusal of the Image of thought. The 
destruction affirmed by Sasha, to which the text is driven, is the dangerous encounter 
with that which cannot be thought, that which involves thinking the failure of the 
faculties of art, but which also ‘perplexes’ the soul and ‘forces it to pose a problem’ 
(DR: 176). A significant aspect of Good Morning, Midnight is that this perplexity does 
not just concern the protagonist. It is the novel’s insistence and it concerns the reader: 
how we see, read, feel and think.  
 
 
Chapter Five  
The absent maternal inheritance and Julia’s becoming-child in After 
Leaving Mr Mackenzie 
  
We turn now to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of minor literature, in the first part of 
an extended discussion which spans this chapter and the next and which encompasses 
After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea. A central 
argument in the following readings is that in Rhys’s novels, albeit to a varying degree, 
patriarchy, capitalism and imperialism are inescapable. These are her ‘machinic 
assemblages’, comparable, perhaps, to those power structures in which Kafka’s 
protagonists are entrapped (bureaucracy, the judiciary, capitalism and maybe even, if 
we follow Deleuze and Guattari, a nascent fascism). This chapter explores the need to 
face this inescapability in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie. After delineating the concept 
of minor literature developed in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature the chapter 
proceeds to an analysis of oppressive desire in Rhys’s second novel.61 The problem of 
masochism is explored, using Savory’s incisive reading of the ‘Caribbean subtext’ of 
Julia’s narrative (1998: 57-84). The emphasis then shifts, and a schizoanalytic approach 
is taken up, as it is argued that Julia’s return to her mother conceals a non-Oedipal 
drama.  The final section explores Julia’s problematic ‘becoming-child’ – her insistence 
on a childlike realm that is beyond the systems of power against which she rages, the 
effects of which the novel maps with great precision.  
 
61 Hereafter, page references to the 1986 English translation edition of Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature 





I. Rhys and minor literature 
It is useful to begin with terminology. The term ‘assemblage’ as used by Deleuze and 
Guattari has its roots in the ‘German word Komplex (as in the “Oedipal complex”)’ 
(Buchanan 2015: 383). This reminds us that the assemblage does not signify something 
mechanical, even though material objects can be part of it, but is a lived relationality, 
a ‘“living” arrangement’ that shapes human behaviour (Buchanan 2015: 385). A central 
proposition in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature is that power affects us by being 
proximate: ‘Power is not pyramidal as the Law would have us believe; it is segmentary 
and linear, and it proceeds by means of contiguity, and not by height and farawayness’ 
(K, 56). This idea is useful for reading Rhys’s fiction. The assemblage is our lived 
experience within a network of power relations which affect every aspect of our lives, 
to such a degree that our experience is inseparable from our environment and from the 
experience of those near to us. Embodied subjectivity is inseparable from objective 
determinants such as language, society and political regimes; experience is always 
shared, never simply individual. Assemblages consist of desire, ‘machines’ – the latter 
term denotes anything that involves a conscious or systematised production – and 
statements which are always collective. In contrast to the assemblage, the machinic 
assemblage denotes a social situation which is overdetermined by power structures 
(such as capitalism) that, together, incorporate everything and everyone, and in which 
we invest our desire to the extent that we are not actively working to dissolve them. 
We might think of machinic assemblages as the political reality of our lives that 
exceeds us. For Deleuze and Guattari, one of the most important features of Kafka’s 
writing is its prognostic function, as the author listens to the future, senses social 
changes and the new machinic assemblages which were emerging in his time. Kafka’s 
fiction is enthralled to the question, ‘when can one say that a new assemblage is coming 
into view? – diabolical or innocent, or both at the same time’ (K, 83). The prognostic 
function of Rhys’s fiction is not clear, but this chapter explores how her third novel 
kicks into gear the author’s faltering search for the possibility of affirming 
communality in the future – a search which eventually involves what might be 
understood as a sort of prognostics.  
Rhys’s excoriating treatment of the exclusionary and oppressive mechanisms 




maternal relationship have generally been dealt with as distinct problems, and the latter 
– like the ‘father problem’ in Kafka’s fiction – has, naturally, mostly been read through 
psychoanalytic theory. This chapter proceeds in the light of the schizoanalytic critique 
of the general exclusion of the political in psychoanalysis, with the aim of showing that 
these two Rhysian themes are, in fact, inseparable and are better understood as her 
inscription of a desire that is individual but also collective and political. I propose, in 
short, that the ‘mother problem’ in Rhys’s novels be considered in an expanded sense 
as the maternal dimension of the political problem of desire. The maternal relationship 
in the novels discussed in these two chapters is not merely inseparable from the socio-
political: it actually stands for the latter. Childhood desiring scenes in After Leaving 
Mr Mackenzie, Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea that involve the mother 
serve as the prototype for subsequent political desiring scenes.  
In Anti-Oedipus and Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature Deleuze and Guattari 
argue that psychoanalysis works to conceal the fact that desire constitutes the social 
field and invests itself in capital, and is therefore that which determines both 
subjugation and the possibility of revolution: ‘We maintain that the social field is 
immediately invested by desire [...] There is only desire and the social, and nothing 
else’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 31). To resist the Oedipalisation of desire – its 
reduction to the familial sphere – a schizoanalysis is required which replaces the focus 
on a self-contained ego with an exploration of how desire and ‘affects or drives form 
part of the [social, political] infrastructure itself’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 71).  
Schizoanalysis maps the ways in which desire reinforces and creates possibilities for 
escape from the established and oppressive order of things. This chapter and the next 
argue that Rhys’s ability to confront the problems of retrograde desire and complicity 
in her writing is a condition for her capacity to engage productively with the question 
of how to write against the order of things when one is writing in the language of 
masters. This is the question described by Deleuze and Guattari:  
 
How to tear a minor literature away from its own language, allowing it to 
challenge the language and making it follow a sober revolutionary path? How 
to become a nomad and an immigrant and a gypsy in relation to one’s own  






Rhys’s answer is surprisingly similar. Confronting the limitations of language is, I 
propose, one of the ways in which Rhys maps desire and orients her texts towards an 
escape from the given. This is the first element of Deleuze and Guattari’s tripartite 
definition of a minor literature. It is followed by the propositions that minor literature 
is always political and is a collective assemblage of enunciation (K, 16). We can see in 
Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea a becoming-minor, as the two texts work 
towards the realisation of these criteria. The orientation of After Leaving Mr Mackenzie 
is more doubtful.  
Deleuze’s literary analyses mostly focus on writers who are ‘problematic [...] 
from the perspective of an adult-morality’ and who wear their ‘perversions’ on their 
sleeve, as it were, rather than concealing them (Lambert 1998: 21). As touched upon 
in my introduction, this is a good reason for taking a schizoanalytic approach in reading 
Rhys’s problematically passive protagonists. Kafka’s ‘perversion’, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, is his desire for distance, typified by his preference to remain a bachelor. 
Kafka’s writing exemplifies minor literature because it concerns the impossibility he 
experienced of living and writing in a ‘language that is not [his] own’, and yet this 
impossibility is absolutely not Kafka’s alone. On the contrary, it is the ‘problem of 
immigrants, and especially of their children, the problem of minorities, the problem of 
minor literature, but also a problem for all of us’ (K, 19). Kafka speaks his problems 
‘for all of us’: how to reveal the ways in which language is oppressive and how, despite 
these operations, to work against them and create a language which makes possible the 
conditions for positive change? Kafka’s situation is shared by us all to a greater or 
lesser extent, yet his desire for solitariness is testament to the fact that the conditions 
of a truly minor language are not yet possible.  
Deleuze opens his 1993 collection Essays Critical and Clinical with the 
provocative proposition, ‘[t]he shame of being a man—is there any better reason to 
write?’ (1997:1), a question that speaks to Kafka’s predicament, and which means not 
that we should write to work through our neuroses but that we should write to confront 
the limitations of language and write against its inadequate, oppressive and stifling 
representational functions. This involves acknowledging that our language is the 
language of the privileged few against the unprivileged many, but writing anyway. 
Shame at our complicity in forms of power which oppress, exploit and control should, 




out of the current situation (which is linguistic and non-linguistic) might become 
visible. This is Kafka’s shame. I find something comparable in Rhys’s third novel.  
The Trial (Der Prozess, 1925) famously concludes with the brutal murder of K, 
and an astonishing statement which fuses complicity and resistance, submission and 
anger, and which gives life itself to the affect: ‘It was as if the shame would outlive 
him’ (Kafka 2000: 178). Shame is one of the most fascinating affects precisely because 
of its capacity for denoting both the objective and the subjective genitive. K may feel 
shame at his own inadequacies or for the inadequacies of mankind generally and his 
murderers in particular. Kafka’s inscription of the inseparability of complicity and 
resistance is, I think, the reason why Kafka’s work epitomises minor literature for 
Deleuze and Guattari. This problematic is at the heart of their chapter ‘Proliferation of 
Series’ in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, and its initially strange celebration of the 
manner in which Kafka ‘accelerates’ the proliferation of ‘segments’. This celebration 
echoes Deleuze and Guattari’s infamous Nietzschean proposition in Anti-Oedipus that 
schizoanalysis should aim to further ‘accelerate the process’ of capitalism’s 
reterritorialisation, to accelerate the ‘movement of the market, of decoding and 
deterritorialisation’ brought about by advanced capitalism (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 
261). Understood as a proposition of political philosophy, their suggestion in Anti-
Oedipus is problematic. However, in a literary context in Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature it can, in my opinion, be read as an affirmative statement of the power of 
literature to change things. To see it this way, we need to grasp the extent to which, in 
this philosophy, our complicity with oppressive forms of power is absolutely 
inescapable. The conditions for revolution are not yet possible because capitalism has 
invaded everything. There is no ‘Outside the Machine’, to borrow the title of Rhys’s 
vehemently anti-establishment 1960 short story, and so there is no longer a pure 
‘revolutionary desire that would be opposed to power, to the machines of power’ and 
therefore ‘no way to draw a firm distinction between the oppressors and the oppressed’ 
(K, 57). We all comply with the status quo to an extent: we are always part of both 
camps, to varying degrees. This proposition is what makes Deleuze and Guattari’s 
schizoanalysis an exceptionally useful tool for understanding Voyage in the Dark and 
Wide Sargasso Sea – novels which chart the protagonists’ becoming through acts of 





The solution proposed by Kafka, on Deleuze and Guattari’s reading, is that all 
forms of desire must be seized in an ‘all-too-possible-future’, in the hope that ways of 
escape will be made clear (K, 59). This act is Kafka’s shameful proliferating of desire 
as both paranoiac and schizoid desire in an immanent experimentation which aims to 
diagnose and anticipate, to free new patterns, and – potentially – to reveal and thereby 
overcome his own libidinal investments of the social field. In Voyage in the Dark and 
Wide Sargasso Sea Rhys deterritorialises the maternal function with similar effect. The 
maternal inheritance is political, it plays a causal role in the protagonists’ fates, and the 
severance of the maternal line is subject to reiteration. This severance enables the 
proliferation of different forms of connection forged chaotically by the two contrary 
forms of desire. This is Rhys’s minor experimentation and it leads to a form of self-
overcoming. In After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, however, despite the severance of the 
female line, Julia’s rage remains an impotent form of critique because the text is unable 
to confront sufficiently its own use of the language of masters.  
 
II. Deterritorialising the maternal inheritance  
Many critics have argued that the unhealthy behaviour of Rhys’s protagonists is most 
explicable as the result of a problematic maternal bond: Gardiner (1978) and Kloepfer 
(1989) are notable examples. Rhys’s texts forge a strong link between the absence of a 
nurturing mother figure and the protagonists’ childishness, lethargy and, sometimes, a 
submissive self-involvement in un-joyous sexual encounters with more or less 
exploitative men. The behaviour of these women suggests an early life deprived of 
nurturance and social education, in which there has been no safe maternal containment 
to allow healthy psychic development, in which little worldly advice is forthcoming, 
no stable positive female role models offer themselves, and financial support is 
minimal and always threatening to vanish. The young protagonists are infantilised by 
exploitative men, a procedure which seems to stand, warped, in the place of nurturance 
and care, and operates as a delimiting, violent objectification and political control. It 
seems causally related to their inability to move into a secure and re/productive female 
maturity.  
 In addition to the lack of nurturance there is also an absent material inheritance 
in the three novels discussed here which contributes to the protagonists’ vulnerability 




as in Wide Sargasso Sea, it is a curse. The reputation of Annette’s madness and 
licentiousness is inherited by Antoinette, as is the legacy of the mother’s status as the 
‘widow of a slave-owner, daughter of a slave-owner’ (WSS, 27). In another severance 
of the female line the protagonists’ reproductive function is disabled. Two protagonists 
are involved in scenarios of failed motherhood. In After Leaving Mr Mackenzie Julia 
recalls the death of her infant child and this loss is described in terms of inevitability, 
weakness and her lack of will. More dramatically, Anna’s narrative chronicles her fall 
into a life of promiscuity and unwanted pregnancy, a process which concludes in her 
termination and which I describe as Anna’s becoming-unmother. My use of the term 
‘inheritance’ refers to the material and the psychical, to that which the mother or mother 
figure literally withholds and to the lingering and self-perpetuating consequences of 
this withholding, and to the presence of a female line in the most general sense of 
female transmission and tradition.  
 The absent maternal inheritance has a political function in Rhys’s novels. The 
thorny maternal bond in Rhys’s fiction grows through a violently patriarchal social 
order in which women’s bodies are objectified to an extreme degree.62 Both older and 
younger generations are imprisoned in stultifying social roles, and regulatory notions 
of acceptable behaviour and appearance are constant ideals against which all female 
deviation is negatively assessed, a situation embodied by Hester in Voyage in the Dark 
and Annette in Wide Sargasso Sea. Equally, Julia’s mature relationship with her mother 
and Anna’s with her stepmother and her unhappy reproductive fate are largely 
determined by capital. These are primarily relationships of power. Anna’s becoming-
unmother starkly lays bare this reality: money from her family is withdrawn and she 
becomes pregnant after engaging in deeply unequal sexual relationships in which she 
receives money for sex. This leads inevitably to her unwanted pregnancy. This is the 
negative sense of my proposition that in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie and Voyage in 
the Dark the absent maternal inheritance is deterritorialised. The standard function of 
the relationship is changed: it becomes a relationship of power which renders the 
protagonist unfit for self-care and therefore without ‘a dog’s chance’ in an uncaring, 
sharply divided and exploitative society (ALMM, 17). Crucially, in both the second and 
third novels, an unpleasant encounter with the mother or mother-substitute in which 
 




the female line is severed forms a narrative turning point and marks the protagonists’ 
decline.  
When Anna meets her stepmother in Part One of Voyage in the Dark, she is 
informed by the older woman that she is being cut off financially. This severance seems 
symbolically tied to Anna’s separation from Walter Jeffries after their disastrous 
country trip in the following chapter. This, in turn, sets off a depressive decline in which 
Anna spirals emotionally and becomes involved with a series of exploitative 
individuals most of whom want to use her for sex. In After Leaving Mr Mackenzie there 
is a clear intensification of Julia’s unhappiness which stems from her fruitless return to 
the family home. The combined effect of her visit to her dying mother, her humiliating 
encounters with her sister and uncle, and the compounded, almost paralyzing isolation 
she experiences during the funeral rituals pushes Julia closer to death – to that which 
is threatening her from the first page: hence, in the late ‘Staircase’ section of Part Two, 
Julia’s state of death-in-life finally assumes a haptic quality when she imagines Mr 
Horsfield’s hand is the hand of ‘someone dead’ (ALMM, 120). Prior to her mother’s 
death, Julia cares enough about her sense of self-worth to refuse Mr Mackenzie’s final 
cheque and to ensure the proprietors of her hotel do not hear her return with a male 
companion. After the funeral, Julia’s noisy return to her hotel with Mr Horsfield results 
in her being asked to leave, and the final pages bring her face to face with Mr 
Mackenzie once again, only for her to shock us as well as him by her brazen, out-of-
the-blue request for a large amount of money: ‘Lend me a hundred francs, will you?’ 
(138). In a brutally unadorned sense, the severance of the maternal line and the absence 
of an inheritance unfits Julia for self-care.  
Julia remembers her mother’s love altering suddenly for the worst with the 
arrival of a new baby: 
 
And then her mother – entirely wrapped up in the new baby – had said things 
like, ‘Don’t be a cry-baby. You’re too old to go on like that. You’re a great big 
girl of six.’ And from being the warm centre of the world her mother had 
gradually become a dark, austere, rather plump woman. (ALMM, 77)  
 
Julia recalls the painful awareness of the loss that replaced intimacy, and her mother’s 
indifference: ‘she had asked innumerable questions, which her mother had answered 




76). These words convey an unarticulated sadness predicated on a loss of shared sense-
making. The final adjective describes the arid realm into which the mother and 
daughter’s linguistic relationship has moved, and the one-sidedness of the 
communication underscores the fact that the consequences of this shift are starkly 
imbalanced. Quite simply, the mother stops teaching her daughter. Julia’s silence is 
significant in this novel; by the time of her meeting with Mr Mackenzie on page 22, 
she has spoken only three lines to the hotel maid. She is unable to tell Mr Horsfield that 
her mother has died despite the significant time they spend together. These silences and 
her mother’s linguistic austerity work together to establish the facts that Julia has a 
limited access to language, and the power of language plays a central role in her 
unhappiness.  
The reference to the mother’s austerity is painfully sad, but it also positions the 
scene as a prototype. As in Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea, in After Leaving 
Mr Mackenzie scenes of sexual desire have their prototype in early desire for the mother 
who withholds affection and thereby exercises power at her daughter’s expense. The 
second novel chronicles episode after episode in which Julia requests money from 
others and is judged accordingly, and these follow the primal scene in which the mother 
refuses to give to the daughter the capital of conversation and knowledge and instead 
voices negative judgement on her. This pattern is self-consciously played out between 
Julia and Mr Horsfield: ‘“They force you to ask – and then they refuse you. And then 
they tell you all about why they refuse you. I suppose they get a subtle pleasure out of 
it, or something.” Mr Horsfield said: “Subtle pleasure? Not at all. A very simple and 
primitive pleasure”’ (ALMM, 65). There is a tragic sense running through Julia’s 
narrative that she is getting too old to make such childish monetary requests of people, 
that her requests are therefore increasingly unsuccessful and the occasion of a 
characteristic Schadenfreude. Mr Horsfield’s attraction to Julia is inseparable from his 
awareness that he will soon need to sever their acquaintance because she will ask too 
much of him.  
Julia’s insistence on enacting these scenes of financial request seems somewhat 
masochistic: why, we might ask, does she not try to get a job? I read her as being 
without the psychological and material means to sell herself successfully as 
employable, and therefore as having no recourse but asking family and ex-lovers for 
money. Nevertheless, several readings of masochism in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie 




does remarkably little to better her situation in a profoundly exploitative sexual 
marketplace; she willingly exchanges her body for very little money in transactional 
encounters in which she experiences virtually no pleasure. Dell’Amico argues that 
these requests are contractual utterances in what is Rhys’s most clearly masochistic 
novel (2005). Dell’Amico uses Deleuze’s idiosyncratic 1967 formulation of 
masochistic demonstrativeness in ‘Coldness and Cruelty’ to argue that Rhys’s 1930s 
protagonists are involved in a disruptive masochism which cannot be entirely 
distinguished from female complicity but which is not identical to it.63 As Dell’Amico 
explains, Deleuzian masochistic theatres ‘are orchestrated by the victim and pertain to 
a deflation of the punitive powers of the law: the goal is to find and groom a torturer 
whose punishments are denied as pain and experienced as pleasure instead’, and the 
process ‘resolves as an outwitting and dis-avowal of the law by, again, experiencing 
repression/punishment as pleasure’ (2005: 64). We can use this model of desire to 
understand Julia’s return to her mother: her choice to go back to her family can be read 
as a Deleuzian-masochistic redress to Maître Lagros’s termination of her payments 
from Mr Mackenzie, in which she had no say. The return to London can be read as a 
disavowal of the capacity of Lagros’s law to render her a victim without agency, and 
an active seeking-out of pain that can be articulated as pleasure. Julia experiences 
another Deleuzian-masochistic pleasure in being judged and rejected by her sister but 
thereby forcing her sister to recognise that Julia’s individualist choices have allowed 
her a certain freedom that the dutiful and devoutly class-bound Norah lacks. We can 
even read Julia’s strange moments of apparent ecstasy during her mother’s cremation 
as a masochistic or ‘unspeakable’ pleasure at the pain of finally losing her mother – a 
reading suggested by Kloepfer (1989) and Savory (1998: 63) who note that Julia’s 
feeling that ‘some essence of her was shooting upwards like a flame’ is an identification 
with her mother’s body in the funeral rite (ALMM, 94).  
Although persuasive, I find Dell’Amico’s reading of a disruptive masochism 
generally too strong a model of resistance in Rhys’s fiction. I find the self-destructive 
tendency of her protagonists passive and ‘quantitatively’ weak, reactive rather than 
active, not a wilful choice of a path that could easily be avoided but an acceptance of 
the validity of vulnerability in certain circumstances and a function of a politically 
driven narrative strategy. I am also not positing desire as that which is for either a good 
 




or bad object. Desire in Voyage in the Dark works as that which co-exists in two 
contrary states. In After Leaving Mr Mackenzie this is not yet clearly an aesthetic 
principle, but rather than reading Julia as desiring her own destruction, I follow 
Savory’s contention that Julia seeks to dull her feelings with various forms of 
‘anaesthesia’ and escape (1998: 73). My focus on passivity rather than masochism also 
aims to steer away from interpretations which rest on the concept of a self-enduring, 
stable self or ego that is there in the first place, before it self-destructs. Dell’Amico’s 
analysis rests on her delineation of processes in which the ego overcomes the super-
ego, and her analysis is consequently at odds with the terms of this thesis. There are 
surely other strands of Deleuze’s essay on masochism which could be deployed in 
reading Rhysian passivity, but my concern is with interrogating subjectivity as 
becoming in order to work against the victim paradigm which is still dominant in the 
criticism. For this reason I find the usual concept of masochism and Deleuze’s 
reformulation of it of no great help.   
Having said this, Savory’s arguments concerning sadomasochism in After 
Leaving Mr Mackenzie are very useful for the connections they draw between the 
biographical facts of Rhys’s abuse by the family acquaintance, Mr Howard, her 
difficult relationship with her mother, the various social, political and psychological 
dynamics which run through her second novel and the ‘Caribbean subtext [that] is so 
buried in this novel that critics have often had trouble finding it’ (1998: 73). For Savory, 
sadomasochism is not the defining framework or impulse of the text, but one of a 
number of important concerns and dynamics. The rest of this section draws on several 
of these which are particularly useful for my reading of the absent maternal inheritance, 
most important among which is the childlike.  
In Savory’s analysis, Rhys’s account of sexual abuse sheds crucial light on what 
her second novel is doing: ‘What fundamentally shaped Rhys’s sense of sexuality and 
gender is clearest in the draft manuscript narratives of Mr Howard (BEB), which 
together form a story intertwining gender, sexuality, race and nationality with 
colonialism’ (Savory 1998: 61). Although Rhys avoids writing the abuse explicitly into 
any published text other than the harrowing 1976 short story ‘Goodbye Marcus, 
Goodbye Rose’, many critics have identified its influence across the novels and, as 
Savory notes, Julia’s sexual encounters replicate the sadomasochistic dynamics that 
Rhys laid out in her account in the Black Exercise Book (1998: 65). The history of 




sexuality that we find in Rhys’s fiction. In After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, Voyage in the 
Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea especially, sexuality is about ‘power and trade, and thus 
is connected to Caribbean racial and economic history’ (Savory 1998: 68). This is 
clearest in the profoundly disquieting links between the masochistic female, the 
prostitute and the Caribbean slave that is forged in the second and third novels.  
In the most explicit appearance of this connection in the earlier novel, Norah 
recalls how she was inspired by her identification with a slave in Joseph Conrad’s first 
novel, Almayer’s Folly (1895): 
 
The slave had no hope, and knew of no change. She knew of no other sky, no 
other water, no other forest, no other world, no other life. She had no wish, no 
hope, no love... The absence of pain and hunger was her happiness, and when 
she felt unhappy she was tired, more than usual, after the day’s labour. (ALMM, 
75) 
 
Norah explicitly views herself as a slave to her mother, being led by this passage to 
think that her ‘life’s like death. It’s like being buried alive. It isn’t fair’ (ALMM, 75). 
Obviously, this identification is deeply problematic. Norah’s equation of her labour 
with the suffering of slaves is made in a desire to trivialise the history of slavery and to 
efface both the suffering of slaves and the very reality of slavery – its racial, economic, 
geographic, political and sexual determinants. This is the disingenuous identification 
of a fascistic desire, evidencing a craving for more power that destroys Julia’s capacity 
to care for those with less. Rhys’s characterisation of this sister generally paints the 
same picture. Norah is not sympathetic, and she begrudges Julia that which she herself 
does not have (and which she does not even desire): the ability to refuse, to a certain 
extent, social dictates concerning femininity. Norah is the embodiment of seething 
ressentiment, and Rhys clearly suggests that she is as enslaved by her bourgeois need 
to belong to the class of the ‘good’ and ‘respectable’ as she is by her mother’s need for 
care (98). However, the novel’s Caribbean subtext and Julia’s extreme dependency on 
destructive sexual relationships and her clearly diminishing use value mean that the 
Conrad allusion resonates well beyond the jealous sister’s limitations. There is a strong 





Julia was not altogether unhappy. Locked in her room – especially when she 
was locked in her room – she felt safe [...]  
But on some days her monotonous life was made confused and frightening 
by her thoughts. Then she could not stay still. She was obliged to walk up and 
down the room consumed with hatred of the world and everybody in it – and 
especially of Mr Mackenzie. 
Then she would feel horribly fatigued and would lie on the bed for a long 
time without moving. The rumble of the life outside was like the sound of the 
sea which was rising gradually around her. (ALMM, 9) 
 
There are striking similarities between this description and the Conrad excerpt, and the 
simile in the final sentence even creates the idea of an ocean journey which, when set 
in relation to the slave’s monologue, suggests the Middle Passage. There are similar 
associations in Voyage in the Dark but they are far more problematised. In After 
Leaving Mr Mackenzie it is as though Rhys knows the association between white 
female sexual submission and Caribbean slavery is impossible to justify, but cannot 
help herself from creating it anyhow and the link just sits in the text, unclear, 
challenging the reader to find her own adequate explanation.  
My understanding of Rhys’s writing does not allow me to read this association 
as evidence of what Gregg claims is Rhys’s racist imagination (1995). Rather, in the 
vein of Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, I contend that we can view this association 
as Rhys’s badge of shameful perversion. It is an event, of sorts, which obstructs the 
possibility of an easy and definitive reading and makes it evident that in the world of 
After Leaving Mr Mackenzie we cannot tell the difference between the oppressor and 
oppressed. Julia’s existence is a symptom of the unjust, uncaring and exploitative ethos 
of patriarchal capitalism. She is a victim but also a vehicle for the text’s fascistic desire 
for a profoundly destructive identification: the link itself suggests the positing of a 
simple binary between all the oppressed and all the oppressors which functions to 
perpetuate the dominant order rather than destabilising it. This link-allusion compound 
– a double reference involving the desires of both sisters – indicates the coexistence of 
contrary desires, and Julia’s ethical capacity is shown to be only marginally superior to 
that of her sister, a difference of scale (the narrator’s implicit likening of Julia to a slave 




Significantly, this textual perversion is expressed at a remove. Julia is likened 
to Conrad’s slave, but it is only when we reach the passage later in the novel that we 
are able to see the similarity to the earlier one. In a sense, then, this lets Julia off the 
hook. The reader might well overlook her perversion entirely. The text’s confrontation 
with its own complicity in fascistic structures is not explicit. It is as the Caribbean is in 
this novel: submerged. It is the text’s attempt at accusing itself of using the language 
of mastery, but there remains an evident and fearful hesitation in its so doing. This 
difficulty corresponds to the central difference between the language of the two sisters. 
Julia generally speaks, however vaguely, in an attempt to express a degree of truth 
whereas Norah’s language, like her body and her behaviour, is entirely regulated by 
the code of respectability. This situation is dramatised in Norah’s physical response of 
‘disgust’ at her sister’s excoriation of the faults of the respectable: Norah ‘felt very 
giddy. Now the blood ran up to her own face. There was tingling in her finger-tips. She 
thought: “She’s disgusting, that’s what she is. She’s my sister, and she’s disgusting”’ 
(ALMM, 98). The suggestion is that Norah cannot adequately process and respond to 
Julia’s words in language and so physiological response takes over. In this rising blood 
pressure we can also, perhaps, sense the text’s own repressed desire to commit to its 
staging of a confrontation with its complicity.  
All relationships in Rhys’s novels are political in the sense that they involve 
power, inequality and capital. Savory states that ‘the way [that] money is used both 
reveals and further defines human relationships, whether they be sexual or familial’ 
(Savory 1998: 71). This is the central problematic in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie. The 
absent maternal inheritance on the mother’s death is a replication of the primal 
rejection, and the handing over of money plays out in all of Julia’s subsequent, 
unsuccessful sexual relationships. This absence is a legal rejection (a refusal to 
recognise in law Julia’s rights to receive any bequest) and as such is a counterpoint to 
Legros’s notice of termination of Mr Mackenzie’s allowance. Late in the novel Julia 
tells Mr Horsfield about her formative relationship with Mr James: 
 
He was a sort of god to me and everything he did was right. Isn’t one a fool 
when one’s a kid? But sometimes I used to pray that he’d lose all his money, 
because I imagined that if that happened I’d see him oftener. And then I’d 






In all the sexual relationships in Rhys’s novels stark financial inequality 
problematically determines the dynamic, the woman always has the losing hand and 
the man always abuses his privilege. We can imagine Julia’s wishes – which in one 
respect seem distinctly sadomasochistic – as those of the ‘kid’ for her mother’s 
attention and gratitude, and for her younger sister, her rival for her mother’s attention, 
to get lost. The other important aspect of this passage is its evocation of Jane Eyre, as 
Julia proceeds to compare her desire to that of a friend who ‘used to pray that the man 
she loved might go blind [...] so that he might be entirely dependent on her, d’you see?’ 
(ALMM, 125). The power dynamic between Jane and Rochester throughout most of 
Brontë’s novel is not dissimilar to that in which Rhys’s protagonists are caught when 
they are involved with men. Brontë makes this inequality the difficulty that the strong, 
Christian yet angry Jane must weather. In her second novel, Rhys attacks it as a 
structural problem which cannot be overcome but can merely be avoided.  
 In Rhys’s later novels the difficulty of these always-political human 
relationships is offset to a degree by the protagonists’ passionate attachment to place. 
Anna’s descent is due to homesickness as well as heartbreak at Walter’s rejection, 
Sasha is mourning her beloved Paris, and the failure of Antoinette’s marriage is largely 
due to the husband’s jealousy of her attachment to her island. Their love of place 
sustains these women and opens up the vision of the novels, preventing it from being 
excessively inward-looking. Yet, as Savory observes, After Leaving Mr Mackenzie is 
without this balancing principle (1998: 81). Julia lacks a solid territory of her own as 
much as she lacks an assured voice. Certain detailing and motifs work, in addition to 
the allusions to slavery, to secure the presence of the Caribbean in this text: the 
mother’s Brazilian birthplace, from which she was ‘transplant[ed] as a plant’ might 
have been, is evoked in the dying woman’s delirious reference to ‘[o]range-trees’ 
(ALMM, 76), which is mirrored in greater vagueness by Julia’s own daydreams of ‘a 
dark-purple sea, the sea of a chromo or of some tropical country that she had never 
seen’ (9). These position the mother at a difficult remove from the longed-for homeland 
of her youth, yet Julia has no such love for any location and is therefore at a double-
remove. She has only an antipathy toward England in general which suggests the 
colonial distrust of the motherland (a striking feature of Rhys’s literary terrain) and – 
above all – a not belonging. Julia is without a home and a place of family. In this, she 




disturbingly in the simile of plant transplantation. Julia’s mode is the nomad’s 
movement from city to city, room to room, adapting well or poorly, depending on her 
environment.  
 Erica Johnson reads this lack of attachment as a drive to escape the present. She 
argues that spectrality and an intricate use of animal and machine imagery work as a 
collective function of Rhys’s ‘scepticism about human beings’ which is fictionalised 
in narratives that pit her protagonists against extreme ‘antipathy’ from those they 
encounter (Johnson 2015: 209). Her protagonists’ response is, Johnson argues, to form 
a ‘profound identification with non-human agencies [...] as though to escape or at least 
extend their subjectivities beyond the limits of their own imperilled bodies, and to enter 
into an affective state that Rhys repeatedly refers to as “indifference”’ (2015: 209). I 
also see a strong urge to escape in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, but for me this is Julia’s 
desire to escape to a state of childhood. She describes this herself as the ‘same feeling 
a boy has when he wants to run away to sea’ (ALMM, 39-40). The novel as a whole 
supports the protagonist’s problematic insistence on an unobtainable state which is 
somehow beyond the indifferent reality of the world in which she lives. I read the 
childlike as the text’s major ontological code that vies for dominance with indifference. 
Julia resorts to this ‘place’ because she has no attachment to a worldly location and like 
an unhappy child’s imaginary world might be, the childlike is a place of isolation which 
temporarily shuts out the reality of human relationships and which is therefore ‘beyond’ 
the political.  
 
III. Becoming-child 
In using the term ‘childlike’ I am indicating the text’s proliferation of references to 
childhood and the childlike as well as Julia’s immersion in memories of her youth. Julia 
is caught up in an insistent becoming-child: she is strikingly immature and the novel is 
dense with references to Julia being like a child – surprisingly more so than in Voyage 
in the Dark, in which the protagonist’s youthfulness is a major plot determinant. This 
immaturity works in various ways. It manifests as a defect. Julia’s belated craving for 
her mother’s recognition, the intensity of her fear that she will not receive this in 
kindness (she ‘felt a sort of superstitious and irrational certainty that if that happened 
it would finish her’ (ALMM, 69)), and her mirror-checking obsession with her 




by men who infantilise her and who are attracted by her immaturity. Julia’s ability to 
sometimes remind Mr Horsfield of a child magnetises him and after they have sex he 
rhapsodises about her youthful waif-like appearance, rather creepily enjoying the sight 
of her arm ‘hanging down the side of the bed. It looked so pathetic, like a child’s arm. 
He said: “Julia, your hand is so lovely it makes me want to cry”’ (112). The childlike 
is also sometimes projected onto others: Julia’s mother suddenly starts wailing 
‘disconsolately, like a child’ (71), and Mr Horsfield notes Julia’s youthfulness – ‘[i]t’s 
the easiest thing in the world to imagine you a kid’ – before feeling its contagion: ‘Do 
you know what you’ve done for me, Julia? You’ve given me back my youth?’ (117). 
Most frequently, however, the childlike is something which Julia considers and feels 
in relation to both strong psychic and bodily feeling. That is, the childlike is most often 
a state of intense affect.  
During her first visit to the cold-blooded Uncle Griffiths Julia castigates herself 
with the statement that it is ‘childish to imagine that anybody cares what happens to 
anybody else’ (ALMM, 61), and after crying at her mother’s funeral, Julia repeats the 
accusation in a different form: ‘When you cried like that it made you feel childish. You 
could be comforted quite childishly’ (95). The childish here is an un-cynical state of 
imaginative, intense feeling in which comfort is a possibility if not a given. The 
childlike is attached to Julia’s extreme mental and physical fatigue which, though 
sometimes close to both inertia and indifference, is most redolent of the exhaustion of 
the young child. Following her mother’s death, Julia determines that she is feeling ‘ok’ 
but ‘only very sleepy, horribly sleepy, as a child would be after a very exciting day’ 
(90). At the funeral, a ‘feeling of rest crept from her knees upwards to her eyes. The 
clock ticked: “You’re young yet – young yet – young yet”’ (101), and shortly 
afterwards,  
 
[a]s she walked, Julia felt peaceful and purified, as though she were a child. 
Because she could not imagine a future, time stood still. And, as if she were a 
child, everything that she saw was of profound interest and had the power to 
distract and please. (ALMM, 101)  
 
Here the comparison denotes the atemporal consciousness of the child who cannot 
think ahead. This attribute is shown as an attraction as well as that which makes life 




Mr Horsfield and Mr Mackenzie, both of whom feel, at least fleetingly, a certain 
admiration for Julia’s impractical attitude to life:  
 
Mr Mackenzie’s code, philosophy or habit of mind would have been a complete 
protection to him had it not been for some kink in his nature – that volume of 
youthful poems perhaps still influencing him – which morbidly attracted him 
to strangeness, to recklessness, even unhappiness […] Mr Mackenzie began to 
think about Julia Martin. (ALMM, 18-19)  
 
Yet Julia’s childlike unworldliness is not simply myopic recklessness (as we 
might describe Anna’s inability to look ahead in Voyage in the Dark). The important 
late chapter in Part Two entitled ‘Childhood’ follows the chapter in which Julia and Mr 
Horsfield have sex, the former in a grief-stricken state and the latter in complete 
ignorance of her pain. Julia’s sad inability to share marks not just her distrust of people 
but also her immaturity. As Savory writes, ‘[m]ature vision has to include a sense of 
other people. Julia looks back rather than forward, her consciousness centered on her 
own responses’ (1998: 64). Suitably, then, ‘Childhood’ plunges us into a meditation on 
this titular time which opens with a description of a state in which potential is 
inseparable from a self-centred evasion of responsibility:  
 
Every day is a new day. Every day you are a new person.  
Julia felt well and rested, not unhappy, but her mind was strangely empty. 
It was an empty room through which vague memories stalked like giants. 
She read Mr Horsfield’s note, and it was as if she were reading something 
written by a stranger to someone she had never seen. 
[...] Every day is a new day; every day you are a new person. What have 
you to do with the day before? (ALMM, 114) 
 
This passage gives us a strong sense of where the chapter will take us and signals what 
the insistence of the childlike does in the novel generally. The refrain evokes the 
freedom of the child who has not yet developed a perception of time, but Julia’s 
relegation of Mr Horsfield to ‘a stranger’ indicates the ease with which we can do 
violence to others when we relinquish precisely this – our sense of continuity. Julia’s 




leads her to recall her innate knowledge, held ‘ever since she knew anything’, that 
people are ‘unfriendly’ (ALMM, 115). At which point we are plunged into the novel’s 
most detailed meditation on childhood, development and affect. The first paragraph 
outlines an epistemological and ontological dimension of childhood which suggests a 
Lockean ‘pure’ perception prior to knowledge of the world:  
 
When you were a child, you put your hand on the trunk of a tree and you were 
comforted, because you knew that the tree was alive – you felt its life when you 
touched it – and you knew that it was friendly to you, or, at least, not hostile. 
But of people you were always a little afraid. (ALMM, 115)  
 
In one respect, the young Julia’s ‘comfort’ is the opposite of Antoine Roquentin’s 
titular nausea in Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist novel of 1938 (La Nausée). Her young 
consciousness is a tabula rasa and her pure experience of the tree anchors her in a 
world which comforts due to the life that it sustains and to which it gives access. There 
is also the suggestion that it is Julia’s perception itself, her capacity for conscious 
experience, that marks the world as ‘friendly’. Conspicuously absent is that which so 
often fills Rhys’s prose: there is no anxiety about the arbitrariness or inadequacy of 
words, or the instability of meaning. Instead, Julia’s words evoke an extra-linguistic 
identification with the necessary and commensurable nature of being, which is the 
opposite of Roquentin’s anguish at the inadequacy of language and the contingency 
and superfluity of existence. Words and feeling are entirely in harmony and both 
enhance the young Julia’s access to the world.  
 However, this passage also sustains a sense of profound loss, created through 
the bleak final sentence, the discomforting second-person address and the past tense. 
As the subsequent paragraph unfolds, the idea forms of an originary wholeness from 
which the young Julia was removed: ‘When you are a child you are yourself and you 
know and see everything prophetically. And then suddenly something happens and you 
stop being yourself; you become what others force you to be. You lose your wisdom 
and your soul’ (ALMM, 115). Characteristically, the ‘something’ is oblique. It suggests 
the childhood loss of the maternal bond, which is signalled by the touch of the tree in 
the paragraph above which seems to stand in the place of the mother’s hand; yet this 
code is conflated with the code of social conformity that ‘force[s] you to be’ a certain 




event of sexual abuse which may have also been the occasion of the mother’s betrayal 
of her daughter. The demands, then, are presumably those of sexual submission, gender 
conformity and daughterly obedience. Savory ties Julia’s incapacity for enjoyment 
generally and her childish inability to incorporate others into her understanding to her 
melancholy inability to let go of a situation of a ‘vividly felt apprehension of the impact 
of a situation on the self’ in childhood, (1998: 64). Certainly in these few paragraphs 
in ‘Childhood’ the text seems to be revisiting an originary loss. The opacity in which 
the prose is couched also adds to the sense that these may be memories or screening 
memories of a trauma which cannot be revisited directly. Subsequent paragraphs which 
describe a final pure happiness and a first ‘fear of nothing’ conflate darkness and light, 
fear and desire, freedom and terror, life and death in a manner that baits the reader into 
inferring a subtext of a traumatic sexual awakening. They also signal a way out of this 
problematic search for the correct psychoanalytic interpretation.  
This discussion has, of course, entered territory which appears at odds with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of the psychoanalytic tendency to Oedipalise 
everything. Yet it is at this stage that their method of literary criticism becomes 
particularly useful. ‘The three worst themes in many interpretations of Kafka’, they 
write, 
 
are the transcendence of the law, the interiority of guilt, the subjectivity of 
enunciation [...] And also, the idea of the tragic, of the internal drama [...] No 
doubt Kafka holds out the bait [...] because he wants to make a very special use 
of Oedipus to serve his diabolical project. It is absolutely useless to look for a 
theme in a writer if one hasn’t asked exactly what its importance is in the work 
– that is, how it functions (and not what its ‘sense’ is). (K, 45) 
 
Following this advice, we might cease to ask what this world-shattering ‘something’ 
was for the young Julia, or what childhood or the childlike mean in this novel and turn 
instead to the question of what this bait, this seemingly loaded return to childhood, 
does, here and throughout the text as a whole. What diabolical use might Rhys be 
making of Oedipus? My proposition is that the childlike is the text’s problematic 
orientation to and reterritorialisation into an impossible, imaginary prior state of 
holistic, singular affective experience that is untouched by capitalism and power, and 




in the processes she so despises, and the text’s affirmation of a desire that is pure and 
‘outside’ power. The novel severs the female line through the absence of a bequest and 
the deterritorialisation of the mother function, but it also enacts a return to origins, 
signalled by Julia’s return to her incapacitated mother’s bedside. The family drama 
tempts us to read this orientation as the return to the mother, but she is entirely absent 
in the important chapter, ‘Childhood’, which designates this returned-to state as the 
place in which Julia still had her ‘wisdom and [her] soul’, which is all the more 
dangerous for not being the place of the mother, and all the more seductive. This 
orientation is Julia’s attempt to escape the realities of her present and the society in 
which she lives, and her claim of moral superiority. Yet, as the final page makes clear, 
there is no escaping capitalism. Her orientation is a flight, but one which fails as it 
rediscovers its ‘larval fascism’ (Deleuze 1997: 4).  
 
IV. Suspicious oneness and a fantasy of escape 
The two paragraphs in ‘Childhood’ already discussed depict this place as a prelapsarian 
state which is neither pre-symbolic nor exactly innocent: there is sufficient innate 
knowledge of cruelty such that Julia was ‘always a little afraid’ of people (ALMM, 
115); and the description of her habit of catching butterflies is sinister as it shows her 
‘fine’ enjoyment at ‘get[ting her] hand on something that a minute before had been 
flying around in the sun’ (116). Childhood is instead a state of intensely affective 
wholeness when the child is ‘at one’ with her body, her thoughts, sensations and her 
environment: ‘When you are a child you are yourself and you know and see everything 
prophetically’ (115). This wholeness is vividly apparent in the description of the ‘last 
time [Julia was] really happy’, a time when Julia was  
 
happy about nothing [and] had to jump up and down. ‘Can’t you keep still, 
child, for one moment?’ No, of course you couldn’t keep still. You were too 
happy, bursting with happiness. You ran as if you were flying, without feeling 
your feet. And all the time you ran, you were thinking, with a tight feeling in 
your throat: ‘I’m happy – happy – happy...’ 
That was the last time you were really happy about nothing, and you 
remembered it perfectly well. How old were you? Ten? Eleven? Younger... 





Julia’s early understanding of what is ‘friendly’ and ‘unfriendly’ is instinctive, like an 
animal’s, but it also depends on sensation: ‘you felt its life when you touched it – and 
you knew’ (115). In her memory of happiness, Julia’s feeling is entirely at one with her 
ability to express it in words and her body’s capacity for expressing it in movement.  
 This is, however, no becoming-joyful in a Deleuzian Spinozist sense, as that 
philosophy does not allow for an innocent childhood consciousness prior to the 
trappings of adult knowledge of power. Instead, childhood is a state of delusion in 
which the child mistakenly believes she is free. Maturity is a matter of becoming 
incrementally aware that one is deluded. ‘Consciousness’, writes Deleuze, ‘is 
inseparable from the triple illusion that constitutes it, the illusion of finality, the illusion 
of freedom, and the theological illusion. Consciousness is only a dream with one’s eyes 
open’, and the child’s belief that she ‘freely wants’ to drink milk or to run or jump up 
and down is as mistaken as the drunk’s belief that ‘it is from a free decision of the mind 
that he speaks the things he later, when sober, wishes he had not said’ (Deleuze 1988: 
20). Rhys may have disagreed with this view of the necessarily delusional nature of 
consciousness, but it is significant that there is no innocent and free childhood 
elsewhere in her other novels. The most prominent child in her fiction is Antoinette 
who is not exempt from the crimes of her family and whose fate is mired precisely by 
her inability to see things clearly. It is, I think, unclear whether in Julia’s idealisation 
of childhood Rhys is genuinely proposing that there is a state of human consciousness 
which is free and beyond power, but at the same time it is impossible to say definitively 
that Rhys is critiquing such a belief. For this reader the novel works somewhat as an 
exploratory exercise, probing the becomings to which such a naively self-assured 
oneness might give rise. 
The holistic affective experience of the child has many echoes in Julia’s present, 
in her reflections upon her bodily and psychological response to situations. The ‘effect’ 
of the strange wallpaper in her hotel room ‘was, oddly enough, not sinister but cheerful 
and rather stimulating’; unlike striped wallpaper, the images of birds and fungus in this 
new room do not make ‘her head ache worse when she awoke after she had been 
drinking’ (ALMM, 8). Looking at the Seine makes Julia  
 
shiver[]. She felt certain that the water made her room much colder. It was only 




the current to flow more strongly. When you were drunk you could imagine 
that it was the sea. (ALMM, 12)  
 
As these two examples show, alcohol is not only an anaesthetic for Julia. It also 
enhances her capacity for affective experience.  
 In After Leaving Mr Mackenzie city life is an affective onslaught. Returning to 
her room, Julia’s mood changes suddenly: ‘She could not have explained why, when 
she got to her room, her forebodings about the future were changed into a feeling of 
exultation’ (ALMM, 45). While crossing a road her recollection of the war suddenly 
shifts and ‘an exultant and youthful feeling took possession of her’ (ALMM, 49). 
Pondering the poorly lit London streets, Julia thinks  
 
It was the darkness that got you. It was heavy darkness, greasy and compelling. 
It made walls round you, and shut you in so that you felt you could not breathe. 
You wanted to beat at the darkness and shriek to be let out. And after a while 
you got used to it. Of course. And then you stopped believing that there was 
anything else anywhere. (ALMM, 62) 
 
These passages give us a clear indication of Julia’s plight: she is intensely affected by 
the external world and because she has no money and does not want to buy into 
normative modes of self-making she is constantly swerving from and deflecting the 
effects of unpleasant encounters. Her becoming-child is not, then, simply an attempt to 
reactivate her affective capacity, for this capacity is already heightened. It is, rather, 
the text’s insistence on precisely this capacity as a response to and a rebuke of the 
unfeelingness of those she encounters and the society in which she lives. It is an 
insistence on vulnerability and openness as an alternative to the desire to wield power.  
 Julia’s becoming-child is both attractive and subversive to a limited extent. It is 
a commitment to personal feeling, a rejection of the demands of capitalist society. To 
Uncle Griffiths she is able to assert her utterly childlike commitment to ‘lovely things’ 
rather than to financial security (ALMM, 60). To Norah, after their mother’s funeral, 
Julia goes further, denying any guilt at having left the care of their mother entirely to 





Animals are better than we are, aren’t they? They’re not all the time pretending 
and lying and sneering, like loathsome human beings [...] They’ll let you die 
for want of a decent word, and then they’ll lick the feet of anybody they can get 
anything out of. And do you think I’m going to cringe to a lot of mean, stupid 
animals? If all good, respectable people had one face, I’d spit in it [...] you’re 
jealous. That’s the bedrock. All you people who’ve knuckled under – you’re 
jealous. (ALMM, 97-98) 
 
Julia’s rage is complicated and feels very much like a child’s tantrum, albeit one with 
a strong political message. The freedom that she is claiming, and of which she knows 
Norah is jealous, is not just freedom from the rules of gender and sexuality. It is the 
freedom to follow or to be committed to one’s feelings – a freedom that is always 
compromised whenever one ‘knuckle[s] under’. This is not a Romantic commitment to 
the production of a creative life, but an insistence on the uncompromised value of the 
affective life. The heart of her accusation is that Norah hasn’t ‘once looked’ at Julia as 
though she ‘cared whether [she] lived or died’ (ALMM, 98), while in contrast she has 
felt sincere pity for Norah. She feels fully whereas, the text suggests, Norah does not. 
Julia’s commitment to her affective life is a rejection of the codification of feelings and 
behaviour in respectable, bourgeois society. Mr Mackenzie and Mr Horsfield are 
attracted by Julia’s ability to make them feel alive in the sense of momentarily feeling 
something (whether sentimentality for an inappropriate woman, or anger at social 
injustice) other than that which is permitted in their pre-scripted middle-class lives. 
Two pages after she locates her first memory, Mr Horsfield asks Julia, ‘with a certain 
curiosity’:  
 
‘What do you think about, Julia?’ 
She said: ‘All the time about when I was a kid.’ 
‘It’s the easiest thing in the world to imagine you a kid,’ Mr Horsfield felt 
sentimental about her. And then he wanted to laugh at himself because he was 
feeling sentimental. (ALMM, 117) 
  
Julia’s becoming-child is a movement away from the norms of permissible adult 
behaviour, just as Mr Horsfield here moves away from the permissible self-serving 




relative powerlessness of childhood over the affective corruption of adult life. As such 
it is a minor refusal of the dominant order – a slight deterritorialisation.  
Problematically, however, Julia’s becoming-child is also profoundly 
unselfconscious: although living the painful reality of it, in all her humiliations and 
rejections, Julia apparently remains oblivious to the fact that her dependency has had 
devastating consequences. In Part Three, the narrator informs us in a sombre tone that, 
despite Julia’s attempt to convince herself that ‘[a]nything might happen. Happiness. 
A course of face massage’, in reality ‘[s]omething in her was cringing and broken, but 
she would not acknowledge it’ (ALMM, 131). Julia does not look to the future, as 
Savory notes, but neither does she seem able to locate herself temporally: she evades 
her own history as irresponsibly as she denies Mr Horsfield familiarity after they have 
had sex. Furthermore, her becoming-child permits no acknowledgement of her 
involvement with others. In an early moment in Part One, Julia walks ‘towards the 
quay, feeling serene and peaceful. Her limbs moved smoothly; the damp, soft air was 
pleasant against her face. She felt complete in herself, detached, independent of the rest 
of humanity’ (13). It is easy to overlook the catastrophic lack of self-awareness in these 
peaceful-sounding lines. From start to finish, After Leaving Mr Mackenzie chronicles 
the pain of Julia’s dependency on others. Her becoming-child is not a process of 
beneficial change, but a refusal to ‘grow up’ in the sense of attempting to become 
financially independent and taking responsibility for one’s social existence. Julia 
remains as financially dependent on the novel’s final page as she was on the first, and 
seemingly without definite plans to change her ways. Her affective life is one of painful 
dependency and in this sense the novel presents us with a striking dramatisation of the 
Deleuzian-Spinozist unethical life. Julia is committed to misconceiving her existence 
as something external to the society she so despises and against which she rages. On 
her return to London she buys an English illustrated newspaper: ‘she read steadily 
down the glossy pages, which chattered about a world as remote and inaccessible as if 
it existed in another dimension’ (45). Heeding the signal at the opening of ‘Childhood’, 
we are reminded that the childlike is also self-centred and profoundly apolitical. Julia’s 
becoming-child tempts us to infer an Oedipal drama of sexual abuse and maternal loss 
and thereby distracts us from noticing that the protagonist invests not in a return but in 
an entirely impossible and irresponsible freedom.    
John Su has recently argued that in Rhys’s later novels negative affect which 




resists oppressive structures (2015). Given this proposition, Julia’s orientation to a state 
in which the bodily and linguistic expressions of affective experience are in harmony 
seems, in a fairly straightforward way, to be accepting of the status quo. Her becoming-
child is a function of a reterritorialised schizoid desire, turned from a line of flight into 
a self-destructive acceptance of a binary logic, ‘conforming to a code of dominant 
utterances, to a territory of established states of things’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2006: 55). 
Su’s argument rests somewhat on the privileging of the linguistic code, which Deleuze 
and Guattari oppose. In their philosophy, affect is not something that can (or should) 
ever be captured in language, but is the form of embodiment which manifests the flux 
of life: the task of literature is to free life rather than to capture it. Rather than describing 
a situation in which certain oppressed groups are unable to articulate certain types of 
negative affect due to ideological structures which have deformed the subjectivity of 
those people, Deleuze and Guattari argue that to write in ‘hate’ against ‘all languages 
of masters’ necessitates ridding language of its representational function as far as is 
possible. This will never be a completed process:  
 
Even when it is unique, a language remains a mixture, a schizophrenic mélange, 
a Harlequin costume in which very different functions of language and distinct 
centers of power are played out, blurring what can be said and what can’t be 
said. (K, 26)  
 
This mélange is particularly evident in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie. Clearly, the text 
critiques dominant structures, but it is not able to rid itself of the representational 
function and become writing as delirium: writing aimed not at being ‘free’, but at 
fighting dualisms, scrambling codes, ‘tracing flows and causing them to circulate’ and 
altogether betraying signification (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 144).  
 Returning to this originary ‘Childhood’ scene of holistic affective experience, 
it is clear that with her second novel Rhys is not yet such a traitor. The passage is rife 
with dualisms (the ‘first time’ and the ‘last time’, fear versus happiness), and thick with 
both lack (the girl’s play with the butterfly lacks kindness, and she ‘never [tells] 
anybody why’ she cries in terror) and a striving for control, for capturing that which 
should not be captured (affect, the butterfly), which involves, of course, an original 
term: ‘The last time you were happy about nothing; the first time you were afraid about 




chapter is Julia’s enjoyment in capturing the butterfly which seems to be the occasion 
of her first fear ‘of nothing’. The child cruelly imprisons a living thing merely for her 
pleasure, and takes a sadistic enjoyment in the ‘very fascinating sound’ made by the 
butterfly in the tin box as it makes a surprising ‘row’. 
 
Of course, what always happened was that it broke its wings; or else it would 
fray them so badly that by the time you had got it home and opened the box and 
hauled it out as carefully as you could it was so battered that you lose all interest 
in it. Sometimes it was too badly hurt to be able to fly properly.  
‘You’re a cruel, horrid child, and I’m surprised at you.’  
[...] 
That was the first time you were afraid of nothing – that day when you were 
catching butterflies – when you had reached the patch of sunlight. You were 
not afraid in the shadow, but you were afraid in the sun. (ALMM, 116) 
 
Julia’s fear ‘of nothing’ is, we can infer, her terror as she senses her own capacity for 
cruelty or, the same thing, the absence of her kindness. Due to what is presumably the 
mother’s scolding words, her fear might be prompted by the thought that she is 
replicating the coldness of her mother – that ‘still, desolate, and arid’ being ‘just behind 
[her]’ (ALMM, 116). The child’s actions also bear a striking resemblance to the men 
who use Julia for their own pleasure only to ‘chuck [her] away’ when they find her 
broken and useless (116), and again there is a thematic association with slavery as Julia 
conceives of butterflies according to their use-value. In this chapter Rhys brings to light 
the complicity of all thinking people, adults and children alike, in the cruelty of masters 
but, tragically, while Julia can cry at this the text can do nothing more with this 
knowledge. It is passive, just as Julia is, ‘just stay[ing] in [her] room’ all day, ‘just lying 
there and thinking’ (116-17). There is no comment on Julia’s cruel desire, and two 
short chapters later, in ‘Departure’, Julia repeats her disposal of the butterfly in her 
articulation of how completely disposable she finds Mr Horsfield: ‘If you think [...] 
that I care... I can always get somebody, you see. I’ve known that ever since I’ve known 
anything [...] To hell to all of you!’ (126). She commits to cruelty here rather than 





After Leaving Mr Mackenzie is, I think, the novel in which Rhys faces the most 
significant impasse. The text cannot bring itself to look at what becomes so evident in 
the later novels: the fact that language is always part of the social world, and every 
utterance proceeds from the assemblage of which it is part. The vision in this work is 
like Julia’s: fixated on the political potential of an individual’s passionate feeling, and 
unable to understand the political need to acknowledge one’s role in the dominant order 
– that is, how one always affects and is affected by others. Rhys’s language here 
ultimately retains a commitment to a will to power quite unlike the sense of self-
overcoming we encounter in the later novels. In Julia’s final request from Mr 
Mackenzie, Rhys’s conclusion seems to acknowledge the failing of her text. The 
deterritorialised mother function is reterritorialised as Julia refuses to confront her own 
complicity and desires. Her line of flight merely rediscovers ‘Oedipal structures’ and 
‘fascist coagulations’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2006: 29) in her claim of an alternative 
affective life. After Leaving Mr Mackenzie seems to both ask and answer Deleuze’s 
question in ‘On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature’: 
 
In fleeing everything, how can we avoid reconstituting both our country of 
origin and our formations of power, our intoxicants, our psychoanalyses and 
our mummies and daddies. How can one avoid the line of flight’s becoming 
identical with a pure and simple movement of self-destruction? (Deleuze and 
Parnet 2006: 29) 
 
In her next novel Rhys turns to a dramatic deterritorialisation of language to solve this 
problem, but in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie she is unable to offer a positive answer. 
Perhaps, though, this was a productive inability. Perhaps this second novel is Rhys’s 
admission of her own paranoiac desire to be outside that which she critiqued. In this 
sense, Julia’s becoming-child might be read as the guilty expression of the bad daughter 








Rhys’s minor literature: becoming-unmother in Voyage in the Dark 
 
I. Anna’s complicity 
In her third novel Rhys no longer offers the possibility of a realm beyond the 
assemblages she maps. On the contrary, Voyage in the Dark is relatively at home with 
its complicity in oppressive power structures. This chapter focuses on what I term 
Anna’s becoming-unmother by tracing Rhys’s problematic inscription of masochistic 
sexual encounters which lead inevitably to the protagonist’s abortion at the novel’s 
close. The central proposition, inspired by arguments in Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature, is that the text haemorrhages desire in a manner which inflicts a liberating 
violence on both its body (the text’s and Anna’s) and its thought.  
I intend no glorification of abortion in these arguments; rather I offer a reading 
of complicity which works through the radical sexual politics of Anna’s story. Emery’s 
incisive and illuminating commentary on the control of women’s bodies in Voyage in 
the Dark demonstrates how important the text’s historical context is for understanding 
Anna’s narrative (1990: 91-104). Emery deciphers Rhys’s nuanced encoding of the 
political control of women’s bodies in the Edwardian period, charting the connections 
between Anna’s fate and the Contagious Diseases Acts, Purity Crusades and the Social 
Hygiene Movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The analysis 
brings to light the subtext of rising social panic in the 1910s, 20s and 30s prompted by 
the spread of venereal disease, feminist agitation, women’s increasing use of birth 
control and their increasing resort to illegal abortion. Anna’s disturbing, dangerous 
abortion at the novel’s close was rewritten for Rhys’s Constable editor, Michael 
Sadleir, to soften the impact of Anna’s brutal demise by making her ‘death’ more 
ambiguous, yet it remains a rare, unusually realistic and detailed literary depiction of 
an experience which was relatively common among women in England in the early 
decades of the twentieth century but which remained, in 1934, a largely taboo subject.64  
Detailing the increasing permissiveness of the publishing world of English 
literature in the interwar years, Chris Baldick writes that ‘the Great War blew away the 
 
64 The Abortion Law Reform Association was founded in 1936 by women in England campaigning for 
the right to have more involvement in abortion legislation – a fact which speaks to the timeliness of 




official censorship of literary representation’ of the bodily facts of sexuality in its 
‘regular and irregular’ forms (2004: 378, 377). Writers were now permitted to address 
a range of more or less risqué areas of human experience and, as Baldick notes, a few, 
such as Rhys, Aldous Huxley, Elizabeth Bowen and Rosamond Lehmann were able 
not only to challenge the taboo around abortion but to ‘address abortion as a fact of 
contemporary life’ (2004: 378).65 It is significant that, while not an isolated pioneer, 
Rhys was among the first twentieth-century writers to address this controversial topic 
in her fiction, and to situate it firmly in relation to class divisions in England, women’s 
economic status and the prevalence of prostitution in both its ‘amateur’ and 
‘professional’ forms. Rhys’s first-person narrative situates the reader in unusual and 
disturbing proximity to the events of Anna’s ‘fall’, and Emery suggests that it is the 
singularly female point of view from which we witness the protagonist’s experience in 
Voyage in the Dark that makes Rhys’s depiction of abortion so unusual even among 
such contemporary works (1990: 79). Rhys had an abortion, or ‘what was then called 
an illegal operation’, at the end of her early affair with Lancelot Grey Hugh Smith, as 
she explains in Smile Please (118), but the third novel is in no way simply a personal 
exploration of this subject. Anna’s narrative generally and her uncontrollable blood 
loss at the novel’s close are, I think, comments on the restrictive codification of 
women’s bodies and state control of their fertility in a country in which, when the novel 
is set, women still did not have the vote. In short, the novel demonstrates a profound 
engagement with sexual politics.  
It has been argued that the early twentieth-century ‘reproduction crisis’ 
surrounding gender, sexuality and the rethinking of maternity that accompanied 
women’s increasing ‘reproductive autonomy’ is central to Anglo-American modernism 
generally (Hauck 2003: 256). We might, then, consider that in Voyage in the Dark Rhys 
is writing back to the codification of women’s bodies, male anxiety concerning fertility 
and also a certain modernist preoccupation. We might even read the novel as Rhys’s 
‘late modernist’ refusal of an aesthetics of formal mastery that is found in a certain 
 
65 The literary texts Baldick cites here in addition to Voyage in the Dark are Huxley’s Eyeless in Gaza 
(1936), Bowen’s story ‘Firelight in the Flat’ (1934) and Lehmann’s The Weather in the Streets (1936). 
Baldick also notes T.S. Eliot’s concise inclusion of the subject in The Waste Land and Naomi 
Mitchison’s depiction in Cloud Cuckoo Land (1925), which is somewhat ‘softened’ by the novel’s 





strain of modernism practised by Pound, Wyndham Lewis and the Futurists.66 
However, Voyage in the Dark is read in this chapter for its complicity rather than for 
its disruption of artistic conventions. Rather than focusing on the text’s relation to its 
literary moment, the discussion here concerns the novel’s relentless inward gaze at its 
own problematic desire. The shape (though not the content) of my argument is similar 
to an important chapter on this novel by Emery which, deploying Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
theory, suggests that the bodily degradation suffered by Anna evolves as a sort of 
Carnivalesque, ‘collectively experienced cycle of life’ which ‘is opposed to the 
European realistic convention of “character”’ (1990: 79). Emery argues that at the 
novel’s conclusion a ‘spirit of laughter’ which is both ‘destructive’ and ‘regenerating’ 
enables Anna to identify with the black community of her childhood, thereby 
‘imagin[ing] a return’ that also ‘perhaps chang[es] the meaning of the abortion into an 
event that regenerates her own life’ (1990: 80-81). I also see a crucial form of 
relationality being forged at the novel’s end which is both destructive and generative, 
and I think Emery sets an important precedent for reading Anna’s abortion as a solution 
of sorts to an aesthetic problem concerning how to sustain difficult life.  
There is a significant body of criticism focused on the difficult relationships 
between Rhys’s protagonists and their mothers, yet a relative scarcity of scholarship on 
unwanted pregnancy and abortion in Rhys’s writing. There are numerous explanations 
for this, but I suspect that there is something in Rhys’s representation which makes 
analysis a little too uncomfortable. Two factors seem particularly important in Anna’s 
case: the sense of inevitability surrounding the abortion, and Rhys’s emphasis on 
Anna’s youth and vulnerability which may be read as special pleading. There is a 
problematic, even masochistic ‘fatedness’ in Anna’s narrative. If her willingness to be 
exploited, her increasing promiscuity and resulting pregnancy are the narrative 
elements that render the text a modern retelling of Émile Zola’s Nana (1880), Anna 
entirely lacks the self-consciousness and bawdy self-confidence that ensure Nana is no 
simple victim. Yet paying close attention to the many mirrorings and repetitions 
involved in Anna’s slide into a hellish promiscuity leads us out of a closed cycle of 
destruction. What emerges clearly is desire in its two forms: one works to 
deterritorialise the text, producing ways out of the impasse which blocks Anna’s ability 
 
66 I am thinking here of Tyrus Miller’s theorisation of ‘late modernism’ as a trend in 1930s literature in 
which artists sought politically meaningful aesthetic solutions to the ‘impasse’ or decline of earlier 




to live well, and the other does the opposite, reinforcing hegemonic processes and 
leading the protagonist to her destruction.  
The role of Anna’s youthfulness in her sad fate is profoundly troubling. It 
attracts men and it is a cause of her economic vulnerability, rendering her open to 
exploitation. Clearly attracted by her youth, Walter and Vincent bolster their power by 
infantilising Anna, repeatedly referring to her as ‘you rum child’ (ViD, 48), ‘my dear 
child’ (75) and ‘my infantile Anna’ (69). Most significantly, Anna’s youth enables 
Rhys to maintain to a degree Anna’s victimhood in a narrative in which the protagonist 
knowingly plunges into a depressive downward spiral of increasingly unsafe, 
anonymous sexual encounters until she finds herself with an unwanted pregnancy and 
seeks an abortion. Anna has none of Nana’s more mature capacity to enjoy a decadent 
sexuality, and her unhappiness, youth and over-determined vulnerability somewhat 
distract our attention from the fact that, in the second half of the book, she becomes 
painfully self-destructive, making irresponsible choices that lead directly to her violent 
fate. Eighteen when the novel begins, Anna is by far the youngest of the protagonists 
of Rhys’s novels and also the most clearly self-destructive, and it is too easy, I think, 
to position the first fact as the excuse for the second. The intense pathos at the end of 
Part Three and in Part Four need not distract us from the violence of Anna’s thoughts 
about the foetus. Similarly, her fate is an intensely violent one: she must choose 
between unwanted motherhood and the danger of an illegal abortion, and yet it is 
surprisingly easy to overlook the details of the violence being done to the two bodies 
in the novel’s closing pages.  
In my opinion Rhys’s third novel is a feminist masterpiece, but it is so because 
Rhys creates a protagonist who is a tragic victim of the violence inflicted by a cruel 
society on vulnerable women and who is ruled by a problematic desire which, in the 
second half of the book, as her powerlessness increases, becomes inseparable from her 
self-/destruction. Voyage in the Dark is a devastating depiction of oppressive desire in 
a feminist narrative. It presents a poetic articulation of the proposition that we are all 
guilty of bad desire to an extent. However, this is not simply a pessimistic indictment 
of humankind. Anna’s destructive desire is not excused by Rhys, and in this novel in 
which birth and maternity are so central we can see Rhys as positioning one’s 
complicity in oppression as the starting point for creativity. This works in numerous 
ways. On the one hand, Voyage in the Dark does more than suggest its author’s 




acknowledgement in her novels of guilt concerning her family’s history of slave-
ownership. On the other, although more explicit than in After Leaving Mr Mackenzie, 
this engagement is still a subtext, and so is rendered through evasion. The text 
negotiates an uneasy path bearing the flows of productive and destructive desire and, 
in this sense, Voyage in the Dark is closest to Kafka’s minor literature as Deleuze and 
Guattari view it: literature which takes its own failure as its starting point.  
A great deal of Rhys criticism has addressed Rhys’s use of two time schemes 
in Voyage in the Dark, a method foregrounded in Rhys’s earlier title for the novel, Two 
Tunes. The intertwining of these ‘two tunes’ of Anna’s past as a child in the West Indies 
and her present fall into becoming-unmother has been given vigorous explication. 
Savory’s complex analysis highlights the integrity of Rhys’s poetics, identifies Rhys’s 
characteristic use of details which ‘juxtapose opposites’ alongside the original choice 
of title as evidence that ‘clearly a binary structure was Rhys’s intention’, and suggests 
that Anna’s past and present constitute one more structural opposition (2009: 58). 
Rhys’s handling of race in this novel has also been read as evidence of a binary 
principle. O’Connor, for example, explores this in relation to Anna’s fall, concluding 
that there is a distinct Manichaeism at work in this novel (1986). However, as Savory 
notes, ‘Anna’s fondest memories [of her childhood in the West Indies] suggest that she 
breached racial divisions somewhat’ (2009: 59). Any discussion of binaries in Rhys’s 
work ought to allow room for that dominant critical proposition: that the collapsing of 
apparent opposites is central to Rhys’s aesthetic. As a counterpoint to this, I suggest 
that desire in its contrary states and rhizomatic relationality are key principles in this 
novel. Rather than reading Anna’s narrative in terms of a dichotomy between past and 
present, innocence and experience, victim and victimiser, a warm fantasy world of 
being black and a lived, cold, white English reality, we can understand Rhys to be 
working against the binary logic that codifies Anna’s social existence. Desire is not 
good or bad. Always political, never simply Oedipal, although in this novel it flirts 
with being so, and never simply the target of power or the passive object of repression, 
desire constitutes social machines as much as it is constituted by them. Desire is 
fascistic and schizoid, always playing its two tunes. The text does not require that we 
privilege either of these. Rather, I propose, it asks that we listen closely to the 
cacophony of desire as it is pulled between these two poles. ‘The Cries of London’ is 
encountered repeatedly by Anna, cropping up unexpectedly as supposedly cheerful 




challenges us to enjoy its images and to respect the street vendors whom it purports to 
depict while not overlooking the politics of its representation of the itinerant and 
dispossessed. Its cries are those of social misery, cries for social justice, the demand 
that although the agency of these street workers may be limited it must not be denied, 
and the cries of sellers happily playing their part in the life of London. Voyage in the 
Dark asks us to listen to the different cries of desire which echo across and beyond 
Anna’s narrative.  
 
II. Dangerous desire, difficult connections and diverse series 
The coexistence of schizoid and paranoiac desire in this novel is most evident in the 
proliferation of increasingly tense associations between Anna’s inability to prevent her 
unhappy progression from loss of virginity to pregnancy and the history of slavery in 
the Caribbean. It is easy to view this association as an artistic weakness on Rhys’s part, 
and even to deem it a politically dangerous, ethically impoverished elision of the 
differences between the black experience of slavery, the violence done to women’s 
bodies in patriarchal capitalist society and female masochism. Yet while Rhys 
establishes definite connections between these three things, the difference between 
them remains resolute and irresolvable in the text. Indeed, this difference holds these 
situations of power together and allows them to work as a multiplicity. The key 
question is: what does this multiplicity do? The chapter in Kafka: Toward a Minor 
Literature entitled ‘Proliferation of Series’ provides us with a useful set of concepts for 
thinking about this problem.  
In Chapter Three of the first part of Voyage in the Dark, Walter seduces Anna 
for the first time. He is her first lover, and when he voices pleasure in this fact she 
becomes cold, she cries, but obediently follows him to the bedroom:  
 
I kept saying, ‘I must go, I must go.’ Then we were going up another flight of 
stairs and I walked softly […]  
I stopped. I wanted to say, ‘No, I’ve changed my mind.’ But he laughed and 
squeezed my hand and said, ‘What’s the matter? Come on, be brave,’ and I 
didn’t say anything, but I felt cold and as if I were dreaming.  
When I got into the bed there was warmth coming from him and I got close 




forget so utterly, except that you’ve always known it. Always – how long is 
always? (ViD, 32)  
 
In the italicised lines, Anna accesses the memory of something. She cannot be recalling 
sex because she was a virgin before this encounter. Instead it seems that this is the 
recollection of a masochistic desire or an experience of being forced to do something 
against her will. The flight of stairs up which Anna is led and her ‘dream’-like passivity 
in relation to Walter’s dominance strongly evoke Antoinette’s recurring dream in Wide 
Sargasso Sea. In the dream’s earlier two reiterations in Part One a man is leading 
Antoinette through a forest into a walled garden and up steps to what will presumably 
be her attic cell and the turrets of Thornfield Hall. Clearly, Antoinette’s fate in her 
dream concerns her entry into sexuality into which the Rochester figure leads her, and 
has only one possible conclusion: her subjugation to his will. Her trance-like inability 
to resist the man may carry the dream’s function of wish-fulfilment. Just as Sasha’s 
early nightmare of being stuck struggling against the flow of a crowd in Good Morning, 
Midnight suggests that she wants to want to be different (while actually desiring 
conformity), there is a strong suggestion that Antoinette wishes that she could wish to 
resist her marriage plot. Antoinette’s dream feels unavoidably masochistic. It also 
suggests the girl’s guilt at her desire for sex, and a concurrent desire for punishment, 
and thereby recalls the young Rhys’s preference for Catholicism over the majority 
Anglican faith of the white community of Dominica, lending support to a reading of 
the dream as Antoinette’s desire to be punished for her sexual fantasies.67  
Antoinette perceives the garden at Coulibri as an alternative Eden, like ‘that 
garden in the Bible – the tree of life grew there. But it had gone wild’ (WSS, 16). There 
is a similarity between Coulibri’s Eden and the ‘enclosed garden’ into which Antoinette 
is compelled in her second dream (WSS, 34). The ancient Greek root of the word 
‘paradise’ means ‘a (Persian) enclosed park, orchard, or pleasure ground (Xenophon)’ 
(Oxford English Dictionary, my italics). The walled garden of the dream, then, stands 
also for the paradise of Antoinette’s childhood. The dream that seems initially to 
symbolise her sexual desire and religiously inculcated guilt can be understood to 
signify the problematic desire to return to the lost place of the loving relationship that 
 
67 There are numerous references to Rhys’s preference for Catholicism in her letters and autobiography. 




Antoinette shared with her mother for a few short years in infancy. On this reading the 
danger in her dream derives from two points: the impossibility of the desire to return 
to the place of the maternal bond, and the worldly and psychical danger posed to the 
individual who is prematurely deprived of this relationship. There is the primal desire 
for safety in the awareness of its impossibility; and the fact that, in her melancholic 
inability to let go of the loss of their mother, Antoinette is doomed to replicate in her 
sexual relationships the dynamics of the maternal relationship, always entering into the 
illusion of loving safety with a man whose protection is never reliable, whose love is 
never lasting. There is a still more dangerous meaning in this nexus of fate, desire and 
return. Heeding the facts that Antoinette’s narrative is not ‘free’ (she is doomed to end 
up in Thornfield Hall) and that in her dreams she is enslaved to her desire to follow 
what is clearly a dangerous path, we can read this desire to return to her childhood Eden 
as the desire to return to a state of innocence prior to her awareness of her family’s 
history of slavery.  
We can think this problem through using Peter Hulme’s detailed analysis of 
Rhys’s ambivalence in relation to her family history: it may be that Antoinette/Rhys 
guiltily desires a return to a ‘family romance’ – a time when she could freely admire 
her family’s power (Hulme 1994a). Alternatively, the imbrication of slavery and desire 
in Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea can be understood as an expression of 
the inescapable fact that for Rhys, desire is necessarily – perhaps even tautologically – 
self-endangering. The desire to recover the maternal bond which is the template for 
subsequent desires is the desire to re-enter the ‘enclosed garden’ of childhood which 
must, for some time and to some degree, have shielded the young Rhys from the painful 
reality of her family’s role in Dominican slavery. In Smile Please she recalls the 
moment when she realised that she and her family are ‘hated’ because of their history 
(49), and this recollection is grounds, I think, for reading in these two novels the desire 
to return to the time before this event. Yet this desire holds within it impossibility – 
protection from such knowledge cannot again be found – and extreme danger, 
implicating the desiring subject in the heinous wrongs of the system which she seeks 
to avoid. This instance of profoundly complicated yearning conveys the degree to 
which adult desire in Rhys’s writing is never innocent and is always endangering. It 
signals the fact that the political contaminates everything in Rhys’s minor literature – 
the maternal bond and sexual desire most of all. These scenes of female submission in 




depicts, ‘social investments are themselves erotic and, inversely [...], the most erotic of 
desires brings about a fully political and social investment, engages with an entire 
social field’ (K, 64). Slavery, like fascism, was a ‘concretion’ of ‘historically 
determined desire’, and Rhys inherited the history and the social, ethical and 
epistemological difficulty that follow from that desire (K, 59).  
Throughout Rhys’s oeuvre we find scenes of desire which defy social codes, 
ranging from Rhys’s and Anna’s youthful desire to be black, to her protagonists getting 
drunk alone in cafes and causing scenes. The casual and sometimes masochistic sex in 
After Leaving Mr Mackenzie and Voyage in the Dark also manifests a schizoid desire 
that marks a point of escape from the patriarchal regime of England in the 1920s and 
30s which drastically demarcated the permissible for women’s bodies. To this extent, 
Rhys’s writing demonstrates Deleuze and Guattari’s central proposition that it is 
precisely ‘desire [that] doesn’t cease to undo’ all machinic assemblages (K, 59). Yet 
while Anna’s schizoid desire creates a point of escape from bourgeois patriarchy, how 
it works in terms of the racial concretion of slavery is a far more oblique matter.  
Returning to Anna’s first seduction by Walter, the idea of a maternal prototype 
helps us to understand the dream-like italicised statement of recollection which is so 
difficult to reconcile with the fact that this encounter is the occasion of her losing her 
virginity: ‘Of course you’ve always known, always remembered, and then you forget 
so utterly’ (ViD, 32). The statement makes sense if Rhys is likening the irresistible lure 
of the dangerous sexual encounter to a different type of desire which shares its 
dynamics. The novel opens with a meditation on Anna’s intense and physical loneliness 
which figures her move to England as ‘being born again’ into that which is ‘cold’ and 
distant (7). The coldness that engulfs her when she is following Walter evokes this 
movement away from her homeland and from the maternal bond. Her desire to be held 
‘close’ and ‘warm’ by him strongly recalls the child’s desire for her mother, and using 
the clues in Wide Sargasso Sea we can conclude that Anna’s entry into sexuality is 
inseparable from a dangerous desire for impossible innocence. It seems impossible that 
Anna’s sexual life can ever be one of goodness and free will.  
Anna is attracted to the affluent Walter, but more importantly she needs him to 
desire her. She is without money, and her future depends on attracting a wealthy 
husband, as Maudie reinforces throughout the book, advising that Anna ‘ought to make 
him give [her] a flat’ (ViD, 41)). Anna is not engaged in prostitution for most of the 




time he puts ‘some money’ into her bag (33), and this procedure remains in place. The 
‘businesses’ of money and sex are inseparable in Rhys’s view, as she indicated in Smile 
Please in her observation that they are ‘mixed up with something very primitive and 
deep’ (121). Anna’s reading of Nana is effective shorthand for the proposition that 
Rhys dramatised in all her novels: prostitution and other forms of sexual relationships 
including marriage differ in magnitude rather than in kind. In all cases, women are 
sexual commodities in a transactional, patriarchal economy. Anna’s material and 
psychological poverty means she has very little choice in how she sells herself to 
Walter. Her capitulation to his request for sex is, in one sense, her submission to being 
bought and used at his pleasure. Although her fate becomes unhappier as the narrative 
proceeds and she embarks on far more meaningless affairs, it is in this scene as she 
submits for the first time that Anna is most dangerously close to the slavery of unwilling 
prostitution.  
A number of further resonances between Voyage in the Dark and Wide 
Sargasso Sea reinforce the centrality of slavery in the former. Anna’s statement 
concerning an uncanny remembrance resonates powerfully with Antoinette’s forgotten 
knowledge about what she ‘must’ do in the ‘cardboard house’ in England at the end of 
Wide Sargasso Sea:  
 
In the end flames shoot up and they are beautiful. I get out of bed and go close 
to watch them and to wonder why I have been brought here. For what reason. 
There must be a reason. What is it that I must do? (WSS, 146)  
 
Protagonist and reader must turn to Antoinette’s dreams for the answer to this question, 
as they have prophesised her fate as much as her destructive maternal inheritance, her 
awful marriage deal and the cruelty of her husband have enforced her unhappy plight. 
The answer, of course, is set fire to Thornfield Hall, the house of her oppressor, just as 
in Part One the emancipated slaves set fire to Coulibri, the house of ex-slave-owners. 
Antoinette finally takes her cue from black Dominican history in a gesture that affirms 
a virtual connection to that culture and thereby allows her a means of escape.  
There are numerous times in Voyage in the Dark when Anna gets ‘that feeling 
of a dream’ about her everyday existence (ViD, 21, 67, 129), and many dream-like 
reminiscences of her childhood which seem involuntary, but there is only one actual 




Three. Unlike Antoinette’s last dream, Anna’s does not make it clear what she must 
do. It does, though, develop a series of problematic but powerful symbolic connections 
between Anna’s sexual identity and slavery. Anna dreams that she is ‘on a ship’, sailing 
among ‘small islands – dolls of islands’ which, according to the novel’s geographical 
logic, should be the West Indies but are ‘wrong’; on their shores grow ‘English trees’ 
(140). A sailor carries a ‘child’s coffin’ from inside which a ‘little dwarf’ dressed as a 
‘boy bishop’ arises, appearing very much ‘like a doll’ (140-41). Anna tries to ‘walk up 
the deck and get ashore’ but she cannot:  
 
I was powerless and very tired, but I had to go on. And the dream rose into a 
climax of meaninglessness, fatigue and powerlessness, and the deck was 
heaving up and down, and when I woke up everything was still heaving up and 
down. 
 
It was funny how, after that, I kept on dreaming about the sea. (ViD, 141, 
my italics) 
 
We must note the undeniable presence of Wide Sargasso Sea in Anna’s dream: the fact 
that Anna is sailing to England against her will is reason alone for allowing that this 
passage might once have been intended for Antoinette’s story. The passage also 
reminds us that Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea concern themselves with 
very similar things: both protagonists are white Creole women with a family history of 
slave-ownership which is, in a profoundly difficult manner, inextricable from their 
sexual identities both in the West Indies and in England. The phrase I have italicised 
also fits with the sensation of passive fatedness in Antoinette’s dreams. The little dwarf 
in ‘priest’s robes’ recalls the fascist dream figure in Good Morning, Midnight, but the 
‘narrow, cruel face’ of this ‘boy bishop’ that is ‘like a doll’ evokes the cruelty of 
Antoinette’s husband who attempts to turn her into a ‘marionette’ locked, like a doll in 
a dollhouse, inside the attic of Thornfield Hall. Anna here initiates a series of dreams 
of the sea (just as Antoinette repeats her dream of walking through a wood). In a lecture 
entitled ‘Symbolism in Dreams’, first published in English in 1920, Freud identifies 
the sea and ships as well as woods with the female sexual organs and the mother 
(2001b: 149-69). In the context of Caribbean history the associations are different. 




Rhys’s prose creates a profoundly disquieting association between the ‘heaving up and 
down’ and ‘climax’ of the sexual act and the ocean journey of the Middle Passage, an 
effect underscored by the repeated reference to the ‘powerless’. Again, this is a highly 
complex connection. It suggests to me that Anna’s life does, in the course of the novel, 
become a form of slavery, and that her potentially lethal termination is an essential, 
inevitable part of a violent exploitation. The association also suggests guilt at an 
inherited involvement in slavery.  
Anna’s dream occurs at the end of the chapter in which she realises she is 
pregnant. In this chapter she has a long recollection of the West Indies and rumours 
about women who practised Obeah. She is jolted back to the present and her dawning 
realisation by her pregnancy sickness which resembles seasickness: the ‘bed was 
heaving up and down and I lay there thinking, “It can’t be that”’ (ViD, 140). She is 
resigned, thinking ‘as soon as a thing has happened it isn’t fantastic any longer, it’s 
inevitable. The inevitable is what you’re doing or have done. The fantastic is simply 
what you didn’t do. That goes for everybody’ (140). But her almost-pragmatic tone 
immediately shifts, becoming more fatalistic and self-pitying – ‘[t]he inevitable, the 
obvious, the expected’– and she then begins to imagine the cruel things people will say 
when they discover she is pregnant, culminating in a question about why she didn’t 
‘bloody well make a hole in the water’ (140).68 This is marked by a line break, followed 
immediately by the dream in which she ‘was on a ship’. This sequencing suggests the 
guilt and shame that an unforgiving society will impose on Anna as an unmarried 
pregnant woman, enlarged and transformed into her guilt at her family history. The 
shame she ‘ought’ to feel (and that ‘should’ make her want to drown herself) manifests 
in her awareness of the place of the history of slavery in her identity and body, as her 
pregnancy sickness induces a dream of an unfree transatlantic crossing.  
The dream is a revelation in a narrative which, since Anna’s first sexual 
encounter with Walter, has depicted sex as a violent and exploitative practice which 
will lead to her demise. It sheds light on the mysterious thing that Anna has ‘always 
known, always remembered’ (ViD, 32). Her shrouded recollection as she loses her 
virginity is the near-resurfacing of her family’s history of slavery as a reaction to her 
unhappy understanding of what sex with Walter really means. She submits to him in a 
 





self-destructive erotic drive which positions her as both slave to his desires and one of 
the slave-masters, whether her own imaginary family, James Potter Lockhart (Rhys’s 
slave-owning great-grandfather) or the figure of Antoinette/Bertha which may, in 1934, 
have been in embryonic form. In this series of scenes of desire and memory, desire is 
always that which is involved in two counter-movements, one of which works to harden 
the ‘segments’ or local scenes of oppressive power, and the other which works to 
weaken them, warning Anna to try to escape.  
By the time we come to the second sex scene between Walter and Anna, several 
months have passed (the story starts in October or November 1913, and it is now 
January 1914) and we are unsure how often the pair have met, but she has become 
accustomed to her part in their sexual routine: ‘Of course, you get used to things, you 
get used to anything. It was as if I had always lived like that’ (ViD, 35). She has just 
turned 19, is drinking heavily in Walter’s home, she is no longer cold and instead wants 
to share with him her passionate feelings about her home in the West Indies. Her 
feelings have deepened and she seems to be falling in love but it is clearly not 
reciprocated. Anna tells Walter about the beauty of Constance Estate, her ‘mother’s 
family place’, describing the colours of the island, her childhood desire to be black (45) 
and, in a haunting eruption, recalling ‘an old slave-list’ she once found at Constance:  
 
‘It was in columns – the names and the ages and what they did and then General 
Remarks.’  
…Maillotte Boyd, aged 18, mulatto, house servant. The sins of the fathers 
Hester said are visited upon the children unto the third and fourth generation – 
don’t talk such nonsense to the child Father said – a myth don’t get tangled up 
in myths he said to me…  
‘All those names written down.’ I said. ‘It’s funny, I’ve never forgotten 
it.’ (ViD, 45-46)  
 
Walter remains mostly silent, allowing Anna to proceed into a further free association 
of childhood memories and replying only with terse, negative comments, noting in a 
voice that sounds just like the husband’s in Wide Sargasso Sea that her home sounds 
‘too lush’ for him. He makes little attempt to hide his lack of interest in Anna’s inner 
life, which Anna accepts. They have sex and she recalls her convent school’s practice 




going to sleep (48) – the recollection clearly signifying the degree of conflict, guilt and 
desire that she feels about her relationship with Walter, as well as suggesting her 
awareness that the demise of the relationship is imminent. Anna then asks Walter to 
turn the light out and her thoughts return to the slave girl: ‘Maillotte Boyd, aged 18. 
Maillotte Boyd, aged 18… But I like it like this. I don’t want it any other way but 
this. […] Lying so still afterwards. That’s what they call the Little Death’ (48). This 
time Anna reveals explicitly that she views herself as a willing slave. It is one of a 
handful of passages in Rhys’s fiction which pinpoint the lure of sexual masochism with 
breathtaking precision. It is impossible not to link this passage to Rhys’s descriptions 
in her Black Exercise Book of the guilt she assumed at the sexual abuse that she 
suffered as a teenager. Yet proceeding further with this establishment of links between 
Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea opens a productive realm of meaning in 
which desire is no longer confined to the personal but given its due status as a vehicle 
for power.  
In the fifth novel, Antoinette has a brief, intense friendship with Tia, the black 
daughter of a friend of Christophine’s named Maillotte. Christophine arranges for the 
girls to become friends so that Antoinette has some protection from the anger of the 
local black children. However, the friendship ends when Antoinette isn’t forthcoming 
with money after losing a bet, and Tia finally puts into words her pent-up resentment 
of Antoinette’s privilege and family history:  
 
She hear all we poor like beggar […] Plenty white people in Jamaica. Real 
white people, they got gold money. They didn’t look at us, nobody see them 
come near us. Old time white people nothing but white nigger now, and black 
nigger better than white nigger. (WSS, 21)  
 
Later in Part One, Tia and her mother stand amid the crowd which has set fire to 
Antoinette’s childhood home of Coulibri, thereby killing her brother and her mother’s 
parrot, Coco. In a scene painful for its positioning of raw, impossible desire as the 
child’s only response to profound tragedy, Antoinette sees her former friend:  
 
Then, not so far off, I saw Tia and her mother and I ran to her, for she was all 
that was left of my life as it had been. We had eaten the same food, slept side 




will be like her. Not to leave Coulibri. Not to go. Not. When I was close I saw 
the jagged stone in her hand but I did not see her throw it […] We stared at each 
other, blood on my face, tears on hers. It was as if I saw myself. Like in a 
looking-glass. (WSS, 38)  
 
Antoinette’s identification with Tia has sustained great critical debate, and Rhys 
ensures we cannot but pay attention to it by returning the dreaming Antoinette to this 
childhood bond in the novel’s penultimate paragraph, in which she sees Tia beckoning 
her to jump from Thornfield Hall’s battlements. Tia represents Antoinette’s and Rhys’s 
Caribbean home in this final scene and, I think, something richer than a lost Eden. This 
is yet another scene of impossible desire: not only can Antoinette not return to Coulibri 
and Jamaica, but the question of whether the identification with Tia was ever mutual 
in the first place, of whether it was ever capable of sustaining any real warmth, remains 
utterly unclear. It is quite possible that there never were welcoming arms outstretched. 
What does seem relatively clear, I think, is the fact that, while in the West Indies, 
Antoinette could not comprehend, let alone overcome, the social history that divided 
her from her friend and provoked Tia’s anger. My suggestion is that Antoinette 
identifies so strongly with Tia because she wants to run away from her own history, 
identity and unhappiness, and because she wants to be part of the black community, 
but also so that she can be Maillotte’s daughter. At the burning of Coulibri she runs 
towards a black mother and daughter in a crowd, and although she’s running to her 
enemies, she is also running to a maternal bond which at that moment derives its 
strength from the black community of which mother and daughter are a part. In 
contrast, the disintegration of Antoinette’s relationship with her mother is an inevitable 
result of their social isolation, their distance from the white Jamaican ladies and the 
grief this caused Annette. At the scene of the burning of her childhood home, when she 
knows her relationship with her mother is now in a deathly descent, Antoinette runs to 
Tia and Tia’s mother. This is done, I contend, in an impossible but understandable 
desire for a different mother, which is also the desire to usurp Tia’s place. ‘I will live 
with Tia and I will be like her’ suggests usurpation as well as sisterly cohabitation. This 
is an ethical desire for positive connection with a community from which Antoinette is 
divided, driven by the understandable although selfish desire for maternal warmth 
which she currently lacks, and which inflicts violence as the identification itself 




what is not hers. The text thereby performs its commitment to writing against the 
‘instrument of subservience’, as Salman Rushdie describes the English language 
(1982), in the knowledge that the text is still written in the language of masters. 
Maillotte is not present on the final pages of the novel, but we can still read Antoinette 
as reaching out to the daughter who has a mother. Alternatively, perhaps Antoinette’s 
final act is fundamentally less self-serving than the young girl’s desire to be a part of a 
black family.  
 Another peculiarity in the details of the slave recalled by Anna is the surname, 
which also appears in Wide Sargasso Sea as one of the two family names attached to 
the unpleasant character of Daniel, Antoinette’s mixed-race half-brother and the Iago 
figure in this Caribbean tragedy. Daniel Boyd or Daniel Cosway is a resentful 
blackmailer intent on taking revenge on his father’s daughter, Antoinette, by spreading 
rumours of her incestuous relationship with another half-brother, Sandi, and of her 
inheritance of her mother’s madness. It is hard to know what to make of this strange 
conglomeration of names in Voyage in the Dark other than the fact that if we assume 
any correlation between names and characters in the two novels, Maillotte Boyd clearly 
stands for both black identity which is desired and the idea of a dangerous black 
presence in a white bloodline. Hulme concludes that Maillotte Boyd’s name represents 
a profound social anxiety about miscegenation which is also present in Wide Sargasso 
Sea, and about which Rhys was deeply ambivalent, both sharing and being critical of 
such worry (2000a). Anna Snaith has taken the name as the keystone in Rhys’s use of 
blackness as a grammar for proto-feminist revolt: Maillotte is Rhys’s means of blurring 
racial categories and thereby writing back to the imperialist form of thought (2014: 
148-49). Maillotte seems to figure the interrelation of histories of empire, race, gender 
and class, and she thereby seems to cause Anna’s abjection against a threat posed from 
an exorbitant outside or inside. Both of these important readings add significantly to 
the possibilities for sense-making in our reading of Voyage in the Dark and Wide 
Sargasso Sea. As a counterpoint, I propose that this use of a proper name also detaches 
language from sense by refusing the representational function altogether in a gesture 
that answers the husband’s violent renaming of Antoinette in the latter text.  
 In the fantastical conjuration of Maillotte Boyd, Anna’s masochistic desire for 
Walter is inseparable from the desire she voiced a page earlier – her forbidden desire 
‘to be black’ (ViD, 45). The slave’s surname suggests that Anna is aware that this desire 




fact that those in league with masters cannot identify with the oppressed. This scene is 
another brilliantly dense dramatisation of the coexistence of the two contrary states of 
desire. And yet, the fact that the slave’s name is an uncomfortable amalgam of Maillotte 
and Daniel in Wide Sargasso Sea warns us against assuming that the names refer to 
particular characters in the later novel or to any single, definitive set of racial 
coordinates. The recurrence of both names in the last novel invites us to look for 
meaning, for what the names represent in Anna’s narrative, and confronts us with the 
stark fact that they signify a number of contrary things. The two names also bear in 
themselves the possibility that they mean nothing at all in relation to the later novel, 
and the possibility that they denote a character who is not in Wide Sargasso Sea, either 
in the sense that there is no ex-slave named Maillotte Boyd in the 1966 text, and in the 
sense that Rhys entirely omits any evidence to support the idea that Tia’s mother is 
related to Daniel. Rhys’s recycling of the names in 1966 renders the name of the 
already-absent slave girl in Voyage in the Dark a signifier without a signified. It is 
without sense, language deterritorialised. The proper name works just as Deleuze and 
Guattari describe its function in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature: as materially 
intense expression, a ‘living and expressive material that speaks for itself and has no 
need of being put into a form’ (K, 21). Maillotte Boyd works in opposition to the name 
of Bertha in Wide Sargasso Sea, which is used by the husband to signify – that is, to 
represent – his complete domination of his wife. Anna’s desiring scene can be read as 
a radical dismantling of dualisms, which is not content to rid the text of the opposition 
of contrary desires (the text supports all desires at once) and between oppressor and 
oppressed, mother and lover. In Anna’s strange identification with a name which has 
no subject, Rhys rids language of its representative function which gives a figurative 
sense, leaving only 
 
a distribution of states that is part of the range of the word. The thing and other 
things are no longer anything but intensities overrun by deterritorialised sound 
or words that are following their line of escape [...] it is now a question of a 
becoming that includes the maximum of difference as a difference of intensity, 
the crossing of a barrier, a rising or falling [...] To make the sequences vibrate, 
to open the word onto unexpected internal intensities – in short, an asignifying 
intensive utilisation of language. Furthermore, there is no longer a subject of 




states that forms a mutual becoming, in the heart of a necessarily multiple or 
collective assemblage. (K, 22) 
 
Anna’s reference to Maillotte strips the text of the traditional structures and processes 
on which we depend to construct meaning. We can understand the association as 
signifying Anna’s guilt and masochistic desire, or we can engage in a difficult but 
rewarding differential reading practice that involves thinking through Voyage in the 
Dark in tandem with Wide Sargasso Sea, thinking through the placing of various names 
in several texts and Anna’s and Antoinette’s scenes of desire alongside Rhys’s own 
family history of slave ownership and what she might be doing in terms of confronting 
that history. To make these connections the reader needs to be open to multiple story 
lines, histories and manifestations of desire in both its orientations, and to the difficulty 
of thinking beyond dualisms. This is, I think, an important example of Rhys’s strategy 
of encouraging her readers to draw connections between different painful histories 
which are traditionally kept separate, but here the strategy emerges across different 
texts and different desiring scenes. This encouragement is also an ethical impulse: there 
is communality in Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea, but it is virtual rather 
than actual, existing as non-pre-existent relations among writer, different texts, 
characters and readers and among different series of scenes of desire which are the 
means of a careful and highly self-conscious mapping and remapping. Reading Rhys 
is surprisingly close to schizoanalytic thought in its requirement of both abstraction and 
creation.  
As more scholarship on Rhys’s writing emerges, and more connections across 
the work become visible, the critical community is responsible for actualising the 
patterns and links in Rhys’s writing and the meaning-making which they allow. This is 
the case for all great artists, but it is a particularly important aspect of our encounters 
with Rhys’s texts due to her style of imbricating diverse histories and submerging 
meaning, and the degree of difficulty that always attends the notions of connection and 
communality in her work. Conversations become possible at different times due to the 
inevitable changes in the academic climate around the world. The recent so-called ‘turn 
to affect’, for example, coincides both with a turn from what was the dominant 




the coding of the environment in literature.69 The idea of this ‘turn’ has been 
deconstructed by feminist and postcolonial critics such as deCaires Narain who 
comments that this is better described as a ‘“re-turn” to key tenets of the feminist 
movement, with its focus on the experiential, the personal and the domestic’. She cites 
Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks as evidence that postcolonial writing ‘also has a 
longer history of engagement’ with affect than is ‘perhaps obvious, given its belated 
and knotted connections to work on feminism and affect’ (deCaires Narain 2013: 276). 
Without calling it a ‘turn’, then, we can nevertheless say that recent work on 
embodiment by Ahmed, deCaires Narain and others is making possible increasingly 
nuanced, productive engagements with difficult connection in Rhys’s fiction. This 
work, which is foundational for the present study, suggests a reorientation. Rather than 
reading these narratives as concerning connections which happen to be difficult, and 
then looking for a cause of this situation, this thesis proposes that Rhys writes about 
the ethical and ontological fact of the difficulty of connection. Of course she does so 
from her perspective, but this is nevertheless a fact of life for many people and is at the 
heart of many social, political and philosophical questions. This fact is also central to 
aesthetic concerns. The literary text is a site of connection. It allows the reader to feel 
connection with the author’s voice and her vision, and to learn from these things. As 
deCaires Narain observes, the text can also make possible the conditions for difficult 
conversations. It can be such a condition. The literary text can enable solidarity while 
reminding us of the hard work needed for this to be possible. Rhys’s last three novels 
remind us of this necessary hard work. The end of Voyage in the Dark dramatises a 
great physiological effort to live that takes place as the text forges a complex network 
of difficult connections. In this harrowing conclusion, Anna’s haemorrhaging body 
figures the life of the literary text. It may even, in Deleuzian parlance, be releasing that 
life.  
 
III. The proliferation of desire: a termination and the life of the text 
In their chapter ‘The Proliferation of Series’, Deleuze and Guattari identify a 
proliferation of terms in Kafka’s novels which works to unblock situations. Doubles 
and trios are common in his fiction, but signal an Oedipal impasse. ‘Why two or three 
 
69 This environmental and ecological focus is evident in Rhys studies in work such as Savory’s essay in 




and not more?’, his novels ask – and answer, by rendering these units ‘so vacillating, 
so supple and transformable, that they are ready to open onto series that break their 
form and explode their terms’ so that, by the time Kafka comes to write The Trial and 
The Castle (Das Schloss, 1926), ‘there will be no reason for a novel to end’ (K, 54-55). 
Something similar is at work in the various dualities in Voyage in the Dark which 
function as a sort of limitation for Anna and, perhaps, Rhys. There is the slave and the 
slave-owning family, black and white, virginity and promiscuity, innocence and 
experience, victim and victimiser, male power and female submission, the good and 
bad woman, the past and present and the many other versions of the ‘two tunes’. There 
is good reason to think that these respectable dualisms block something in the text, and 
in the desiring scenes with Walter, Rhys is not content to oppose objects of desire, 
submission and domination, but instead creates a series in which these dualities are 
connected to sexual masochism, identification with the black community, both free and 
enslaved, to betrayal, family memory, the haemorrhaging of a dangerous abortion and 
the transatlantic crossing.  
In Anna’s delirious haemorrhaging in the novel’s final chapter we have a 
similar, though even more vivid, procedure in which Rhys connects different terms 
across divergent series.70 A white man’s face in the recent past leads Anna to think of 
the white masks worn by men in Carnival during her childhood; Hester’s past 
disapproval of this tradition is echoed in the present as Mrs Polo also thinks Anna’s 
bleeding ‘ought to be stopped’; Anna’s present giddiness evokes a scene of dancing – 
it is unclear when, but presumably also during Anna’s youth; the banging of kerosene-
tins in Carnival echoes both the clock ticking in the present and the regular pulse of her 
dangerous blood loss; remembrance of Walter’s past instruction to Anna to leave his 
flat evokes the voice of somebody (again, it is unclear who), instructing Anna in horse-
riding, somewhere on the island of her childhood; and the recollection of trying to grip 
the horse’s sides with her knees brings her back to her present (ViD, 156-58). This is 
not a simple opposition between the past and the present but a series of temporally and 
thematically different moments connected across the present and different series of the 
past and these moments are in no way neutral. The terms and the characters which are 
repeated in these series each ‘correspond to a position of desire’ (K, 55).  
 
70 This analysis refers to the conclusion of the published text of Voyage in the Dark and not to Rhys’s 
original version of the ending, which is available in Bonnie Kime Scott’s edited volume, The Gender of 




We can also read in these series what Deleuze and Guattari describe as 
‘segments’: these are scenes in which a particular concretion of power is exercised and 
visible. In The Trial there is the ‘police segment, lawyer segment, judge segment’ (K, 
55). In the last chapter of Voyage in the Dark there is the illegal abortion segment 
(Anna’s current bodily predicament), the sexual submission segment (signalled by 
Walter’s voice – a situation of sexual desire involving a ghastly inequality), the 
prostitution segment (the white face of the man who knows that Anna will say, ‘[s]top, 
stop, stop’ (ViD, 158)), the colonialism segment, and the absent mother segment 
(Hester and Anna in her delirium both embody this). Deleuze and Guattari theorise that 
capitalism and bureaucracy proceed by the production of hard segments which are often 
contiguous with each other and across which desire flows. Desire becomes ‘attached 
to this or that form of content, crystallised in this or that form of expression (capitalist 
desire, fascist desire, bureaucratic desire, and so on)’, attached to this or that segment 
(K, 59). However, when there is a proliferation which results in the acceleration of 
chaotic flows of desire, the creation of a line of flight from the current assemblage 
becomes possible as, however unexpectedly and momentarily, desire might be for the 
abolition of the current assemblage and might just direct itself at an alternative 
assemblage coming into sight. Desire might find ‘a way out, precisely a way out, in the 
discovery that machines are only the concretions of historically determined desire and 
that desire doesn’t cease to undo them’ (K, 59). It is the task of literature to predict 
‘diabolical powers before they become established’, in such a way that desire 
overcomes those powers and finds these lines of escape (K, 59).  
This conceptualisation of political literature enables a positive reading of the 
contrary flows of desire that have run throughout Voyage in the Dark and which 
coalesce in the diverging series as Anna haemorrhages, struggles for life, overhears, 
remembers and imagines. The various terms (people, symbols, motifs, phrases) which 
are repeated in these different series cease to have just a representative function. 
Instead, they ‘become agents, connective cogs of an assemblage [...] each cog 
corresponding to a position of desire, all the cogs and all the positions communicating 
with each other through successive continuities’ (K, 55). Everything in this complex 
assemblage is desire, and this is what Anna’s bodily predicament – which is notably 
also one of delirium, a schizoanalytic term for the predicament of literature – becomes 
in this text’s conclusion. The two contrary forms of desire traverse her body in an 




entrapment in impoverished, undesired motherhood) and the desire for a double death 
in the lethal flow of blood out of her body. This is the desire both of the oppressors and 
the oppressed, ‘desire as a plenitude, exercise, and functioning’ (K, 56). Yet Anna’s 
desire for life is only one instantiation of the impersonal desire that traverses her body. 
This novel’s final scene dramatises the flow of desire of all sorts as life itself. 
Imperialism, capitalism and patriarchy coalesce on the sexually exploited white 
woman’s body as she bleeds out and recalls her colonial childhood. The flows of desire 
in her delirium are the signs of this larger complex assemblage which she now figures 
so well, the assemblage of advanced imperialist capitalism that ‘brings into coexistence 
engineers and parts, materials and machine personnel, executioners and victims, the 
powerful and the powerless, in a single collective ensemble’ (K, 57). Anna’s body is a 
passive concretion of this assemblage and an active moment of resistance and escape. 
There is deathly reterritorialisation in the bedroom, plantation and colony, but there is 
also the contrary impulse which ‘makes desire take flight through all the assemblages, 
rub up against all the segments without settling down in any of them, and carry always 
farther the innocence of a power of deterritorialisation that is the same thing as escape 
(the schizo-law)’ (K, 60). This is not the breaking down of distinction between different 
types of power structures, but the rapid movement from one into the other, such that 
each is constantly changing. The mask is a key trope here and a constant in a sequence 
of transforming segments, as the scene of amateur prostitution and nonconsensual sex 
morphs into the racist assumptions of the family of colonialists and a colonialist’s 
summary of ‘the whole damned business’ of colonialism (ViD, 156), into the 
Masquerade scene which reveals both the oppression of women that breaches racial 
divisions and the violence done to women’s bodies throughout the history of racism. 
In its final sense the mask expresses Anna’s bleak assessment of the void within 
humanity’s lust for power, all society being ‘a place where nobody is’ (158).  
As a concretion of the complex assemblage of advanced imperialist capitalism, 
Anna’s body is caught up in a dangerous becoming that maps the world – an inverse of 
the psychoanalytic archaeology of family drama. ‘Contact and contiguity are 
themselves an active and continuous line of escape’ and so the ‘pathways’ of Anna’s 
delirium and haemorrhaging form a rhizomatic outward movement, ‘open[ing] up all 
the polyvocal elements of desire, in the absence of any transcendental criteria’ (K, 61). 
We can hear numerous voices in the final pages of the novel: Anna’s, Hester’s, 




those celebrating Carnival. As the connections between Anna’s past and present 
proliferate the relationships between speaker, voice and words spoken are destabilised, 
the figures become interchangeable while the words are increasingly torn from sense, 
becoming elements that reverberate with other elements, according to their sound, 
appearance and associations. The flashback-delirium ‘becomes a center for the 
perturbation of situations and characters, a connector that precipitates the movement of 
deterritorialisation’ (K, 61) and, as Anna’s ability to hold onto any one line of narrative 
disintegrates, it precipitates the deterritorialisation of language.   
As desire traverses these segments, the connected terms (the beat of Carnival, 
Hester’s disapproval, the mask) cease to be confined to their representational function, 
and become materially intense expression: there is the pulse of sound (voices, drums), 
movement (Anna’s body, dancing, riding), Anna’s delirious thought, and the 
accelerating pulse of the text as it reaches its conclusion. The meaning of the text then 
emerges not through the interpretation of a fixed linguistic code but when we sense the 
connections and reverberations between these terms and this sound and movement. The 
predicament of Anna’s desiring body, her delirium flashbacks and her uncontrolled 
blood flow connects things in such a way that the text ‘opens up new series and explores 
uncharted regions that extend as far as the unlimited field of immanence’ (K, 62). When 
we read the conclusion of Voyage in the Dark this way we enter into a zone of 
indistinction with the text, in which the reverberations and connections between the 
terms of materially intense expression change according to our affections – our capacity 
to be affected – at any given instant. We find the desire and the pulse that we want at 
any particular moment.  
Three questions remain: what is Rhys’s question in writing? Does she offer a 
prognosis? And does her language at the close of the third novel evidence a high 
coefficient of deterritorialisation? I offer just a tentative answer to the first question 
here. It is answered more fully in the following analysis of Wide Sargasso Sea. My 
feeling is that in Voyage in the Dark and Wide Sargasso Sea Rhys addressed the 
question of how to write what she had to write – that is, what she saw and felt, her own 
perspective – without excluding others, and without writing for and over others. These 
novels are her attempt to write an ‘I’ that is also a ‘we’ that does not inflict avoidable 
violence on others. This gives us an answer to the second question. For decades 
feminist thinkers have been engaged with the question of how to write as an oppressed 




that the end of Voyage in the Dark grapples precisely with this problem and is, 
therefore, a sort of prognosis. How to speak of the multiplicity that is women, how to 
utter something meaningful as this collective assemblage? Rhys offers her answer: start 
with maximum difficulty and complicity. Start with the body of an unhappy, oppressed 
white woman in the moments of abortion and deathly blood loss, with a desire that is 
both claiming escape from the replication of oppressive female roles, and that is 
hardening victimisation, complicity, individualism, irresponsibility, and hardening the 
segments that have been involved in these predicaments. Start with a brilliant, rich and 
political imagining of a predicament of maximum passivity: the patient, brought there 
by passions, and entirely without interpersonal agency, suffering and being moved. 
Start with a series that brings together sex, childhood, slavery, masochism, bleeding, 
dancing, riding, drumming, listening, observing, desiring. Start, in other words, with 
the impulse of the rhizome, reaching out and hoping for the best.  
As to the final question, in her third novel Rhys advanced the most explicit 
version of what would remain from then on her preferred model for concluding novels: 
a dramatic violence experienced by the protagonist in her first-person narrative as a 
deathly self-overcoming is made proximate. The sense of self-overcoming is clearer in 
Good Morning, Midnight and Wide Sargasso Sea, but the violence and death are most 
apparent in Voyage in the Dark. In both the original conclusion and the published 
ending of her third novel Rhys engages with the problem identified by O’Connor 
(1986): how to write the first-person narrator’s death and thereby deterritorialise the 
first-person narrative? We have no reason to think that at the end of the published 
version of Voyage in the Dark Anna does not die, and we need not speculate on her 
existence beyond the narrative. The end of the text marks Anna’s death, and the text 
itself therefore marks her life, hence the repeated references to birth in the opening 
lines. But as Anna’s becoming-unmother concludes by submitting the language of life 
to a deathly deterritorialisation, a line of flight is opened up for a different form of life. 
As the representation of her blood flow releases materially intense expression in the 
text’s acceleration towards its encounter with its outside, with that which is beyond the 
first-person narrator’s life, everything beyond Anna’s capacity for experience, life 
ceases to belong to Anna. Communality may not yet be possible, but at the conclusion 
of Rhys’s third novel the life of the complex assemblage of advanced capitalism, life 




complicity, difficult connection and unmothering thereby finally exceeds the individual 
and becomes impersonal life. This is the implicit affirmation of Voyage in the Dark.  
In the final paragraph of this novel Anna watches the ‘ray of light’ come in 
‘under the door 
 
like the last thrust of remembering before everything is blotted out. I lay and 
watched it and thought about starting all over again. And about being new and 
fresh. And about mornings, and misty days, when anything might happen. And 
about starting all over again, all over again... (ViD, 159) 
 
This passage does not describe Anna’s desire to resume her unhappy promiscuity, nor 
a determination to prolong her existence. The words are fresh and devoid of 
compromise. To me, the ‘new and fresh’ life signals a different life, and perhaps a new 
novel, a new writing life. In the ‘misty days, when anything might happen’ and the 
palpable sense of the cyclical there is an evocation of Wide Sargasso Sea. The words 
suggest imagination and memory, and the freedom, effort and necessity involved in 
working out how to write what ‘you’ve always known, always remembered’. Rhys’s 
subsequent novels will offer a vision as dangerously uncompromising as that in Voyage 
in the Dark. It is likely that in this novel that chronicles Anna’s becoming-unmother, 
Rhys experienced her own becoming-writer.  
 
 
Coda: Anxiety, sensation and connection in Wide Sargasso Sea 
 
I. The ‘struggle’ to ‘get the thing right’ 
Chapter Two concluded by suggesting that anxiety is the dominant affect in Rhys’s 
novels. The subsequent chapters have explored failure in three guises, in Good 
Morning, Midnight and After Leaving Mr Mackenzie; and, in reading Voyage in the 
Dark, I have identified an aesthetic solution to an on-going problem that is predicated 
on risk. This concluding discussion turns to the anxiety of Wide Sargasso Sea and 
examines the conclusion to Rhys’s search for the conditions of positive connection.   
Rhys voiced anxiety about a great variety of things in her writing and 




however, most evident in her letters to her editors, Diana Athill and Francis Wyndham, 
in which she wrote of her anxiety at confirming her final novel’s completion and 
relinquishing control by handing it over for publication. She demonstrated the degree 
of this worry by delaying for twenty-seven years before publishing a work which was 
written at least in fledgling form in 1939. The clearest and most resonant evocation of 
this concern occurs across a number of her poems and letters to her editors between 
1964 and 1966, in which Rhys refers to her ‘struggle’ to ‘get the thing right’ and finish 
(or bring to term) Wide Sargasso Sea, her grudging acceptance that – due to some 
mysterious aesthetic law – the gestation was complete, and her fearful awareness or 
‘complex’ that the text, once birthed, would have a life of its own which she would not 
be able to control, ‘cold print being so final and nothing to be done about it anymore’ 
(Letters, 255). Rhys was plagued by the impossibility of determining the final, perfect 
linguistic expression and deeply anxious about the chance of a negative critical 
reception and the likelihood of being misread. In a letter of 1964 to Francis Wyndham, 
Rhys ponders how she, ‘of all people’, dare ‘say [Brontë] was wrong? Or that her 
Bertha is impossible? Which she is’ (Letters, 271). Rhys then cites an important passage 
from Brontë’s 1850 ‘Preface’ to her sister’s novel, Wuthering Heights, which describes 
the essentially passive role of the writer in relation to the creative work which somehow 
assumes a life of its own.: 
 
She wrote: - Charlotte did: 
‘This I know: The writer...owns something of which he is not always 
master... it will perhaps for years lie in subjection... then without warning of 
revolt there comes a time... when it sets to work... You have little choice left but 
quiescent adoption (?) As for you, the nominal artist – your share is to work 
passively – under dictates you neither delivered nor could question – that would 
not be delivered at your prayer, nor changed at your caprice. If the result be 
attractive the World will praise you, who little deserve praise. If it be repulsive 
the World will blame you, who as little deserve blame.’ 
So you see she knew. It is so. (Brontë 1850: xxiii-xxiv, in Letters, 271) 
 
This passage was clearly of great importance to Rhys. In her letters at around this time 
Rhys makes numerous references to the poetry she was writing in order to ‘cure 




‘labour’ of writing prose and to access creative solutions for Wide Sargasso Sea 
(Letters, 261 and 271). One such text, entitled ‘Kitchen Poem’, is dedicated ‘To 
Charlotte Bronte [sic], who said “There comes a time…”’ and relays the inspiration 
Rhys found in her dreams (‘ ’), her anxious 
attempt to conclude a text (obviously her final novel) and her awareness of the 
instability and violence of both words and critical reception, which might ‘  
’.71 Rhys had been nurturing Wide Sargasso Sea for close to three decades 
when she wrote this poem and the letter to Wyndham, and a sense of awe at the mystery 
of the final appearance of the novel is palpable in her repetition of Brontë’s words. It 
is striking that Rhys’s expression of passivity in the creative act is formulated using the 
words of Brontë, to whom Rhys’s long-gestated novel is a reply. There is here a sense 
of over-determined passivity. We might go as far as inferring a sort of possession or 
Obeah at work, whereby Brontë or some other force was controlling precisely when 
and how Wide Sargasso Sea was to be born: ‘I’m not quite in control of [the novel] 
now’, Rhys declared in 1964, ‘[i]t’s in control of me’ (Letters, 274).  
Rhys’s use of Brontë’s ‘Preface’ may be read as homage or taken as the 
expression of Rhys’s sense of inadequacy in comparison to the canonical nineteenth-
century novelist. We can infer a political dimension in this uneasy, even phobic 
identification, as the woman from the colony adopts words from a canonical voice of 
the motherland to describe her literary endeavour to write back. If Sandra Gilbert and 
Susan Gubar had considered Rhys’s relationship to Brontë they might have read an 
identification with the older English author that counteracts a characteristically female 
‘“anxiety of authorship” – a radical fear that [Rhys] cannot create, that because she can 
never become a [historically male] “precursor” the act of writing will isolate or destroy 
her’ (1979: 49). This is not, however, the anxiety that I read in Rhys’s authorial 
statements. Undoubtedly, within them we find her political awareness of the instability 
and violence of language and her knowledge of the intensified problems with 
authorship experienced by women writers. But on my reading Rhys’s anxious 
connection to Brontë, and her statements concerning her literary practice delineate not 
 
71 Rhys’s poem ‘Obeah Night’ gave her the idea for the love potion plot device on which the last third 
of the novel turns and through which Rhys makes the husband sympathetic to a degree. She sent it to 
Francis Wyndham and it is published in her Letters (264-266). ‘Kitchen Poem’ is held in UTC: 






a problem of writing as a woman and concerning women’s access to language, but a 
problem with what happens to the writer as she writes. Despite the maternity metaphor, 
I do not read Rhys’s ontological problem with creation as centring on gender. Her 
statements convey an irrepressible anxiety at the fact that literary creation involves a 
deeply problematic relinquishment of agency as the artist becomes a conduit for 
inspiration; she becomes passive before the work of art which in a sense births itself. 
Rhys found motherhood difficult, but came to understand writing as a comparable form 
of creation in which the writer is caught up in an anxious, passive becoming-mother in 
which she has limited control over the development and birth of her creation. In a tragic 
letter of March 1966 Rhys informs her editor of the sudden death of her husband, Max 
Hamer, and declares in a passive voice that Wide Sargasso Sea is now ready:  
 
I’ve dreamt several times that I was going to have a baby – then I woke with 
relief.  
Finally I dreamt that I was looking at the baby in a cradle – such a puny 
weak thing. 
So the book must be finished, and that must be what I think about it really. I 
don’t dream about it any more. (Letters, 301) 
 
Confronted with another profound loss, it seems that Rhys could sustain no further faith 
in improving her novel. Circumstance concluded the tortuous writing process which 
had spanned three decades, and the artist concluded her greatest work with an 
acknowledgement of her passivity. Whereas in Good Morning, Midnight Rhys faced 
the possibilities that the art work and the art world do nothing, in her struggle to produce 
her final novel she seems to have faced the question of how to locate and necessarily 
relinquish artistic agency in the process of literary creation. I propose, then, that Rhys’s 
anxiety at birthing her texts found fictional expression in narratives in which the 
maternal line is severed and intuitive affiliations across divergent series are established 
in its place, and that the passivity of her protagonists figures the author’s anxiety 
concerning her own passivity in the creative act.  
Anthony Cuda has written a compelling book on modernist anxiety concerning 
the relinquishment of control in the passions of the creative process (2010). The writers 
on whom he focuses refuse ‘to grant the viability of an intellectual and self-possessed 




unpredictable energies of passion’ (Cuda 2010: 187). Instead, argues Cuda, they 
address the illusion of the artist’s complete control and self-awareness, and the fact that 
‘psychological openness or vulnerability to intrusion is neither weakness nor aberration 
but a structural part of how we experience the world and a constitutive part of the 
creative process’ (2010: 187). They return obsessively to scenes of passivity or what 
Cuda calls ‘passion scenes’ in order to develop textual strategies that ‘reflect the 
ceaselessly uncomfortable and often threatening ways in which passion both shapes 
and disfigures our experiences of self-possession and creativity’ (2010: 34). Cuda’s 
reading is compelling and his arguments transpose easily onto Rhys’s novels which 
concern both passivity and passion. I contend that the Rhys woman’s passivity, her 
willingness to be vulnerable and buffeted by the world through which she moves, 
constitutes Rhys’s evolving version of Cuda’s passion scene. 
Rhys’s novels show us that ‘good’ activity is often not really good and that 
passivity is not the opposite of activity; they offer a diagnosis of the human condition, 
depicting it as affective enmeshment, a matter of sometimes disgusting and sometimes 
shameful bodies being affected by intensities which move those bodies closer to or 
further from joyful action. Sasha expresses this succinctly: 
 
My life, which seems so simple and monotonous, is really a complicated affair 
of cafés where they like me and cafés where they don’t, streets that are friendly, 
streets that aren’t, rooms where I might be happy, rooms where I never shall be, 
looking-glasses I look nice in, looking-glasses I don’t, dresses that will be lucky, 
dresses that won’t, and so on. (GMM, 40) 
 
Conspicuously absent here are other people and how they affect Sasha, but the passage 
nevertheless shows subjectivity to be a dissipating individuation taking place as one is 
affected by other entities. Rhys’s art is not a matter of developing compensatory 
mechanisms to shore up the fragments of a self-contained, self-identical ego.72 Instead, 
her prescient vision helps us to see the life of the affected not as a limitation, an 
inhibition or a symptom, but the stuff of great literature. Her novels are the necessary 
other side of this story, whereby we affect others with words in what Claire Colebrook 
 
72 Cuda’s analysis takes as a counterpoint statements by a range of figures such as Freud, Georg Simmel, 
T.E. Hulme, Wilhelm Worringer and the ‘Men of 1914’ which suggest that art (and formal 




describes as the ‘transindividual possibility of becoming’ (Colebrook 2000a: 7). This 
is the potential of great literature.  
This thesis has argued that passivity is a function of Rhysian becoming. I 
suggest, in conclusion, that it also figures an authorial anxiety concerning agency. 
When the individual is conceived as an emerging entity determined largely by its 
encounters, it becomes very difficult to locate agency. Rhys does not, in general, make 
great effort to locate it (Antoinette’s becoming-disgusting is a rare exception), 
preferring instead to focus on the experience of and potential in vulnerability and 
openness. I believe that we have no reason to think that this choice was not a positive 
one. We can read Rhys as affirming the ontological, aesthetic and ethical value of the 
instability which arises from not possessing but being possessed and affected by the 
winds of external causation. The ending of the last two novels strongly convey an 
affirmation of openness. This situation sheds light on and is illuminated by Rhys’s 
ontological and, I think, ethical statement that ‘when you are safe you are very rarely 
free [...] when you are free you are very rarely safe’. Free need not mean free from 
oppressive conditions or from political structures which limit our capacity for joy. It 
may denote the dissolution of becoming. One of the most curious things about Rhys’s 
fiction is the fact that there is paranoia and anger but strikingly little anxiety felt by the 
protagonists concerning their lack of safety. There is, instead, the potent anxiety 
palpable in Sasha’s lonely description of the affective life that signals the global affect 
that saturates Rhys’s novels and becomes urgent in the final three. Our bodies are 
proximate to other bodies and life is a matter of relationality, yet connection with other 
people is precisely that which is hardest to affirm for Rhys’s protagonists because 
people are, more often than not, hostile. Sasha cannot even acknowledge others in this 
passage. This inability to affirm connection with other people is, I contend, the source 
of the most profound anxiety within Rhys’s novels. In Wide Sargasso Sea she reaches 
a means of resolving this which is also her means of overcoming her worry about the 
artist’s passivity. 
One solution can be sensed at the end of Good Morning, Midnight which, like 
Antoinette’s call to Tia, suggests that the literary text itself be considered for its 
‘transindividual possibilit[ies] of becoming’. Both novels end in a dark, unknown 
‘passage’, signalled in the fourth novel by an ellipsis, between indeterminate states, in 
which the protagonist is somehow connected to another. These conclusions work for 




change. However, in Wide Sargasso Sea, Rhys develops a far more sophisticated means 
of affirming connection by saturating her text with affect, in the form of ‘pure’ and 
‘autonomous’ entities extracted from human affections, blocs of ‘nonhuman 
becomings’ through which art gives ‘sensation the power to exist’ (WP, 166). These 
blocs of sensation make connection visible, bringing it into presence and thereby 
countering Antoinette’s and Rhys’s anxious inability to affirm connections with others. 
This argument is indebted to Cuda’s reading of T. S. Eliot’s 1940 poem ‘East Coker’, 
which became the second part of Eliot’s Four Quartets in 1943. Cuda argues that Eliot’s 
complex manipulation of sound and imagery in this poem ‘recalibrate[s] the affective 
scales of passion and surrender’ in such a way that Eliot can accept that the ‘passive 
nature of inspiration coincides with – rather than opposing or obstructing – the active 
processes of the conscious mind’ (Cuda 2010: 60). In the ‘midst of debilitating 
paralysis’, images and sounds work as ‘signals of affective emergence’, countering 
evacuation with presence as ‘process[es] of becoming visible and audible’ (Cuda 2010: 
60). Drawing on Cuda’s analysis, I propose that blocs of sensation formed from a dense, 
dynamic network of connections logically oppose the dangerous impulse to 
individualism that is always threatening in Rhys’s work and always hinders – if not 
actually severing – relationality. To conclude this discussion I turn to the life that Rhys 
gives to sensation in the attic scene in Wide Sargasso Sea.   
 
II. Becoming-present  
A great deal has been written on the idea of the return in Rhys’s fiction, and her complex 
transmutation of fact into fiction. GoGwilt reads in this oeuvre an ongoing search for 
the lost memory of Rhys’s Caribbean childhood (2011), and Hulme and Gregg have 
discussed how Rhys distorted history due to her inability to face it. I propose that 
Rhys’s returns and use of facts are her means of forging connections between people, 
places, histories and, of course, texts. The fire at Coulibri in Wide Sargasso Sea is the 
most potent return in this fiction and is also the rewriting of historical events. The 
conflagration of Antoinette’s childhood home, in the novel’s first section adumbrates 
Antoinette-Bertha’s concluding act of setting fire to her husband’s house in England, 
thereby also establishing the fact that the novel is a return to the prehistory of Jane 
Eyre. The fire functions as the mnemonic trace of race riots in the West Indies in the 




at Grand Bay, Dominica, which was the slave plantation bought by her maternal great-
grandfather in 1824 and which, on his death, was left to his wife, Jean, to run. There 
was an attack on the property by rioters in the Dominican ‘Census Riots’ or ‘Guerre 
Negre’ of 1844, but the house was not burnt.73 However, the ‘Estate house at Geneva 
was burned down in 1932 during a period of unrest in which the incumbent Lockhart 
was very unpopular’ (Hulme 1994a: 87, n. 12). This was four years before Rhys’s one 
return to the island. Notwithstanding this transposition of a 1930s fire to the 1830s, the 
fire at Coulibri, in a work published when Rhys was in her late seventies, can obviously 
be understood as a search for the lost memories of childhood. It undoubtedly marks a 
confrontation with her history. It may symbolise the emigrant’s final admission that her 
home is irretrievably lost and, given Rhys’s problematic position growing up in 
Dominica as the white great-granddaughter of a slave-owner, may have always been. 
To me the fire obliquely suggests the violence committed by her family. Crucially, Rhys 
locates Coulibri in Jamaica, thereby putting a critical distance between her story’s 
opening tale of origins and her childhood, and the fire thereby stands for the traumatic 
history of the region as well as her family history.74 Crucially, the fire also signifies an 
authorial history.  
In a letter of 1945 Rhys writes that she has a ‘novel half finished’ and it ‘might 
be the one book [she’d] written that’s much use’ (Letters, 39). This was ‘Le Revenant’, 
an early version of Wide Sargasso Sea (Letters, 213). According to Angier, the fate of 
this embryonic novel had already taken a dramatic turn in 1939, in a striking incident 
which was ‘extraordinary, a typically Jean story’ (1990: 372): 
 
One day after Good Morning, Midnight had been published Leslie gave [Rhys] 
Jane Eyre: and suddenly – so he told Maryvonne, and so Jean must have told 
him – she had ‘a marvellous idea’. She was very excited. She wrote Le 
Revenant, or half of it, very quickly, and Leslie typed what she had written [...] 
But then something happened. They had a furious row; and to punish Leslie she 
took his typescript and burned it in the grate. (Angier 1990: 371) 
 
73 Hulme has redressed the fact that in much Rhys criticism the fire in Wide Sargasso Sea is taken and 
reported as historical fact (1994a). He suggests that Rhys’s fictionalisation of the event may have had a 
compensatory function, enabling her to view her family as victims of history rather than individuals who 
were involved in handing out extreme and violent punishments to the black rioters. 
74 Part Two of the novel takes place on an unspecified Windward Island, though the geographical 
descriptions suggest the island on which Rhys grew up. Granbois is based on Bona Vista, Rhys’s father’s 





Assuming the tale is accurate we can infer that in her rage, destroying her manuscript 
was Rhys’s means of exerting agency, whether with the intention of punishing herself 
or her husband; and in this act we can sense the threat to agency that producing a 
finished novel may have represented for Rhys. In terms of these arguments it is striking, 
to say the least, that in the year in which the Second World War broke out, and Rhys’s 
fictional testament to the death of her artistic birthplace was published, the author 
herself burned a version of her fifth novel which would, in its final form, open and 
close with an image of a fire which had its origins in Rhys’s family history. In a sense, 
then, we can read the burning of Coulibri, which connects various biographical, 
historical and textual facts to one another, as the objective correlative of the violent 
dissolution of the artist in the passion of artistic creation. This passion involves an 
encounter with the unthinkable (the failure of art to effect positive change), the 
proliferation of both forms of desire in a chaotic optimism, and the anxious passivity 
of the creative process as the author is ‘taken over’ by the passions of inspiration. On 
this reading, the fire is the objective correlative of the literary passion which ensures 
that loss of the self – rather than loss of one’s origins – is the condition of writing. In 
one sense, then, this is a fairly conventional use of a symbol which denotes the 
impossible simultaneity of destruction and creation. In another, the fire figures the 
connection of disparate moments of violence across diverse series (historical and 
textual) and thereby has a similar function to that of Anna’s body at the conclusion of 
Voyage in the Dark.  
In this sequence of repetitions, returns and fires, connection becomes almost 
tangible and we might even intuit Rhys’s intention in the title of her final novel, which 
evokes a threateningly dense marine tangle that prevents smooth movement. The 
Sargasso Sea is the only sea to not be bound by a land mass, and the title thereby also 
suggests a concern with that which threatens us in ‘free’, unbound being – the difficulty 
of both locating agency and affirming positive connections with others. The title also 
indicates Rhys’s preoccupation with place. For Deleuze and Guattari great writers 
create percepts or ‘beings of sensation, which preserve in themselves the hour of a day, 
a moment’s degree of warmth’; these are ‘the landscape before man, in the absence of 
man’, ‘compound[s] of sensation that no longer need[] anyone’ (WP, 169). Wide 
Sargasso Sea presents a marvellous dramatisation of how the pure qualities of the 




ego on the West Indian island, and Antoinette is made deathly cold and amnesiac by 
the environment of the English attic-prison. Poetic logic in one territory becomes loss 
of self in another. There is great potential in perceiving Rhys’s urban and Dominican 
landscapes – the plantation gone to ruin, the threatening streets of Paris and the English 
streets which are ‘all alike’ – not as external places, but as the very element of a 
‘passage of life’, showing us that ‘[w]e are not in the world, we become with the world’ 
(WP, 169). Rhys’s oeuvre unfolds as a drama of navigating social encounters but also 
those landscapes which lead to an ‘increase or decrease’ of our power, ‘growth or 
decline, joy or sadness’ (Deleuze 1997: 140).  
Antoinette’s intense love for her homeland gives us an important signal 
concerning how to read the end of the final novel. It is at the end of Wide Sargasso Sea, 
when Antoinette is trapped in the cold, unpleasant attic that she develops an intensely 
affective imaginative capacity centred on her response to her red dress which allows 
her to reach back to other inhabitants of her homeland. Antoinette’s removal from the 
island or, to rephrase it, the termination of her becoming-island, leads to a far more 
potent sort of becoming, in which she enters into a zone of indistinction, encountering 
others from her island, sensing connection firstly with Coco the parrot, then Aunt Cora 
and finally Tia in the bloc of sensation which creates her line of flight and necessary 
destruction. The Coulibri fire serves as the keystone for the affective register Rhys 
builds, becoming the key point of affective, intuitive connection in a dense tissue of 
relationality.  
During the fire at Coulibri, the family escape the burning house only for Annette 
to attempt to re-enter. Mason asks if she is trying to rescue her ‘Jewel case’, but Aunt 
Cora tells him ‘Nothing so sensible’, and explains that Annette wanted to return for her 
‘damned parrot’, Coco, a bird that ‘didn’t talk very well, he could say Qui est là? Qui 
est là? And answer himself Ché Coco, Ché Coco’ (WSS, 35). Mason prevents Annette 
from returning for the bird, and shortly afterwards Coco emerges from the 
conflagration: 
 
I opened my eyes, everybody was looking up and pointing at Coco on the glacis 
railings with his feathers alight. He made an effort to fly down but his clipped 
wings failed him and he fell screeching. He was all on fire. 
 I began to cry. ‘Don’t look,’ said Aunt Cora. ‘Don’t look.’ She stopped and 





In the attic in Thornfield Hall, Antoinette’s life depends on her affective awareness of 
colour, smell and texture that remind her of vitality: ‘Time has no meaning. But 
something you can touch and hold like my red dress, that has a meaning. Where is it?’ 
(WSS, 151). The dress reminds Antoinette of the Coulibri fire – it is ‘the colour of fire 
and sunset’ – and the deathly fall of Coco, but this affective association itself has 
vitality, enabling that experience when ‘your soul is lifted up when it flowers. Everyone 
wants that’ (151). The force of the affective imagery and the smell of the dress grows: 
 
The scent that came from the dress was very faint at first, then it grew stronger. 
The smell of vertivert and frangipanni, of cinnamon and dust and lime trees 
when they are flowering. The smell of the sun and the smell of the rain. 
  
 ... I was wearing a dress of that colour when Sandi came to see me for the 
last time. (WSS, 151) 
 
In the final line, the smell of the landscape of her home conjures Antoinette’s 
affectionate relationship with Sandi which has not been included from her perspective 
until now. This reminiscence is a moment of hope, despite its pathos. Later, after a 
violent incident in which her step-brother denies her help, Antoinette is left feeling 
worse off and worries that ‘they had changed’ her dress when she wasn’t looking; but 
she reassures herself, ‘but how could they get the scent?’ (WSS, 152). She sees it laid 
out on the floor and again her affective response is a transformational encounter: ‘and 
it was as if the fire had spread across the room. It was beautiful and it reminded me of 
something I must do. I will remember I thought. I will remember quite soon now’ (153). 
At this point, the affect produced by her dress which recalls the Coulibri fire begins to 
resemble the paradoxical feeling of needing to do something that will risk everything; 
this is the ‘necessity’ to ‘lose [...] soul to find soul’, Antoinette’s necessary surrender to 
bliss, that Harris celebrates (1980: 145, 148). However, there is still an ebb and flow of 
affect; it has not sufficiently secured its life, there is not enough sensation to make 
connection present.  
Harris persuasively identifies the flamboyant ‘tree of life’ at Coulibri (WSS, 17), 
which resurfaces in this late vision, with the foodbearing tree in the Arawak-Carib 




is handling the ‘variables of unconsciousness’ in drawing on this pre-Columbian 
imagery: ‘Nothing […] possesses quite the tone of necessity – that runs deeper than 
appearance and logic – with which Jean Rhys imbues Antoinette, and in so doing makes 
her madness essentially human’ (Harris 1980: 145). The necessity Harris identifies runs 
throughout the novel but becomes palpable in the novel’s closing pages, as Antoinette 
returns again and again to the increasingly affective red dress. The garment’s intensity 
increases as the prose seems to be involved in a conjuration, adding ever greater density 
of connection to its material, so that it does not just smell of Antoinette’s home, or 
remind her of a sexual passion, but incorporates history (her own and that of the West 
Indies) and mythology, figured by the foodbearing tree of life, and then, gradually, the 
specifics of a life which can sustain, populated finally by people, landscape and 
creatures with whom Antoinette desires connection: 
 
Then I turned round and saw the sky. It was red and all my life was in it. I saw 
the grandfather clock and Aunt Cora’s patchwork, all colours, I saw the orchids 
and the stephanotis and the jasmine and the tree of life in flames[...] I saw my 
doll’s house and the books and the picture of the Miller’s Daughter. I heard the 
parrot call as he did when he saw a stranger, Qui est là? Qui est là? and the man 
who hated me was calling too, Bertha! Bertha! The wind caught my hair and it 
streamed out like wings. […] when I looked over the edge I saw the pool at 
Coulibri. Tia was there. She beckoned to me [...] All this I saw and heard in a 
fraction of a second. And the sky so red. Someone screamed and I thought, Why 
did I scream? I called ‘Tia!’ and jumped and woke. (WSS, 155) 
 
This time Antoinette’s vision is dense with warm colour, sweet fragrance, sound, 
motion, the familiar, the fearful, a sense of timelessness and above all a sense of rich, 
intricate connection which is neither simple nor linear but ‘alliances, alloys; these are 
not successions, lines of descent, but contagions, epidemics, the wind’ (Deleuze and 
Parnet 2006: 52). This is an affective delirium, a poetic complex of imagery and 
sensation formed through a dense entanglement of relations which has been built over 
pages. This bloc of sensation composed of affects and percepts logically opposes the 
anxious, passive inability to affirm human relationships which has dominated since the 
opening page and all Rhys’s previous novels, by securing the presence of connection 




it is neither controlled nor determined by her. Rather, she is passive before it and it 
moves Antoinette to call out to Tia, in a process similar to that described by Deleuze in 
his essay on T. E. Lawrence: 
 
The mind begins by coldly and curiously regarding what the body does, it is 
first of all a witness; then it is affected, it becomes an impassioned witness, that 
is, it experiences for itself affects that are not simple effects of the body, but 
veritable critical entities that hover over the body and judge it. (Deleuze 1997: 
124) 
 
This scene dramatises affect as sensation given life, expressed in its ability to affect 
Antoinette.  Language is no longer confined to its representational function but has 
become a liberated language torn from sense, ‘a living and expressive material that 
speaks for itself and has no need of being put into a form’ (K, 21). The signifiers no 
longer just convey meaning. They create sensation, acting directly on Antoinette and 
reminding her of what she must do: ‘Now at last I know why I was brought here and 
what I have to do’ (WSS, 156). Critics have debated the meaning of Antoinette’s final 
call to Tia. My suggestion is that by securing affective connection the bloc of sensation 
impassions Antoinette sufficiently so she becomes able to recognise that she ‘must’ do 
that which feels most difficult: to repeat her dreamt call to Tia from the battlements in 
her waking life, to affirm the possibility of communality in the future, in hope and as a 
sign of reparation, in Antoinette’s and Rhys’s full knowledge of their complicity in 
what has been.  
This thesis has argued that Rhys’s fiction assigns great value to difficulty, and I 
propose that Antoinette calls to Tia in her dream because of all the people Antoinette 
has encountered it is the affirmation of her connection with Tia that is the most 
necessary. Her connection with the girl who has instinctively punished Antoinette for 
her family’s actions, a girl who has both less and more than her, is the most necessary 
because it is the most difficult to affirm. Antoinette has never been able to comprehend 
and accept the divisions between herself and Tia which made friendship impossible; 
and if the suggestion in the previous chapter holds, then this connection is difficult, too, 
because Antoinette’s call is in no way selfless as she is calling to Tia’s mother as well 
as the black community in general. As she did in her third novel, Rhys again makes 




involves contrary desires the central procedure at work is not a chaotic proliferation in 
hope, but the making present of feeling. Antoinette’s need for the vitality of her dress 
leads to the conjuration of a bloc of sensation dense with connections to her homeland 
which overcomes her scepticism and enables her really to feel the need to affirm a 
connection with Tia in a moment when she has nothing left to lose. In the most intuitive 
form Rhys affirms a creative necessity of feeling in the place of the presupposition of 
a people who work for and with one another. Communality can never be assumed for 
Rhys but her global affect finally becomes creative, and the need to really feel the need 
to forge a connection becomes the text’s affirmation of its own anxious feelings as a 
condition for faith in a better world and faith in what we might describe as falling into 
love, a ‘matter’ described beautifully by Sedgwick as 
 
suddenly, globally, ‘knowing’ that another person represents your only access 
to some vitally  
transmissible truth  
or radiantly heightened  
mode of perception, 
and that if you lose the thread of this intimacy, both your soul and your whole 
world might subsist forever in some desert-like state of ontological 
impoverishment. (Sedgwick 1999: 167) 
 
The tragic mode of Wide Sargasso Sea enables Rhys’s sophisticated and beautiful 
solution to the problem that runs through all her writing, as the loss of soul to find soul 
concludes with an affective making-present that affirms the possibility of sharing truth 
and thereby knowing the world in a better way. There are a number of reasons for 
relating the ethical overcoming of Wide Sargasso Sea to Rhys’s engagement in the mid-
1960s with the problem of relinquishing agency in the creative process. It is relatively 
straightforward to see how Rhys might have viewed the creative passions as the loss of 
soul to find soul. Passivity was clearly a condition of difficult feeling for her, but 
perhaps in the mystery of creativity the impossibility of defining her borders and 
locating agency was alchemised for or by Rhys into the necessity of somehow affirming 
her connection with others. The monument of feeling that Rhys creates in her art is 
proof that whether or not intended, that connection is one of her greatest achievements. 




overcome in her final novel, thereby moving protagonist and author towards joyful 
action. However, Ahmed’s arguments are also resonant here. There is a movement 
through Rhys’s novels from individualist passivity to the ethical capacity for openness 
that we sense in Voyage in the Dark and finally see in Wide Sargasso Sea. After her 
dream, Antoinette has nothing left to do but complete Bertha’s actions, and this means 
that she has nothing left to lose in calling to Tia. This does not happen in the novel. The 
conditions of a minor language are not yet in place for Antoinette or Rhys, nor for us 
today. Yet Wide Sargasso Sea helps us to recognise that our awareness of the need to 
feel the need to forge connections while practising an ethical vulnerability might just 
be an integral aspect of our becoming-revolutionary. Rhys shows us that practising an 
ethical vulnerability enables such an awareness. The point is to pay attention to the 
many things that feeling does today and might do in the future. Feeling enables 
Antoinette to remember what she must do, and the novel enables us to remember that 





This thesis has proceeded as a process of abstraction, extracting disconnected scenes 
of passivity and problems from Rhys’s last four novels, which have been examined 
using various schizoanalytic tools in conjunction with a few others. A politics of 
difference has been identified which is central to a textual thinking through of the limit 
of thought. The artist’s confrontation with the literary text’s incapacity to effect change 
has a counterpart in characters who face or refuse to face their complicity in the 
established order. The political nature of desire affects relationality in these novels, 
requiring a break from the tradition figured by the maternal line, and Rhys establishes 
in its place a proliferation of contrary states of desire. Similarly, there is an absence of 
good development in these narratives which disrupts the textual coagulation of 
normative values, and forces the reader to examine her own ideological framework and 
libidinal position. Complicity is addressed textually by embodying the proliferation of 
the segments of a complex, temporally and geographically expansive assemblage in the 
haemorrhaging body of a young woman who has chosen to terminate her pregnancy. 




in favour of and disrupts the established order, it plays out as joyful and sad passions, 
and it proceeds as a becoming, as the constant variation of the protagonists’ power, and 
as the object of art, that which art brings to life and which, in turn, has the capacity to 
bring us ‘to life’.  
The thesis has also proceeded as a process of creation, establishing relations 
between these disconnected arguments and identifying tendencies and functions which 
run through and are developed across Rhys’s work from After Leaving Mr Mackenzie 
to Wide Sargasso Sea. There are, of course, scenes and problems which have not made 
it into this thesis, which nevertheless deserve to be incorporated into the analysis. The 
most obvious is a detailed examination of how place works in this fiction. Two 
Deleuzian ideas which hold considerable potential for Rhys studies might help us to 
take the reading of Rhys’s philosophical literature which has been attempted here into 
contact with the considerable work which has been done on landscape and environment 
in this writing. These are the percept and the idea of the climate of concepts, both of 
which are dealt with in What is Philosophy?. The former, at least, might help us to 
further open up Rhys’s attachments to Dominica and Paris.  
This thesis has attempted to establish Rhys’s philosophical credentials, but far 
more work is warranted in this area. In particular, archive work would be useful for 
establishing textual histories, more details concerning connections across texts and 
Rhys’s other articulations of philosophical problems concerning, among other things, 
agency, subjectivity, perspectivism and the passivity of the writer. Further evidence of 
Rhys’s political views would also be useful, and of course her unpublished writing held 
in the Rhys archive in Tulsa would be a sensible place to start looking for this. The 
fragment which has been so central to this study was sourced from Elaine Savory’s 
1998 monograph, and it is not currently listed on the McFarlin Library’s online archive 
inventory.75 It would be worthwhile to compile these fragments. It is, I think, likely that 
they include material which would warrant further philosophical study.  
The nature of Deleuze’s philosophy is such that it was not possible to look in 
detail at Rhys’s novels through a number of aspects of his thought and to bring this 
examination into intricate dialogue with postcolonial and feminist theories such as 
those I outlined in the first chapter. The intersection of Deleuze’s philosophy and these 
political and literary theories is an important subject for academic inquiry, and Rhys’s 
 




fiction is an ideal context for such work. Obvious connections to be explored are those 
between Deleuze’s thought and Édouard Glissant’s poetics of Relation in the context 
of Rhys’s affirmation of difference, her individualism and her position as a West Indian 
writer; and the relation between Deleuze’s work and Hélène Cixous’s écriture féminine 
in relation to Rhys’s minor literature and what I have identified as her libidinal 
mapping.  
The model of Rhys’s minor literature needs refinement. In particular, it calls to 
be related more substantially to the development of Rhys’s language, so as to account 
for the languages she was exposed to in Dominica which included West Indian Creole 
English, and black and white local variations of it, standard English, French and French 
patois. Ideally this model would also incorporate Rhys’s preference for French and her 
development as an artist writing in French. The concept of Rhys’s minor literature 
deserves to be thoroughly interrogated through relevant postcolonial theories. This was 
not within the scope of this thesis, but I hope the arguments developed here have 
opened some avenues of potential inquiry.  
One of the things that has emerged strongly from this investigation is the 
potential of reading affect in Rhys’s fiction. For decades critics have sought ways to 
navigate between postcolonial and psychoanalytic feminist concerns in Rhys’s 
narratives, and it seems that closer attention to her inscription of affect as that which is 
social and political would be profitable here. The psychoanalytic work of Jessica 
Benjamin (1988) and André Green (1986) might be profitably used to further prise 
open the difficult issue of miscegenation which runs through Rhys’s narratives and 
constitutes an important dimension of the mother-daughter relationships. However, one 
of the most resonant relationships to emerge in the lines of inquiry followed in this 
thesis is that between Rhys’s writing of affect and Fanon’s psychoanalytic work on race 
and colonialism. While bringing these two writers into dialogue with one another is 
clearly a task fraught with difficulty, I think further exploration of this connection 
would be particularly productive.  
A  diffuse issue in this thesis has been the matter of competing types of ‘strong’, 
‘generous’ and ‘weak’ readings. The analysis has navigated the problems in using 
Deleuze, whose thought vacillates between weak and strong but definitely inclines to 
the latter, to produce a strong reading of a weak strategy. This has not been the central 
concern, but it would be instructive to stage further encounters between Deleuze’s 




philosophers of ‘weakness’. There is a recently energised interest in literary studies in 
vulnerability, demonstrated in the torrent of beautiful work on ‘critical vulnerability’ 
(Emma Mason), fragility, shattering (Sara Ahmed), trembling and the tremulous 
(Glissant). Thinking about these arguments together, one of the questions which 
emerges is: how does one draw out the potential in vulnerability without idealising it 
and, unwittingly, turning it into a strength? How do we claim that passivity does 
something of political value while still arguing that it works through weakness? To 
argue that a character’s passivity does something of political value is to argue that it is 
therefore ‘acceptable’ according to usual notions of doing. It may be argued that this 
thesis inadvertently works to soften the political force of Rhys’s radical passivity: that 
in showing it to be doing something, I have rendered it ‘acceptable’, when a moralistic 
notion of acceptability is precisely what Rhys’s fiction works against.  
The resolution of these various questions is not something that can be offered 
here. I do, however, propose that we follow Braidotti and many other feminist thinkers 
who argue that we should look to the myriad possibilities for political change, that we 
should always consider our own positionality, and that our critical practice should be 
nomadic rather than well-behaved. This study has argued that Rhys does these things 
in her fiction. I have tried to do likewise and have aimed to open up passivity in these 
novels by reading it as the difficult, persistent and passionate life of Rhys’s writing. 
This thesis has, I hope, demonstrated that there is good reason to read Rhys 
alongside Deleuze and through the schizoanalytic method. To conclude, I turn briefly 
to Rhys’s ideas about a writing life which bear a striking resemblance to statements in 
Deleuze’s final work – an essay entitled ‘Immanence: A Life’.76 Deleuze writes:  
 
What is immanence? A life... 
[...] 
A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes 
through and that are measured by given living objects: an immanent life 
carrying with it the events or singularities that are merely actualised in subjects 
and objects. This indefinite life does not itself have moments, close as they may 
be one to another, but only between-times, between-moments; it doesn’t just 
 
76 This was originally published as ‘L’Immanence: une vie’, in Philosophie, 47 (1995): 3-7. It appeared 
just two months before Deleuze’s death in November of that year. The English translation, by Anne 




come about or come after but offers the immensity of an empty time where one 
sees the event yet to come and already happened, in the absolute of an 
immediate consciousness. (Deleuze 2001: 29) 
 
Rhys’s novels actualise the life she lived, and she claimed in letters and in Smile Please 
that literature, poetry and the act of writing were her reasons for life. To her daughter 
in 1959 Rhys wrote that yes, human beings are generally ‘devils – but poor devils most 
of them’, and yet, 
 
Still one is left with all sorts of problems. How to explain away music, painting, 
poetry, courage, self-sacrifice of any sort, flowers, gardens, good acting or 
writing. Grace or beauty at all?  
[...] 
So to encourage myself I’ll write MAGNA VERITAS PREVALLI and stick 
it on the screen (Great is truth it will prevail). For I know that to write as well 
as I can is my truth and why I was born. (Letters, 173) 
 
The instances of grace and beauty in Rhys’s fiction are instances of life, and so too are 
blocs of sensation, the writer’s delirium and her hallucinations. These are the 
impersonal flows of life released in great literature. Rhys’s understanding of this 
impersonality is signalled in her novels and stated in a letter of 1953: ‘I don’t believe 
in the individual Writer so much as in Writing. It uses you and throws you away when 
you are not useful any longer’ (Letters, 103). As Lambert (1998) and other 
commentators have remarked, the fabulating function of literature is impersonal in the 
sense that the reader shares in the hallucinations of a future people brought into 
presence through the writer’s delirium. Rhys’s delirium enabled her to work towards 
the affirmation of connection that she needed. This was her writerly becoming. But 
what, we might ask, did Rhys become? Affirmative, certainly, and with the world, in 
the sense that her delirium is world-historical and shared by us today. Above all else, I 
read Rhys in her writer’s life as becoming passionately impersonal as she and her 
writing, and through it her readers, enter a zone of proximity in which passions and the 
impersonal are inseparable. The political, the difficult, the intimate and the affective, 
the philosophical and the artistic, and the passive and radical populate this zone.  




language, and Rhys wrote about attempting to do this. ‘One must have blind faith’, she 
writes in 1959: ‘Sometimes I long for an entirely new way of writing. New words, new 
everything – sometimes I am almost there. But no – it slides away’ (Letters, 160). Yet 
Rhys’s effort remains. Through a profound, ethical literary imagination Rhys created 
ideas which are of great importance today and she did so with beauty and intellect, 
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